Severely handicapped class arrives - The Lowell
Severely handicapped class arrives - The Lowell
Severely handicapped class arrives - The Lowell
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att t, Vir timrtl. Max 2, KM<br />
POLITICS.<br />
Libya attack sparks? controversy<br />
Worldwide troubles fueled by U.S.-Libya conflict<br />
By Fnuxb Cbu<br />
GMO"C1 Moammar Khadafy, <strong>The</strong><br />
men- mention of the umc conjure*<br />
up the image of the madman, the<br />
leader of Db>».<br />
In the put few months. Col.<br />
Khadafy hat become the Reagan Atlnunluratfja's<br />
symbol for intcrra*<br />
f tonal terrorism and has been called<br />
an "evil and dangeruui nudmaa."<br />
<strong>The</strong> principal rtxton for this image<br />
of Khadafy b that evidence snows<br />
Khadafy yipporu and trains terrorists,<br />
evidence that has been term-<br />
ed by the Reagan Administration as<br />
conclusive and indupuuWc.<br />
Khadafy. who gained power in<br />
1969, envisions a united Arab world<br />
and has put forth his ideas in the three<br />
volume Grrtn Book, modeled after<br />
Mao-tie Tung's UtU Red Book. He<br />
views violence and terrorism as a<br />
Kceiury nKans to achieve hit dream<br />
of Arab unity.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Rome and Vienna Airport<br />
massacirs cm December 27 last year<br />
lulled 19 and injured 110. including<br />
many Americans, and was the action<br />
of Palestinian terrorists headed by<br />
Fighting terror<br />
with terror -<br />
will it ever stop?<br />
By Ann Liu<br />
Only lime will tell if the American bombing of Libya will actually<br />
help stop terrorism. For now, the majority of Amc.icarn<br />
support President Ronald Reagan's decision. Yet, in the future,<br />
will the effect of this attack do more haim than good?<br />
Many leaders ofFuropeancounit>supicu fears that Khadafy<br />
will seek vengeance for the air strikes MI t£yu. nircau;, two<br />
weeks ago, two kidnapped Briions and one kidnapped American<br />
were found dead in the outskirts of Beirut.<br />
<strong>The</strong> ymup claiming responsibility for the slaying* of the two<br />
Briions. Leigh Douglas and Philip Padfictd. atid American, Peter<br />
Kilbom of Berkeley, California, calls itself the Arab Revolutionary<br />
Cells, a group believed lo be linked to Abu Nidal.<br />
"...the existence of terrorist<br />
groups within the United States is still<br />
uncertain."<br />
After trying; economic sanctions and public condemnation,<br />
Reagan .noved lo bomb Libya, and in doing so, showed Libya lhat<br />
America will not tolerate terrorism.<br />
Reagzn's retaliation can be amsidrrcd justifiable, for now: but<br />
maybe Reagan failed to realize what might result fr< m the attack.<br />
Perhaps be was so infuriated because of the continued terrorism<br />
thzt he did not consider the fact that many innocent lives will continue<br />
to be laa.<br />
<strong>The</strong> only apparent reason for attacking Libya was revenge for<br />
the bombing of the LaBelle discotheque, a disco frequented by<br />
American GU. Hob>a. Tbc*< w*cr. arc considered<br />
international, and they had '•.very<br />
right to be in lh»e water*.<br />
This aiucl was to warn Khadafy<br />
of the practice of the U.S. Sixih<br />
Fleet iJid to admonish his support of<br />
terrorist activities.<br />
Khadafy wemed untaunted: the<br />
hwnhtng of tiie La Belle Diwothcquc<br />
in West Berlin left two dead and 110<br />
injure.!. Once again, evidence pointed<br />
•j> 1 ibyant u perpetrator* of the act.<br />
East Germany had appeared to let<br />
the Ubyan plotters, who were<br />
ordered to bomb an undisclosed<br />
target by the Libyan People's<br />
Bureau, into West Berlin; western<br />
intelligence had known about the<br />
"plan" H»t had acted "15 rpiiKjio<br />
too late ' to save the discotheque.<br />
Even wftile the Berlin cue was being<br />
investigated, other Libyan terrorin<br />
plou werr uncovered — France<br />
expelled (wo Libyan diplomau<br />
because of unpccied terrorist plans.<br />
President Reagan conferred with<br />
U>p cabinet members and a decision<br />
to act agauui Ub>a was reached.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re was a delay between the decilion<br />
a go ahead with the strife and<br />
the atuck it*clf in order to plan Uic<br />
strike, obtain maximum firepower<br />
and «ck Allied support.<br />
President Reagan had hoped that,<br />
in the case of toughrr economic and<br />
politics! sanx.kxn agreed upon by the<br />
Allies, the attack might have been<br />
called off. It was not.<br />
At approxinotely 7 o.ir. EST on<br />
April 14, U.S. Navy A-6E. A-7E and<br />
Air Force FB-111 bombers swooped<br />
down on their targets In and around<br />
the Libycn cities of Tripoli and<br />
Benghui. Targets included airfield!,<br />
suspected terrorist training camps,<br />
miliury installations, ard the El-<br />
Azziziya Barracks, the compound<br />
where Khadafy and his fj. tily lived.<br />
<strong>The</strong> strike had been carried out by<br />
planes from the carriers in the<br />
Mediterranean and from airbasrt in<br />
Erf land. <strong>The</strong> FB-t IU from England<br />
had to fly an ewra 2800 nautical miles<br />
around France and Spain because<br />
those countries would not allow the<br />
use of their airspace for the strike.<br />
Hi£h'iech laser guided gravity<br />
•jombj, and cluster bombs cured<br />
much damage, although damage<br />
defense." tndcal. that w how many<br />
in Washington. DC. defended the<br />
President s action.<br />
France, West Germany, and<br />
especially lta>y *cre concerned about<br />
the ruk or haviitj a war that they did<br />
not particularly care for fought on<br />
their soil.<br />
<strong>The</strong> American public, however,<br />
seemed to approve of President<br />
Reagan's r *oo: a poL* taken after the<br />
<strong>The</strong> bombing or the LaBtUc discotheque spvkrtf the United States<br />
to retaliate.<br />
unciffifinncd.<br />
sketchy and<br />
After the attack. Libyan official*<br />
toured foreign journalists around<br />
what they hive been Mated<br />
wreckage, and Libyans were quick to<br />
*how the destruction of civilian sectors<br />
of Tripoli and the d*t.;agcd<br />
foreign embassies, which analysts<br />
suggested might have been caused by<br />
misguided Libyan anti-aircnfl<br />
missiles.<br />
Two of Khadafy's sons were injured,<br />
and his adopted baby daughter,<br />
Hana. was reportedly killed In the<br />
strike.<br />
Khadafy vowed revenue and pro*<br />
miscd LJDTC terrorist attacks against<br />
the Americam and those w ho opposed<br />
him.<br />
Fallout irom the atuck followed<br />
swifUy. AHic* bad doubts ahoui the<br />
effectiveness of the attack and feared<br />
further escalation of tcnoru.n in<br />
Western Eurojw.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Bntish criticized Prime<br />
Minister Margaret Thatcher for<br />
allowing British atrbaves to be stag*<br />
ing arcai for the strike. Thuchcr.<br />
who herself stated in January Uur a<br />
stride aeaimt Libya would surety<br />
cause more chaos, defended the<br />
American action as one o( "self-<br />
strike showed an astoauhuis 77 percent<br />
approval rate, compared with a<br />
previous high of 56 percent.<br />
Many critics of the atuck have<br />
pointed out :hat such an attack would<br />
not change Khadafy*s policies;<br />
rather. •* would further his cause in<br />
uniting the Arabs, which is wttal is<br />
hspoening — the Arab nations have<br />
protested th-r Urrtod State* attack on<br />
Libya.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re is also a question of why<br />
Libya was choten as the target when<br />
countries such «s Syria and Iran arc<br />
also training and supporting<br />
terrorists.<br />
It U obvious that one such suike<br />
will not eliminate terrorism, and the<br />
Reagaa Administration u now faced<br />
with retaliating yftcr every act of terrorism<br />
or not acting by force vjizz:<br />
a tcrrorisi supporting nation.<br />
Representative Robert Mkhd of Illinois<br />
characterized the present situation<br />
in the following way:<br />
"We are in a war. It b a new kind<br />
of war. It is a termott wir. We are<br />
going over the thrcshhold; we arc<br />
ploughing new ground, and we have<br />
to think what conies neM."<br />
It appears that the tonfliu between<br />
the U.S. and Ubya b far from over.<br />
and it U likely to become worse<br />
before it jcti better.<br />
Bjr!<br />
LyndooH. I<br />
riihti. iSld<br />
polUkUn. Hc>1<br />
K U S f<br />
JcMcHdiraurC<br />
a lot more mud.<br />
vilibkr politicml I<br />
for prexidcnl fl<br />
1918. an<br />
were u<br />
g<br />
Inj pibeoetot:<br />
Stevemen to pui<br />
ballot. LaRu<br />
Democratic Y<br />
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dredsofc<br />
elections oatior<br />
local political c<br />
tkularty the Dei<br />
sidenble appr el<br />
LaRcuche's fi<br />
his radical polj<br />
smemeno. <strong>The</strong>'r<br />
include si.ppofto'l<br />
ponnfnoclore<br />
oemnirioootvmn|<br />
figures as evil. R-f<br />
spirators. Am<br />
revelations ha 1<br />
Secretary of Swei<br />
plot IP take overt!<br />
lOualtth m<br />
Anv.ieaa >outh h<br />
scale, ukgil druJ<br />
TUe URoucl<br />
acevted of i<br />
publkosui. UK<br />
By I<br />
<strong>The</strong> ocnts o.*|<br />
united a broad \<br />
a march and ralt> I<br />
forPeace.J.<br />
19.<br />
About 20,jfc»|<br />
peopiewngv<br />
carried picket ttd<br />
.ten depictirif fn<<br />
demands were to %<br />
South African a<br />
tcvention in Ccr<br />
Caribbean, fici<br />
nuclear arms t<br />
aw: Justus for s<br />
After marchiri):<br />
degree wrcftcr.;<br />
at City IU1I bj<br />
ciitc^ainmcm. ft'<br />
supposing gruu,<br />
Spme orpni/<br />
were the Ore<br />
America, the Coti<br />
with the Pct