Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ... Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...
UAS ROADMAP 2005 4.4.2 Communication Relay By 2010, existing and planned capacities are forecast to meet only 44 percent of the need projected by Joint Vision 2010 to ensure information superiority. A separate study, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as Communications Platforms, dated November 4, 1997, was conducted by OSD (C3I). Its major conclusions regarding the use of an UA as an airborne communication node (ACN) were: � Tactical communication needs can be met much more responsively and effectively with ACNs than with satellites. � ACNs can effectively augment theater satellite capabilities by addressing deficiencies in capacity and connectivity. � Satellites are better suited than UA for meeting high capacity, worldwide communications needs. ACNs can enhance intra-theater and tactical communications capacity and connectivity by providing 1) more efficient use of bandwidth, 2) extending the range of existing terrestrial LOS communications systems, 3) extending communication to areas denied or masked to satellite service, and 4) providing significant improvement in received power density compared to that of satellites, improving reception and decreasing vulnerability to jamming. DARPA’s AJCN is developing a modular, scalable communication relay payload that can be tailored to fly on a RQ-4/Global Hawk and provide theater-wide support (300 nm diameter area of coverage) or on a RQ-7/Shadow for tactical use (60 nm diameter area). In addition to communications relay, its intended missions are SIGINT, electronic warfare, and information operations. Flight demonstrations began in 2003, and the addition of a simultaneous SIGINT capability is planned by 2010. 4.4.3 Weapons If combat UA are to achieve most of their initial cost and stealth advantages by being smaller than their manned counterparts, they will logically have smaller weapons bays and therefore need smaller weapons. Smaller and/or fewer weapons carried per mission means lethality must be increased to achieve equal or greater mission effectiveness. Achieving lethality with small weapons requires precision guidance (in most cases) and/or more lethal warheads. Ongoing technology programs are providing a variety of precision guidance options; some are in the inventory now. With the advent of some innovative wide killarea warheads, hardening guidance systems, i.e., resistance to GPS jamming, appears to be the greatest technology requirement. A potentially significant advantage to smaller more precise weapons and penetrating launch platforms such as J-UCAS is the reduction in collateral damage. In some cases these platform and weapons combinations could reduce an adversary’s ability to seek sanctuary within noncombatant areas. The Air Force Air Armament Center’s SDB is half the weight of the smallest bomb the Air Force uses today, the 500 pound Mark 82. Its 250 pound class warhead has demonstrated penetration of one meter of reinforced concrete covered by one meter of soil. The Air Force hopes to deploy it by 2007 on the F-15E, followed by deployment on several other aircraft, including the J-UCAS and MQ-9. 4.4.4 Payload Cost Control Table 4.3-2 provides the payload capacities used in Figure 4.3-4, which shows current DoD UA cost approximately $8,000 per pound of payload capacity (sensors), a comparable number to the payload capacity of the JSF, which is $7,300 per pound (weapons). This same capability metric applied to J- UCAS is $5,500 per pound of payload (weapons). As UA become smaller, or stealthier, the standoff range of sensor systems may be reduced. Reduced sensor standoff capability coupled with more use of COTS systems can have a significant impact on some sensor packages for some classes of UA. Page 61
UAS ROADMAP 2005 Page 62
- Page 24 and 25: UAS ROADMAP 2005 2.1.8 Joint Unmann
- Page 26 and 27: UAS ROADMAP 2005 2.1.10 I-Gnat-ER U
- Page 28 and 29: UAS ROADMAP 2005 2.1.13 Extended Ra
- Page 30 and 31: UAS ROADMAP 2005 2.2.3 Cormorant Us
- Page 32 and 33: UAS ROADMAP 2005 2.2.7 Eagle Eye Us
- Page 34 and 35: UAS ROADMAP 2005 2.3.2 Maverick Use
- Page 36 and 37: UAS ROADMAP 2005 2.3.4 XPV-2 Mako U
- Page 38 and 39: UAS ROADMAP 2005 2.3.6 Onyx Autonom
- Page 40 and 41: UAS ROADMAP 2005 FQM-151 Pointer Ba
- Page 42 and 43: UAS ROADMAP 2005 2.4.2 Micro Air Ve
- Page 44 and 45: UAS ROADMAP 2005 launched and contr
- Page 46 and 47: UAS ROADMAP 2005 2.5.2 Tethered Aer
- Page 48 and 49: UAS ROADMAP 2005 2.5.6 High Altitud
- Page 50 and 51: UAS ROADMAP 2005 2.6 UAS PROGRAMMAT
- Page 52 and 53: UAS ROADMAP 2005 TABLE 2.7-1. CLASS
- Page 54 and 55: UAS ROADMAP 2005 3.0 REQUIREMENTS R
- Page 56 and 57: UAS ROADMAP 2005 TABLE 3.3-1. COMBA
- Page 58 and 59: UAS ROADMAP 2005 3.5 INTEROPERABILI
- Page 60 and 61: UAS ROADMAP 2005 4.0 TECHNOLOGIES U
- Page 62 and 63: UAS ROADMAP 2005 over present compu
- Page 64 and 65: UAS ROADMAP 2005 provide coverage t
- Page 66 and 67: UAS ROADMAP 2005 recognized today a
- Page 68 and 69: UAS ROADMAP 2005 Class A or B Misha
- Page 70 and 71: UAS ROADMAP 2005 Weight, Lb 100,000
- Page 72 and 73: UAS ROADMAP 2005 Panchromatic Calen
- Page 76 and 77: UAS ROADMAP 2005 5.0 OPERATIONS 5.1
- Page 78 and 79: UAS ROADMAP 2005 labs have been inv
- Page 80 and 81: UAS ROADMAP 2005 5.3 OPERATIONS 5.3
- Page 82 and 83: UAS ROADMAP 2005 5.3.3 battlespace
- Page 84 and 85: UAS ROADMAP 2005 6.0 ROADMAP This S
- Page 86 and 87: UAS ROADMAP 2005 range/endurance ai
- Page 88 and 89: UAS ROADMAP 2005 level below that a
- Page 90 and 91: UAS ROADMAP 2005 � Unmanned syste
- Page 92 and 93: UAS ROADMAP 2005 Appendices
- Page 94 and 95: UAS ROADMAP 2005 APPENDIX A: MISSIO
- Page 96 and 97: UAS ROADMAP 2005 be treated more li
- Page 98 and 99: UAS ROADMAP 2005 3. The integration
- Page 100 and 101: UAS ROADMAP 2005 of expendables. In
- Page 102 and 103: UAS ROADMAP 2005 Range Transporter
- Page 104 and 105: UAS ROADMAP 2005 APPENDIX B: SENSOR
- Page 106 and 107: UAS ROADMAP 2005 film can. Primary
- Page 108 and 109: UAS ROADMAP 2005 mature, and integr
- Page 110 and 111: UAS ROADMAP 2005 should be encourag
- Page 112 and 113: UAS ROADMAP 2005 Contractors have p
- Page 114 and 115: UAS ROADMAP 2005 APPENDIX C: COMMUN
- Page 116 and 117: UAS ROADMAP 2005 FIGURE C-1. GLOBAL
- Page 118 and 119: UAS ROADMAP 2005 GCS, Ops Cell MOB
- Page 120 and 121: UAS ROADMAP 2005 (TSAT), Net-Centri
- Page 122 and 123: UAS ROADMAP 2005 Architecture, GIG,
UAS ROADMAP <strong>2005</strong><br />
4.4.2 Communication Relay<br />
By 2010, existing and planned capacities are forecast to meet only 44 percent <strong>of</strong> the need projected by<br />
Joint Vision 2010 to ensure information superiority. A separate study, <strong>Unmanned</strong> Aerial Vehicles as<br />
Communications Platforms, dated November 4, 1997, was conducted by OSD (C3I). Its major<br />
conclusions regarding the use <strong>of</strong> an UA as an airborne communication node (ACN) were:<br />
� Tactical communication needs can be met much more responsively and effectively with ACNs than<br />
with satellites.<br />
� ACNs can effectively augment theater satellite capabilities by addressing deficiencies in capacity and<br />
connectivity.<br />
� Satellites are better suited than UA for meeting high capacity, worldwide communications needs.<br />
ACNs can enhance intra-theater and tactical communications capacity and connectivity by providing 1)<br />
more efficient use <strong>of</strong> bandwidth, 2) extending the range <strong>of</strong> existing terrestrial LOS communications<br />
systems, 3) extending communication to areas denied or masked to satellite service, and 4) providing<br />
significant improvement in received power density compared to that <strong>of</strong> satellites, improving reception and<br />
decreasing vulnerability to jamming.<br />
DARPA’s AJCN is developing a modular, scalable communication relay payload that can be tailored to<br />
fly on a RQ-4/Global Hawk and provide theater-wide support (300 nm diameter area <strong>of</strong> coverage) or on a<br />
RQ-7/Shadow for tactical use (60 nm diameter area). In addition to communications relay, its intended<br />
missions are SIGINT, electronic warfare, and information operations. Flight demonstrations began in<br />
2003, and the addition <strong>of</strong> a simultaneous SIGINT capability is planned by 2010.<br />
4.4.3 Weapons<br />
If combat UA are to achieve most <strong>of</strong> their initial cost and stealth advantages by being smaller than their<br />
manned counterparts, they will logically have smaller weapons bays and therefore need smaller weapons.<br />
Smaller and/or fewer weapons carried per mission means lethality must be increased to achieve equal or<br />
greater mission effectiveness. Achieving lethality with small weapons requires precision guidance (in<br />
most cases) and/or more lethal warheads. Ongoing technology programs are providing a variety <strong>of</strong><br />
precision guidance options; some are in the inventory now. With the advent <strong>of</strong> some innovative wide killarea<br />
warheads, hardening guidance systems, i.e., resistance to GPS jamming, appears to be the greatest<br />
technology requirement. A potentially significant advantage to smaller more precise weapons and<br />
penetrating launch platforms such as J-UCAS is the reduction in collateral damage. In some cases these<br />
platform and weapons combinations could reduce an adversary’s ability to seek sanctuary within noncombatant<br />
areas. The Air Force Air Armament Center’s SDB is half the weight <strong>of</strong> the smallest bomb the<br />
Air Force uses today, the 500 pound Mark 82. Its 250 pound class warhead has demonstrated penetration<br />
<strong>of</strong> one meter <strong>of</strong> reinforced concrete covered by one meter <strong>of</strong> soil. The Air Force hopes to deploy it by<br />
2007 on the F-15E, followed by deployment on several other aircraft, including the J-UCAS and MQ-9.<br />
4.4.4<br />
Payload Cost Control<br />
Table 4.3-2 provides the payload capacities used in Figure 4.3-4, which shows current DoD UA cost<br />
approximately $8,000 per pound <strong>of</strong> payload capacity (sensors), a comparable number to the payload<br />
capacity <strong>of</strong> the JSF, which is $7,300 per pound (weapons). This same capability metric applied to J-<br />
UCAS is $5,500 per pound <strong>of</strong> payload (weapons). As UA become smaller, or stealthier, the stand<strong>of</strong>f<br />
range <strong>of</strong> sensor systems may be reduced. Reduced sensor stand<strong>of</strong>f capability coupled with more use <strong>of</strong><br />
COTS systems can have a significant impact on some sensor packages for some classes <strong>of</strong> UA.<br />
Page 61