Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ... Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 - Federation of ...
UAS ROADMAP 2005 � Aircraft Control, everything but payloads and weapons. � Payload, product and control. � Weapons, kinetic and electronic. � Situation Awareness. These four functional interfaces and their corresponding processes must be distinct and accessed separately (Figure C-8). One overall aircraft design goal would be to allow changes to payloads without requiring recertification of the flight control system software. Another would be to provide security to the various functions and subsystems: weapons security, aircraft security, and payload security. Secure methods must be developed that allow machine to machine sensor tasking, while precluding inadvertent automatic weapons employment through an aircraft control or payload control interface. Aircraft Control Function UA control applications can and should be designed with net-centricity in mind. Rather than stand alone applications, installed on custom equipment, UA controls can be designed and deployed as network services, accessed by general purpose computers, and interfaced through the GIG via TCP/IP. Payload Function The word “payload” refers to all UA functions that are not aircraft command and control, not weapons employment, and not situation awareness. Currently this includes an array of electro optical sensors, synthetic aperture radar, signals intelligence sensors, and communications relay equipment. Electro optical sensors collect both still and motion imagery. These include visible, infra red, multi-spectral and hyper spectral sensors. Many current UA payloads require extensive custom interfaces to integrate sensors, platforms and control stations. Changes in payload and aircraft configuration ripple across many systems and subsystems in some cases requiring recertification of flight control mechanisms. Future UA payloads must be modular, which means independent of and separable from the UA, especially the UA’s flight critical systems. This can be accomplished by implementing the following in all new payload designs (see Appendix E) � Standard physical interfaces. includes mounting brackets and electrical/electronic connectors � Standard product format. imagery, SIGINT, communications relay � Standard control interface mapping. assigning corresponding functions on different UA systems to the same keyboard commands Weapons Function The weapons function includes dropping bombs, launching missiles and conducting information operations. The weapons function must be isolated from payload and platform control to preclude inappropriate access to weapons functions, and subsequent accidental employment, through non-weapons functions interfaces. The weapons function must support common message sets such as those described in MIL-STD-1760. Situation Awareness Function The situation awareness function provides situation awareness from two perspectives: that of the UA operator and that of other operators in the airspace. The UA Interoperability Integrated Product Team identified a set of data elements required to support situation awareness. It also identified the need to register these data elements with the DISA metadata registry to support Extensible Markup Language (XML) tagging. The data types and units are based on the international standard for units (SI) and are the same as data elements defined in NATO STANAG 4586. The situation awareness function supports capabilities provided by: � Link 16 � Integrated Broadcast System (IBS) APPENDIX C - COMMUNICATIONS Page C-15
UAS ROADMAP 2005 � Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL) � Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) � Air Traffic Control (ATC) Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), expanded Mode S Link 16 provides real time situation awareness of events taking place beyond the range of an aircraft’s onboard sensors. Air Force AWACS and Joint STARS, plus the Navy Hawkeye, maintain the data transmission of an integrated picture to all nodes on the network via Link 16. The current system is closed. It is not IP base or web enabled. IBS integrates the Tactical Intelligence Exchange System (TRIXS), Tactical Related Applications (TRAP), the TRAP Data Distribution System (TDDS), the Tactical Information Broadcast System (TIBS), the Global Command and Control System’s (GCCS) Near Real Time Dissemination (NRTD) interface into a single situation awareness broadcast. SADL links U.S. Air Force close air support aircraft with the U.S. Army's EPLRS. The SIAP is the air component of the Common Tactical Picture that is generated and distributed by the various sensors and command and control systems. The IFF Mode S is a secondary surveillance and communication system, which supports Air Traffic Control. CHALLENGES Impediments to Networked UA Communications As the Services and industry work to make the ubiquitous network a reality, individual programs will have to address a number of complex issues. While the solutions to these issues may be highly tailored to individual program requirements, they must draw on GIG standards to assure seamless connectivity and broad based information sharing. Current data link systems focus on aircraft and sensor technology rather than network based interfaces, and often use unique formats for data transfer. The resultant, tightly coupled interfaces preclude broad interoperability. Traditional circuit based systems have enjoyed success over the years. Many users expect circuit functionality and performance to be emulated in an IP environment. While dedicated circuits offer performance precisely tailored to the operational requirement, they represent single points of failure and often have limited interoperability/flexibility due to optimization for specialized applications. Sized for peak demand, point-to-point circuits are not always required to operate at full capacity. Due to being closed circuits, however, their surplus bandwidth is not available to external users. Frequency Spectrum Considerations and Bandwidth Constraints Many UAS use COTS data link equipment that offers the developers reduced costs for the equipment and shorter development periods. Problems associated with using commercial RF for military applications include being designed within the U.S. authorized spectrum, which means that they are given the “lowest” priority within the United States and its Possessions (US&P). As a result, use of these frequencies may be prohibited in some countries. The use of COTS usage for proof of concept is OKaccpetable on a temporary basis, but the strong consideration must be given system must be replaced withselecting a material solution that truly takes spectrum supportability into account. equipment that operates in theThis includes considering equipment designed to operate in properly allocated band before field testing and especially before entering formal development or large numbers are procured. Such replacement efforts need to be programmed into the transition plan from ACTDs into a normal acquisition program. RF spectrum challenges for UAS � Spectrum use is controlled internationally by treaties and within the US&P by laws and regulations. � Those treaties, laws, and regulations have divided the spectrum by type of service use, (e.g., radio navigation, aeronautical mobile, fixed-satellite, and mobile satellite), by user (e.g., Government and non-government), and by region (1) Europe, Africa, Former Soviet Union, and Near East; (2) Western Hemisphere; and (3) Far East and Western Pacific. APPENDIX C - COMMUNICATIONS Page C-16
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UAS ROADMAP <strong>2005</strong><br />
� <strong>Aircraft</strong> Control, everything but payloads and weapons.<br />
� Payload, product and control.<br />
� Weapons, kinetic and electronic.<br />
� Situation Awareness.<br />
These four functional interfaces and their corresponding processes must be distinct and accessed<br />
separately (Figure C-8). One overall aircraft design goal would be to allow changes to payloads without<br />
requiring recertification <strong>of</strong> the flight control system s<strong>of</strong>tware. Another would be to provide security to the<br />
various functions and subsystems: weapons security, aircraft security, and payload security. Secure<br />
methods must be developed that allow machine to machine sensor tasking, while precluding inadvertent<br />
automatic weapons employment through an aircraft control or payload control interface.<br />
<strong>Aircraft</strong> Control Function<br />
UA control applications can and should be designed with net-centricity in mind. Rather than stand alone<br />
applications, installed on custom equipment, UA controls can be designed and deployed as network<br />
services, accessed by general purpose computers, and interfaced through the GIG via TCP/IP.<br />
Payload Function<br />
The word “payload” refers to all UA functions that are not aircraft command and control, not weapons<br />
employment, and not situation awareness. Currently this includes an array <strong>of</strong> electro optical sensors,<br />
synthetic aperture radar, signals intelligence sensors, and communications relay equipment. Electro<br />
optical sensors collect both still and motion imagery. These include visible, infra red, multi-spectral and<br />
hyper spectral sensors.<br />
Many current UA payloads require extensive custom interfaces to integrate sensors, platforms and control<br />
stations. Changes in payload and aircraft configuration ripple across many systems and subsystems in<br />
some cases requiring recertification <strong>of</strong> flight control mechanisms. Future UA payloads must be modular,<br />
which means independent <strong>of</strong> and separable from the UA, especially the UA’s flight critical systems. This<br />
can be accomplished by implementing the following in all new payload designs (see Appendix E)<br />
� Standard physical interfaces. includes mounting brackets and electrical/electronic connectors<br />
� Standard product format. imagery, SIGINT, communications relay<br />
� Standard control interface mapping. assigning corresponding functions on different UA systems to<br />
the same keyboard commands<br />
Weapons Function<br />
The weapons function includes dropping bombs, launching missiles and conducting information<br />
operations. The weapons function must be isolated from payload and platform control to preclude<br />
inappropriate access to weapons functions, and subsequent accidental employment, through non-weapons<br />
functions interfaces. The weapons function must support common message sets such as those described<br />
in MIL-STD-1760.<br />
Situation Awareness Function<br />
The situation awareness function provides situation awareness from two perspectives: that <strong>of</strong> the UA<br />
operator and that <strong>of</strong> other operators in the airspace. The UA Interoperability Integrated Product Team<br />
identified a set <strong>of</strong> data elements required to support situation awareness. It also identified the need to<br />
register these data elements with the DISA metadata registry to support Extensible Markup Language<br />
(XML) tagging. The data types and units are based on the international standard for units (SI) and are the<br />
same as data elements defined in NATO STANAG 4586. The situation awareness function supports<br />
capabilities provided by:<br />
� Link 16<br />
� Integrated Broadcast System (IBS)<br />
APPENDIX C - COMMUNICATIONS<br />
Page C-15