Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ... Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...
UAS ROADMAP 2005 17% 14% 12% 19% 38% APPENDIX H – RELIABILITY Page H-5 Power/Prop Flight Control Comm Human/Ground FIGURE H-2. AVERAGE SOURCES OF SYSTEM FAILURES FOR U.S. MILITARY UA FLEET (BASED ON 194,000 HRS). 22% 11% 7% 28% 32% Misc Power/Prop Flight Control Comm Human/Ground Misc FIGURE H-3. AVERAGE SOURCES OF SYSTEM FAILURES FOR IAI UA FLEET (BASED ON 100,000 HRS). Israeli Defense Forces have also accumulated over 100,000 hours of operational flight experience with their UA. The manufacturer of most of these UA, Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI), has documented the causes of failures across the past 25 years of this experience and made recommendations for improving reliability based on this analysis. Of current U.S. UA systems, both the Pioneer and the Hunter originated as IAI designs, and the Shadow evolved from the Pioneer’s design. For these three reasons, any examination of U.S. UA reliability would be incomplete without examining the reliability of their Israeli counterparts and predecessors. The data trends derived from the U.S. UA operations summarized in Figure H-2 are remarkably similar (within 10 percent) to that of the Israeli UA fleet for all failure modes. With twice as many flight hours for the U.S., it is not surprising that the share of failures due to flight control is less. Given that the IAI data is also based on a substantial number of flight hours as well, one can argue that the U.S. is facing the same technical and operational problems of other operators. Furthermore, because manufacturing techniques and supply quality differ from one country to the next, it is interesting to ask the question “Why are the failures modes still similar?” One answer points to external factors and the operating environment itself, including weather and the low Reynolds number flight regime. MQ-1 and MQ-9/Predator RQ-1A. The Predator experienced low mission completion rates during its initial deployment in the Balkans in 1995-1997. While the primary causal factor was weather, system failures did account for 12% of the incomplete missions. Mission-level operational data from the system deployed in Hungary was used to perform a limited assessment of system reliability based on data covering missions from March 1996 through April 1997. Out of the 315 Predator missions tasked during that timeframe, weather and system cancellations kept nearly two-thirds on the ground (60 percent). Of the remaining missions that were launched, slightly under one half were subsequently aborted. These aborts were due to system (29 percent), weather (65 percent), and operational issues (6 percent) that included airspace conflicts, operator errors, and crew duty limitations. Data indicates that 38 missions (12 percent) were scrubbed due to system failures, an additional 18 system aborts (6 percent) that did not result in mission cancellation (due to launch of another aircraft or weather hold), and other issues which kept the Predator on the ground 6 times (2 percent). Out of this
UAS ROADMAP 2005 total of 62 sorties affected by mission aborts or cancellations due to maintenance, operations, or human errors, the systems’ failure breakout data is provided in Table H-2. MQ-1B. The Predator transition into production led to some problems which affected aircraft reliability. As the first ACTD program to transition to production, the Predator established the precedent, as well as the lessons learned, for the transition process. First, nearly continuous deployment commitments since March 1996 have delayed operational testing. Second, development of the ORD, usually produced early in a program to guide system design, was not begun until after the ACTD ended (indicated by the N/A in Table H-1) Third, additional challenges to system reliability were introduced, such as the addition of a wing deicing system (glycol-weeping wings) as well as a redesigned control station for greater portability. Since this rocky start, the Predator fleet has logged over 100,000 hours (as of October 2004) and has “come of age” during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. As a result of its unorthodox transition process, however, Predator reliability issues were discovered and addressed during operations around the world. Although the system still experiences reliability issues and aircraft losses, its performance during these operations has been remarkably good when compared to those outlined in the ORD. The data in Table H-1 and H-2 represents all mission aborts (on the ground and in-flight) for all MQ-1B systems between January 1997 and June 2002. The share of power/propulsion failure modes has doubled in the MQ-1B compared to the MQ-1A. The Predator program office acknowledged that the engine is the primary reliability issue. The primary distinguisher between the MQ-1A and MQ-1B models is the Rotax 914 turbocharged engine, which replaced the smaller Rotax 912 model, and was implemented primarily to increase the Predator’s speed. With the new engine, a variable pitch propeller was also added. The data over this five-year period indicates that the new variable pitch propeller accounted for 10 percent of all power/propulsion aborts, while the engine made up nearly 70 percent. This is accompanied by a corresponding reduction in flight control failures as well as a large decrease in malfunctions attributable to human errors and operations and hardware on the ground. This does not necessarily mean that powerplant-related failures have increased in the MQ-1B model, but that reliability improvements made in other areas (communications) have made a comparatively greater impact on system reliability. The significant decline in human and ground related errors (from 16 percent to 2 percent) is attributed to a concerted training effort according to one Predator operator. Enhancements in situational awareness also played a role in this positive trend. For example, periodic automated updates of the weather are supplied to the control station. A VHF/UHF ARC-210 radio has also been added to provide voice relay capability to the MQ-1B pilot, enabling direct, over the horizon communication with ATC authorities in the area of flight. An APX-100 Identification, IFF/Selective Identification Feature (SIF) Mode 4 transponder was added to further facilitate coordination with AWACS flight controllers. Air Force Portable Flight Planning Software (PFPS), an offshoot of the Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS), is another tool defined in the Block 1 upgrade in which threat and mission planning information can now be passed directly to the Predator system. The percentage of communications and flight control failures remained virtually unchanged between the two models. Note: The RQ-1B became designated as the MQ-1B in 2002, after it acquired the ability to carry weapons. MQ-9. To address certain reliability issues which arose during MQ-1B operations, the MQ-9 Predator system, now denoted MQ-9A, is scheduled to undergo specific modifications from its predecessors designed to enhance reliability. Specifically, the MQ-9 will have actuators with an MTBF of 2,000 hours, which is over an order of magnitude improvement over the actuator MTBF of 150 hours on the earlier Predator models. There will be a triplex (double redundant) flight control system, and the control surfaces survivability will increase with two rudders, four ailerons, and four elevators. The overall objective failure rate for the MQ-9 is on the order of 10 -5 , or 1 in 100,000 hours of flight, a value equal to APPENDIX H – RELIABILITY Page H-6
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UAS ROADMAP <strong>2005</strong><br />
total <strong>of</strong> 62 sorties affected by mission aborts or cancellations due to maintenance, operations, or human<br />
errors, the systems’ failure breakout data is provided in Table H-2.<br />
MQ-1B. The Predator transition into production led to some problems which affected aircraft reliability.<br />
As the first ACTD program to transition to production, the Predator established the precedent, as well as<br />
the lessons learned, for the transition process. First, nearly continuous deployment commitments since<br />
March 1996 have delayed operational testing. Second, development <strong>of</strong> the ORD, usually produced early<br />
in a program to guide system design, was not begun until after the ACTD ended (indicated by the N/A in<br />
Table H-1) Third, additional challenges to system reliability were introduced, such as the addition <strong>of</strong> a<br />
wing deicing system (glycol-weeping wings) as well as a redesigned control station for greater portability.<br />
Since this rocky start, the Predator fleet has logged over 100,000 hours (as <strong>of</strong> October 2004) and has<br />
“come <strong>of</strong> age” during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. As a result <strong>of</strong> its<br />
unorthodox transition process, however, Predator reliability issues were discovered and addressed during<br />
operations around the world. Although the system still experiences reliability issues and aircraft losses,<br />
its performance during these operations has been remarkably good when compared to those outlined in<br />
the ORD.<br />
The data in Table H-1 and H-2 represents all mission aborts (on the ground and in-flight) for all MQ-1B<br />
systems between January 1997 and June 2002. The share <strong>of</strong> power/propulsion failure modes has doubled<br />
in the MQ-1B compared to the MQ-1A. The Predator program <strong>of</strong>fice acknowledged that the engine is the<br />
primary reliability issue.<br />
The primary distinguisher between the MQ-1A and MQ-1B models is the Rotax 914 turbocharged engine,<br />
which replaced the smaller Rotax 912 model, and was implemented primarily to increase the Predator’s<br />
speed. With the new engine, a variable pitch propeller was also added. The data over this five-year<br />
period indicates that the new variable pitch propeller accounted for 10 percent <strong>of</strong> all power/propulsion<br />
aborts, while the engine made up nearly 70 percent. This is accompanied by a corresponding reduction in<br />
flight control failures as well as a large decrease in malfunctions attributable to human errors and<br />
operations and hardware on the ground. This does not necessarily mean that powerplant-related failures<br />
have increased in the MQ-1B model, but that reliability improvements made in other areas<br />
(communications) have made a comparatively greater impact on system reliability.<br />
The significant decline in human and ground related errors (from 16 percent to 2 percent) is attributed to a<br />
concerted training effort according to one Predator operator. Enhancements in situational awareness also<br />
played a role in this positive trend. For example, periodic automated updates <strong>of</strong> the weather are supplied<br />
to the control station. A VHF/UHF ARC-210 radio has also been added to provide voice relay capability<br />
to the MQ-1B pilot, enabling direct, over the horizon communication with ATC authorities in the area <strong>of</strong><br />
flight. An APX-100 Identification, IFF/Selective Identification Feature (SIF) Mode 4 transponder was<br />
added to further facilitate coordination with AWACS flight controllers. Air Force Portable Flight<br />
Planning S<strong>of</strong>tware (PFPS), an <strong>of</strong>fshoot <strong>of</strong> the Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS), is another<br />
tool defined in the Block 1 upgrade in which threat and mission planning information can now be passed<br />
directly to the Predator system. The percentage <strong>of</strong> communications and flight control failures remained<br />
virtually unchanged between the two models. Note: The RQ-1B became designated as the MQ-1B in<br />
2002, after it acquired the ability to carry weapons.<br />
MQ-9. To address certain reliability issues which arose during MQ-1B operations, the MQ-9 Predator<br />
system, now denoted MQ-9A, is scheduled to undergo specific modifications from its predecessors<br />
designed to enhance reliability. Specifically, the MQ-9 will have actuators with an MTBF <strong>of</strong> 2,000 hours,<br />
which is over an order <strong>of</strong> magnitude improvement over the actuator MTBF <strong>of</strong> 150 hours on the earlier<br />
Predator models. There will be a triplex (double redundant) flight control system, and the control<br />
surfaces survivability will increase with two rudders, four ailerons, and four elevators. The overall<br />
objective failure rate for the MQ-9 is on the order <strong>of</strong> 10 -5 , or 1 in 100,000 hours <strong>of</strong> flight, a value equal to<br />
APPENDIX H – RELIABILITY<br />
Page H-6