Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...

UAS ROADMAP 2005
JTRS
Cluster 1
AMF JTRS
MIDS JTRS
TSAT
UA Related Program Schedules
CY04 CY05 CY06 CY07 CY08 CY09 CY10 CY11 CY12 CY13 CY14 CY15
HAIPE
Cluster 1 NSA Certification
AMF JTRS
Vehicular and Rotary Wing Platforms
(i.e. FIreScout)
IOC
Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Applications
Link 16, TACAN and Digital Voice
MIDS JTRS NSA Certification
IOC
IOC
Contract Award PDR CDR Key Decision Point LRIP
APPENDIX C - COMMUNICATIONS
Page C-22
TSAT 1 TSAT 2 IOC TSAT 3 TSAT 4
FIGURE C-11. CONSOLIDATED HIGH LEVEL PROGRAM SCHEDULE.
TSAT
DoD relies extensively on SATCOM for UA command and control as well as product dissemination.
Reliance on foreign commercial vendors, however, entails some risk. A government owned, broadband,
SATCOM constellation will reduce reliance on commercial SATCOM and provide more available and
cost effective BLOS communications support to UA operations. For a more complete description of
current UA communications, refer to the section entitled “Historical Perspective,” and its discussions of
Global Hawk and Predator operations.
The TSAT constellation implements the space borne component of the GIG, moving data globally
through an orbiting optical and RF based network. The first TSAT is scheduled for launch in FY13
(CY12). An additional TSAT will be launched each year until all 5 TSAT systems are established in their
geosynchronous orbits (Figure C-11). TSAT will connect to the terrestrial backbone via teleports located
at strategic points throughout the globe. TSAT will be transparent to most GIG users, and be experienced
simply as a high data rate transfer capability.
UAS, such as Global Hawk and Predator, will connect to TSAT directly through the FAB-T, which
include both RF and Optical data links.
High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryption Devices
The principal objective of Information Assurance is to assure access to authorized users while denying
access to unauthorized users. For example, imagery exploiters and operations center personnel may need
UA data, but a medical technician does not. Historically the separation has been accomplished through
physically securing the classified networks, and encrypting the information as it leaves the protected
facility. Circuits that transfer unencrypted classified information are designated red in security
accreditation plans. Circuits carrying unclassified information or encrypted classified information are
designated black. Open connections between red circuits and black circuits are prohibited. This principle
of red/black separation guides the design and implementation of classified information processing
facilities.
A variation on the idea of red/black separation, and a fundamental tenet of the GIG, is the concept of red
edge/black core. Information created in classified enclaves (red edge) is encrypted and sent across the
GIG as unclassified (black core) information. This concept allows all information to traverse the web
through any available series of networks, regardless of encryption schemes employed.
Some daunting architectural challenges must be overcome in order to achieve red edge/black core. One
issue has to do with embedded enclaves, which under the current architecture would require successive