Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...
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Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ... Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...

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06.01.2013 Views

UAS ROADMAP 2005 be treated more like a consumable, thus providing an opportunity to significantly reduce overall life-cycle costs to DoD. Greater strategic potential lies in an 80 percent solution now, rather than in a 95 percent solution many years from now. Quicker solutions using less fiscal resources afford investment opportunities in other areas that promote the potential for further strategic advantage. � Stand-off. During peacetime, the majority of airborne land and littoral ISR missions are accomplished using standoff techniques. The standoff mode is also used during military operations when the risk is too great to expose platforms to a high probability of loss, or political sensitivities mandate constraint. Standoff UA designs need to emphasize the attribute of long endurance in order to achieve the effect of persistence. If broad area coverage and/or extremely long-range sensor performance is required, then high altitude capability must also be emphasized. Otherwise altitude performance should be dictated by the other requirements factors. Additionally, while it is possible to equip a large UA with an impressive suite of imagery and signals intelligence sensors simultaneously, the question must be asked if this is the most efficient way to achieve the desired effect. Lastly, while imagery, signals and measurement sensors generally have performed well in the standoff role, they face limitations against weak signals and very high resolution imagery requirements. Weak signals are extremely difficult, expensive and possibly unaffordable for stand-off platforms to collect. These type sensors should be employed on platforms that can get close to, or over fly the targets, which can substantially reduce the complexity and cost of the sensing technology used. Alternatively, small UA could be deployed to get in close and collect the very high resolution imagery and achieve greater success against the weak signals. � Overflight. As discussed above, there are some cases where over-flight for collection purposes are required. This can occur during peacetime where political conditions support such missions such as, maritime surveillance, peacekeeping or GWOT, or in combat where a sufficient reduction in hostile air defenses has occurred. There is no over-arching set of capabilities required for overflight, as there is in the stand-off or denied access roles. If persistence is desired, then typically this would be achieved via long-endurance attributes between airframe shaping and engine choice. Altitude would likely be dictated by the mission equipment being employed. For collections against very faint signals, or requiring very high degrees of resolution, then medium to low altitude UA are probably the better choices. However, this introduces weather as a design consideration since medium to low altitude aircraft must operate in areas often plagued with icing and turbulence. Once again, small UA should be considered in trade analysis because they can maneuver “under the weather” as well as get very close and use low cost technology to get high resolution results. � Denied access. In limited cases, access to denied areas is required to support combat or national requirements. Generally this is achieved from space; however it is advantageous to have an airborne penetrating capability that arrives “unwarned” to prevent an adversary from denying collection due to the predictable nature of orbiting systems. Previously, the DoD used manned platforms, most notably the U-2 and SR-71 although many other manned platforms of various types have been used on occasion. Clearly the disadvantage of manned platforms in a denied access collection role is the potential for loss of the aircrew and the diplomatic situation that would result (e.g., EP-3 incident). As a result, UA are better suited to this mission area and have seen limited action in the past (e.g., D- 21 and AQM-34 Firebee drones). In the 1990s, the DarkStar UA system was developed using a different design philosophy than its predecessors. However, it never reached operational capability. system was developed and operated in this environment. The DarkStar’s primary platform attribute, survivability, must be the primary one of any UA designed for use in denied airspace. Generally this dictates reduced signature with considerations for operating speed and altitude. Designing an ISR system to operate in the denied environment is more difficult than designing a strike system because the ISR system will complicate signature reduction by the incorporation of sensor apertures in numerous places across the platform. The design of such platforms will have to strictly adhere to system design principles and trades to achieve the desired effect when employed. The 2003 Defense APPENDIX A – MISSIONS Page A-3

UAS ROADMAP 2005 Science Board and 2003 Air Force Scientific Advisory Board results both observed that a UA capable of unwarned collection is needed by DoD. ISR summary. UA have an established and growing track record supporting the ISR mission area. Reconnaissance UA have been used to experiment and bridge into other mission areas (such as strike – see next Section). Endurance will always be a hallmark of the UA design when supporting ISR; however the “denied access” mission will require some design trades against the endurance principle. The concept of using miniature UA to conduct collection against weak signals or obtain very high resolution results is an emerging capability that deserves increased emphasis. Next, trade studies need to be conducted to determine if multi-mission, versus dedicated mission, platform designs are the most cost effective approach for every application. Lastly, opportunities must be sought to take advantage of the growing commercial market to solve DoD problems. Strike/Suppression of Enemy Air Defense Actions in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have shown the value of arming UA. Lightweight weapons on long endurance platforms like the MQ-1 Predator make possible rapid reaction to fleeting targets, a mission that is more accurately termed “armed reconnaissance” and can be considered a sub-set of the Strike mission, possibly the first example of “persistent strike.” This capability plays more on the endurance and surveillance capability of the UA than on its weapons prowess. However, UA are being developed to carry greater payload load-outs, with greater variety to offer greater strike flexibility to warfighters. The Air Force’s MQ-9 Predator development is an example of a movement in a direction of greater weapons capability while retaining its reconnaissance and endurance capabilities. This kind of armed reconnaissance or persistent strike capability is crucial in executing GWOT missions. Strategic Planning Guidance has made reducing risk in GWOT its top priority. The joint Air Force-Navy development of J-UCAS is the first example of a net-centric UA system where significant weapons employment flexibility is a design requirement. Besides the strike mission, the J- UCAS program will provide a UA capable of operating in the SEAD role. The SEAD role will also emphasize survivability as a key design requirement. As opposed to the armed reconnaissance or strike against lightly defended targets, the SEAD mission makes significantly greater survivability demands on UA developers because of its intended use in denied airspace. Understanding the design trades required to develop an effective capability is critical to holding down acquisition costs. A robust system engineering effort is paramount. UA have two attributes that are attractive for the SEAD, strike, and armed reconnaissance missions when compared to manned assets: � Eliminate risk of the loss of an aircrew � Potential for greater survivability by reducing signatures through optimal shaping not possible with traditional manned aircraft design and through greater maneuverability (beyond human tolerance) These attributes can be used to improve operational effect, or reduce cost while maintaining the same level of operational effect. The Strategic Planning Guidance specifically directs acceptance of “…increased risk and/or undertake initiatives to achieve substantial savings…” However, before UA can be used to improve effect or lower cost in the strike/SEAD mission area, there are several challenges that must be met: 1. Rules of engagement (ROE) considerations that may require the intervention of a human operator. 2. The prosecution of advanced integrated air defense systems (IADS) targets and time critical targets through an as yet unperfected automatic targeting and engagement process or by a human operator outside the vehicle. APPENDIX A – MISSIONS Page A-4

UAS ROADMAP <strong>2005</strong><br />

Science Board and 2003 Air Force Scientific Advisory Board results both observed that a UA capable<br />

<strong>of</strong> unwarned collection is needed by DoD.<br />

ISR summary. UA have an established and growing track record supporting the ISR mission area.<br />

Reconnaissance UA have been used to experiment and bridge into other mission areas (such as strike –<br />

see next Section). Endurance will always be a hallmark <strong>of</strong> the UA design when supporting ISR; however<br />

the “denied access” mission will require some design trades against the endurance principle. The concept<br />

<strong>of</strong> using miniature UA to conduct collection against weak signals or obtain very high resolution results is<br />

an emerging capability that deserves increased emphasis. Next, trade studies need to be conducted to<br />

determine if multi-mission, versus dedicated mission, platform designs are the most cost effective<br />

approach for every application. Lastly, opportunities must be sought to take advantage <strong>of</strong> the growing<br />

commercial market to solve DoD problems.<br />

Strike/Suppression <strong>of</strong> Enemy Air Defense<br />

Actions in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have<br />

shown the value <strong>of</strong> arming UA. Lightweight weapons on long endurance platforms like the MQ-1<br />

Predator make possible rapid reaction to fleeting targets, a mission that is more accurately termed “armed<br />

reconnaissance” and can be considered a sub-set <strong>of</strong> the Strike mission, possibly the first example <strong>of</strong><br />

“persistent strike.” This capability plays more on the endurance and surveillance capability <strong>of</strong> the UA<br />

than on its weapons prowess. However, UA are being developed to carry greater payload load-outs, with<br />

greater variety to <strong>of</strong>fer greater strike flexibility to warfighters. The Air Force’s MQ-9 Predator<br />

development is an example <strong>of</strong> a movement in a direction <strong>of</strong> greater weapons capability while retaining its<br />

reconnaissance and endurance capabilities. This kind <strong>of</strong> armed reconnaissance or persistent strike<br />

capability is crucial in executing GWOT missions. Strategic Planning Guidance has made reducing risk<br />

in GWOT its top priority.<br />

The joint Air Force-Navy development <strong>of</strong> J-UCAS is the first example <strong>of</strong> a net-centric UA system where<br />

significant weapons employment flexibility is a design requirement. Besides the strike mission, the J-<br />

UCAS program will provide a UA capable <strong>of</strong> operating in the SEAD role. The SEAD role will also<br />

emphasize survivability as a key design requirement. As opposed to the armed reconnaissance or strike<br />

against lightly defended targets, the SEAD mission makes significantly greater survivability demands on<br />

UA developers because <strong>of</strong> its intended use in denied airspace. Understanding the design trades required<br />

to develop an effective capability is critical to holding down acquisition costs. A robust system<br />

engineering effort is paramount.<br />

UA have two attributes that are attractive for the SEAD, strike, and armed reconnaissance missions when<br />

compared to manned assets:<br />

� Eliminate risk <strong>of</strong> the loss <strong>of</strong> an aircrew<br />

� Potential for greater survivability by reducing signatures through optimal shaping not possible with<br />

traditional manned aircraft design and through greater maneuverability (beyond human tolerance)<br />

These attributes can be used to improve operational effect, or reduce cost while maintaining the same<br />

level <strong>of</strong> operational effect. The Strategic Planning Guidance specifically directs acceptance <strong>of</strong><br />

“…increased risk and/or undertake initiatives to achieve substantial savings…” However, before UA can<br />

be used to improve effect or lower cost in the strike/SEAD mission area, there are several challenges that<br />

must be met:<br />

1. Rules <strong>of</strong> engagement (ROE) considerations that may require the intervention <strong>of</strong> a human operator.<br />

2. The prosecution <strong>of</strong> advanced integrated air defense systems (IADS) targets and time critical targets<br />

through an as yet unperfected automatic targeting and engagement process or by a human operator<br />

outside the vehicle.<br />

APPENDIX A – MISSIONS<br />

Page A-4

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