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Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...

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UAS ROADMAP <strong>2005</strong><br />

Dissemination Means<br />

UAS normally disseminate information via data links. Depending upon the system, information may be<br />

processed onboard the aircraft or transmitted to the ground for processing. In either case, the<br />

communications channel is susceptible to detection, radio direction finding, intercept, and electronic<br />

attack efforts. If the UA is transmitting a live video feed, the communication channel is likely to be<br />

wideband and continually emitting. Encryption <strong>of</strong> the data links would reduce the possibility <strong>of</strong><br />

successful intercept and exploitation. Depending upon the UA system, the dissemination data links and<br />

the command and control links may share the same frequencies and be interwoven through multiplexing<br />

schemes.<br />

The data links and the transmit and receive equipment associated with the dissemination <strong>of</strong> information<br />

are susceptible and vulnerable to the same efforts that threaten the command and control links. The<br />

dissemination data links on larger aircraft should be encrypted, as they are more likely to be relaying data<br />

that are <strong>of</strong> interest to higher echelons. Conversely, handheld/small and tactical UA may not require<br />

encryption devices because it is harder to intercept their dissemination signals (closer to the ground<br />

station and flying at lower altitudes) and because the information they collect and disseminate is highly<br />

perishable.<br />

SURVIVABILITY CLASSIFICATIONS<br />

When considering airframe survivability, it is useful to divide UA into three categories (small, medium,<br />

and large) based on size, speed, and operational altitude. These categories are useful for considering the<br />

likely threat environment and application <strong>of</strong> susceptibility and vulnerability reduction techniques, but<br />

should not be applied rigidly. While categories are useful for providing guidelines, each UA is unique<br />

and survivability should be considered in the context <strong>of</strong> its specific design and mission. These<br />

survivability categories are not intended to establish recognized UA classifications.<br />

� Small. UA with a gross weight less than 500 pounds, a wingspan <strong>of</strong> 20 feet or less and that operate at<br />

altitudes below 10,000 feet and 100 knots. These UA generally support tactical requirements and<br />

range from man-portable up to trucked systems. Examples include the Raven, Dragon Eye, Pioneer<br />

and Shadow.<br />

� Medium. UA with a gross weight between 500 and 5,000 pounds., a 20-60 feet wingspan and<br />

generally operate at altitudes <strong>of</strong> 10,000-30,000 feet and below 250 knots. These UA primarily<br />

support tactical engagements, but may also address operational (theater) or strategic requirements.<br />

The systems are airlifted or transported in specialized containers. Examples include the Predator and<br />

Fire Scout UA.<br />

� Large. UA with a gross weight above 5,000 pounds, wingspan longer than 60 feet and that operate<br />

above 25,000 feet and 250 knots. These UA are generally considered operational (theater) or<br />

strategic assets. These systems can self deploy or, as with Global Hawk, can operate from CONUS.<br />

UA with a mission to deliver ordnance in high-density threat environments, such as the J-UCAS, will<br />

operate from remote bases to support tactical requirements.<br />

THREATS BY SURVIVABILITY CLASSIFICATION<br />

To credibly assess the threat a UA will face one must consider the entire system, including the ground<br />

station and data link as well as the aircraft. One must also consider the entire spectrum <strong>of</strong> threat types,<br />

including directed energy weapons (DEW) and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC). A basis for<br />

starting a general threat analysis is to consider the types <strong>of</strong> threats and the likelihood each could engage<br />

each UA category Tables K-1 and K-2). For a detailed threat analysis, a UA must be assessed<br />

individually based on its specific design, mission, and mode <strong>of</strong> operation.<br />

APPENDIX K – SURVIVABILITY<br />

Page K-4

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