Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ... Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...

06.01.2013 Views

UAS ROADMAP 2005 APPENDIX H: RELIABILITY OVERVIEW The combined U.S. military UA fleet (Pioneers, Hunters, Predators, Global Hawks, and others) reached the 100,000 cumulative flight hour mark in 2002. Through 2004, this number has accelerated past 150,000 hours. This experience has provided quantifiable dividends in system reliability. Reliability is at the core of achieving routine airspace access, reducing acquisition system cost, and improving mission effectiveness for UA. Although it took the fleet of military UA 17 years to reach the 100,000 flight hour milestone, this appendix highlights the first comprehensive study 1 to formally address the reliability issue for these increasingly utilized military assets. UA reliability is important because it underlies their affordability, availability, and acceptance. Affordability. The reliability of the DoD’s UA is closely tied to their affordability primarily because the Department has come to expect UA to be less expensive than their manned counterparts. This expectation is based on the UA’s generally smaller size (currently a savings of some $1,500 per pound) and the omission of those systems needed to support a pilot or aircrew, which can save 3,000 to 5,000 pounds in cockpit weight. Beyond these two measures, however, other cost saving measures to enhance affordability tend to impact reliability. System affordability has to be weighed against airworthiness and life-cycle costs (LCC). The demands of certification will tend to increase unit costs, perhaps beyond popular expectations. While attention needs to be directed at ways to increase reliability under cost constraints, additional up front investment has the prospect of lower LCC through reduced attrition from service-life extension and fewer mishap losses, in turn driving down requirements to acquire attrition reserves. Availability. With the removal of the pilot, the rationale for including the level of redundancy, or for using man-rated components considered crucial for his safety, can go undefended in UA design reviews, and may be sacrificed for affordability. Less redundancy and lower quality components, while making UA even cheaper to produce, mean they become more prone to in-flight loss and more dependent on maintenance, impacting both their mission availability and ultimately their LCC. Acceptance. Finally, improving reliability is key to winning the confidence of the general public, the acceptance of other aviation constituencies (airlines, general aviation, business aviation, etc.), and the willingness of the FAA to regulate UA flight. Regulation of UA is important because it will provide a legal basis for them to operate in the National Airspace System for the first time. This, in turn, should lead to their acceptance by international and foreign civil aviation authorities. Such acceptance will greatly facilitate obtaining overflight and landing privileges when larger, endurance UA deploy in support of contingencies. Regulation will also save time and resources within both the DoD and the FAA by providing one standardized, rapid process for granting flight clearances to replace today’s cumbersome, lengthy (up to 60 days) authorization process. A third benefit of regulation is that it could potentially lower production costs for the military market by encouraging the use of UA in civil and commercial applications. This overview presents reliability from several perspectives commonly used in reliability analysis. Reliability is the probability that an item will perform its intended function for a specified time under stated conditions. It is given as a percentage which represents the probability that a system or component will operate failure-free for a specified time, typically the mission duration. It relates closely to Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). Mean Time Between Failure. describes how long a repairable system or component will continue to perform before failure. For non-repairable systems or components, this value is termed Mean Time To Failure (MTTF). 1 UA Reliability Study, Office of the Secretary of Defense(Acquisition Technology, and Logistics) APPENDIX H – RELIABILITY Page H-1

UAS ROADMAP 2005 Availability is a measure of how often a system or component is in the operable and committable state when the mission is called for at an unknown (random) time. It is measured in terms of the percentage of time a system can be expected to be in place and working when needed, or mission available rate (MAR) in percent. Class A Mishap Rate is the number of accidents (significant aircraft damage or total loss) occurring per 100,000 hours of fleet flight time. In cases where a UA fleet has not accumulated this amount of flying time, its MR represents its extrapolated losses to the 100,000 hour mark. It is expressed as mishaps per 100,000 hours. It is important to note that this extrapolation does not reflect improvements that should result from operational learning or improvement in component technology. Maintenance cancellations/aborts were broken out into failures of the aircraft’s major subsystems. Use of these failure modes lead to a higher fidelity representation of the aircraft’s reliability. In order to make uniform comparisons between systems, the following definitions were used to categorize areas of system failure leading to mission aborts or cancellations. Power/Propulsion (P&P). Encompasses the engine, fuel supply, transmission, propeller, electrical system, generators, and other related subsystems on board the aircraft. Flight Control. Includes all systems contributing to the aircraft stability and control such as avionics, air data system, servo-actuators, control surfaces/servos, on-board software, navigation, and other related subsystems. Aerodynamic factors are also included in this grouping. Communication. The data link between the aircraft to the ground. Human Factors/Ground Control. Accounts for all failures resulting from human error and maintenance problems with any non-aircraft hardware or software on the ground Miscellaneous. Any mission failures not attributable to those previously noted, including airspace issues, operating problems, and other non-technical factors. Because operating environments are not uniform as a variable affecting the data, weather was excluded as a causal factor in this study. Data and Trends Figure H-1 shows the Class A Mishap Rate per 100,000 hours versus cumulative flight hours for the Global Hawk, Predator, Hunter, and Pioneer fleet for the period 1986 through 2003. Class A mishaps are those aircraft accidents resulting in loss of the aircraft (in Naval parlance, “strike”), human life, or causing over $1,000,000 in damage 2 . These data show a mishap rate (i.e., Class A accidents per 100,000 hours of flight) of 20 for Predator, 47 for Hunter (24 since the major reliability improvements in 1996), 88 for Global Hawk, 281 for Pioneer, and 191 for Shadow. For comparison to two manned military aviation mishap rates, the U-2 and F-16 have cumulative Class A mishap rates of 6.8 and 4.1 per 100,000 hours, respectively. Comparing to non-military aircraft, general aviation suffers about 1 Class A mishap per 100,000 hours, regional/commuter airliners about a tenth of that rate, and larger airliners about a hundredth of that rate. With the exception of Pioneer and to a lesser extent Shadow, these statistics make it apparent that the reliability of UA is tracking that of early manned military aircraft, and maturing to approach an equivalent level of reliability to their manned military counterparts. Specifically, the early Pioneers (as discussed later in this appendix) had an analog air data system, problems with ship-board EMI, and generally suffered from poor design practices. (A planned conversion to a more reliable engine for the Pioneer never took place.) Compared to this low benchmark, the Hunter program has seen continuous reliability enhancements from efforts initiated in the mid-1990’s to improve hardware and maintenance. Not surprisingly for the higher-end systems, the Predator has enjoyed relatively high and stable reliability 2 Per OPNAV Instruction 3750.6R, “Loss of a UAV is not a Class A unless the cost is $1,000,000 or greater.” All Pioneer mishaps discussed are therefore Class B Mishaps. APPENDIX H – RELIABILITY Page H-2

UAS ROADMAP <strong>2005</strong><br />

Availability is a measure <strong>of</strong> how <strong>of</strong>ten a system or component is in the operable and committable state<br />

when the mission is called for at an unknown (random) time. It is measured in terms <strong>of</strong> the percentage <strong>of</strong><br />

time a system can be expected to be in place and working when needed, or mission available rate (MAR)<br />

in percent.<br />

Class A Mishap Rate is the number <strong>of</strong> accidents (significant aircraft damage or total loss) occurring per<br />

100,000 hours <strong>of</strong> fleet flight time. In cases where a UA fleet has not accumulated this amount <strong>of</strong> flying<br />

time, its MR represents its extrapolated losses to the 100,000 hour mark. It is expressed as mishaps per<br />

100,000 hours. It is important to note that this extrapolation does not reflect improvements that should<br />

result from operational learning or improvement in component technology.<br />

Maintenance cancellations/aborts were broken out into failures <strong>of</strong> the aircraft’s major subsystems. Use <strong>of</strong><br />

these failure modes lead to a higher fidelity representation <strong>of</strong> the aircraft’s reliability. In order to make<br />

uniform comparisons between systems, the following definitions were used to categorize areas <strong>of</strong> system<br />

failure leading to mission aborts or cancellations.<br />

Power/Propulsion (P&P). Encompasses the engine, fuel supply, transmission, propeller, electrical<br />

system, generators, and other related subsystems on board the aircraft.<br />

Flight Control. Includes all systems contributing to the aircraft stability and control such as avionics, air<br />

data system, servo-actuators, control surfaces/servos, on-board s<strong>of</strong>tware, navigation, and other related<br />

subsystems. Aerodynamic factors are also included in this grouping.<br />

Communication. The data link between the aircraft to the ground.<br />

Human Factors/Ground Control. Accounts for all failures resulting from human error and maintenance<br />

problems with any non-aircraft hardware or s<strong>of</strong>tware on the ground<br />

Miscellaneous. Any mission failures not attributable to those previously noted, including airspace issues,<br />

operating problems, and other non-technical factors. Because operating environments are not uniform as<br />

a variable affecting the data, weather was excluded as a causal factor in this study.<br />

Data and Trends<br />

Figure H-1 shows the Class A Mishap Rate per 100,000 hours versus cumulative flight hours for the<br />

Global Hawk, Predator, Hunter, and Pioneer fleet for the period 1986 through 2003. Class A mishaps are<br />

those aircraft accidents resulting in loss <strong>of</strong> the aircraft (in Naval parlance, “strike”), human life, or causing<br />

over $1,000,000 in damage 2 . These data show a mishap rate (i.e., Class A accidents per 100,000 hours <strong>of</strong><br />

flight) <strong>of</strong> 20 for Predator, 47 for Hunter (24 since the major reliability improvements in 1996), 88 for<br />

Global Hawk, 281 for Pioneer, and 191 for Shadow. For comparison to two manned military aviation<br />

mishap rates, the U-2 and F-16 have cumulative Class A mishap rates <strong>of</strong> 6.8 and 4.1 per 100,000 hours,<br />

respectively. Comparing to non-military aircraft, general aviation suffers about 1 Class A mishap per<br />

100,000 hours, regional/commuter airliners about a tenth <strong>of</strong> that rate, and larger airliners about a<br />

hundredth <strong>of</strong> that rate.<br />

With the exception <strong>of</strong> Pioneer and to a lesser extent Shadow, these statistics make it apparent that the<br />

reliability <strong>of</strong> UA is tracking that <strong>of</strong> early manned military aircraft, and maturing to approach an equivalent<br />

level <strong>of</strong> reliability to their manned military counterparts. Specifically, the early Pioneers (as discussed<br />

later in this appendix) had an analog air data system, problems with ship-board EMI, and generally<br />

suffered from poor design practices. (A planned conversion to a more reliable engine for the Pioneer<br />

never took place.) Compared to this low benchmark, the Hunter program has seen continuous reliability<br />

enhancements from efforts initiated in the mid-1990’s to improve hardware and maintenance. Not<br />

surprisingly for the higher-end systems, the Predator has enjoyed relatively high and stable reliability<br />

2 Per OPNAV Instruction 3750.6R, “Loss <strong>of</strong> a UAV is not a Class A unless the cost is $1,000,000 or greater.” All<br />

Pioneer mishaps discussed are therefore Class B Mishaps.<br />

APPENDIX H – RELIABILITY<br />

Page H-2

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!