HERMANN HESSE AND THE DIALECTICS OF TIME Salvatore C. P. ...

HERMANN HESSE AND THE DIALECTICS OF TIME Salvatore C. P. ... HERMANN HESSE AND THE DIALECTICS OF TIME Salvatore C. P. ...

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chapter 'The Logic of Laughter7 (27-55), according to which humour springs from the unexpected association of two 'previously unconnected' (45) patterns or, as he puts it, 'matrices of experience' (ibid.). The descriptions of humour given above show a common dialectical foundation. 11 Humour brings together two disparate, or even opposite, elements (thesis and antithesis), be they patterns, strands of thought, or scripts, and make them clash and coalesce (synthesis) for a fraction of time. 12 The dialectical dynamic of humour, which is apparent in the pun, is also key to the concept of Romantic irony as well as to Hesse's idea of 'Humor', both rooted in the dichotomy between ideal and reality (see section 6.3). 13 As noted above, it is generally assumed that humour retains traces of violent instincts. This ancestral hostility has a further sociological implication, for humour can be seen as an outlet for subversive energy. In a perspective influenced by both Bergson and Freud, Mary Douglas highlights the destabilising effect of humour in the private sphere: 'the essence of the joke is that something formal is attacked by something informal, something organised and controlled, by something vital, energetic' (149). She takes her point further and suggests that humour can trigger unexpected associations, leading individuals to question a learnt behaviour and inciting them to new possibilities, although humour does not ultimately bring about any real change: The joke merely affords opportunity for realising that an accepted pattern has no necessity. Its excitement lies in the suggestion that any particular ordering 11 Although Neil Schaeffer presents 'context as the definitive feature of laughter' (2), he later integrates the dialectical component discussed above by pointing out: 'juxtaposition of incongruous elements appears to contain a significance even if we are unable or unwilling to state precisely what it is' (7). 12 In this context, it is worth stressing the link between humour and the 'fleeting', as common experience suggests in connection with the readiness required in the delivery of a verbal joke. The preparation stage of a joke accumulates expectancy on the listener's part that it is suddenly neutralized or dissipated a second after the punch-line has triggered the laughter. Humour therefore appears associated with the 'moment' on the one hand although in the specific case of a joke and, at least for Hesse, to eternity on the other. 13 As underlined by Brown and Ziolkowski (see note 38 in Chapter 2, section 4), a pun is also evocative of the technique of the counterpoint, through which two independent musical lines are woven together to form one coherent, and comprehensible, musical idea. It should be noted that Hesse uses the word 'Humor' sparingly. The expression, for instance, does not crop up in Knulp, Demian, Klingsors letzter Sommer, or Siddhartha. This fact is not surprising with regard to Demian and Siddhartha, which Ziolkowski describes as devoid of humour (see below in this section), but it does surprise one in relation to Klingsors letzter Sommer where, as Diirr notes, 'fmdet sich eine eigentumliche, gefahrvolle Ironic ein, die hochstens in einen verganglichen Galgenhumor ausartet' (42). Henceforth, we will refer to Hesse's specific idea of humour with the German 'Humor'. 167

of experience may be arbitrary and subjective. It is frivolous in that it produces no real alternative, only an exhilarating sense of freedom from form in general. (Douglas, 150-51) Mary Douglas here refers primarily to the personal dimension of an individual; her statement, however, holds true when extended to the social sphere. Humour can indeed be seen as a way to offload the dissatisfaction of not just an individual but a group who come to question the status quo of a given society. In her article, 'Humour and the public sphere in nineteenth-century Germany', Mary Lee Townsend, argues that before 1848, 'in Germany as elsewhere, the voice of the people had been stifled and forced to express itself through the ambiguities of humour and satire7 (200). She also highlights the high degree of controversy over the issue whether the satirical impulse typical of that period was a progressive force or, on the contrary, 'a subtle form of social control that served to pacify further an already docile population' (201). 14 The idea of humour as a social agent lies at the core of Mihkail Bakhtin's analysis of social and literary interaction during the Renaissance. He identifies two poles in the culture of the time: that of a cultivated establishment, and that of antagonistic ordinary people. 15 These social and cultural contrasts, arising from class division, would symbolically flare up at carnival, which, by playful staging of a social turnaround, channelled the dissatisfaction among the lower population strata at their subordinate condition: The world is briefly and safely subverted in carnival time, in festival time, in order to allow us briefly to rehearse and revise the categories by which we live for the rest of the year. (Miller, 16) The essence of carnival, therefore, lies in an impulse to 'overturn] reality' (Gurevich, 57) or, it can be added, to overturn realities, an impetus to new perspectives which is, however, confined to a given period of time. This idea of carnival immediately links 14 'Some, including radicals and conservatives', Townsend notes, 'believed that humour encouraged citizens to dissipate the anger and frustration that they otherwise might have directed against the established order' (201). 15 'It was the official culture, the culture of the Church, the culture of the educated literati [...] the people who never laughed and even hated laughter [...] On the other pole of medieval culture Bakhtin found popular tradition, which was dominated by laughter' (Gurevich, 55). It should be noted, however, that Gurevich rejects Bakhtin's view of laughter as the prerogative of the masses, although he does not dismiss Bakhtin's argument on the dynamics of carnival, which is fundamental to the present discussion. 168

chapter 'The Logic of Laughter7 (27-55), according to which humour springs from the<br />

unexpected association of two 'previously unconnected' (45) patterns or, as he puts<br />

it, 'matrices of experience' (ibid.).<br />

The descriptions of humour given above show a common dialectical<br />

foundation. 11 Humour brings together two disparate, or even opposite, elements<br />

(thesis and antithesis), be they patterns, strands of thought, or scripts, and make<br />

them clash and coalesce (synthesis) for a fraction of time. 12 The dialectical dynamic of<br />

humour, which is apparent in the pun, is also key to the concept of Romantic irony as<br />

well as to Hesse's idea of 'Humor', both rooted in the dichotomy between ideal and<br />

reality (see section 6.3). 13<br />

As noted above, it is generally assumed that humour retains traces of violent<br />

instincts. This ancestral hostility has a further sociological implication, for humour<br />

can be seen as an outlet for subversive energy. In a perspective influenced by both<br />

Bergson and Freud, Mary Douglas highlights the destabilising effect of humour in<br />

the private sphere: 'the essence of the joke is that something formal is attacked by<br />

something informal, something organised and controlled, by something vital,<br />

energetic' (149). She takes her point further and suggests that humour can trigger<br />

unexpected associations, leading individuals to question a learnt behaviour and<br />

inciting them to new possibilities, although humour does not ultimately bring about<br />

any real change:<br />

The joke merely affords opportunity for realising that an accepted pattern has<br />

no necessity. Its excitement lies in the suggestion that any particular ordering<br />

11 Although Neil Schaeffer presents 'context as the definitive feature of laughter' (2), he later integrates the<br />

dialectical component discussed above by pointing out: 'juxtaposition of incongruous elements appears to<br />

contain a significance even if we are unable or unwilling to state precisely what it is' (7).<br />

12 In this context, it is worth stressing the link between humour and the 'fleeting', as common experience<br />

suggests in connection with the readiness required in the delivery of a verbal joke. The preparation stage of a<br />

joke accumulates expectancy on the listener's part that it is suddenly neutralized or dissipated a second after the<br />

punch-line has triggered the laughter. Humour therefore appears associated with the 'moment' on the one<br />

hand although in the specific case of a joke and, at least for Hesse, to eternity on the other.<br />

13 As underlined by Brown and Ziolkowski (see note 38 in Chapter 2, section 4), a pun is also evocative of the<br />

technique of the counterpoint, through which two independent musical lines are woven together to form one<br />

coherent, and comprehensible, musical idea. It should be noted that Hesse uses the word 'Humor' sparingly. The<br />

expression, for instance, does not crop up in Knulp, Demian, Klingsors letzter Sommer, or Siddhartha. This fact<br />

is not surprising with regard to Demian and Siddhartha, which Ziolkowski describes as devoid of humour (see<br />

below in this section), but it does surprise one in relation to Klingsors letzter Sommer where, as Diirr notes,<br />

'fmdet sich eine eigentumliche, gefahrvolle Ironic ein, die hochstens in einen verganglichen Galgenhumor<br />

ausartet' (42). Henceforth, we will refer to Hesse's specific idea of humour with the German 'Humor'.<br />

167

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