Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...

UAS ROADMAP 2005
3. The integration, interoperability, and information assurance required to support mixed
manned/unmanned force operations.
4. Secure, robust communications capability, advanced cognitive decision aids, and mission planning.
5. Adaptive autonomous operations and coordinated multi-vehicle flight.
Strike, persistent strike and armed reconnaissance missions may be against heavily or a lightly defended
targets. The level of threat determines which UA attribute is most influential in the design. If the
requirement is to engage and defeat lightly defended targets, then a conventionally designed UA would
stress payload and aero performance to achieve the most efficient “kill” capability. The ability to provide
a persistent threat against adversaries will stress endurance as a design feature in the lower threat
environments. If prosecution of highly defended targets is required, then a design stressing survivability
is paramount, and often will trade away payload and aerodynamic performance to achieve greater
certainty of success against highly defended targets. This trade is required to ensure “anti-access” targets
(targets that deny use of conventional joint force assets) are eliminated early in a campaign so the Joint
Force Commander can use the full range of forces at his disposal and achieve desired effects as swiftly as
possible. (Strategic Planning Guidance: “Swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping military campaigns
while preserving for the President the option to call for a more decisive and enduring result in one of the
two.”)
UA would be used against heavily defended targets for two reasons. First, a UA can theoretically achieve
levels of survivability that manned aircraft cannot. Signature control without the need for human
caretaking becomes less difficult, and maneuverability could be increased beyond human tolerances
should that be required to enhance survivability. The design driver for this case is survivability, however
it is achieved. If such survivability measures fail, the use of a UA removes the risk of losing a human life.
Previously, DoD has tended toward multi-mission configurations where one platform would accomplish
both/many missions (e.g., the multi-mission platform). It should be noted that a UA designed to be cost
effective for both lightly and heavily defended targets would be of sufficient size that it would no longer
be a low cost solution. A trade analysis would be required to determine if one multi-mission UA should
be procured, or if a range of separate UA for each mission is a better value.
If a UA are to reduce the numbers of manned strike assets required, it will have to offer a weapons
compatibility mix similar to that of manned strike assets in order to keep overall armament development
and support costs low. Additionally, UA must be examined for every opportunity to further reduce
operations and support costs. Operational data is available for many UA as a result of OEF and OIF.
Analysis is required to determine where savings can be achieved, or how they could be achieved if proper
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) is applied.
J-UCAS should conduct such an analysis as part of its Operational Assessment to ensure the program
implements these lessons learned during its system development and demonstration phase.
SEAD may be analyzed as two different types of missions. The first is pre-emptive SEAD, in which a
pathway is cleared prior to the ingress of strike aircraft. The other type is reactive SEAD, in which the
SEAD asset must react rapidly to “pop-up” enemy air defense threats during the execution of a strike.
Since closing with that threat will be required, the survivability of the vehicle must be assured through a
combination of speed, stealth technology, and/or high maneuverability.
Execution of both the pre-emptive and the reactive SEAD mission imply several critical design criteria
for the UA platform and mission control system. These attributes would be similar to those of a UA in a
strike roll against heavily defended targets. UA accomplishing pre-emptive SEAD missions would also
be expected to possess the following system characteristics:
� Extremely high mission reliability, as follow-on force assets (many of which will be manned) will
depend upon the protection of a SEAD UA asset.
APPENDIX A – MISSIONS
Page A-5