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Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...

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UAS ROADMAP <strong>2005</strong><br />

These policies apply, as a minimum, to all aircraft flying in civil airspace. With GPS, the prospect for<br />

relief <strong>of</strong> some redundancy requirements in manned aviation may be an option in the future. However, UA<br />

have a diminished prospect for relief since, unlike manned aircraft, a UA cannot readily fallback on dead<br />

reckoning, contact navigation, and map reading in the same sense that a manned aircraft can.<br />

Autonomy. Advances in computer and communications technologies have enabled the development <strong>of</strong><br />

autonomous unmanned systems. With the increase in computational power available, developmental UA<br />

are able to achieve much more sophisticated subsystem, guidance, navigation and control, sensor and<br />

communications autonomy than previous systems. Global Hawk is capable <strong>of</strong> Level 2-3 autonomy today.<br />

Its airborne systems are designed to identify, isolate, and compensate for a wide range <strong>of</strong> possible<br />

system/sub-system failures and autonomously take actions to ensure system safety. Preprogrammed<br />

decision trees are built to address each possible failure during each part <strong>of</strong> the mission.<br />

One <strong>of</strong> the most difficult aspects <strong>of</strong> high levels <strong>of</strong> autonomy is ensuring that all elements remain<br />

synchronized. Verifying that 1) all messages are received, 2) all aircraft have correctly interpreted the<br />

messages, and 3) the entire squadron has a single set <strong>of</strong> mission plans to execute will be a key<br />

accomplishment. Once developed, such reliable, highly autonomous UA systems should facilitate<br />

integration into the FAA’s Joint Air Traffic Management Vision.<br />

Lost Link. In the event <strong>of</strong> lost command and control, military UA are typically programmed to climb to a<br />

pre-defined altitude to attempt to reestablish contact. If contact is not reestablished in a given time, the<br />

UA can be pre-programmed to 1) retrace its outbound route home, 2) fly direct to home, or 3) continue its<br />

mission. With respect to lost communications between the GCSs and the UA, or the UA and ATC,<br />

however, there is no procedure for a communications-out recovery. Examination <strong>of</strong> a lost link scenario<br />

illustrates that this communications issue can become a critical UA failure mode, if left unaddressed.<br />

NORDO (No Radio) requirements are well documented in 14 CFR 91.185. Remarkably, most lost link<br />

situations bear a striking resemblance to NORDO, and UA would enhance their predictability by<br />

autonomously following the guidance. The one exception to this case is the VFR conditions clause. UA,<br />

even with an adequate S&A system (autonomous), would enhance overall safety by continuing to fly IFR.<br />

Should normal ATC-voice communications fail, the FAA also has the capability to patch airspace users<br />

through to the controlling ATC authority by phone at any time.<br />

FUTURE ENVIRONMENT<br />

The migration <strong>of</strong> the NAS from ground based traffic control to airborne traffic management, scheduled to<br />

occur over the next decade, will have significant implications for UA. S&A will become an integrated,<br />

automated part <strong>of</strong> routine position reporting and navigation functions by relying on a combination <strong>of</strong><br />

ADS-B and GPS. In effect, it will create a virtual bubble <strong>of</strong> airspace around each aircraft so that when<br />

bubbles contact, avoidance is initiated. All aircraft will be required to be equipped to the same level,<br />

making the unmanned or manned status <strong>of</strong> an aircraft transparent to both flyers and to the FAA.<br />

Finally, the pejorative perception that UA are by nature more dangerous than manned aircraft needs to be<br />

countered by recognizing that UA possess the following inherent attributes that contribute to flying<br />

safety:<br />

� Many manned aircraft mishaps occur during the take-<strong>of</strong>f and landing phases <strong>of</strong> flight, when human<br />

decisions and control inputs are substantial factors. Robotic aircraft are not programmed to take<br />

chances; either preprogrammed conditions are met or the system goes around.<br />

� Since human support systems are not carried, mishaps from failed life support systems will not occur.<br />

� Smoke from malfunctioning, but non-vital, onboard systems does not pose the same threat <strong>of</strong> loss,<br />

since smoke in the cockpit <strong>of</strong> a manned aircraft can distract pilots and lead to vision obscuration.<br />

� Automated take-<strong>of</strong>fs and landings eliminate the need for pattern work, resulting in reduced exposure<br />

to mishaps, particularly in the area surrounding main operating bases.<br />

APPENDIX F – AIRSPACE<br />

Page F-10

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