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and Arcesilas, pupils of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that
nothing but virtue could influence happiness, and would allow the name good to
nothing else (35). All other things he divided into three classes, some were in
accordance with nature, some at discord with nature, and some were neutral. To the
first class he assigned a positive value, and called them preferred to the second a
negative value and called them rejected, to the third no value whatever—mere verbal
alterations on the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms right action and sin belong
only to virtue and vice, he thought there was an appropriate action (officium) and an
inappropriate, which concerned things preferred and things rejected (37). He made
all virtue reside in the reason, and considered not the practice but the mere
possession of virtue to be the important thing, although the possession could not but
lead to the practice (38). All emotion he regarded as unnatural and immoral (38, 39).
In physics he discarded the fifth element, and believed fire to be the universal
substance, while he would not allow the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In
dialectic he analysed sensation into two parts, an impulse from without, and a
succeeding judgment of the mind, in passing which the will was entirely free (40).
Sensations (visa) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the examination gone
through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a sensation he called it
Knowledge, if otherwise, Ignorance (41). Perception, thus defined, he regarded as
morally neither right nor wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of truth. Rashness in
giving assent to phenomena, and all other defects in the application to them of the
reason he thought could not coexist with virtue and perfect wisdom (42).
§33. Haec erat illis forma: so Madv. Em. 118 for MSS. prima, comparing formulam in 17, also
D.F. IV. 19, V. 9, T.D. III. 38, to which add Ac. I. 23. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to
keep the MSS. reading and supply pars, as usual. His power of supplying is unlimited. There is a
curious similarity between the difficulties involved in the MSS. readings in 6, 15, 32 and here.
Immutationes: so Dav. for disputationes, approved by Madv. Em. 119 who remarks that the
phrase disputationes philosophiae would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost certain by
mutavit in 40, commutatio in 42, and De Leg. I. 38. Halm's odd em. dissupationes, so much
admired by his reviewer in Schneidewin's Philologus, needs support, which it certainly does not
receive from the one passage Halm quotes, De Or. III. 207. Et recte: for the et cf. et merito,
which begins one of Propertius' elegies. Auctoritas: "system". Inquit: sc. Atticus of course. Goer.,
on account of the omission of igitur after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to begin here. To
the objection that Varro (who in 8 says nihil enim meorum magno opere miror) would not
eulogise himself quite so unblushingly, Goer. feebly replies that the eulogy is meant for
Antiochus, whom Varro is copying. Aristoteles: after this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and
evidently on his own conjecture, inserts igitur, which H. adopts. Varro's resumption of his
exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter IX. ought to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader
would not be much incommoded. Labefactavit, that Antiochus still continued to include Aristotle
in the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school can only be explained by the fact that he
considered ethical resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the strong statement of Varro in
Aug. XIX. 1 nulla est causa philosophandi nisi finis boni. Divinum: see R. and P. 210 for a full
examination of the relation in which Plato's ?dea? stand to his notion of the deity. Suavis: his
constant epithet, see Gellius qu. R. and P. 327. His real name was not Theophrastus, he was
called so from his style (cf. loquendi nitor ille divinus, Quint. X. 1, 83). For suavis of style cf.
Orat. 161, Brut. 120. Negavit: for his various offences see D.F. V. 12 sq., T.D. V. 25, 85. There is
no reason to suppose that he departed very widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a
Stoic view of him transmitted through Antiochus. In II. 134 Cic. speaks very differently of him.
Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that of Antiochus in 22 the difference is merely
verbal. Beate vivere: the only translation of e?da?µ???a?. Cic. N.D. I. 95 suggests beatitas and
beatitudo but does not elsewhere employ them.
§34. Strato: see II. 121. The statement in the text is not quite true for Diog. V. 58, 59 preserves the
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