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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science
Center for Advanced Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science
„Dumitru Staniloae” Faculty of Orthodox Theology
„Al. I. Cuza” University of Iasi

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research
on Religion and
Science
Issue No. 2, January 2008
This Issue is fully supported by
The Metropolitanate of Moldavia and Bucovina, ROMANIA
ISSN 1843 – 4142

JOURNAL FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH
ON RELIGION AND SCIENCE
The journal is an international and inter‐confessional forum for
interdisciplinary research on religion and science.
Publisher
Center for Advanced Interdisciplinary Research
on Religion
and Science
“Dumitru Stăniloae” Faculty of Orthodox Theology,
Iaşi
“Al. I. Cuza” State University, Iaşi, Romania
REVUE DE RECHERCHE INTERDISCIPLINAIRE
RELIGION ET SCIENCE
La revue est un forum international et interconfessionnel, pour la
recherche interdisciplinaire en religion et science.
Editeur
Centre de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Avancée Religion et
Science
Faculté
de Théologie Orthodoxe “Dumitru
Stăniloae”, Iaşi
Université
“Al. I. Cuza”, Iaşi, Roumanie
DIE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERDISZIPLINÄRE FORSCHUNG IN
RELIGION UND WISSENSCHAFT
Die Zeitschrift ist ein internationaler und interkonfessioneller
Ausgangspunkt für die interdisziplinäre Forschung im Bereich Religion
und Wissenschaft.
Herausgeber
Das Zentrum für Fortgeschrittene Interdisziplinäre Forschung Religion
und Wissenschaft
Die Orthodoxe Theologische Fakultät “ Dumitru
Stăniloae”, Iaşi
D ie Universität “Al. I. Cuza “ Iaşi, Rumänien
Contact
Center for Advanced Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science
"Al. I. Cuza" University of Iasi, “Dumitru Stăniloae” Faculty of Orthodox Theology,
Closca Street, No. 9, 700066, Iaşi, ROMANIA, Tel/fax 0040
332101 800/0040 332 101801
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Submission of articles ‐ submission.jirrs@gmail.com,
Contact ‐ contact.jirrs@gmail.com
On line ‐ www.jirrs.org

JOURNAL FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH
ON RELIGION AND SCIENCE
His Beatitude Dr.
Daniel CIOBOTEA
Patriarch of
the Romanian Orthodox Church
Dr. Charles HARPER
Senior Vice President, John Templeton
Foundation, USA
Prof. Dr. Pierre BUHLER
Faculty of Theology, University of
Zurich,
Switzerland
Prof. PhD Philip CLAYTON
Professor of Philosophy and Religion,
Claremont Graduate University,
USA
Prof. Dr. Jurgen MOLTMANN
Eberhard‐Karls‐Universität Tübingen,
Germany
Prof. Dr. Basarab NICOLESCU
Member of Romanian Academy,
President,
Le Centre International
de Recherches et Etudes
Transdisciplinaires, Paris,
France
ADVISORY BOARD
His Eminence Dr.
Kallisto s WARE
B ishop of Diokleia,
United
Kingdom Prof. PhD Willem B. DREES
Faculty of Theology,
Leiden University, Nederland
President,
European Society for Studies Science
and Theology
Prof. Dr. Andrée BIRMELE
Université “M. Bloch“ Strasbourg,
France
R ev. Prof. PhD John BRECK
Institut de T héologie Orthodoxe
“Saint Serge”, Paris,
France
Prof. Dr. M. Eric GAZIAUX
Universite Catolique de Louvain,
Belgium
Prof. PhD Antje JACKELEN
Director,
The Zygon Center for Religion and
Science, Chicago,
USA

JOURNAL FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH ON RELIGION
AND SCIENCE
Rev. Prof. PhD
Gheorghe POPA
Department of
Theology,
"Al. I. Cuza" University
EDITORIAL BOARD
EDITORIAL DIRECTORS
Prof. PhD
Stefan AFLOROAEI
Department of
Philosophy,
"Al. I. Cuza" University
Prof. PhD
Gel u BOURCEANU
Department of
Physical‐Chemistry,
"Al. I. Cuza" University
EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Deacon Adrian Sorin MIHALACHE
Center for Advanced Inte rdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science
“ Al. I. Cuza” University
Authors in present Issu e
Ştefan AFLOROAEI
Roland BENEDIKTER
Carmen BOLOCAN
Alessandro CORDELLI
Constantin CUCOŞ
J án MIŠCOVIČ
Iulian MOGA
Patrik PAUL
Gheorghe POPA
Anne L. C. RUNEHOV
Proof readers
Ştefan MERA
Maria GOGONEA
Web Master
Giani IANAU
Online
POSITIVE MEDIA srl.
PROJECT ASSISTANT
Vlad ENACHE
Department of Theoretical Physics,
"Al. I. Cuza" University
Issue Editor
Ştefan MERA
George CO LIBABA
Translation Coordinator
Prof. Dr. Anca ALBU
Text Revisor
George COLIBABA Nicolet a LEON
Translators
E nglish language
Sorina CHIPER
Anca PETRARU
Andreea Mihaela TAMBA
Art Design
Giani IANAU
Magda RAȚĂ

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
CONTENT
EDITORIAL
ENGLISH….... .....................………………………………………………………………………………..... 3
FRENCH…..........................………………………………………………………………...…....………...... 6
GERMAN..........................…………………………………………………………………………………....9
Education and the academic life
Patrick PAUL
LA QUÊTE DE SENS COMME RECHERCHE DE LIENS
ENTRE APPROCHES FORMELLES ET INFORMELLES DANS LA PROBLEMATIQUE
DES HISTOIRES DE VIE………………………....................................................................13
Carmen BOLOCAN
LE RAPPORT CATECHESE‐THEOLOGIE‐PEDAGOGIE DANS LA PERSPECTIVE DE
L’ENSEIGNEMENT RELIGIEUX ACTUEL.......................................................................................37
Cons tantin CUCOŞ
THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES ON THE YOUTH`S PERSONALITIES
CREATION ………………..............................................................................................................…...61
1

CONTENT
Science, Philosophy an d Religion
Rev. Gheorghe POPA
THEOLOGY AND ECOLOGY. HERMENEUTICAL INSIGTS FOR A CHRISTIAN ECO‐
THEOLOGY …………………............................................................................……………...……...…97
Alessandro CORDELLI
THE REAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE AND THE RELATION
BETWEEN INFORMATION AND ENERGY……....................................................................…..129
Anne L. C. RUNEHOV
N
C
2
EUROSCIENTIFIC EXPLANATIONS OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE ARE NOT FREE FROM
ULTURAL ASPECTS…................................................................................………………………141
Ştefan
AFLOROAEI
D
ISTINCT WAYS OF THINKING AND DISTINCT EXPERIENCES OF TRUTH...............157
Religion, Politics and Hermeneutics
Roland BENEDIKTER
POLITIK UND RELIGION. ZUR GEGENWÄRTIGEN NEU‐ANNÄHERUNG ZWEIER
GESELLSCHAFTLICHER FELDER........................…………………………...……..................189
Ján MIŠCOVIČ
CHANGES
OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM WITH REGARD TO CONDITIONS IN CZECH
LANDS….................................……………………………………………………………………………
209
Iulian MOGA
L
E SOLEIL DE JUSTICE DANS LE NOUVEAU TESTAMENT ET LES OUVRAGES DES
ECRIVAINS
ECCLESIASTIQUES…..........................................................................………………231
JOURNAL
DESCRIPTION
E NGLISH..........................……………………………..………………………………………….…….251
FRENCH..........................……………………………...………………………………………………...
253
GERMAN..........................…………………………….…………………………………………………255

Editorial
Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
To begin with, the journal’s first section consists of studies on
education and academic life. In the first study of the section, “The quest for
meaning as the quest for links between formal and informal approaches on
issues related to life history”, Patrik Paul considers that the subject faces
three obstacles that help to reveal the self i.e. of “corporalisation” (at the
biological level), of socialization (at the psychological level) and finally the
“subjectification” (at the spiritual level). In other words, the identity quest
involves overcoming three different areas of resistance before being able to
experience the always evasive reality of a transcendental subject, due tot its
imaginary form, which is obviously concealed but experienced
phenomenologically as
a the place where spirit is embodied and the body is
spiritualised.
The focus is on the phenomenological approach, as the will to
connect « res cognitans» and «res extensa », in order to bring together the
sensitive and the intelligible and also on the epistemological approach,
which requires that knowledge stemming from science should not be
separated from the life history, which is viewed as a place of reconstruction.
In the second study Carmen Bolocan invites us to look into the The
Relation: Catechesis – Theology – Pedagogy from the Perspective of the
Current Religious Education. The author focuses on the connection which
has existed and must continue to exist between theology, catechesis and
pedagogy, from the point of view of the current religious education.
Catechesis is, at its origins, a narrative, a story, transmitted from one
believer to another. The theological act is lived as an attempt at
interpretation that strives to talk about God’s Word depending on a
determined culture. The interaction pedagogy – content is essential within
the relationship that exists
between the theological act and the catechetic
one.
In the third study “The Impact of Current Technologies on the Creation
of the Personality of Young Persons”, Constantin Cucos argues that rejecting
technology, in the name of a number of so‐called absolute theoretical values,
would mean not paying attention to reality and discarding it. The best thing
to do would be to subdue technology, to humanise and spiritualise it,
assigning
it practices where the complementarity of values should be
present.
The second section in the current issue includes studies located at
the frontier between science, philosophy and religion. In the first paper of
the section, “Theology and Ecology. Hermeneutical Insights for a Christian
Eco­Theology”, Gheorghe Popa points out that nature has always “longed for
salvation”, nowadays more than ever, because man has abused Nature,
separated it from God and used it for his own selfish purposes. He considers
3

EDITORIAL
that re‐establishing patristic thought ‐ based on a Christo‐centric vision of
Creation – could be essential for the understanding and resolution of the
present state of crisis. He outlines
a few hermeneutical insights for a
possible dialogue between contemp orary ecology and Christian theology.
In the second contribution, “The real distinction between essence and
existence and the relation between information and energy”, Alessandro
Cordelli considers that in the Thomistic development of the Aristotelian
metaphysics a central role is played by the actual distinction between the
essence (i.e. the totality of characteristics and capabilities) and the concrete
existence of any being. Even if these two components of the being of any
thing are truly distinct, nevertheless they are not separable, since one
cannot observe the existence if not within the essence of a determined
thing, nor the essence if not in a concrete existing object. The paper is
intended to investigate this analogy, which bridges the gap between natural
science and metaphysics. In the third work of the section, “Neuroscientific Explanations of
Religious Experience are Not free from Cultural Aspects” Anne Runehov
emphasizes that neuroscientific research on religious phenomena such as
religious experiences and rituals for example has increased significantly the
last years. Neuroscientists claim that neuroscience contributes considerably
in the process of understanding religious experiences, because neuroscience
is able to measure brain activity during religious experiences by way of
brain‐imaging technologies. No doubt, those results of neuroscientific
research on religious experiences are an important supplement to the
understanding of some types of religious experiences. However, some
conclusions drawn from neuroscientific research on religious experiences
are arguable. For example, one such conclusion is that a person’s religious
experiences actually derives from some ultimate reality, meaning that
religious experiences
are real. It is the latter assertion that will be analysed
in the present paper.
In the last contribution of this section, Stefan Afloroaei brings into
discussion in “Distinct Ways of Thinking and Distinct Experiences of Truth”
three issues that are not necessarily new but that have received little
consideration in current philosophical discussions. First, one can notice that
the space of freedom that thinking has is much larger than the one
described by Kant in his first critical work. This new space of freedom is no
longer strictly delimited by the classical principle of non‐contradiction, on
the one hand, and by sensitive intuition, on the other. Second, one can
distinguish different modes of thinking without believing that we would be
situating ourselves outside reasonable and meaningful thinking. Such are,
for instance, the thinking that strictly observes the logic of non‐
contradiction and the thinking that exceeds this logic. He considers the fact
that the thinking that exceeds the logic of non‐contradiction induces
another image of the world in which we are situated and can describe other
experiences of truth (to use Gadamer’s expression), such as symbolic and
religious experience. Consequently, we have reasons to believe that one can
talk about alternative in another, stronger and more radical sense of the
4

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
word a s well, as can be seen with authors and ages that had a disposition for
genuinely alternative visions.
The third section includes articles which focus on the relationship
between religion, politics and hermeneutics. In the first study entitled
“Politics and religion. Presenting the new convergence approach of two
social fields”, Roland Benedikter For the vast majority of intellectuals in the
now emerging first world society there can be no doubt that religion has
gained a rapidly increasing political significance since the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989, since the collapse of communism in 1991 and the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001. This increase in importance of religion is
linked to the three other big end‐movements of our time: 1 the end of the
era of the "new world order" in the field of politics, 2 the end of the era of
"neo‐liberalism" in the field of economics, 3 the end of the era of "post‐
modernism" in the field of culture. These three ends are largely related to
the symptom‐date (not cause‐date!) of 11 September 2001, but have their
origins in developments in the second half of the 1990s. The global
"renaissance of the religions" since then increasingly permeates all three
core social fields and their typological macro logic and discourse practices ‐
both visible and invisible. The rise of religious logic to the center of politics
occurs no longer only in countries in the so‐called "third" and "second", but
also in creasingly the "first" world, being one of the decisive long‐term shifts
of ideas
of the present era.
In the second text of this section “Changes of Religious Pluralism with
Regard to Conditions in the Czech Lands”, Ian Miscovic discusses the issue of
religious pluralism and its progressive emergence first in the Czech society
then in the Churches themselves. Its first modern expressions translated
into religious tolerance, which officially was sanctioned in the 17
holic. The result has b the fragmentation of theology into a great
number of branches.
In the article entitled “The Sun of Justice in the New Testament and
the Works of the Ecclesiastic Writers”, Iulian Moga considers that in the
Christian sources, whether we speak about the New Testament or the works
of the Apostolic Fathers, those of the Apologetic ones or of all the Church
writers up to John of Damascus – and we can include here the ones
belonging to Asia Minor and the Cappadocian Fathers –, the concept of Sun
of Justice, which strictly refers to one of the personae of the Holy Trinity or
to the concept of divinity as a whole, acquires new meanings. It emphasizes
most of the doctrinal aspects from the Nicaean credo much before the first
two Ecumenical Synods. The article therefore aims to present the context in
th century
by the local king but genuinely established two centuries later. Ecumenism,
one of the forms of religious pluralism, was echoed in the Czech context
particularly after the Second World War. The conclusions of the second
Vatican Council constituted a key step towards the establishment of
pluralism among the Catholic clergy. The changes in the political system of
Central and Eastern Europe and simultaneously the beginning of the
globalisation process have given an impetus to pluralism. Against the
background of these transformations, pluralism has reached a certain stage
and has taken concrete shape amid the different groups of clergy, including
the Cat een
5

EDITORIAL
which the expression occurs at the Holy Fathers, providing examples up to
the second half of the fourth century, in order to underline its importance
with direct reference to the economy of redemption.
6
Éditorial
Editorial Directors
Pour commencer, la première section du journal est destinée aux
études sur l’éducation et la vie académique. Dans le premier article de la
section, “La quête de sens comme recherche de liens entre approches
formelles et informelles dans la problématique des histoires de vie”, Patrik
Paul considère que la question du sujet rencontre au total trois obstacles
révélateurs de soi: celui de la « corporalisation » (le biologique), celui de la
socialisation (le psychologique) et enfin celui de la « subjectivation » (le
spirituel). Autrement dit, la quête identitaire supposerait de traverser trois
zones de résistance différentes avant d’espérer d’expérimenter la réalité
toujours fuyante d’un sujet transcendantal, grâce à sa forme imaginale,
certes cachée mais expérimentée phénoméno logiquement comme un lieu
où s’incarne l’esprit et où se spiritualise le corps.
L’ensemble insiste sur l’approche phénoménologique, comme
volonté de jonction entre « res cognitans » et «res extensa », ceci afin de
rapprocher le sensible et l’intelligible et sur l’approche épistémologique qui
demande de ne pas séparer la connaissance issue des sciences de l’histoire
de vie, considérée comme lieu de reconstruction.
Dans la seconde étude, Carmen Bolocan nous propose d’analyser Le
Rapport Catéchèse – Théologie – Pédagogie de la perspective de
l’enseignement religieux actuel. L’auteur se concentre sur le rapport entre
théologie, catéchèse et pédagogie qui a existé et doit continuer à exister, du
point de vue de l’enseignement religieux actuel. La catéchèse est, à l’origine,
un récit ou une histoire, qui est transmise d’un fidèle à l’autre. Le fait
théologique est vécu comme une tentative d’interprétation s’efforce de faire
parler la Parole de Dieu en fonction d’une culture déterminée. L’interaction
pédagogie ‐ contenu est essentielle à la découverte de la relation
qu’entretiennent l’acte théologique et l’acte catéchétique.
Dans la troisième étude, « L’influence des technologies actuelles sur
la formation de la personnalité des jeunes », Constantin Cucos souligne le
fait que le refus de la technologie, au nom de soi‐disant valeurs théoriques
absolues, signifierait ne pas faire attention à la réalité et la rejeter. La
meilleure option serait de soumettre la technologie, de l’humaniser et la
spiritualiser et de lui attacher des pratiques là où la complémentarité des
valeurs est présente.
La seconde section de ce numéro inclut des études qui se situent à la
frontière de la science, la philosophie et la religion. Dans la première
contribution, intitulée «Théologie et Ecologie. Esquisses herméneutiques
pour une éco­théologie chrétienne », Gheorghe Popa souligne que la nature a
toujours « désiré le salut », aujourd’hui plus que jamais, vu que l’homme a

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
abusé la Nature, en la séparant de Dieu et l’utilisant pour ses fins égoïstes. Il
considère que le rétablissement de la pensée des Pères de l’Eglise – basée
sur une vision Christocentrique de la création – s’avèrerait essentielle pour
la compréhension et la résolution de la situation de crise actuelle. Il trace
quelques lignes d’un possible dialogue entre l’écologie actuelle et la
théologie
chrétienne.
Dans la seconde étude, “La distinction réelle entre l’essence et
l’existence et la relation entre information et énergie », Alessandro Cordelli
est d’avis que dans le développement Thomiste de la métaphysique
Aristotélicienne, un rôle clé est joue par la distinction réelle entre l’essence
(c’est‐à‐dire la totalité des caractéristiques et des capacités) et l’existence
concrète de tous les êtres. Même si ces deux composantes de n’importe quel
être sont tout à fait distinctes, pourtant elles ne sont pas séparables, car on
ne pourrait pas observer l’existence à l’extérieur de l’essence d’une chose
déterminée, ni l’essence à l’extérieur d’une chose existant concrètement.
L’étude se propose d’explorer cette analogie qui relie la distance
entre la
science naturelle et la métaphysique. Dans la troisième étude de la section, « Explications
neuroscientifiques de l’expérience religieuse ne sont pas détachées des aspects
culturels », Anne Runehov affirme que la recherche sur des phénomènes
religieux comme par exemple les expériences religieuses et sur les rituels
s’est considérablement développée les dernières années. Les
neuroscientifiques soutiennent que la neuroscience contribue
considérablement au processus de compréhension des expériences
religieuses, car la neuroscience est capable de mesurer le niveau d’activité
du cerveau au cours des expériences religieuses grâce à l’utilisation des
techniques d’imagerie cérébrale. Sans doute, les résultats de la recherche
sur les expériences religieuses constituent une contribution importante
pour la compréhension de certains types d’expériences religieuses.
Pourtant, il existe des controverses autour de certaines des conclusions de
la recherche neuroscientifique. Par exemple, une de ces conclusions est que
les expériences religieuses d’une personne dérivent en fait d’une réalité
ultime,
ce qui implique que les expériences religieuses sont réelles. C’est sur
cette affirmation que s’appuie l’étude présente.
Dans la dernière contribution de cette section, Stefan Afloroaei
introduit dans le débat autour Les Différents manières de penser et les
différentes expériences de la vérité, trois aspects qui ne sont pas
nécessairement nouveaux mais qui n’ont pas été suffisamment considérés
dans les débats philosophiques actuels. Premièrement, on peut observer
que l’espace de liberté dont dispose la pensée est beaucoup plus vaste que
celui que décrivait Kant dans sa première œuvre critique. Ce nouvel espace
de liberté n’est plus strictement délimité par le principe classique de non‐
contradiction, d’une part, et par l’intuition sensible, d’autre part.
Secondement, on peut distinguer de différents modes de pensée sans
considérer qu’on se placerait de cette façon a l’extérieur de la pensée
raisonnable et significative. C’est le cas de la pensée qui respecte
strictement la logique de la non‐contradiction et la pensée qui dépasse cette
logique. Il considère le fait que la pensée qui dépasse la logique de la non‐
7

EDITORIAL
contradiction induit une autre image du monde ou on se situe et peut
décrire d’autres expérience de la vérité (pour utiliser l’expression de
Gadamer), comme l’expérience symbolique et religieuse. Par conséquent, on
a des raisons pour croire qu’on peut parler de l’alternative, dans un sens
distinct, plus forte et radicale du mot, comme le prouvent les auteurs et les
temps
8
qui avaient une disponibilité à des perspectives alternatives
véritables.
La troisième section comprend des articles qui se concentrent sur le
rapport entre religion, politique et herméneutique. Dans la première étude,
intitulée “Politique et religion. La nouvelle approche actuelle de deux champs
sociaux”, Roland Benedikter remarque que pour la grande partie des
intellectuels des pays qui actuellement sont en train d’accéder dans le
premier monde il est certain que la religion a gagné une importance
politique croissante depuis la chute du Mur de Berlin en 1989, depuis
l’effondrement du communisme en 1991 et les attaques terroristes de 11
septembre 2001. L’importance croissante de la religion est liée à trois
autres mouvements terminaux de notre époque : 1. la fin de l’ère du ‘nouvel
ordre mondial’ dans le domaine politique, 2 la fin de l’ère du
‘néolibéralisme’ dans le domaine économique, 3 la fin de l’ère du
‘postmodernisme’ dans le domaine culturel. Ces trois fins sont largement
liés à la date symptomatique (non pas la date cause !) de 11 septembre
2001, mais leurs origines remontent aux développements de la seconde
moitié des années 1990. La ‘renaissance de la religion” au niveau mondial
depuis cette période‐là s’est progressivement diffusée dans tous les trois
domaines sociaux majeurs et dans leurs macro logique et pratiques
discursives typologiques –celles visibles et invisibles également. L’avance
de la religion vers le centre de la politique se produit désormais pas
seulement dans des pays appartenant soi‐disant « deuxième » ou
« troisième » monde, mais progressivement du « premier » monde,
constituant l’une des mutations des idées décisives à long
terme de l’ère
contemporain e.
Dans la seconde contribution de cette section, “Changements du
pluralisme religieux dans le contexte des Pays Tchèques », Ian Miscovic
aborde la question du pluralisme religieux, de la façon dont il est
progressivement apparu d’abord dans la société puis dans les Eglises elles‐
mêmes. Ses premières manifestations modernes se sont traduites par la
tolérance religieuse, officiellement confirmée au XVII ème siècle par le
souverain, mais véritablement instaurée seulement deux siècles plus tard.
Une des formes du pluralisme religieux, l’œcuménisme, a trouvé un écho
dans le contexte tchèque, surtout après la seconde guerre mondiale. Les
conclusions du Concile Vatican II constituèrent un pas marquant vers
l’établissement du pluralisme au sein du clergé catholique. Les changements
des systèmes politiques en Europe centrale et orientale ainsi que,
parallèlement, la mise en marche des processus de globalisation, ont donné
une impulsion au pluralisme. En toile de fond à ces changements, le
pluralisme est arrivé à un certain stade et s’est exprimé concrètement dans
les différents clergés, dont le clergé catholique. Il y a aussi comme résultat le

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
morcellement de la théologie en un
grand nombre de branches et partie liée
à cela son pluralisme.
Dans l’article intitulé, “Le Soleil de Justice dans le Nouveau
Testament et les ouvrages des écrivains ecclésiastiques”, Iulian Moga
montre que dans les sources Chrétiennes, que l’on parle du Nouveau
Testament ou des écrits des Pères Apostoliques, des Apologétiques ou des
tous les écrivains de l’Eglise jusqu'à Jean de Damas – y compris les auteurs
de l’Asie Mineure et Cappadocie ‐, le concept de Soleil de Justice, qui fait
référence à une des personæ des la Sainte Trinité ou au concept de la
divinité dans l’ensemble, acquiert de nouvelles significations. Il souligne la
majorité des aspects doctrinaires du Credo de Nicée bien en avant des deux
premiers Synodes Œcuméniques. L’auteur se propose de présenter le
contexte ou l’expression apparaît chez les Pères Saints, en se limitant à des
exemples allant jusqu'à la deuxième moitie du IVe siècle, afin de souligner
son importance pour l’économie du salut.
Leitartikel
Directeurs Editoriaux
Der erste Abschnitt der Zeitschrift besteht aus Beiträgen zum Thema
Erziehung und akademisches Leben. Patrik Paul denkt in dem ersten
Beitrag des Abschnittes, “Die Frage des Sinns und die der Beziehung zwischen
formllen und informellen Ansätzen zu Aspekten bezüglich der Geschichte des
Lebens”, dass das Subjekt drei Hindernissen in der Selbstoffenbarung
begegnet: dem der “Verkörperlichung” (auf biologischer Ebene), der
Sozialisation (auf psychologischer Ebene) und endlich dem der
“Subjektivation” (auf geistiger Ebene). Mit anderen Worten setzt die
Identitätsfrage drei unterschiedliche Widerstandsebenen vor der Erfahrung
der immer evasiven Wirklichkeit des transzedentalen Subjektes voraus,
wegen seiner imaginären Form, die offensichtlich verborgen ist, aber
phänomenologisch als Ort experimentiert wird, wo der Geist verkörpert ist
und der Körper vergeistigt ist.
Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf dem phänomenologischen Aspekt, als der
Wunsch, «res cognitans» und «res extensa» zu verbinden, um Empfindung
und Vernunft zusammenzubringen. Dafür sollte man die Erkenntnis, deren
Wurzeln in der Wissenschaft liegen, von der Geschichte des Lebens nicht
trennen,
die als Ort der Rekonstruktion gesehen wird.
Im zweiten Beitrag lädt uns Carmen Bolocan ein, in das Thema Die
Beziehung: Katechese – Theologie – Pädagogie aus der Perspektive der
aktuellen religiösen Erziehung hineinzuschauen. Die Autorin befasst sich mit
der schon seit früh existierenden Verbindung, die auch heute bestehen
sollte, zwischen Theologie, Kathechese und Pädagogie aus dem
Gesichtspunkt der heutigen religiösen Erziehung. Katechese bedeutet eine
Erzählung, eine Geschichte, die von Gläubigen zu Gläubigen übermittlet
wird. Der theologische Akt wird als ein Interpretationsversuch gelebt, der
über Gottes Wort zu sprechen strebt, in Abhängigkeit von einer bestimmten
9

EDITORIAL
Kultur. Die Interaktion zwischen Pädagogik und dem Inhalt ist wesentlich
innerhalb der Beziehung
zwischen dem theologischen und dem
kathechetischen Akt.
Im dritten Beitrag “Die Folge der aktuellen Technologien auf die
Bildung der Persönlichkeit bei Jugendlichen” bestreitet Constantin Cucos die
Tatsache, dass die verwerfende Technologie im Namen von einigen
sogenannten absoluten theoretischen Werten bedeuten würde, die
Wirklichkeit nicht zu berücksichtigen und sie wegzuwerfen. Die Lösung
dazu wäre, die Technologie zu unterwerfen, sie zu humanisieren und
spiritualisieren, indem dieser Praktiken zugewiesen werden, in denen die
Komplementarität der Werte vorhanden ist.
Der zweite Abschnitt zum vorliegenden Aspekt schließt Beiträge ein,
die sich an der Grenze zwischen Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Religion
befinden. Im ersten Beitrag “Theologie und Ökologie. Hermeneutische
Einblicke in eine christliche Öko­Theologie” hebt Gheorghe Popa hervor, dass
“die Natur sich immer nach Rettung sehnte” und heutzutage mehr als je,
weil der Mensch die Natur vergewaltigt und sie von Gott getrennt hat, um
sie für seine eigennützigen Zwecke zu verwenden. Er ist der Meinung, dass
eine Neubetrachtung der patristischen Gedanken – die auf der
christozentrischen Vision der Schöpfung basieren ‐ für das Verständnis und
Lösung der aktuelle Krise wesentlich sein könnte. Weiterhin werden einige
hermen eutische Richtungen für einen möglichen Dialog zwischen der
heutigen Ökologie und der christlichen
Theologie unterstrichen.
Im zweiten Beitrag, “Der wirkliche Unterschied zwischen Wesen und
Dasein und die Beziehung zwischen Information und Energie” meint
Alessandro Cordelli, dass in der Thomistischen Entwicklung der
Aristotelschen Metaphysik eine Hauptrolle dem aktuellen Unterschied
zwischen dem Wesen (d. h. die Gesamtheit aller Charakteristika und
Fähigkeiten) und dem konkreten Dasein jedes Wesens zugewisen wird.
Selbst wenn diese zwei Komponenten im Wesens jedes Dinges
unterschiedlich sind, sind sie jedoch nicht ternnbar, solange man das Dasein
eines bestimmten Dinges nicht wahrnehmen kann, weder dessen Wesen, als
nur in einem konkret existierenden Ding. Die Studie befasst sich mit der
Analyse der Analogie, die die Lücke zwischen
Wissenschaft und
Methaphysik
überbrückt.
In der dritten Studie des Abschnittes “Neurowissenschaftliche
Erklärungen der religiösen Erfahrungen sind nicht frei von kulturellen
Aspekten” betont Anne Runehov, dass sich die neurowissenschaftlichen
Forschungen von religiösen Phänomenen, wie zum Beispiel den religiösen
Erfahrungen und Ritualen in den letzten Jahren erheblich erweitert hat. Die
Neurowissenschaftler behaupten, dass die Neurowissenschaft zum
Versändnis der religiösen Erfahrungen beitragen kann, da sie die Tätigkeit
des Gehirns während der religiösen Erfahrungen mittels der Technologien
des Brain‐Imaging (Bildgebung des Gehirns) messen können. Die Ergebisse
solcher neurowissenschaftlichen Forschungen der religiösen Erfahrung sind
zweifellos ein bedeutender Beitrag zum Verständnis einiger Arten von
religiösen Erfahrungen. Einige Schlussfolgerungen der
neurowissenschaftllichen Forschung sind jedoch bestreitbar. Es ist der Fall
10

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2,
January 2008
der Ansicht, dass die religiöse Erfahrung einer Person einer letzten
Wirklichkeit entstammt, was bedeuten soll, das die religiösen Erfahrungen
wirklich sind. Die Behauptung wird ans chließend in diesem Beitrag
analysiert.
In dem letzten Beitrag dieses Abschnittes, “Unterschiedliche
Denkarten und unterschiedliche Wahrheitserfahrungen” befasst sich Stefan
Afloroaie mit drei Aspekten, die nicht unbedingt neu sind, die aber in der
aktuellen philosophischen Debatte wenig Beachtung fanden.
Zuerst kann man feststellen, dass der Freiheitsraum des Denkens viel
größer als der von Kant in seinem Kritischen Werk beschriebene ist. Dieser
neue Freiheitsraum wird nicht mehr ausschließlich durch die Prinzipien der
Non‐Kontradiktion, einerseits und der sinnlichen Intuition andererseits
abgegrenzt. Zweitens kann man zwei Denkarten unterscheiden, ohne zu
glauben, dass wir uns außerhalb des vernünftigen und sinnvollen Denkens
befinden. Diese sind diejenigen, die ausschließlich die Logik der Non‐
Kontradiktion beachtet und das Denken, das die Logik übersteigt. Der Autor
ist der Meinung, dass das Denken, das die Logik der Non‐Kontradiktion
überschreitet, ein anderes Bild der Welt, in der wir leben, herbeiführt und
andere Wahrheitserfahrungen beschreiben kann (um Gadamers Ausdruck
zu verwenden), wie die symbolische und religiöse Erfahrung. Folglich gibt
es Gründe zu behaupten, dass man über Alternative in einem stärkeren und
radikaleren Sinn des Wortes sprechen kann, so wie man schon bei
bestimmten Autoren und in bestimmten Zeitaltern mit einer echten
alternativen Gesinnung bemerken kann.
Der dritte Abschnitt umfastt Artikeln, die sich auf der Beziehung
zwischen Religion, Politik und Hermenueitk konzentrieren. Roland
Benedikter behauptet in der ersten Studie mit dem Titel “Politik und
Religion. Darstellung des neuen Konvergenzansatzes von zwei sozialen
Feldern”, dass für die Mehreit der Intelektuellen in der jetzt
hervorkommenden ersten Weltgesellschaft keinen Zweifel besteht, dass der
Religion eine schnell wachsende politische Bedeutung seit dem Fall der
Berliner Mauer 1989, dem Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus 1991 und
den terroristischen Angriffen vom 11. September 2001 zugewiesen wird.
Diese Zunahme der Bedetung von Religion ist mit anderen drei großen
Endbewegungen unserer Zeit in Verbindung zu bringen: die erste ist das
Ende des Zeitalters der „Neuen Weltordnung“ in der Politik, die zweite ist
das Ende des Zeitalters des „Neuliberalismus“ in
der Wirtschaft und die
dritte ist das Ende des Zeitalters der „Postmoderne“ in der Kultur.
Diese drei Ende werden hauptsächlich mit dem Symtom‐Datum
(nicht Ursache‐Datm) vom 11. September 2001 in Verbindung gebracht, sie
haben aber ihre Ursprünge in den Entwicklungen aus der letzten Hälfte des
90‐Jahren. Die seit damals zunehmende globale "Renaissance der
Religionen" breitet sich in allen drei sozialen Hauptfeldernaus und ihrer
Makrologik und ihren typologischen Diskurspraktiken – sowohl in den die
unsichtbaren als auch in den sichtbaren. Der Austieg der religiöse Logik
zum Zentrum der Politik tritt nicht nur in den sogenannte „dritten“ und
„zweiten“ Ländern auf, sondern auch in der „ersten“ Welt und ist einer der
maßgebenden langfristigen Ideenwandeln in unserem Zeitalter.
11

EDITORIAL
Im zweiten Text dieses Abschnittes “Änderungen des religiösen
Pluralismus in Bezug auf die Bedingungen in den Tschechischen Ländern“
behandelt Ian Miscovic den Aspekt des religiösen Pluralismus und seinen
progressiven Aufkommen erstens in der tschecischen Gesellschaft und dann
in den Kirchen selbst. Sein erster moderner Ausdruck wurde durch religiöse
Toleranz übersetzt, die offiziel im 17. Jh. Durch den dortigen König
Bewilligung fand und in Wirklichkeit sich zwei Jahrhunderte später
durchgesetzt hatte. Ökumenismus, eine der Formen des religiösen
Pluralismus fand einen besonderen Echo im tschechischen Kontext nach
dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die Schlussfolgerungen des Zweiten Vatikanischen
Konzils bedeuteten ein wichtiger Schritt für die Errichtung des Pluralismus
im katholischen Klerus. Die Wende in den politischen Systemen im Mittel‐
und Osteuropa und der gleichzeitige Beginn des Globalisierungsprozesses
gaben den Anstoss für den Pluralismus. Vor dem Hintergrund von diesen
Umwandlungen hat der Pluralismu ein bestimmtes Niveau erreicht und
konkrete Form innerhalb der verschiedenen Gruppen des Klerus
angenommen, einschließlich der Katoliken.
Das Ergebnis war die
Fragmentierung der Theologie in eine g roße Zahl von Zweigen.
In dem Artikel mit dem Titel “Der Sohn der Gerechtigkeit in dem
Neuen Testament und in den Werken der Kirchenschriftsteller” meint Iulian
Moga, dass in den christlichen Quellen, sei es das Neue Testament oder die
Werke der Apostolischen Väter, die der Apologetiker oder von allen
Kirchenschriftstellern bis zu Johannes von Damaskus‐und hier können auch
die Kirchenschriftsteller aus Asia Minor und die Kappadokischen Väter
genannt werden– gewinnt der Begriff von Sohn der Gerechtigkeit, der sich
ausschließlich auf eine der Personen der Dreiheiligkeit oder auf die Gottheit
als ein Ganzes bezieht, neue Bedeutungen. Mit diesem Begriff werden die
meisten doktrinarischen Aspekte aus dem Bekenntnis von Nizäa schon vor
den zwei Ökumenischen Synoden akzentuiert. Das Ziel des Artikels ist es,
den Kontext darzustellen, in dem der Ausdruck bei den Heiligen Vätern
erscheint, indem Beispiele bis zur zweiten Hälfte des vierten Jahhunderts
geliefert werden, um dessen Bedeutung mit direktem Bezug zu der
Ökonomie der Erlösung hervorzuheben.
12
Leitartikel Direktores

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
La quête de sens comme recherche de liens
entre approches formelles et informelles dans la
problématique des histoires de vie
Patrick PAUL *
* Université François Rabelais, Tours, Laboratoire des sciences de l’éducation,
E‐mail Address: docppaul@wanadoo.fr
Abrégé ‡
La question du sujet rencontre donc au total trois
obstacles révélateurs de soi : celui de la
« corporalisation » (le biologique), celui de la
socialisation (le psychologique), celui enfin de la
« subjectivation » (le spirituel). Autrement dit, la quęte
identitaire supposerait de traverser trois zones de
résistance différentes avant d’espérer expérimenter la
réalité toujours fuyante d’un sujet transcendantal, grâce
ŕ sa forme imaginale, certes cachée mais expérimentée
phénoménologiquement comme un lieu oů s’incarne
l’esprit et oů se spiritualise le corps.
L’ensemble insiste sur l’approche phénoménologique,
comme volonté de jonction entre « res cognitans » et «res
extensa », ceci afin de rapprocher le sensible et
l’intelligible et sur l’approche épistémologique qui
demande de ne pas séparer la connaissance issue des
sciences de l’histoire de vie, considérée comme lieu de
reconstruction.
‡ Le résumé a été rédigé par l’éditeur en utilisant des
fragments du texte de l’étude.
La recherche de sens dans la problématique de
histoires de vie supportées par une approche
phénoménologique configure la sensation, le ressenti,
l’émotion ‐ c’est à dire les expériences vitales essentielles,
marquantes ‐ selon une intentionnalité et des significations
qui peuvent se trouver différentes selon les moments. Mais
toujours le sens s’appréhende comme signe et direction
sitôt que le sens perçu, comme manifestation visible, révèle
d’autres dimensions, cachées mais cependant présentes, de
la personne.
13

PAUL ‐ La quête de sens comme recherche de liens entre approches formelles
et informelles dans la problématique des histoires de vie
La formation, comme action de former ou de se former,
prête (il n’est qu’à lire l’énoncé du dictionnaire Larousse sous
ce mot) à de nombreuses interprétations. Parmi ces dernières,
l’approche philosophique retient la formation comme
signifiant le principe d’organisation interne et d’unification de
l’être, la succession des degrés de finalisation de la forme
correspondant au processus de perfectionnement de l’être.
Le problème de la relation de l’être et de la forme, celui
de ces transformations successives suppose du paradoxe de
l’articulation contradictoire entre principe formel, moule de
l’apparence configurant transitoirement la contingence comme
traces, et la réalité informelle de l’être, son insaisissabilité
d’essence transcendant nécessairement toute forme. Il est donc
un jeu, tant dialectique que contradictoire, entre formel et
informel, ce dernier exprimant la subjectivité de chacun au
cours de l’apprentissage et de l’expression formelle et un
incessant passage entre l’un et l’autre impliquant les concepts
de transformation, d’information. L’informel dans ce contexte,
comme abstraction réfutant les représentations classables et
reconnaissables devient alors le niveau de réalité sans doute le
plus à même de favoriser l’accès à une expérimentation, certes
voilée, mais « simple » de l’être.
Si la forme correspond au principe d’organisation
interne des apparences, l’informel renvoie ainsi à son
dépassement ce qui, en quelque domaine que ce soit, pose
à la fois d’un côté la question des normes (biologiques,
psychologiques, sociétales…) et de leur transgression,
inhérente à leur réalité et de l’autre la relation entre le
régime de l’illusion formelle, témoin d’idolâtrie et de
fantasmagories, et la forme révélatrice des traces
informelles de la présence, construction
phénoménologique de l’esprit. Le récit, l’image, le symbole
deviennent ainsi les signes d’une réalité cachée, ils
témoignent d’une dimension informelle dont la réalité nous
échappe. L’exploration du formel présuppose ainsi d’une
part invisible, agissante et agente, de même nature afin de
recomposer l’unité. La relation entre formel et informel dès
lors, à finalité éthique, se déploie identiquement à celle du
multiple et de l’un, des valeurs universelles et des
impératifs personnels.
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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Le rapport des relations entre formel et informel
pourrait s’entendre comme celui des relations entre
l’apparent (zâhir) et le caché (bâtin) dans la théologie
mystique chiîte dont traite abondamment H. Corbin. Mais
s’il existe des sens multiples non exclusifs les uns des
autres, c’est par un cheminement, une transformation
intérieure que leur élucidation intellective s’opère. Cette
posture, d’évidence herméneutique est tout autant
phénoménologique dans la mesure où la phénoménologie
ressort bien du dévoilement de la sensation, de ce qui est
caché sous l’apparence objective des choses considérées
comme des phénomènes (G. Lacaze, 2000, p. 52) :
« derrière le phénomène, derrière le sens apparent,
manifeste, il s’agit pour le phénoménologue herméneute,
de dévoiler le sens caché, ce qui n’apparaît qu’à celui qui
est capable de le recevoir » dans la mesure où un lien
existe entre modes de comprendre et modes d’être, entre
épistémologie et ontologie dans la phénoménologie. Le
monde des phénomènes, organisé et connu par les
différents degrés de la raison dans sa progression logique,
joue avec le déterminisme et le savoir. Mais il postule dans
une dynamique relationnelle et paradoxale un non
déterminisme, un non savoir (le monde du noumène) à
jamais antinomique.
1) Une phénoménologie de l’être dans l’espace et
le temps
L'histoire de vie se conçoit donc comme recherche et
construction de sens à partir de faits temporels personnels
(G. Pineau ; J‐L Le Grand, 1996). Ce qui importe, c’est que
l’espace et le temps sont des formes certes distinctes (G.
Durand, 2003, pp. 24‐27,) mais dont la possible
réunification change le nature même de ces deux entités en
leur donnant un sens. L’être – là (Dasein) est à entendre
comme « être‐au‐présent » de nous‐mêmes, comme
manière d’être dans l’instant, comme « présence ». Dès lors
l’anamnèse comme récurrence, récursivité du temps
devient une manière de retrouver, dans la relation à
15

PAUL ‐ La quête de sens comme recherche de liens entre approches formelles
et informelles dans la problématique des histoires de vie
l’espace et au temps qui lui est conjoint, un certain type
d’expérience au présent, relation à la base du sens. C’est
donc le phénomène du sens qui est support de la fondation
ontologique, les modes de l’intelligence (les niveaux
logiques), sous‐jacents aux modes phénoménologiques de
la perception et les modes de l’essence devenant les deux
faces indissociables du réel. Le temps, sitôt qu’il redevient
« kairos » en se reliant à l’espace (topos), laisse
transparaître l’individuation comme figure temporelle de
l’espace, récit visionnaire (H. Corbin). Ce renversement du
temps en espace emblématique 1 accessible à l’imaginatio
vera, devient récital d’images, Mundus imaginalis, récit et
« récital » englobant d’images (G. Durand, 2003, p. 40).
Mais réciproquement, sitôt que l’histoire devient image, le
lieu des épiphanies plurielles et concrètes engendre le
temps de l’âme, la pérégrination « exodique » de l’exilé (G.
Durand, 2003, p. 40). Les aires qui signalent les « topoi »
sont des aires de signification sémantique, des matrices qui
ordonnent le temps au sein d’un même ordre spatial.
L’espace et le temps, dès lors qu’ils ne sont plus disjoints,
deviennent les deux faces d’un processus d’unification et
de signification de l’être qui se dévoile dans et par le temps
mythique et spatialisé du récit.
C’est dans la direction de l’individuation ici soulevée
qu’il faut aller si l’on souhaite comprendre et légitimer le
courant des histoires de vie. La naissance même de ce
courant, dès le 4 ème siècle avant J.C en Grèce, en témoigne.
Un groupe peu discipliné, se considérant "philosophe",
lance en effet l'aventure des "bios". Ce sont les socratiques,
qui en font une pratique pédagogique (nous dirions
aujourd'hui une méthodologie), tentant de répondre aux
préceptes de Delphes "connais‐toi toi‐même et tu
connaîtras l'univers et les Dieux". Pour parler de cet art
naissant, Socrate, fils de sage‐femme, parle de maïeutique,
d'accouchement de soi par les idées logées en soi (le bios :
maïeutique). Comme le souligne G. Gusdorf (1990), le
vecteur temporel de l'autobiographie n'est ni rétrospectif
1 Voir dans la médecine traditionnelle chinoise les relations entre
les systèmes emblématiques du Hetu et Luoshu
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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ni projectif mais inchoatif, ouvrant sur des
commencements, des genèses, des naissances. Entre la
chronologie des histoires et l'achromie des lois et des
modèles, les histoires de vie ouvrent une tierce voie
orientée vers la recherche des sens.
Nous pouvons établir d’autres filiations entre les
approches contemporaines des histoires de vie et divers
courants plus anciens comme celui de la "bildung‐
formation" au XIXème siècle mais qui s’enracine, de façon
plus lointaine encore, chez Maître Eckhart au 15 ème siècle
ou chez Chrétien de Troyes, au 13 ème siècle (P. Paul, 2002).
Le courant de la bildung, en particulier, est en
Allemagne intégré au courant des sciences de l’esprit et se
traduit par « éducation de soi ». Référant, en premier lieu, à
Goethe il a été initié par Diltey. L’interrogation du récit de
formation, d’ordre à la fois anthropologique et spirituel,
pose la question de la structure et de la transformation de
la conscience individuelle et de son rapport au social. Le
récit de vie, dans ses fondements, s’apparente à une
ontogenèse qui interroge la façon dont un individu devient
c qu’il est. Mais par sa racine étymologique même la
bildung, comme image (bild), renvoie à la façon dont la vie,
à la fois révèle l’image archétype qui se love dans l’intime,
au plus profond de l’intériorité de chacun (l’Imago Dei) et à
la façon dont nous pouvons vivre, au quotidien, de la
manière la plus adéquate à cette image (P. Paul, 2005). Il
s’agit donc de former son âme à l’image de cette réalité
intérieure et cachée qu’il s’agit, par le processus de
formation et par le cheminement de vie qui s’y associe, sur
différents niveaux de réalité, de se révéler à soi‐même afin
d’en porter témoignage. La question de la bildung, comme
construction identitaire et quête du Nom, interroge les
dispositions qui se découvrent puis qui sont fixées au fur et
à mesure du chemin, en correspondance avec des valeurs
d’invariabilité, d’inaltérabilité et ainsi de trouver sa juste
place au sein de notre environnement humain. Nous
ignorons, au départ, ces dispositions. C’est l’expérience de
confrontation aux divers niveaux qui composent notre
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PAUL ‐ La quête de sens comme recherche de liens entre approches formelles
et informelles dans la problématique des histoires de vie
réalité humaine qui fait découvrir, par l’action, ce pour
quoi l’on est fait ou pas fait. Goethe illustre cette thèse
dans le « Wilhem Meister » en insistant sur les crises,
conversions, révélations articulant providence et destinée.
Ce modèle d’intelligibilité biographique est donc lié à une
téléologie donnant du continu dans les discontinuités de la
vie. Le sens de nos existences ne s’acquiert que dans la
mesure de la prise de conscience de la trajectoire qui fixe,
de façon inaltérable, nos qualités et capacités. Notre
histoire, quel que soit le passé qui l’enracine, a donc un
sens en termes de futur. Pour citer Merleau‐Ponty (1945 p.
471) « dès que j’introduis l’observateur, qu’il suive le cours
du ruisseau ou que, du bord de la rivière, il en constate le
passage, les rapports au temps se renversent. Dans le
second cas, les masses d’eau déjà écoulées ne vont pas vers
l’avenir, elles sombrent dans le passé ; l’à‐venir est du côté
de la source et le temps ne vient pas du passé. Ce n’est pas
le passé qui pousse le présent, ni le présent qui pousse le
futur dans l’être ; l’avenir n’est pas derrière l’observateur,
il se prémédite au devant de lui, comme l’orage à l’horizon.
Si l’observateur, placé dans la barque, suit le fil de l’eau, on
peut bien dire qu’il descend avec le courant vers son
avenir, mais l’avenir, ce sont les paysages nouveaux qui
l’attendent et le cours du temps, ce n’est plus le ruisseau
lui‐même ».
L’être se forme et se transforme en conséquence selon
un modèle interne ayant sa propre finalité. C’est donc faire
un mauvais procès que de nier les reconfigurations
cherchant à donner sens aux évènements puisque la réalité
cognitive n’est pas antérieure ou concomitante mais
postérieure aux situations vécues, le sens étant toujours
une mise en rapport entre le vécu et la forme implicite. S’il
y a une histoire et un sens, associé à la révélation de
l’Imago Dei, ce potentiel caché, qui demande comme tout
trésor à être découvert, postule d’au moins deux niveaux
de réalité et de la problématique de leur séparation,
rarement formulée. Le principe d’unification qu’ils
présupposent tisse le lien entre niveaux de réalité, les
thèmes de l’identité et de la formation qui en résultent, en
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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tant qu’auto reconnaissance de sa propre histoire, révélant
au fur et à mesure du chemin les valeurs supportées par
l’Imago Dei à la condition de bien distinguer l’image réelle
(l’identité) de l’image attendue (l’identification). Cette
tension contradictoire et unificatrice tout à la fois
interroge l’herméneutique et l’ésotérique au‐delà des
modèles socio‐historiques prégnants qui tendent, avant
tout, à la reproduction de motifs préexistants et non à la
production de sens. La finalité, aujourd’hui très oubliée, du
modèle de la bildung est en fait initiatique, son canevas
articulant les singularités de l’unique avec les généralités
de l’universel. Il s’agit de faire jaillir du visible l’invisible,
de l’apparent le caché, le supra‐perceptible de la
perception, le fixé de l’activité. La compréhension du sujet
s’explicite au mieux dans la dialectique sujet/monde
situant le sujet en action dans le monde. Mais pour qu’il y
ait formation et initiation, il ne suffit pas de vivre une
expérience. Il faut qu’il y ait, associée à la dimension
subjective de l’expérience vitale, une mise en
problématique de l’expérientiel de façon à favoriser la
reconnaissance des intentionnalités formatrices. Mais les
rapports du singulier et de l’universel reposent sur une
double incomplétude de la dialectique sujet/monde. Aucun
sujet ne peut prétendre en effet à une totale réalisation en
tant que sujet d’autant que le cheminement propre à la
quête identitaire procède par résistances et ruptures ou
par effacements et désidentifications successives. Aucun
sujet ne peut affirmer sa totale identité au monde, quel que
soit son cheminement puisqu’il ne s’agit pas d’une
accumulation d’expériences et de savoirs mais bien de la
découverte des dispositions, des vertus propres à chacun.
La bildung relève ainsi d’un savoir herméneutique d’ordre
réflexif qui fait passer du sensible (du vécu) à l’intelligible
(le sens) par auto‐connaissance. Si cette intelligibilité est,
comme l’âme et les Idées platoniciennes, préexistante à
l’existence, ce n’est qu’à la fin de la quête que le secret de
la vie apparaît pleinement. Devenir ce que l’on est, en
vérité, sans doute de toute éternité suppose ainsi d’un
19

PAUL ‐ La quête de sens comme recherche de liens entre approches formelles
et informelles dans la problématique des histoires de vie
retour vers soi‐même, d’une aptitude à dérouler le fil de
son histoire dans une temporalité libre du continu et du
discontinu de façon à « réaliser » le plan, le projet,
l’intentionnalité propre à notre « Image », ce qui, plus
habituellement, ressort de la construction identitaire.
Une des plus grandes critiques opposées à la
méthodologie des histoires de vie concerne la
configuration, la re‐figuration et reconfiguration des
histoires de vie (essentiellement la problématique du sens
et le présupposé de l’illusion et de la déformation).
L'approche psychanalytique considère en effet (P. Paul,
2003) que ce processus peut être l'objet d'illusions, de
déformations, de manipulations, dans la mesure où n'est
pas tenu en compte l'inconscient, via les théories de
refoulement, de la névrose, du transfert… Ce
questionnement a été l'objet de ma recherche de doctorat
en mettant en parallèle repères diurnes et nocturnes, récits
de formation et récits de rêves, conscient et inconscient,
formel et informel tant dans le questionnement identitaire
que dans la méthodologie des histoires de vie.
2) Histoire de vie, entre approche consciente et
inconsciente.
L'histoire de vie, sous la forme d'un récit oral et/ou
écrit, est la narration, avons nous dit, qu'un individu fait de
certains événements marquants de sa vie. Mais le récit, soit
naturellement, soit en liaison avec la problématique d'une
recherche, procède par sélection, réorganisation,
structuration.
Autrement dit, toute approche en histoire de vie
devrait s'interroger tout autant sur la parole énoncée (le
récit, logos) que sur les silences, les non‐dit (le récit,
muthos) ou les sélections, les reconfigurations, ce qui
postule une dialectique formelle/informelle, su/insu,
rationalité/imagination, conscient/inconscient, qu'il
conviendrait d'approfondir. Ricoeur (1983) avance le
couple « mimèsis‐muthos » comme opérant sur le
dynamisme de toute analyse. Si la mimèsis se comprend
comme re‐présentation, imitation (le dire du récit), il est
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une mise en intrigue des faits qui ressort du muthos (de
leur agencement) et qui fait que c’est l’intrigue, bien plus
encore que la représentation de l’action, qui devrait
interpeller. L’action devient le corrélat de l’activité
mimétique régie par l’agencement des faits. L’étymologie
du mot « mythe », précisément « muthos » en grec, renvoie,
certes, à la « parole » (muthein : « parler »), mais celle‐ci
réfère, d’évidence, à une parole intérieure, à une dimension
organisatrice, légendaire, à un récit lié aux grands
archétypes de l’âme et qui manifesteraient l’inconscient
rendu conscient, précisément par le récit dès lors que le
narrateur/auteur a effectué le chemin permettant d’en
découvrir la « mise en intrigue » et « l’agencement » sous‐
jacent donnant toute leur intelligibilité aux actes.
Cette percée ouvre un espace d’expériences et un
horizon illimité à effet anthropoformateur. L’apport de
cette expression, surtout s’il s’agit d’approches auto‐
référentielles, en faisant entrer des personnes qui parlent
pour devenir sujets, interroge frontalement le paradigme
scientifique disciplinaire. Le verdict d’illusion
biographique, que nous avons réfuté, peut se résoudre à la
condition d’introduire d’autres logiques de pensée. Ce sont,
en particulier, ces autres compréhensions du monde qui
peuvent construire une connaissance tant formelle
qu’informelle. Celles‐ci, d’un contenu autant
anthropologique qu’épistémologique, appèlent donc des
approches radicalement nouvelles, ce que la
transdisciplinarité rend présentement possible.
L’articulation entre formel et informel, analogue à diurne
et nocturne, pose deux temps de la formation que G. Pineau
(1998) nomme formation formelle et expérientielle. La
dimension formelle et diurne s’enracine de façon
dominante dans le champ de l’hétéroformation à la
différence de la formation expérientielle qui supporte bien
plus les valeurs de l’autoformation. Ces deux temps
prennent en compte la dimension temporelle dans son
hétérogénéité, ils se succèdent et imposent leur
reconnaissance, tant dans la formation que dans la
21

PAUL ‐ La quête de sens comme recherche de liens entre approches formelles
et informelles dans la problématique des histoires de vie
méthodologie des histoires de vie. La mise en tension et en
relation de ces deux temps anthropoformateurs,
radicalement autres l’un de l’autre, supporte la
théorisation de la formation de la personne, inscrite dans
la dualité des temps mais dans la continuité du devenir. Les
essais de compréhension des effets formateurs,
déformateurs et transformateurs interpelle les histoires de
vie par la transdisciplinarité en ce sens que les relations
épistémologiques de la seconde croisent les
préoccupations méthodologiques de la première.
Dans le cadre de l'histoire de la personne en effet, la
méthodologie des histoires de vie nous offre une forme qui
renvoie à la narration d'un supposé vécu. Elle est une
enquête sur ce que l'on veut conserver car considéré
comme signifiant. Mais le récit figuré, avons nous dit à
propos de l’histoire, est toujours icône visible et opérateur
de l'absence tout à la fois, nous y reviendrons, postulant
d’autres réalités cachées de l’humain. L'histoire de vie offre
à reconnaître dans ce que l'on dit ce que l'on voit au
moment présent ou ce dont on souhaite pouvoir témoigner.
Ce dire constitue ou destitue une pensée signifiant l'être ou
sa parodie.
Nous rejoignons en ces propos l'approche
phénoménologique de M. Foucault (1966) pour qui
l'histoire est à considérer comme le lieu même de la
reconstruction et celle de Merleau‐Ponty (1945) qui
considère nous l’avons dit, l'avenir du côté de la source du
fleuve bien plus que du côté de l'océan. Car le temps qui se
retourne du côté de l'origine lie de façon plus étroite le
sensible et l'intelligible. La mémoire, qui témoigne de cette
relation, n'est plus alors à considérer objectivement,
comme l’approche positiviste voudrait le laisser croire
mais elle est sujette à un processus dynamique en
réorganisation permanente. C'est donc un processus de
formation/transformation permanente dont les récits de
vie témoignent, chaque histoire devenant la fixation, à un
instant particulier, d'une dynamique cognitive formelle
tendue vers l'horizon secret, informel et à jamais voilé du
sujet qui, cependant, oriente et se signifie dans
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
l'organisation interne de ses manifestations. La métaphore
du chemin, dont traite abondamment Buber et sur laquelle
il nous semble important d'insister, illustre donc bien la
problématique des histoires de vie.
L'exigence scientifique d'une mise à distance des
croyances et des opinions valorisant une recherche à visée
cognitive de signification des expériences peut en
conséquence passer par le récit. Entrer dans l'histoire, par
le récit, c'est être capable de construire une temporalité
ordonnée à visée informative. Simplement, les
informations touchent ici à la réalité de sujets non
seulement conscients mais inconscients, le travail sur le
récit modifiant au final l'action et ses conséquences (P.
Ricoeur). Par delà ses défaillances, la reconfiguration
analysée de l'histoire de vie en intégrant l’inconscient
donne à l'herméneutique sa validité en permettant de
réorganiser des expériences personnelles afin de leur
donner du sens, au delà des individualités. La
compréhension et le sens ressortent d’un dialogue. Or il
n’est pas de dialogue entre un « je » et un « tu » qui ne soit
inclusif, pour Buber, d’un dialogue entre un « je » et
« cela ». Le rapport à autrui et le rapport au monde ne sont
pas des données indépendantes. Autrui est un sujet qui
perçoit le monde, le même monde que je perçois.
L’irruption de l’autre, depuis le dehors, devient l’écho
d’une résonance du dedans. Ce n’est donc pas l’événement
en soi, sa configuration, mais la manière de le vivre qui
porte sens. Cette manière signe la potentialité
organisatrice à l’œuvre dans celui qui reçoit et qui
interprète l’événement et que l’événement rend ainsi
manifeste. Il est donc un lien entre ce qui fait l’événement,
ce qui lui donne sens et ce qui œuvre et met en œuvre.
L’objectif des histoires de vie est une élucidation du statut
de l’homme en situation dans le monde qui articule à la
lecture des faits et des évènements celle de leur ressenti,
évolutif selon le sens qu’on leur donne au fur et à mesure
du déroulement temporel.
23

PAUL ‐ La quête de sens comme recherche de liens entre approches formelles
et informelles dans la problématique des histoires de vie
Le sens donné à histoire singulière par le récit de vie
engage donc sur la voie du mythe des origines, associé à
l’inconscient et c'est sans doute à ce prix, même s'il n'est
jamais affirmé, que l'histoire rationnelle, ordonnée et
structurée par nos souvenirs, devient porteuse de vie, de
connaissance et d'auto connaissance. Se pose donc
d'emblée autant la relation entre soi et l’autre, entre
individu et société qu’entre histoire de vie personnelle et
histoire mythique de l’âme qui composent, d’une manière
ou de l’autre, toute réalité humaine.
Devenir homme c'est donc toujours bricoler sa vie en
allant dans les voies obliques qui relient savoir conscient et
savoir insu ou inconscient. Dès lors, et quels que soient les
biais possibles ou les dangers de la narration, toute
personne qui parle décline une faculté transitoire de son
identité à la fois consciente et inconsciente, au fur et à
mesure de son récit et de son interprétation, les phases qui
composent son cheminement et la façon de les configurer
manifestant nécessairement une valeur liée tant à la
qualité d'être de l'instant qu’aux aptitudes de relation
entre niveaux de réalité différents de la surface aux
profondeurs. La question de la formation du sujet
transparaît donc toujours en filigrane de toute recherche
de mise en forme et en sens de données, au point de
convergence de deux réalités radicalement autres entre
elles. L'élucidation de ce processus, qui tisse les relations
du même et de l'autre manque cependant habituellement
des méthodes aptes à le révéler que le croisement des
récits articulant logos et mythos, rationalité et ressenti,
réflexion et imagination, diurne et nocturne, inversement,
rend possible.
Le point souvent critiqué, en particulier par la
psychanalyse, concerne le déni de l'inconscient dans les
méthodologies habituelles des histoires de vie. Notre
positionnement, nous le démontrons, est différent puisque
l'inconscient, l'informel, le mythe, le rêve, participent du
processus.
Autrement dit, l'interaction veille‐sommeil, régime
diurne‐régime nocturne semble donner une nouvelle
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
crédibilité, inscrite dans la dynamique même du bios, aux
souvenirs en reconfiguration permanente, en leur offrant
l'indispensable dimension subjective, dynamique et
anthropo‐formatrice qui structure nos transformations en
créant de nouveaux liens entre concepts, illumination
artistique et créativité. Valoriser la part nocturne de la
construction identitaire permet de s’attarder un temps sur
les mises en forme et en sens du récit qui privilégient le
sensible et le mythique, le poétique par rapport à la logique
de la pensée analytique qui nous imprègne tous. Cela
favorise, à la condition de s’y abandonner, le contact à nos
profondeurs.
C'est dans la diachronie des récits que peut
transparaître, par synchronie, une autre réalité de soi, à la
condition que puisse exister, dans la forme événementielle
avancée, la résonance phénoménale d'une autre réalité,
cachée. L'accès au réel, toujours sur fond voilé, passe par le
détour de la perception, de son énonciation, de la
spéculation raisonnée sur l'objet dirigeant vers la prise de
conscience du sujet. Il impose également le rapport et le
tissage entre une réalité diurne, à dominant hétéro‐
formative, et une dimension nocturne, auto‐formative. Le
rêve, en particulier, fait remonter un anté‐sujet (G.
Bachelard) par dilution des formes, un inconscient bio‐
cognitif s'articulant au conscient et permettant de se
trouver (heuristique : heurêka).
3) L’humain comme articulation entre deux
natures
Le sujet et l’anté-sujet bachelardien, comme nature et
culture chez Chrétien de Troyes, modes explicatifs et
compréhensifs dans la philosophie du XVIIIème siècle,
physique classique et quantique au XXème siècle, régime
diurne et nocturne pour G. Durand, Ego et Alter Ego divin
avec H. Corbin (la liste n’est pas exhaustive) présupposent
toujours de couples opposés et contradictoires appelant une
mise en tension et une résolution unificatrice. Cette
situation peut se symboliser sous le forme d’un couple
25

PAUL ‐ La quête de sens comme recherche de liens entre approches formelles
et informelles dans la problématique des histoires de vie
signifiant deux évènements contradictoires, A et non-A (⎯A
), et d’un état T considéré comme état (lieu et temporalité)
apte à manifester la réunion de la contradiction préalable.
Ce « tiers inclus », qui suppose d’un changement de logique
par rapport au tiers exclu, s’appréhende comme point de
rencontre entre l’état de semi potentialisation de A (l’état T
de AT ) et l’état de semi actualisation de non-A (l’état T
de⎯AT). Cette rencontre d’ordre paradoxal, nous l’avons
suffisamment explicité par ailleurs (P. Paul, 2003), ne peut
s’engager que sur un autre niveau de réalité que celui de A
et de non A et dans lequel les lois deviennent différentes.
Pour Y. Barel (1979), le moment idéal pour étudier le
paradoxe est dans son émergence ce qui correspond à l’état
T de rencontre des contradictoires préalablement mentionné.
Cette interaction est un choc entre éléments opposés, un
moment paradoxal destructeur/créateur dont les effets
inverses ne peuvent s’appréhender à la conscience que dans
l’alternance d’une double forme, tantôt liée aux épreuves
d’un nécessaire lâcher-prise, tantôt aux espoirs les plus fous
d’une reconstruction. L’état T comme troisième élément,
identiquement au triangle pédagogique de J. Houssaye,
réfère au tiers invisible mais constitutif des relations (Y.
Bertrand, 1999). Cet état qui résulte aussi du « tissage » de
la vie et de son activité contraire, la mort, dirige donc vers
une autre réalité qui, pour reprendre la belle phrase d’H.
Corbin, spiritualise le corps et « corporalise » l’esprit. Entre
temps biologique/nature/génétique et temps
psychosocial/culture/collectif, le temps individuel et
personnel (kairos), toujours vécu au présent, devient la
mesure du parcours et du mouvement, c’est à dire du
changement comme appréhension du sens que l’on donne à
sa vie. Les nœuds de ce tissage nous l’avons avancé (P.
Paul, 2003), comme ligatures des nœuds de la vie entre
activités divergentes et contradictoires, fixent la Forme
imaginale comme révélation, en soi, de soi et manifestation
théophanique de l’un grâce à la réunion des deux faces,
formelle et informelle, de la réalité.
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Trois lieux, au moins, sont donc indispensables pour
l’appréhender dans sa plénitude. L’un ressort de l’univers
extérieur, l’autre appartient à l’univers intérieur, le dernier
enfin à l’espace-temps de médiation qui se construit à la
condition de retrouver le chemin du voir et la vie qui se
cachent sous les relations entre l’apparence phénoménale
des choses et leur essence « numineuse » et cachée. La
quête identitaire du sujet serait alors ce qui lui apparaît au
fur et à mesure de la recherche d’une unité perdue qui
relirait en les intégrant deux aspects, apparent et caché, duel
et non-duel de la personne. Deux statuts ontologiques autant
qu’épistémologiques président donc à l’humain selon qu’on
le situe en tant qu’objet de connaissance ou en tant que sujet
vivant. En parallèle la connaissance, séparée par la
transgression et la mortalité de la vie, possède en son cœur
une possible délivrance par unification, c’est au moins ce
qu’affirme le mythe quand le Serpent énonce notre aptitude
à devenir « comme Dieu » (Genèse, III, 5). Il s’agit alors de
connaître, paradoxalement, l’Un par l’intégration non-duelle
de notre double nature, cette création d’un « inter-monde
imaginal », pour reprendre H. Corbin, équivalant à
l’inscription d’un cheminement dont l’enjeu cognitif le plus
fondamental consiste à briser les voiles de la mort (« non,
vous ne mourrez point, Dieu sait, en effet, que le jour où
vous en mangerez, vos yeux s’ouvriront et que vous serez
comme Dieu, connaissant le bien et le mal » Genèse III, 4-
5). Il est donc un niveau d’ouverture des yeux à la réalité
physique et duelle, lié à la mort, qui s’oppose à un autre
niveau d’ouverture des yeux, de l’ordre de la non-dualité, de
l’auto connaissance, de l’accès à un inter-monde imaginal et
vital. Si, en ce processus, différents niveaux de soi
coexistent, leurs distinctions et intégrations supposent à leur
tour une gnoséologie faite de ruptures et de relations (en
particulier d’ordre épistémologique) inscrivant des réalités
différentes (sans quoi il n’y aurait point de distinction). Le
chemin sinueux de notre enquête affirme donc la
reconnaissance d’impératifs de mutations, de morts et de
27

PAUL ‐ La quête de sens comme recherche de liens entre approches formelles
et informelles dans la problématique des histoires de vie
renaissances, celles-ci, par modification progressive des
structures relationnelles entre le « Même » et « l’Autre »,
organisant et ordonnançant nos rapports au monde, aux
autres et à nous-mêmes (alter Ego) .
La traversée vers l’autre rive de soi se construit ainsi
par mise en synchronie de deux processus distincts. L’un
réside dans la traversée des niveaux de réalité considérés
comme ruptures et obstacles qui résistent et qui
s’opposent (option duelle). L’autre impose d’expérimenter
la posture inhérente aux ponts qui réunissent entre eux les
niveaux de réalité différents (option non‐duelle). Cette
dernière opération ressort de la relation, de l’entre‐deux,
du tiers inclus, c’est à dire d’une épistémologie de
l’effacement formel et de la transparence tant vitale que
subjective et non d’une épistémologie de la réduction
déterministe et de la résistance cognitive de l’objet.
L’ensemble du processus, formel et informel,
séparant/reliant l’objet et le sujet, permet de faire retour à
l’origine de soi. La mémoire, qui témoigne de cette relation,
n’est plus alors à considérer objectivement, ainsi qu’une
approche par trop positiviste tendrait à l’affirmer, mais
sujette à un processus dynamique en réorganisation
permanente, capable d’oublis et d’intégrations, en tout cas
de transformations, de reproductions modifiées et de
restructurations impliquant le sommeil (Nature, vol 427,
pp. 352‐355 et pp 304‐305, 22 janvier 2004).
A partir du moment où plusieurs déterminismes,
associés à chacun des niveaux de réalité, agissent
simultanément, l’imprévisibilité devient la règle. Les
confrontations entre déterminismes personnels, sociaux,
familiaux et la vacuité d’essence de l’individu créent un jeu,
un espace de liberté apte aux changements. Ce phénomène,
d’ordre chaotique, en générant des points de bifurcation,
obéit cependant à des capacités internes, cachées d’auto
organisation qui se révèlent par tension en dirigeant vers
la réalisation de sa propre nature. Le non équilibre aboutit
donc à une nouvelle cohérence, un nouvel état présentant
des propriétés différentes, plus aptes à manifester le
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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principe d’individuation, l’informel, l’inconscient, devenant
ici le fil de chaîne, l’agent conducteur du processus.
Les problèmes de la relation de l’être et de la forme,
des transformations successives liées à cette interaction
supposent ainsi de s’introduire dans le paradoxe de
l’articulation contradictoire entre principe formel, moule
de l’apparence, configurant transitoirement la contingence
comme traces, et réalité informelle de l’être dont
l’insaisissabilité d’essence transcende nécessairement
toute forme. Nous rejoignons ici C. Jambet (2003) qui,
commentant Sohravardî, considère que la forme est
substance lumineuse tandis que la matière est substance
opaque, barzakh 2 . Il est donc un jeu, tant dialectique que
contradictoire, entre formel et informel et un incessant
passage entre l’un et l’autre impliquant au passage les
concepts d’information et de transformation. L’informel
dans ce contexte, comme abstraction réfutant les
représentations classables et reconnaissables, devient
alors le niveau de réalité sans doute le plus apte à favoriser
une expérimentation par implication, certes voilée, mais
« simple » du sujet.
Dans le cadre de l’histoire de vie de la personne ou dans
celui, plus particulier, la phénoménologie des rêves, la forme
renvoie à la narration du vécu existentiel ou onirique. Elle
interroge sur ce que l’on veut conserver, ce qui est considéré
comme signifiant et dont elle constitue le récit figuré par les
sensations, les émotions, les images ou les visions. Les images
offertes, en donnant sens au récit, deviennent autant icônes
visibles qu’opérateurs de l’absence (M-J. Mondzain, 2003).
Elles offrent à reconnaître dans ce que l’on dit et dans ce que
l’on voit ce qui constitue ou ce qui destitue la pensée et, plus
encore, ce qui signifie l’être ou sa parodie. Dans l’expérience
formelle du rêve le récit, comme image, par la vision de
« l’autre » offre à découvrir le « Même ». Mais la similitude
n’est ni dans le récit ni dans la vision mais à leur horizon, qui
2 Voir les analogies de cette énonciation avec la dialectique
bien/lumière ; mal/ténèbres dans la tradition biblique.
29

PAUL ‐ La quête de sens comme recherche de liens entre approches formelles
et informelles dans la problématique des histoires de vie
suggère ce qui n’est pas montré. L’informel, comme paysage
et perspective secrète de la similitude, donne à la
dissemblance ses lettres de noblesse en renvoyant à autre
chose qu’elle même, le réel insaisissable et à jamais voilé
demeurant pourtant, de la sorte, signifié et orienté.
Si la forme correspond au principe d’organisation interne
des apparences, l’informel fait écho à cette matrice invisible et
à son dépassement ce qui, en quelque domaine que ce soit,
pose à la fois d’un côté la question des normes ou des valeurs
(biologiques, psychologiques, sociétales, identitaires …) et de
l’autre leur transgression, inhérente à leur impératif continuel
de dépassement. Si l’enjeu de cette contradiction ressort d’un
questionnement éthique, cette dialectique interroge en
parallèle la relation entre le régime de l’illusion formelle,
témoin d’idolâtrie et de fantasmagories, et celui de la forme
« réelle » (l’Imago Dei) considérée comme révélation des
traces informelles de la présence et manifestation
phénoménologique de l’esprit. Le récit, l’image, le rêve, le
symbole deviennent ainsi les signes d’une réalité cachée, ils
témoignent d’une dimension informelle dont la réalité nous
échappe. L’exploration de la forme, le contenu des rêves
présupposent ainsi possiblement d’une part invisible de nature
différente, agissante et agente, afin de recomposer l’Unité.
La relation entre formel et informel dès lors, à finalité
éthique et ontologique, se déploie identiquement à celle du
multiple et de l’Un, des impératifs personnels et des valeurs
universelles. Si la forme (M. Fabre, 1994) répond à la question
du (pour)quoi en définissant l’objet, son dynamisme sousjacent,
comme principe informel, sous-tend la question du
(pour)qui. Pour l’avoir développé par ailleurs (P. Paul, 2003)
ce processus affirme, nous l’avons compris, la réalisation d’un
cheminement cognitif, d’un parcours transformateur (M.
Buber, 1995) se signifiant en diverses stations construisant les
interactions, sur différents niveaux de réalité, entre l’objet et
le sujet (P. Paul, 2005). Deux approches, deux méthodes
complémentaires officient donc en parallèle, l’une tenant à
l’opacité et à la résistance de l’objet (approche scientifique et
explicative) et valorisant la rationalité objective et
instrumentale, l’autre attestant de la transparence du sujet
(approche herméneutique et compréhensive), de rationalité
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
subjective et narrative. La formation du sujet affirme donc une
dimension plus profonde que le savoir classique, fondé
aujourd’hui sur un monisme matérialiste contraire à tout jeu
dialectique et à toute connaissance « vraie » de l’être. Celle-ci
impose en effet diverses phases d’acquisition impliquant un
cheminement de l’humain entre transformation formelle et
insaisissabilité (informelle) d’essence, la problématique de la
mort, physique autant qu’initiatique, devenant sans doute
l’indicateur le plus fondamental de ce cheminement (P. Paul,
2003). Si l’on accepte ce processus, le statut de l’ordre formel
(logique, sociologique…) se trouve confronté, dans ses
marges, à l’imprévu, au chaos, identiquement à la façon dont
le canon littéraire confucéen, vecteur de l’ordre social,
rencontre le statut de l’extraordinaire (d’inspiration plus
taoïste) inversant inopinément le « controuvé » en merveilleux
(F. Jullien, 2004). Seul ce type de processus, par construction
dialectique, donne stabilité à l’acquis par recherche de
conformité, comme le caractère « extraordinaire » de sa
déstabilisation donne leur mort aux formes, dynamisant ainsi
leur capacité d’essor et leur aptitude de mutation.
Mais en quoi consiste ce caractère « extraordinaire »,
facteur transversal, transgressif et marginal de
transformation ?
L’une de nos pistes de recherche, de longue date, a
considéré à affirmer que le statut, tant difforme qu’informe, du
« merveilleux » dirige vers l’imaginaire (comme image,
simulacre) et le « monde imaginal » (comme imaginatio vera –
H. Corbin, 1971 ; 1980) qui interviennent, le plus souvent de
façon implicite, dans la formation et la transformation. La
Forme, au sens d’Imago dei, de reconnaissance et de processus
identitaire, provient dans notre approche de la neutralisation
des deux activités contraires que sont le conforme et
l’informe, à l’interface des rythmes du dehors et de ceux du
dedans. Cette dialectique devient un moyen de travailler la
complexité (« tisser ensemble »), la mise en rapport des
contradictoires orientant dans la direction d’un troisième
élément jaillissant de leur neutralisation (l’Un) comme
« Forme identitaire véritable » en quelque sorte « ressuscitée »
mais située dans un autre niveau de réalité que celui sur lequel
31

PAUL ‐ La quête de sens comme recherche de liens entre approches formelles
et informelles dans la problématique des histoires de vie
sont impliqués les contraires que sont l’ « objet » et le
« sujet ». Entre temps biologique (génétique) et temps social
(collectif) le temps personnel (identitaire), toujours vécu au
présent, devient la mesure du parcours et du mouvement, c’est
à dire du changement. Les nœuds du tissage, comme ligature
des étapes du chemin de vie, fixent la Forme imaginale qui,
par ce processus, se re-connaît elle-même, cette révélation, en
soi, de soi, manifestation théophanique de l’Un, s’engageant
donc grâce à la réunion des deux faces, formelle et informelle,
duelle et non-duelle, qui la composent. Le chemin, alors,
devient ce qui s’inscrit au-delà de toute direction particulière,
ne répondant ni du savoir ni du non-savoir. Le savoir réfère au
passé, à l’expérience issue de l’existence mais il devient vite
obsolète ou limité face à l’imprévu. Ne pas savoir est
ignorance ou confusion mais peut tout autant référer à l’état
originel. Réaliser l’unité, au-delà des doutes, tend vers la
vacuité. La voie véritable est sans-voie affirment les textes
taoïstes.
Pour reprendre G. Pineau (2001), la construction du
sujet est prise dans l’entre‐deux abyssal d’un sujet
transcendant inaccessible et d’un sujet subordonné
socialement. A cette dyade il faut adjoindre le sujet
corporellement et génétiquement déterminé, en
interaction permanente avec son environnement naturel et
dont, pour reprendre E. Morin (1970) dans son
introduction de « L’homme et la mort », la complexité
biologique accentue le désordre pour y puiser le
renouvellement existentiel de son ordre. Mais en parallèle,
si le corps est substance, il est aussi forme, présentant un
statut ambiguë qu’il faudra comprendre. Si la forme est
lumière, il est alors seulement quasi‐forme, forme de
l’apparence, du semblant. Il résiste à la lumière spirituelle
et peut corrompre ce qu’il est incapable de créer (C.
Jambet, 2003), le salut consistant, toujours pour le même
auteur, à se rapprocher des lumières spirituelles et à se
représenter, dans le monde imaginal, que l’on appartient à
ces pures lumières. La force de l’imagination peut alors
convertir cette semblance en existence effective, l’âme
faisant retour à la lumière intelligible : « La délivrance a
lieu quand l’âme se connaît elle‐même, dans la relation
32

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
simple à la lumière des lumières, se sait être sa
manifestation et son miroir » (C. Jambet, 2003, pp 90‐91).
Cette aspiration à l’informel, enfin, s’apparente, dans son
essence, à un processus d’autoformation dans la mesure où
le concept de soi, qui la sous‐tend, tisse bien les liens entre
une subjectivité absolue, une subjectivité informelle et une
subjectivité formelle, pro‐jetée et re‐présentative (P. Paul,
2005, p. 181). Par sa relation avec les attitudes non
intentionnelles, l’informel insiste sur la problématique du
désir et de l’inconscient, entre pulsions vitales, sexuelles et
quête de sens.
Pour conclure:
La question du sujet rencontre donc au total trois
obstacles révélateurs de soi : celui de la « corporalisation »
( le biologique), celui de la socialisation (le psychologique),
celui enfin de la « subjectivation » (le spirituel). Autrement
dit, la quête identitaire supposerait de traverser trois
zones de résistance différentes avant d’espérer
expérimenter la réalité toujours fuyante d’un sujet
transcendantal, grâce à sa forme imaginale, certes cachée
mais expérimentée phénoménologiquement comme un lieu
où s’incarne l’esprit et où se spiritualise le corps. La
question du lieu, sur différents niveaux de réalité, devient
alors la clé de la problématique identitaire et ontologique.
Elle affirme la complexité de l'homme pluriel, de son
éclatement, de son possible remembrement, en insistant
sur le processus anthropologique de formation qui s'y
associe.
L’ensemble insiste sur l’approche phénoménologique,
comme volonté de jonction entre « res cognitans » et « res
extensa », ceci afin de rapprocher le sensible et l’intelligible
et sur l’approche épistémologique qui demande de ne pas
séparer la connaissance issue des sciences de l’histoire de
vie, considérée comme lieu de reconstruction. Ce qui
importe ici est de considérer que le temps se retourne sitôt
que s’unissent de façon plus étroite les mots et les choses,
l’intelligible et le sensible. L’origine alors, comme non
33

PAUL ‐ La quête de sens comme recherche de liens entre approches formelles
et informelles dans la problématique des histoires de vie
encore manifestée, non encore formalisée s’expérimente
sous fond de présence absente, comme une forme
potentielle de l’être vers laquelle tendre. L’informel, en ce
contexte, s’appréhende comme le réel originel orientant
nos actes et appelant à manifester par con‐formité la voie
et la marque, c’est à dire le « sceau » de l’être.
Bibliographie
1. BAREL, Y., 1979, réed. 1982, Le paradoxe et le système, essai
sur le fantastique social, Ed. Presses Universitaires de Grenoble
2. BERTRAND, Y., Le triangle pédagogique : une structure, une
action, une narration, dans Carrefours de l’éducation N° 7, janvier‐
juin 1999, p.7‐22
3. BUBER, M., 1995, Le chemin de l’homme, Ed. du Rocher
4. CORBIN, H., 1971, L’homme de lumière dans le soufisme
iranien, Ed. Présence
5. CORBIN, H., 1980, Temple et contemplation, essais sur
l’Islam iranien, Ed. Flammarion
6. DURAND, G., 2003, Structures Eranos I, Contretemps Ed. La
Table Ronde
7. FABRE, M. 1994, Penser la formation, PUF
8. FOUCAULT, M., 1966, Les mots et les choses, une archéologie
des sciences humaines, nrf Ed. Gallimard
9. GUSDORF, G., 1990, Lignes de vie 1‐ Les écritures du moi, Ed.
Odile Jacob
10. LUPASCO, S., 1987, Le principe d’antagonisme et la logique
de l’énergie, Ed. L’Hermann, 1951, réed. Le rocher
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No. 2, January 2008
11. HOUSSAYE, J., Le triangle pédagogique : rappels, dans
Carrefours de l’éducation N° 7, janvier‐juin 1999, p. 3‐6
12. JAMBET, C., 2003, Le caché et l’apparent, Ed. de l’Herne
13. JULLIEN, F., 2004, La Chaîne et la trame, PUF
14. LACAZE, G., 2000, « Témoignage et herméneutique chez P.
Ricoeur et H. Corbin », dans « Henry Corbin et le comparatisme
spirituel », Ed. Arché Edidit
15. NICOLESCU, B., 1996, La transdisciplinarité, manifeste, Ed.
du Rocher
16. MERLEAU‐PONTY, 1945, La phénoménologie de la
perception, Ed. Gallimard, Coll. Tel
17. MONDZAIN, M‐J., 2003, Le commerce des regards, Ed. du
Seuil
18. MORIN, E., 1970, L’homme et la mort, Ed. du Seuil, Coll.
Points‐Essais
19. PAUL, P., 2002, « Perceval de Chrétien de Troyes et le récit
de formation », dans Chemins de formation, au fil du temps N° 4,
Nantes, Ed. du Petit Véhicule, pp. 24‐32
20. PAUL, P., 2003, Formation du sujet et transdisciplinarité,
histoire de vie imaginale et professionnelle, Ed. L’Harmattan
21. PAUL, P., 2005, « sujet, autoformation, anthropoformation
et niveaux de réalité, dans « Transdisciplinarité et formation »,
coord. P. Paul et G. Pineau, Ed. L’Harmattan, pp. 175‐202
22. PINEAU, G., 2001, « Un sujet anthropologique
interloquant », communication au colloque d’Angers, mai 2001, Le
récit biographique, enjeux anthropologiques, à paraître
23. PINEAU, G; Le Grand, J‐L, 1996, Les histoires de vie, PUF
24. RICOEUR, P., 1983, Temps et récit 1. L’intrigue et le récit
historique, Ed. du Seuil, Coll. Points‐Essais
35

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
Le rapport catéchèse‐théologie‐pédagogie dans la
perspective de l’enseignement religieux actuel
Carmen BOLOCAN *
*"Al. I. Cuza" University, “Dumitru Stăniloae” Faculty of Orthodox Theology,
Closca Street, No. 9, 700066, Iasi, Romania
Résumé
Dans notre étude intitulée Le rapport catéchèse‐théologie‐
pédagogie dans la perspective de l’enseignement religieux actuel, on a
essayé de souligner le lien qui a existé et qui doit exister, à l’avenir
aussi, entre la théologie, la catéchèse et la pédagogie, dans la
perspective de l’enseignement religieux de nos jours.
La catéchèse est, à ses origines, une narration transmise par des
croyants à d’autres croyants. Elle dérive du discours théologique, elle
est un acte interdisciplinaire. L’acte théologique est vécu comme une
tentative d’interprétation qui s’efforce de faire parler la Parole de
Dieu en fonction d’une culture déterminée. L’interaction pédagogie‐
contenu est essentielle à la découverte de la relation qu’entretiennent
l’acte théologique et l’acte catéchétique.
Notre conclusion est que la catéchèse représente la mise en
forme discursive de la foi, et la foi relève toujours d’une théologie,
parce qu’elle relève toujours d’un discours.
Abstract
In our study, The Relation: Catechesis – Theology – Pedagogy
from the Perspective of the Current Religious Education, we have
tried to underline the relationship that existed and must
continue to exist between theology, catechesis and pedagogy,
from the point of view of the current religious education.
Catechesis is, at its origins, a narrative, a story, transmitted
from one believer to another. It derives from the theological
discourse and is an interdisciplinary act. The theological act is
lived as an attempt at interpretation that strives to talk about
God’s Word depending on a determined culture. The interaction
pedagogy – content is essential within the relationship that
exists between the theological act and the catechetic one.
Our conclusion is that catechesis represents the setting of
belief into a discursive form, and that belief is born of a theology
as it is always born of a discourse.
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BOLOCAN ‐ Le rapport catéchèse‐théologie‐pédagogie dans la perspective de
l’enseignement religieux actuel
La catéchèse est l’une des tâches apostoliques qui a le
plus évolué dans ses méthodes et a entrepris depuis longtemps
une recherche approfondie sur ses enjeux et ses implications.
Les 27 écrits qui composent le Nouveau Testament
relèvent de genres littéraires variés: épîtres, évangiles,
récits, littérature apocalyptique. Ils témoignent, cependant,
d’une préoccupation commune, qu’on peut qualifier de
catéchétique dans le sens qu’ils s’ordonnent à l’intelligence
et à la transmission de la foi. Loin de s’opposer au récit, la
catéchèse est, elle‐même, originairement, narration
transmise par des croyants à d’autres croyants. L’Evangile
selon Luc, par exemple, s’ouvre par ce prologue: „Puisque
beaucoup ont entrepris de composer un récit des
événements accomplis parmi nous, d’après ce que nous ont
transmis ceux qui furent dès le début témoins oculaires et
qui sont devenus serviteurs de la parole, il m’a paru bon, à
moi aussi, après m’être soigneusement informé de tout à
partir des origines, d’en écrire pour toi un récit ordonné,
afin que tu puisses constater la solidité des enseignements
que tu as reçu” 1 . Dans un tout autre langage, le quatrième
évangile expose un dessein analogue en concluant: „Jésus a
opéré sous les yeux de ses disciples bien d’autres signes
qui ne sont pas rapportés dans ce livre. Ceux‐ci l’ont été
pour que vous croyiez que Jésus est le Christ, le Fils de
Dieu, et pour que, en croyant, vous avez la vie en son
nom” 2 . De son côté, la fin de l’Evangile selon Mathieu met
dans la bouche du Seigneur une parole d’envoi qui sera
considérée comme la Charte de la catéchèse chrétienne:
„Allez, de toutes les nations faites des disciples, les
baptisant au nom du Père et du Fils et du Saint Esprit, leur
apprenant à garder tout ce que je vous ai prescrit” 3 .
38
1 Luc 1, 1‐4.
2 Jean 20, 30‐31.
3 Mathieu 28, 19‐20.

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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I. Les origines de la catéchèse chrétienne
I.1. L’enseignement des apôtres
Pour caractériser la vie de la première communauté
chrétienne de Jérusalem, le livre des Actes recourt à cette
formulation: „Ils étaient assidus à l’enseignement (didachè)
des apôtres et à la communion fraternelle, à la fraction du
pain et aux prières” 4 .
En étudiant les éléments utilisés par les rédacteurs,
on parvient à mieux cerner les caractéristiques de
l’enseignement des apôtres. Celui‐ci s’alimente à plusieurs
sources, y compris certains courants de la pensée grecque
tel que le stoïcisme. Mais, la première catéchèse chrétienne
doit l’essentiel de son inspiration et de sa méthode à
l’enseignement religieux de la synagogue. Dans le judaïsme
palestinien du premier siècle de notre ère, la transmission
de la foi repose principalement sur un effort de
mémorisation s’appliquant à la Torah et aux commentaires
des rabbis les plus prestigieux. Les traditions orales qui
naissent au lendemain de la mort de Jésus se cristallisent
autour de la Bible juive relue à la lumière de la parole et de
la destinée du Maître Ressuscité. Ainsi, on retrouve des
ensembles catéchétiques antérieurs au travail des
évangélistes 5 : récits de la passion, recueils de paraboles,
etc. Si le message est nouveau, les procédés de lecture et de
transmission sont empruntés au judaïsme de l’époque.
C’est aussi le contexte juif qui explique la naissance et la
propagation orale des premières confessions de foi
insérées dans le Nouveau Testament 6 .
Le terme d’apôtre (gr. apostolos = envoyé) désigne
des missionnaires itinérants. A ce titre, les apôtres se
vouent de préférence à l’évangélisation, soit auprès des
Juifs, soit en milieu païen. La fonction proprement
4 Actes 2, 42.
5 Cf. Charles Wackenheim, La Catéchèse, col. „Que sois‐je?”, Paris,
1983, p. 14.
6 Par exemple: I re Epître aux Corinthiens 15, 3‐5; Epître aux
Philippiens 2, 6‐11; I re Epître à Timothée 3, 16; Epître aux Hébreux 6, 1‐2.
39

BOLOCAN ‐ Le rapport catéchèse‐théologie‐pédagogie dans la perspective de
l’enseignement religieux actuel
catéchétique incombe plutôt aux ministres des
communautés locales: prophètes, didascales (docteurs) ou
presbytres (anciens). Là encore, l’héritage juif est
déterminant.
A côté de la confession de foi, on rencontre, dans le
Nouveau Testament, un enseignement éthique, qui va
occuper, périodiquement, une place prépondérante dans la
catéchèse chrétienne. Notons, par exemple, des éléments
de morale domestique 7 , des catalogues de vices et de
vertus 8 ou des règles concernant l’attitude des chrétiens à
l’égard des autorités 9 . Un écho de cette instruction se
retrouve dans la Didachè (chapitres 1‐6) sous la forme
d’une „doctrine des deux voies” – celle de la vie et celle de
la mort. Mais cette œuvre ne donne pas une idée complète
de la catéchèse primitive.
I.2. Une catéchèse baptismale
Après avoir “accueilli la parole” de Pierre, trois mille
personnes reçurent le baptême le jour de la Pentecôte 10 .
Avant de baptiser l’eunuque éthiopien, Philippe, en partant
d’un passage du second livre d’Isaïe, “lui annonça la bonne
nouvelle de Jésus” 11 . A Césarée, chez le centurion Coneille,
l’Esprit Saint tomba sur ceux qui “avaient écouté la parole”
de Pierre. D’où la question de celui‐ci: “Peut‐on refuser
l’eau du baptême à ceux qui, tout comme nous, ont reçu
l’Esprit Saint?” 12 .
Les écrits chrétiens du II e siècle rappellent
l’importance de l’instruction que doivent recevoir les
candidats au baptême. Dans sa première Apologie, le
philosophe Justin parle des catéchumènes en ces termes:
“Ceux qui croient à la vérité de nos enseignements et de
notre doctrine promettent d’abord de vivre selon cette loi.
7 Cf. Epître aux Colossiens 3, 18‐25; Epître à Tite 2, 1‐10, etc.
8 Cf. Epître aux Romains 1, 29‐31; I re Epître aux Corinthiens 6, 9‐11;
Epître aux Galates 5, 19‐25, etc.
9 Cf. Epître aux Romains 13, 1‐7; Epître à Tite, 3, 1; I re Epître de
Pierre 2, 13‐17, etc.
10 Cf. Actes 2, 41.
11 Ibidem, 8, 35.
12 Ibidem, 10, 47.
40

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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Alors nous leur apprenons à prier et à demander à Dieu,
dans le jeûne, la rémission de leurs péchés” 13 . A la fin du
siècle, Irénée de Lyon expose, à l’encontre des spéculations
gnostiques, l’enseignement traditionnel des Eglises
d’Orient et d’Occident. Les écrivains occidentaux du III e
siècle – Tertullien, Hippolyte de Rome, Cyprien de Carthage
– nous informent sur le contenu de la catéchèse qui non
seulement précède, mais suit la célébration du baptême.
En Orient, le III e siècle est marqué par l’apogée de ce
qu’il est convenu d’appeler l”école catéchétique
d’Alexandrie”. Berceau de la culture hellénistique,
Alexandrie devient autour de l’an 200 le centre intellectuel
le plus vivant du monde chrétien. Grâce à Clément et à
Origène, la catéchèse chrétienne acquit une structure
systématique, conforme aux exigences philosophiques et
scientifiques des esprits les plus cultivés de l’époque.
Gnose chrétienne, la pensée des Alexandrins annonçait la
théologie savante plus qu’elle ne conférait une forme
classique à la catéchèse baptismale des origines.
À partir du IV e siècle, la littérature patristique va
privilégier et développer la conception primitive de la
catéchèse. Les catéchèses des pères du IV e et V e siècles
relèvent à la fois du genre homilétique et de
l’enseignement méthodique.
En Orient, l’œuvre la plus accomplie est celle de
Cyrille de Jérusalem qui se compose de 24 catéchèses. Les
catéchèses prébaptismales (18), adressées aux
catéchumènes, traitent du péché, de la pénitence et de la
foi avant d’exprimer le symbole de l’Eglise de Jérusalem.
Les catéchèses mystagogiques (5) livrent à ceux qui
venaient d’être “illuminés” le sens du mystère qui
s’accomplit par la célébration des sacrements de l’imitation
chrétienne.
En Occident, Ambroise de Milan, avec De sacramentis
et De mysteriis), et Augustin, avec son traité sur “la
13 Justin le Philosophe, La philosophie passe au Christ. L’oeuvre de
Justin, coll. «Lettres chrétiennes», Paris, 1958, p. 88.
41

BOLOCAN ‐ Le rapport catéchèse‐théologie‐pédagogie dans la perspective de
l’enseignement religieux actuel
catéchèse des débutants” (De catechizandis rudibus) sont
les auteurs qui vont exercer une influence durable.
I.3. La discipline de l’arcane
On appelle “discipline de l’arcane” la discrétion
délibérée qui semble avoir entouré, dans l’Eglise ancienne,
certains rites de l’initiation chrétienne.
Au IV e siècle, la discipline de l’arcane concerne, dans
la plupart des Eglises, les rites et les formules du baptême
et de l’eucharistie, y compris le texte du symbole et du
Pater qui doit être appris par cœur. L’initiation solennelle
a lieu pendant la nuit, et les saints mystères sont célébrés
les portes fermées.
Ainsi, cette discipline apparaît essentiellement
comme une disposition pédagogique et liturgique destinée
à assurer la progressivité de la démarche catéchuménale.
De la part des païens, les chrétiens redoutaient
l’incompréhension et le manque de respect. Chez les
catéchumènes, on cherchait à éveiller une saine curiosité
tout en éduquant le sens du sacré. À l’appui de ces
précautions, on citait la parole de Jésus: “Ne donnez pas
aux chiens les choses saintes, ne jetez pas vos perles
devant les porcs” 14 .
42
II. La catéchèse et la théologie
II.1. La catéchèse dérive du discours théologique
L’essence de la catéchèse est d’être un enseignement
à la fois résumé et complet. Ainsi, certains l’ont définie,
tout en la distinguant du kérygme qui n’est pas cet
enseignement complet. Les autres ont prétendu qu’entre la
théologie comme enseignement, et la catéchèse, la
différence était tout au plus de l’ordre de la technicité.
La catéchèse est un acte interdisciplinaire, une
totalité; l’acte théologique aussi n’a plus aujourd’hui ce
caractère purement spéculatif d’inventaire et d’analyse
d’un donné. L’acte théologique est vécu comme une
14 Mathieu 7, 6.

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tentative d’interprétation qui s’efforce de faire parler la
Parole de Dieu en fonction d’une culture déterminée.
La catéchèse, au fur et à mesure qu’elle devient une
communication réussie, commence à interroger la
théologie. Ainsi l’interaction pédagogie‐contenu est
essentielle à la découverte de la relation qu’entretiennent
l’acte théologique et l’acte catéchétique. Par conséquent, la
catéchèse représente la mise en forme discursive de la foi,
et la foi relève toujours d’une théologie, parce qu’elle
relève toujours d’un discours.
II.1.1. Catéchèse et christologie
La catéchèse veut être une annonce responsable, donc
réfléchie. Elle ne peut pas se dispenser des moyens de
parvenir à une connaissance assumée de ce qu’elle
annonce. Elle tend vers la christologie comme vers le
niveau et le type de discours qui comporte en soi toute
annonce et tout accueil. La christologie n’est pas rédisable
si la reconnaissance de Jésus comme Christ n’a pas lieu. Par
conséquent, la christologie tend vers la catéchèse comme
vers le type ou le registre de discours qui est spécifié par
les hommes concrets et vivants, de ce que la foi professe au
Sujet de Jésus Christ.
Le rapport entre christologie et catéchèse est tel
qu’elles doivent et peuvent l’une et l’autre travailler en
articulation.
III. Catéchèse et pédagogie
Une étude des rapports entre catéchèse et culture
pose la question: “L’Evangile sera‐t‐il, ou nom, annoncé aux
jeunes générations, même en milieu chrétien?” 15 .
Le souci constant de l’éducation est d’obtenir
audience, d’éveiller l’intérêt et, s’il s’agit de transmettre le
message chrétien, de rejoindre les besoins d’une foi à
naître, naissante ou en croissance. Ici, l’effort pédagogique
est primordial.
15 E. Barbotin, Catéchèse et pédagogie, Paris, 1981, p. 7.
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Beaucoup sont enclins à penser que la doctrine est un
fardeau pour la catéchèse, qu’il faut réduire la part de
l’instructif au profit de l’éducatif. En fait, cette réduction du
doctrinal vide l’effort pédagogique de son contenu,
l’enseignement de son objet même elle procède d’une sous‐
estimation des capacités, des appels du fidèle, adulte ou
jeune. Les enfants ont une merveilleuse transparence
spirituelle, une faculté d’instruction qui les ouvre plus que
d’autres aux réalités de la foi. N’est‐ce pas à eux et à leurs
pareils qu’appartient, par privilège, le Royaume des cieux?
La doctrine ne donne pas seulement son contenu à la
pédagogie catéchétique, mais c’est elle encore qui en
détermine les moyens.
L’objet de tout savoir décide de ses procédés de
recherche, mais aussi de sa méthode d’enseignement –
étant bien connu le fait que la connaissance de l’homme à
instruire est d’une extrême importance 16 . Si la parole
qu’enseigne le catéchète vient de Dieu, si elle vise à
éduquer une foi éclairée, vivante, témoignée au fil des
jours, l’alternative doctrine‐pédagogie s’évanouit: c’est la
Vérité qui est Vie, nourriture d’une foi vivante et agissante.
Il faut mesurer l’effort avec soin, selon l’âge, le savoir,
la formation chrétienne déjà reçu. La catéchèse ne doit pas
être “un pensum, au risque d’être évitée le plus souvent
possible et au grand dommage de la foi” 17 . Mais trop de
méthodes semblent n’avoir d’autre but que de réduire ou
d’exclure l’effort. Mais les jeunes générations évaluent
spontanément une activité proposée. Aussi une pédagogie
du moindre effort ne peut‐elle susciter ni soutenir aucune
générosité 18 .
Depuis dès années, la catéchèse veut „partir” de la vie.
Au lieu de prendre pour point de départ la Révélation
biblique, les symboles ou autres énoncés autorisés de la foi,
on observe et analyse la vie quotidienne du chrétien, son
entourage, etc. Dans certains cas on s’efforce ensuite de
rejoindre l’évangile. Mais Jésus‐Christ ne peut être ni
44
16 Cf. Ibidem, p. 9.
17 Ibidem.
18 Cf. Ibidem.

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„induit” ni „déduit” d’aucune réalité naturelle. La pédagogie
du Christ doit être tenue pour exemplaire.
On se pose la question suivante: Jésus part‐il des faits
de vie? Comment les utilise‐t‐il pour l’annonce du
Royaume?
L’enseignement évangélique, parabolique ou non,
s’enracine dans l’expérience commune à Jésus et à tous ses
frères en humanité. Jésus‐Christ part souvent de nos
relations avec l’univers, les êtres si divers qui le
remplissent. C’est un milieu où l’homme affronte des forces
étrangères, découvre ses propres limites; milieu où des
significations concrètent surgissent, où le visible s’auréole
de valeurs symboliques et transcendantes sous le regard de
l’œil et de l’esprit. Ciel et terre, soleil et eau, vent et feu,
semence et moisson, vigne et vin, poisson et filets en
viennent à exemplifier et à signifier, sous le regard du
Maître et de son auditoire, les réalités du Royaume:
„Observez les lis des champs, comme ils poussent: ils ne
plinent ni ne filent… Que si Dieu revêt ainsi, l’herbe des
champs, qui est aujourd’hui et demain sera jetée au four, ne
fera‐t‐il pas bien plus pour vous, hommes de peu de foi!” 19 .
Ou: „Au crépuscule vous dites: «Il va faire beau temps, car
le ciel est rouge feu». Et à l’aurore: «Mauvais temps
aujourd’hui, car le ciel est rouge sombre». Ainsi, le visage
du ciel, vous savez l’interpréter, mais les signes des temps,
vous n’en êtes pas capable?”.
On peut observer que la catéchèse de Jésus s’élève des
humbles réalités quotidiennes pour conduire l’homme de
l’expérience du monde à la Révélation du Royaume de
Dieu.
Le réseau serré et varié de relations nous unit aux
autres hommes: parents ou alliés, voisins, amis ou
ennemis, compatriotes ou étrangers, compagnons de
travail. Tous ces liens interpersonnels ne constituent pas
notre humanité, mais l’atteignent à une grande profondeur.
Or par l’Incarnation, le Fils de Dieu s’engage en tous ces
19 Mathieu 6, 28‐30.
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liens, assume tous ces rapport, les vit de l’intérieur: il les
utilise pour annoncer de nouveaux rapports entre l’homme
et Dieu. Le Christ part de notre vie de relation, il s’appuie
sur elle, mais pour la dépasser et introduire des auditeurs
à une intimité mystérieuse avec Dieu. L’amour parental
offre un point de départ à l’annonce de la paternité divine
toujours prête à exaucer: „Qui d’entre vous, quand son fils
lui demande du pain, lui donnera‐t‐il une pierre? Ou s’il lui
demande un poisson, lui donnera‐t‐il un serpent? Si donc
vous, malgré votre malice, vous savez donner de bonnes
choses à vos enfants, combien plus votre Père qui est dans
les cieux donnera‐t‐il de bonnes choses à ceux qui l’en
prient” 20 .
Le rapport maître‐disciple est, aussi, assumé: Jésus se
reconnaît le Maître 21 , mais en un sens tellement parfait, si
exclusivement propre, qu’aucun homme de la terre ne
mériterait ce titre 22 .
La relation d’amitié est aussi largement assumée.
Jésus est l’ami de ses disciples, mais en un sens neuf et
unique. Pour ses disciples, Jésus n’est pas un ami parmi
d’autres, mais le Messie 23 , le Sauveur du monde 24 , le Christ,
le Fils du Dieu vivant 25 . Cette amitié réciproque ne laisse
pas les partenaires à un rapport d’égalité: Jésus est le
Seigneur qui réclame l’obéissance comme condition de
l’amitié: „Vous êtes mes amis si vous faites ce que je vous
commande” 26 . Ses confidences, appels à l’amitié, ne sont
pas d’origine humaine, mais divine 27 .
Les liens de parenté sont aussi transfigurés. Jésus
exige d’être aimé plus que les proches parents 28 . Il
substitue à tous les rapports humains un lien fondé sur
l’obéissance au Père céleste. Les vrais parents de Jésus ne
46
20 Mathieu 7, 9‐11.
21 cf. Jean 13, 13‐14.
22 cf. Mathieu 23, 7, 10.
23 cf. Jean 1, 41.
24 cf. Ibidem 4, 42.
25 cf. Mathieu 16, 16.
26 Jean 15, 14.
27 cf. Jean 15, 15.
28 cf. Mathieu 10, 37‐38.

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sont pas ses proches, mais: „Quiconque fait la volonté de
mon Père qui est dans les cieux, celui‐là est mon frère et
ma sœur et ma mère” 29 . Chaque homme est appelé à
entrer, par Jésus‐Christ, dans la famille de Dieu, en un
rassemblement universel.
En tous ces cas se retrouve la même démarche
fondamentale: Jésus Christ part de la vie de relation pour
emporter ses disciples vers les réalités toutes nouvelles du
Royaume 30 .
Dans l’Evangile, les faits de vie ne contiennent pas la
réalité du Royaume: ils permettent d’y accéder par
dépassement. Le départ de la vie et l’arrivée à la Bonne
Nouvelle ne sont qu’un seul mouvement. À son tour, le
catéchète s’appuiera sur le fait de vie comme sur un
tremplin pour rejoindre le contenu vivant de la foi. Une
catéchèse fondée sur la doctrine a ses divers niveaux:
Ecriture, symboles de la foi. La parole de Dieu est vie, à la
fois vivante, vitale, vivifiante, vécue dans toute Eglise et
bien propre à rejoindre tout homme, enfant ou adulte, en
ses questions secrètes.
À chacune des étapes de l’histoire, le mystère du salut
est celui de l’effusion de la vie divine, de sa lutte contre les
forces de la mort. Ainsi la Genèse montre la vie jaillissant
des mains de Dieu, le foisonnement prodigieux des espèces
appelées à transmettre la vie, jusqu’à l’homme en qui la vie
trouve sa plus parfaite expression visible 31 .
Ici, c’est le fait de vie primordial, la naissance qui
porte en elle toutes les naissances de l’histoire. Une
catéchèse peut s’appuyer sur les premières pages du Livre,
grâce à son expérience de ses propres commencements,
l’enfant étant plus accordé au mystère de l’enfance du
monde. Le regard émerveillé de l’enfant rejoint le regard
d’amour dont le Créateur enveloppe ses créatures.
29 Mathieu 12, 50.
30 cf. E. Borbotin, op. cit., p. 24.
31 cf. Ibidem, p. 26.
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Le grand fait de l’Incarnation du Fils de Dieu se
manifeste dans le mystère de la Nativité et de l’Epiphanie.
La vie de Dieu et celle de l’homme, la vie d’„en haut” et la
vie d’„en bas” se rencontrent, se joignent, s’unissent à
jamais: celui qui est la Vie devient le centre et le Sauveur
de toute vie.
La Résurrection du Christ au troisième jour
représente le fait de vie par excellence, unique et
transcendant, qui domine, assume, purifie, sauve tous les
faits de vie de l’histoire. Entre ce suprême Fait de vie et les
faits de vie infimes ou graves, joyeux ou douloureux, qui
constituent la trame de nos existences, s’établissent
d’admirables et inépuisables échanges: „Vivre, pour moi,
c’est le Christ” 32 .
Au jour de la Pentecôte, l’Eglise naît en acte de
mission: Pierre inaugure la catéchèse chrétienne, en
partant d’un fait de vie – l’accusation d’ivresse formulée
contre les apôtres – pour proclamer le grand fait de vie qui
domine les siècles: la résurrection du Christ et l’effusion du
Saint Esprit. Ici on voit, du nouveau, un parfait exemple de
la méthode pédagogique.
Toutes les fois que la catéchèse prend pour point de
départ une parole de l’Ecriture, elle part de la vie, parce
que toute parole de Dieu est vie, appel du Vivant éternel
aux vivants mortels, nous. Les paroles du Christ sont esprit
et vie 33 ; Lui seul a les paroles de la vie éternelle 34 , car „elle
est vivante la parole de Dieu, efficace et plus incisive
qu’aucun glaive à deux tranchants…” 35 .
On se demande: pourquoi cette pédagogie de
l’annonce directe de la parole réussit‐elle auprès
d’auditoire très divers, aujourd’hui comme hier? Pourquoi,
par exemple, l’appel des Béatitudes est‐il toujours
provocant? La réponse est la suivante: l’homme au cœur
ouvert et droit est ému de se sentir interpellé, prévenu,
48
32 Philippiens 1, 21.
33 cf. Ioan 6, 64.
34 cf. Ibidem 6, 68.
35 Hébreux 4, 12.

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cherché par Dieu: „Adam, où es‐tu?” 36 ; il est pénétré par
cette parole vivante qui peut „juger les sentiments et les
pensées du cœur” 37 . La parole rejoint ce centre secret où la
liberté tantôt refuse, tantôt accueille la grâce de la foi. Le
Christ tient sa promesse: son Esprit vient nous rappeler,
nous faire goûter ses enseignements, Il sait toucher la fibre
sensible en nous ce jour‐la 38 jusqu’ à la fin des temps, la
parole de Dieu sera, pour l’enfant et l’adolescent comme
pour l’adulte, un fait de vie, une force divine de provocation
spirituelle. Cette force relie l’homme vivant au Dieu vivant,
le fait naître à la vraie vie, l’engendre de nouveau pour qu’il
soit les prémices de la création nouvelle 39 .
En catéchèse, partir de la vie des Saints est une
excellente manière de partir de la vie. L’histoire de la
sainteté montre l’Evangile vécu par des chrétiens
semblables aux autres: faibles et généreux partagés entre
vocation et tentation, souffrance et joie, amour de soi et
amour de Dieu, plaisir et abnégation, péché et grâce, voire
entre des devoirs apparemment contraires. Leurs misères
et leurs progrès conjugués encouragent et stimulent;
chacun reconnaît sa propre misère d’homme et en reçoit
un appel. Les saints sont témoins de l’Evangile au sens le
plus strict: ils enseignent par leur être même. La catéchèse
doit mettre à profit ces faits de vie qui constituent
l’histoire de la sainteté, l’histoire de l’Eglise en ce qu’elle a
de plus pur, de plus vrai, de plus intime. Par conséquent, on
peut identifier ici toutes les méthodes et techniques
pédagogiques les plus utiles, le témoignage de la sainteté
qui concourt le mieux avec la grâce de Dieu à susciter des
croyants, à faire surgir d’autres témoins.
Cette nécessité du témoignage révèle un autre sens de
l’expression partir de la vie. Ici, il ne s’agit pas de procédé
didactique mais d’une exigence spirituelle pour le
36 Genèse 3, 9.
37 Hébreux 4, 12.
38 cf. Jean 14, 26.
39 cf. Jacques 1, 18.
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catéchète lui même. La pédagogie serait stérile si la vie du
maître n’avait pas valeur de signe, si la parole évangélique
ne se traduisait, dans sa vie, en manière d’être. Cela
suppose une vie de prière profonde, une charité active, une
fidélité totale à l’Eglise, à la règle de la foi orthodoxe, une
vie vers la sainteté. Le catéchète doit s’efforcer d’être un
modèle chrétien: convaincu, il a chance d’être convaincant;
croyant, il aide a croire.
L’enseignement religieux peut partir tantôt de la vie
de l’homme, tantôt du Vivant qui est Dieu: la parole du
catéchète doit toujours jaillir d’une vie de foi profonde,
être une parole de foi 40 , en communion avec la foi de toute
l’Eglise.
III.1. On doit enseigner l’Evangile ou le faire vivre?
On se pose une autre question: s’agit‐il pour le
catéchète de diffuser un certain savoir ou de proposer un
art chrétien de vivre? La réponse est la suivante: On n’est
vraiment chrétien que si la vie entière est conduite par la
foi. Le Christ, lui‐même a souvent et hautement désavoué
ceux qui disent et ne font pas 41 .
En ce sens, l’apôtre Jacques enseigne que la foi n’est
rien sans les œuvres, sans une conduite conforme à
l’Evangile: “Mettez la parole en pratique! Ne soyez pas
seulement des auditeurs qui s’abusent eux‐mêmes! Qui
écoute la parole sans la mettre en pratique ressemble à un
homme qui observe dans un miroir le visage qui lui a
donné la nature. A peine s’est‐il observé qu’il est parti et a
oublié comment il était. Celui, au contraire, qui se penche
sur la loi parfaite de liberté et s’y tient, non pas en auditeur
oublieux mais pour la mettre en pratique, celui‐là trouve
son bonheur à la pratiquer” 42 ou, plus dure encore:
„À quoi cela sert‐il mes frères que quelqu’un dise: «j’ai
la foi», s’il n’a pas les œuvres? La foi peut‐elle le sauver? Si
un frère ou une sœur sont nus, s’ils manquent de leur
50
40 cf. Romains 10, 8.
41 cf. Mathieu 23, 3.
42 Jacques 1, 22‐25.

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nourriture quotidienne, et que l’un d’entre vous leur dise:
«Allez en paix, chauffez‐vous, rassasiez‐vous», sans leur
donner ce qui est nécessaire à leur corps, à quoi cela sert‐
il? Ainsi en est‐il de la foi: si elle n’a pas les œuvres, elle est
tout à fait morte. Au contraire on dira: «Toi, tu as la foi, et
moi, j’ai les œuvres». Montre‐moi ta foi sans les œuvres;
moi, c’est par les œuvres que je te monterai ma foi” 43 . Le
Christ, n’a‐t‐il pas annoncé que nous serions jugés sur nos
œuvres? 44
Jésus‐Christ nous appelle à une conversion totale de
notre manière de vivre de notre mentalité: “Convertissez‐
vous et croyez à l’Evangile” 45 . À partir de cette parole, on
n’enseigne pas l’Evangile comme n’importe quelle science.
La liaison affirmée par Pierre entre la Personne du
Christ et Ses paroles vient éclaircir le problème. Jésus
vivant et son message de vie éternelle ne font qu’un. Les
Apôtres croient en Christ parce qu’il a les paroles de vie, et
croient aux paroles de vie parce que Jésus, le Saint de Dieu,
les a prononcés. C’est un cercle vital: le même acte de foi
vivante étreint, d’un seul élan, la personne et la doctrine.
C’est avec son être entier – esprit, cœur, volonté – que le
croyant adhère au Christ entier, Personne et Vérité.
Christ est la Parole éternelle de Dieu, la Vérité
absolue faite chair vivante, corps et âme: “Je suis la
Vérité” 46 . Jésus Christ n’a pas d’idées: Il est sa doctrine, qui
est celle du Père 47 .
Beaucoup d’auditeurs de Jésus sont “venus à Lui” par
la vertu exceptionnelle de son enseignement: “Il parlait
avec autorité et non pas comme les scribes” 48 .
On distingue une différence essentielle entre le statut
de la foi et le rôle de l’annonce avant et après l’Ascension.
43 Ibidem, 2, 14‐18.
44 cf. Mathieu 25, 31‐46.
45 Marc 2, 15.
46 Jean 14, 6.
47 Ibidem, 7, 16; 8, 40; 12, 49.
48 Marc 1, 22.
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Pendant son séjour terrestre, Jésus se révèle non
seulement par sa parole, mais aussi par sa présence
sensible, tangible. Vision et enseignement concourent,
s’interprètent mutuellement: les disciples croient pour
avoir vu et entendu. Au jour de l’Ascension, la vision a pris
fin jusqu’au retour glorieux.
Ainsi, à la jointure de deux temps: le temps du Christ
et celui de l’Eglise, l’attestation des apôtres fonde la foi de
ceux qui croiront sans avoir vu. L’annonce de l’Evangile
doit suppléer la vision oculaire et susciter cette “vision du
cœur” qu’est la foi 49 . “La vision laisse place à
l’enseignement”, écrira Saint Léon 50 . Jésus‐Christ dit à
Thomas: “Parce que tu m’as vu, Thomas, tu as cru.
Bienheureux ceux qui n’ont pas vu et qui ont cru” 51 . Cette
béatitude est celle de la majorité des chrétiens entre
l’Ascension et la Parousie. L’enseignement de l’Evangile
veut conduire l’homme à cette béatitude.
III.2. Enseigner les commandements?!
À l’homme biblique qui désire que Dieu lui enseigne
ses voies, ses sentiers 52 , le Fils de Dieu incarné répond: “La
Route (la Voie) c’est moi”! 53 . Jésus‐Christ est la voie sûre,
unique, infaillible: quiconque le suit ne marche pas dans les
ténèbres, mais aura la lumière de la vie 54 . Par un
mouvement d’amour, cette Voie personnelle et vivante
vient s’offrir à l’homme perdu, le chercher là où il est: “Si
vous m’aimez, vous garderez mes commandements” 55 ou
“Celui qui a mes commandements et qui les garde, voilà
celui qui m’aime” 56 . Et Jean y insiste dans ses épîtres:
“L’amour consiste à vivre d’après ses commandements” 57 .
49 cf. Ephésiens 1, 18.
50 Saint Léon, Deuxième sermon sur l’Ascension (Sermons, t. III; coll.
«Sources chrétiennes», nr. 74, p. 140).
51 Jean 20, 29.
52 cf. Ps 25(24), 4‐5.
53 Jean 14, 6.
54 cf. Ibidem, 8, 13.
55 Jean 14, 15.
56 Ibidem, 14, 21.
57 Jean 2 e ép. 6.
52

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Puisque les commandements, dons de l’amour de
Dieu, appellent l’amour de l’homme, leur vraie pratique ne
conduit pas le chrétien au pharisaïsme. Elle scelle la
rencontre de deux amours dans le Christ: le “Oui” de Dieu à
ses promesses, l’Amen de l’homme à la gloire de Dieu 58 . Elle
est la conformité du vouloir humain au vouloir divin qui
constitue la sainteté, éminemment en Jésus, le Saint, le
Juste 59 , et en chacun de ses fidèles.
La foi fondamentale de l’amour conduit à penser que
les commandements seraient inutiles. On cite les mots du
bienheureux Augustin: “Aime et fais ce que tu veux”. Mais
ces paroles ne recommandent pas l’abandon des
commandements, ni la permissivité. Tout au contraire: elle
annonce la vérité profonde qu’une volonté humaine
possédée par l’amour de Dieu ne peut vouloir que ce que
Dieu vent. La loi d’amour dépasse les périls de la lettre qui
tue, grâce à l’Esprit qui donne la vie 60 . Le véritable amour,
qui est don de soi, se réjouit de dépendre, de servir et
d’accéder ainsi a une plus haute liberté. Le saint est celui
qui dépasse les alternatives: nécessité‐liberté ou
obligation‐liberté.
La morale naturelle et le Décalogue sont assumés,
purifiés, dépassés par la loi évangélique de l’amour.
Enseigner les commandements au jeune chrétien,
c’est lui apprendre à aimer, non en parole mais en acte et
en vérité 61 .
IV. Pratique catéchétique et vie spirituelle
Le développement de la catéchèse est un phénomène
qui peut avoir un impact sur les structures de l’Eglise. Il est
certain qu’on se préoccupe de fournir à ceux qui pratiquent
la catéchèse une formation doctrinale et une formation
pédagogique.
58 cf. II Corinthiens 1, 20.
59 cf. Actes 3, 14.
60 cf. II Corinthiens 3, 6.
61 cf. I Jean 3, 18.
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BOLOCAN ‐ Le rapport catéchèse‐théologie‐pédagogie dans la perspective de
l’enseignement religieux actuel
La pratique catéchétique n’est pas neutre du point de
vue social et culturel. Tout ce qui constitue la joie ou la
tristesse de quelqu’un, la tonalité de son existence, tout
cela ne tient pas à une pratique de la catéchèse. Il y a une
dimension de la catéchèse qui ne relève ni de la théologie,
ni de la pédagogie, mais de l’aventure personnelle de
chacun. La vie spirituelle y se trouve. C’est une respiration
intime d’un être au‐dedans de ce qu’il fait, c’est‐à‐dire au‐
dedans de ce qu’il vit.
La catéchèse est une tâche précise, régulière, qui
s’inscrit dans le temps et domine l’organisation de la vie.
Les données nouvelles apparaissent dans la pratique même
de la catéchèses et elles réclament d’autres modèles de vie
spirituelles que ceux qui sont habituellement proposés.
Dans sa dynamique, la pratique catéchétique est la
manière de laisser à l’Evangile toutes ses chances, le
reconnaître ce qu’il est non pas ma vérité, ni celle du
groupe auquel j’appartiens, mais la sienne “pour la vie du
monde”.
Admettre ou reconnaître le message comme le
message ou la vie d’un autre, c’est le situer dans l’ordre du
don et non pas dans l’ordre de l’appropriation parce que
Dieu a dit: “Que la lumière brille au milieu des ténèbres,
c’est lui‐même qui a brillé dans nos cœurs pour faire
resplendir la connaissance de sa gloire qui rayonne sur le
visage du Christ.Mais ce trésor, nous le portons dans des
vases d’argile, pour que cette incomparable puissance soit
de Dieu et non de nous” 62 .
V. Quelques “finalités” de la catéchèse
En tant que fait culturel et social, la catéchèse est
définie à chaque étape de son développement par tous ceux
catéchistes et catéchisés, clercs et laïcs, parents et
éducateurs – qui participent à la mise en œuvre effective.
Chaque finalité empiète sur les suivantes ou survit en elles
pendant quelque temps. Même s’il était possible de tracer
54
62 II Corinthiens 4, 6‐7.

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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des lignes de partage, celles‐ci varieraient avec les pays et
les continents.
V.1. L’espérance eschatologique
Le noyau primitif de la catéchèse chrétienne est
l’annonce de l’événement pascal: “C’est bien vrai, s’écrient
les disciples d’Emmaüs, le Seigneur est ressuscité” 63 ou les
mots de l’apôtre Paul: “Christ est mort pour nos péchés. Il a
été enseveli, et il est ressuscité le troisième jour” 64 .
La résurrection de Jésus fonde la foi en la
“résurrection des morts”, destinée ultime de tous les
hommes. L’espérance eschatologique apparaît comme la
finalité indiscutée des propositions catéchétiques: toute la
vie des chrétiens est tendue vers le “siècle à venir”, où Dieu
sera “tout en tous”.
V.2. Une intégration ecclésiale
La prédication des apôtres avait suscité des
communautés de croyants. C’est d’ailleurs au sein de
celles‐ci que se développa l’activité catéchétique. La
catéchèse prébaptismale a évolue progressivement vers le
catéchuménat.
Centrée sur les sacrements de l’institution, la
catéchèse de l’époque patristique n’en demeure pas moins
fidèle à l’économie trinitaire de la foi héritée de l’époque
précédente. La pédagogie catéchuménale n’est pas
“ecclésiocentrique” au sens où elle se bornerait à assurer la
survie d’une institution. Par “intégration ecclésiale” nous
entendons l’apprentissage par les catéchumènes de la vie
en Eglise. Les candidats au baptême se familiarisent peu à
peu avec le langage et la mémoire de l’Eglise, acquièrent les
comportements caractéristiques du chrétien et participent
à la célébration des rites. Aux IV e et V e siècles, la finalité
prépondérante de la catéchèse consiste à faciliter l’accès
des catéchumènes à la culture chrétienne, c’est‐à‐dire la
63 Luc 24, 34.
64 I Corinthiens 15, 3‐4.
55

BOLOCAN ‐ Le rapport catéchèse‐théologie‐pédagogie dans la perspective de
l’enseignement religieux actuel
confession de foi, la vie sacramentelle, la prière commune
et une vision de l’homme et du monde inspirée de
l’Evangile. Saint Grégoire de Nysse 65 conçoit l’intégration
ecclésiale ainsi: “Il nous faut des signes pour distinguer
l’homme nouveau du vieil homme. Ce sont me semble‐t‐il,
les mouvements libres de l’âme qui s’arrache elle‐même à
la vie passée pour adapter un nouveau style de vie,
montrant clairement à ceux qui les fréquentent le
changement opéré! Voici en quoi consiste la
transformation, si vous voulez bien me suivre et aligner
votre conduite à mes paroles. Avant le baptême, l’homme
était intempérant, avare, valeur, injurieux, menteur,
calomniateur et tout ce qui s’ensuit. A présent, il lui faut
être réservé, satisfait de ce qu’il possède, prêt à le partager
avec les pauvres, soucieux de la vérité, respectueux de tous
et avenant, en un mot il doit pratiquer tout ce qui est bien.
Tu vois comment Zachée, par son changement de vie, a
étouffé le publicain en lui: il a rendu le quadruple à ceux
qu’il avait lésés; il a distribué aux pauvres ce que
précédemment il leu extorquait”. Toute la catéchèse
s’ordonne à l’édification de l’homme nouveau.
Le destin de la catéchèse illustre l’impossibilité
d’enfermer dans les formules définitives le sens dernier de
l’existence. Ainsi, F. Quéré 66 écrit: “Toute parole se perd en
tant que parole, mais elle se trouve en tant qu’elle devient
autrui, qu’elle participe à sa formation et à son
épanouissement, qu’elle devient constitutive de sa
personne. Lisant l’Evangile, c’est moi que je lis, mais un
moi qui n’existe que par l’Evangile qui l’a fait.
Littéralement, la Parole s’est faite chair. Elle est reprise
éternellement par les voix profondes des hommes”.
Conclusion
Eduquer dit‐on, c’est passer d’une influence quelconque
à une influence formatrice. Appliquée à la catéchèse, une telle
65 Saint Grégoire de Nyssa, Homélie pour la fête des lumière dans Le
baptême d’après les Pères de l’Eglise, coll. «Lettres chrétiennes», Paris,
1962, p. 165.
66 F. Quéré, La foi peut‐elle se transmettre?, Paris, 1974, p. 69‐70.
56

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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formule signifierait que les groupes chrétiens exercent une
influence de fait, mais qu’il dépend d’eux que celle‐ci se
transforme en tâche réellement éducative. Formation non
seulement biblique et théologique, mais scientifique et
technique – au sens de l’une au moins des sciences de l’homme
et des nouvelles techniques pédagogiques. L’originalité de ce
travail consisterait en ceci: situer la vérification de la
parole évangélique dans le contexte actuel des idéologies
et des messages de libération. C’est là une démarche
critique fort exigeante, mais indispensable à ceux qui
entendent dialoguer en vérité.
Un auteur anonyme de la fin du II e siècle énonçait en
ces termes l’originalité de la “bonne nouvelle” confiée aux
disciples de Jésus: “Les chrétiens ne se distinguent des
autres hommes ni par le pays, ni par le langage, ni par les
vêtements. Ils n’habitent pas de villes qui leur soient
propres, ils ne se servent pas de quelque dialecte
extraordinaire; leur genre de vie n’a rien de singulier. Ce
n’est pas à l’imagination ou aux rêveries d’esprits agités que
leur doctrine doit sa découverte; ils ne se font pas, comme
tant d’autres, les champions d’une doctrine humaine. Ils se
conforment aux usages locaux pour les vêtements, la
nourriture et la manière de vivre, tout en manifestant les
lois extraordinaires et vraiment paradoxales de leur
république spirituelle” 67 .
Dans tous les ordres d’enseignement, aucune méthode
si élaborée soit‐elle, ne remplace un bon maître. Aussi bien,
pour l’annonce de l’Evangile, est‐ce Dieu en Personne qui
après avoir instruit le peuple d’Israël par les prophètes, lui
parle en Jésus‐Christ 68 . La Révélation du Fils est une
“venue”, une rencontre. La mission qui la prolonge est un
mouvement de l’homme vers l’homme: “Allez, enseignez
toutes les notions au nom du Père, du Fils et du Saint‐
67 A. Diognète, dans Les écrits des Pères apostoliques, coll. «Foi
vivante», Cerf, Paris, 1979, p. 62.
68 cf. Hébreux 1, 1.
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BOLOCAN ‐ Le rapport catéchèse‐théologie‐pédagogie dans la perspective de
l’enseignement religieux actuel
Esprit” 69 . La question principale se déplace ainsi des
méthodes vers la catéchèse, de la pédagogie vers le
pédagogue.
Entre les difficultés qu’examine le Bienheureux
Augustin dans le traité Sur la catéchèse des débutants, deux
surtout semblent d’une actualité toujours vive: la lassitude
et le découragement. Ces deux constituent un obstacle
quotidien. Les réalités de la foi semblent au catéchète
banales, dénuées d’intérêt. Ce père de l’Eglise observe que
c’est l’amour, la sympathie du maître pour ses élèves qui
renouvelle l’intérêt de l’enseignement
La pédagogie, c’est l’homme même, sa compétence, sa
conviction, sa foi, son amour pour son prochain.
En tout circonstance l’audace de la foi, le “franc‐
parler” de l’Apôtre Paul, l’acceptation même d’être un signe
de contradiction, doivent soutenir l’action difficile et
merveilleuse du catéchète, comme de tout témoin du
Christ.
Il faut se rappeler que le Royaume de Dieu progresse
dans les cœurs selon une loi de lente maturation et
d’échéance lointaine. Sauf charisme exceptionnel, nul
regard humain ne pénètre dans l’univers mystérieux des
consciences pour y mesurer les cheminements de la grâce.
Le catéchète, comme tout Apôtre du Christ, œuvre dans
l’invisible. Une graine fragile imperceptible a été jetée, que
le Maître fera germer, grandir, fleurir, fructifier à l’heure
de la grâce et de la liberté.
Dans cette situation, le catéchète peut faire sienne la
prière émerveillée du Christ: “Je te bénis, Seigneur du ciel
et de la terre, d’avoir caché cela aux sages et aux habiles, et
de l’avoir révélé aux tous petits” 70 .
58
69 Mathieu 28, 18.
70 Ibidem 11, 25.

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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Bibliographie sommaire
1. ***, Catéchèse et dialogue, Lumen Vitae, Bruxelles, 1966.
2. ***, Homélie pour la fête des lumière dans Le baptême
d’après les Pères de l’Eglise, coll. «Lettres chrétiennes», Paris, 1962.
3. ***, Langages de la foi à travers l’histoire. Mentalités et
catéchèse, Fayard-Maine, Paris, 1972.
4. ANTONESCU, G.G., Educaţia morală şi religioasă în şcoala
românească, Editura Cultura Românească S.A.R., Bucureşti, 1937.
5. ANTONESCU, G.G., Istoria Pedagogiei: Doctrinele
fundamentale ale pedagogiei moderne, ediţia a III-a, Editura Scrisul
românesc, Craiova, 1940.
6. BARBOTIN, E., Catéchèse et pédagogie, Lethielleux, Paris,
1981.
7. BRETAGNE, G. de, Pastorale catéchétique, Desclée de
Brouwer, Paris, 1953.
8. BULACU, Pr., Mihail, Pedagogie creştină ortodoxă, Bucureşti,
1935.
9. CASTER, M. van, Dieu nous parle, 2 vol., Desclée de Brouwer,
Paris, 1964‐1965.
10. DIOGNETE, A., Les écrits des Pères apostoliques, coll. «Foi
vivante», Cerf, Paris, 1979, p. 62.
11. DUBUISSON, O., L’acte catéchétique. Son but, sa pratique,
Centurion, Paris, 1982.
12. FARGUES, M., D’hier à demain, le catéchisme, Fayard‐Maine,
Paris, 1964.
13. GODIN, Α., Psychologie des expériences religieuses. Le désir et
la réalité, Centurion, Paris, 1981.
14. JUNGMANN, J.A., Catéchèse. Objectifs et methodes de
l’enseignement religieux (trad. de l’allemand), Lumen Vitae,
Bruxelles, 1955.
15. JUSTIN LE PHILOSOPHE, La philosophie passe au Christ. L’oeuvre
de Justin, coll. «Lettres chrétiennes», Paris, 1958.
16. MARLE, R., Herméneutique et catéchèse, Fayard‐Maine, Paris,
1970.
17. MONTESSORI, M., L’éducation religieuse. La vie en Jésus‐Christ,
Desclée de Brouwer, Paris, 1956.
18. PIVETEAU, D., Comment ouvrir les jeunes à la foi, Desclée de
Brouwer/Bellarmin, Paris, 1977.
59

BOLOCAN ‐ Le rapport catéchèse‐théologie‐pédagogie dans la perspective de
l’enseignement religieux actuel
19. SAINT GREGOIRE DE NYSSA, Homélie pour la fête des lumière
dans Le baptême d’après les Pères de l’Eglise, coll. «Lettres
chrétiennes», Paris, 1962.
20. SAINT LEON, Deuxième sermon sur l’Ascension.Sermons, t. III;
coll. «Sources chrétiennes», nr. 74.
21. SAUVAGE, M., Catéchèse et laïcat. Participation des laïcs au
ministère de la parole et mission du frère enseignant dans l’Eglise,
Ligel, Paris, 1962.
22. SNYDERS, G., Où vont les pédagogies non directives?, PUF,
Paris, 1973.
23. QUERE, F., La foi peut‐elle se transmettre?, Paris, 1974.
24. VOELTZEL, R., Education et Révélation. Introduction aux
problèmes de la pédagogie chrétienne, PUF, Paris, 1960.
25. WACKENHEIM, Charles, La Catéchèse, col. „Que sois‐je?”,
Paris, 1983.
26. WYLER, A., L’educateur au service de lafoi. Mission et visage
du catéchiste, Centurion, Paris, 1978.
60

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
The Impact of the Current Technologies on the
Youth`s Personalities Creation
Constantin CUCOŞ *
* Teacher Training Department
„Al. I. Cuza” University Iasi, Romania
E‐mail Address: cucos@uaic.ro
Abstract ‡
Current technology has become a must for young
persons nowadays, many of their activities being
generated and accompanied by today’s technological
structures. From learning, to keeping informed, from
work to entertainment and recreation activities, all these
elements with pragmatic or aesthetic focus, in a
collective perspective or an intimately individual one,
are built upon or mediated through the new
technologies. Rejecting technology, in the name of a
number of so‐called absolute theoretical values would
mean not paying attention to reality and rejecting it. The
best thing to do would be to subdue technology, to
humanise and spiritualise it, assigning it practices where
the complementarity of values should be present.
Recognising the conduct that youth have adopted
towards the new technologies makes us think that they
are not considerably negative and blamable, the way
they might be described at first glance. Most young
people use technology very carefully and within
reasonable limits, the excesses not being greater than
the ones peculiar to other psycho‐behavioural contexts.
Nevertheless, the delay and the creation of certain habits
– and also the awareness regarding their existence! –
causes us not to lose from sight the possible lapses
which we can prevent at the level of our educational
activities. Especially when the people under
considerationare still flexible and sensitive to the
different educogen stimuli.
‡ The abstract was written by the editor using fragments
from the study
61

CUCOS ‐ The Impact of the Current Technologies on the Formation of the
Personality of Young People
I. Technology – an Existential Dimension of the
Present‐Day Young Generation
The technological universe is bound to reconfigure the
spiritual profile of the present‐day young generation. It is
possible that, from the very beginning, the developing
being has gradually became more responsive to everything
new and acquainted more easily and more profoundly to
what science and technology have had to offer.
Nevertheless, just as the latter evolved unpredictably, their
impact over the young has been equally uneven.
The novelty of the different gadgets, some of which ‐
admittedly – “fitted” an expectancy long ago created, being
the offsprings of an older or of a younger fictional
imaginary (the mobile phone, the computer, the Internet,
the whole range of media‐digital combinations etc.). In
addition to that they impose new representations or
internal rythms, new ways of referring to knowledge, to
oneself and to the others. The degree of acceptance of the
former among the young is considerably higher than that
of the other population categories. The explanation lays, on
the one hand, in the highly permissive and receptive spirit
of youth to novelty and, on the other hand, to the
imaginative co‐extensivity and to the strong connection
that is established between the young person and the
„power” (real or imagined) of the „machine”.
I.1. The Technical Product – Psychological,
Deontological, Anthropological Reverberations
Any new invention affects, to a certain extent, the inner
psychological equilibrium, the range of skills and behaviors
developed around the very features of the object in
question. For instance, handling an ordinary photo camera
used to require from its user the acquiring of a number of
handling, calculation, focusing, framing, temporization
skills etc, according to certain technical data. Not to
mention the laboratory chemistry skills afterwards
(knowing the time the photo needs to be exposed or the
time to keep it in a certain substance). Anyhow, such skills
were much more “natural”, closer to the human behavior,
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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resembling very much to extensions of some similar motive
and mental abilities. The digital photo “ignores” a series of
human skills (duplicated, meanwhile, by the camera) and
develops new ones that are discontinuous or opposite to
the original ones (reframing, adding special effects,
inserting into flashes or pps). Usually, every technical
product re‐organizes the aptitudinal‐behavioural tissue of
a person, establishes a requirements hierarchy at the
psychological level, imposing a certain equilibrium until a
new product appears, with new requirements.
If the consistency of the appearance of new technical
landmarks is too important, the person is induced into a
state of adaptive stress, with negative reverberations also
on other levels of a person’s behavior. From a particular
perspective, the new technical product needs to be built on
as many procedural algorithms of earlier corresponding
products as possible, since it should not lead to behavioral
“breaches”, i.e. reversed movements that would contradict
one’s acquired skills (for instance inventing reverse gears
whose handle would move forward, not backwards, as
usual).
It is possible that the greatest quality of a new technical
product is to maintain or even enhance our own human
nature, not to alter our spirits and weaken our bodies. To
be an extension of the natural and spiritualise it. Not to
mechanize and alienate. Not to be an involution, but an
evolution. The technical progress will force the individual
to learn in a consistent manner, to add, in as natural a way
as possible, new values to the already existing ones, what
is unknown to what is known. Moreover, what needs to be
understood once and for all is the fact that it is not the
intrinsic quality of the technology that matters the most,
but its efficiency. From an axiological point of view,
technology is, to a certain extent, ambivalent and even
neutral, since its usefulness depends on the way it is put
into practice. Not the mobile phones engineers are the ones
to blame for the bomb attacks and the bank account frauds
63

CUCOS ‐ The Impact of the Current Technologies on the Formation of the
Personality of Young People
managed through phones, but the persons actually using
the latter for such purposes.
Technology does not have only a palpable dimension,
but it also has a highly anthropological one, having
repercussions at the social, the human and the spiritual
levels. Every new artefact of this sort is “foreseen” by a
certain “prophecy”, producing, through its effects, a real
“mythology”, even an “eschatology”. It is greeted with
anxiety and thrill, but also with worries. Its integration
practically leads to re‐balancing the representations
system, to recalibrating the bond existing between the
human beings and the universe, to re‐defining a person in
opposition to a new range of demands and values.
Moreover, for the young, a similar product has a symbolic
value, that of liaising the very users to a world that seems
to hierarchically upgrade them. Owning the highly
performing mobile phone is a sign of belonging to a
privileged category, of best positioning oneself on a
material and social scale. The owners of such products do
not own only an object, but also the socially bestowed
attributes ‐ and the value! – of the object in question. In
other words, the owner thinks of himself/herself that
he/she is no longer a common person, but a “somebody ”
due to the object in his/her possession. Or, who knows, one
could achieve a dream or hide a certain weakness!
I.2. The Technical Innovation – between Virtues and
Servitudes
The technical dimension has a notable influence over
the learning mechanisms and also over the formation
structures. The decantation of a digital culture produces
restructurings, as far as the learning mechanisms are
concerned (for instance, the memory drawback) and also
the reorientations, regarding the learning motivation and
its objectives. Judging the situation from this perspective,
we should be more tolerant with the decline of the book
culture in favour of the digital one – at least from the point
of view of the way in which the young are relating to the
two types of cultural expression. What we should focus on
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
first is guiding young people towards a critical and
responsible approach to the cultural products, an
axiological autonomy from the latter, no matter whether
they are delivered under a classical form or under an
electronical one. On the other hand, the extensions of the
formation structures between the curricular level and the
extra‐curricular one also need to be taken into
consideration and re‐evaluated from an educational point
of view. The ruling principle should be that the extra‐
curricular dimension has to stand for an educational
context, both for the initial preparation and for the lifelong
formation.
The influence of a new device on us is not only direct,
through the requirements of its presence and its usage, but
also indirect, through the change of our relationship with
the world around us and to our fellow human beings.
Meanwhile, the device is a mediator, a third party between
our body or our mind and the things around us. The world
seen or used through similar devices looks different from
the one perceived directly through our ears, eyes, skin. It
can receive a different value, consistency, depth, light.
Cohabiting with the technology yields our mental and
sensory apparatus in much of its essential information
background. It makes it perceive to a lesser or to a greater
extent, it renders it slower or more active. The world of a
person that usually walks is different from the one of a
person who travels by car. The world of a person who lives
in the countryside differs from the one of a person who
lives in town ‐ and that is also because the technological
proximity is different. The world perceived and imagined
by a young person passionate about technology looks
different from that of an experienced adult person, who is
no longer interested in the technological novelties. We do
not wish to say that this world is better or worse, but that
it is different. The temporality, the multitude and the
duration of the contacts, the other persons` expectations,
the projections of the future, the decisions and the inner
experiences etc. are all “filtered” through the technologies
65

CUCOS ‐ The Impact of the Current Technologies on the Formation of the
Personality of Young People
employed and will certainly be different in the cases
mentioned above.
The new communication means, based on e‐mailing and
instant messaging, and not on the traditional mailing,
entail new dimensions and representations regarding
space, time, the value of things and that of people. If the
classical telegram involved an informational transfer
within a particular time interval through a tangible device
(everyday more convenient from a social and technological
point of view), the new communication means liaise almost
instantly somewhat "voided" creatures, sometimes with no
face or appearance, with no relation to a tangible support
(the colour and the smell of the sheet of paper, the
calligraphic peculiarities, the format and the style of the
stamp etc.). The tangibility of the communicational device
together with a whole plethora of meanings the latter
bears disappear forever. The personalisation of the
message is done only at the content level, and if it is done
otherwise, it remains somewhat pre‐established,
suggested, the user having the liberty of choosing an
alternative out of many already existing ones.
Communication based on the new devices imposes itself
with a series of drawbacks, but it can also be an opening
due to the technological skills that it supposes.
The communicational technological novelties create
new opportunities, but also new servitudes related to our
role on the social scene. The new space facilitates a virtual
extension, a multiplication of our presence, an
unrepeatable and fantastic ubiquity (within the same time
interval, somebody can read one of my articles published
in an online magazine, somebody else can view my
Curriculum Vitae on my personal website, while someone
else can contact me by e‐mail or instant messaging). On the
other hand, my own privacy can hardly be protected, since,
wherever I am, I can be reached on my mobile phone or,
why not, “tracked down” on the messenger program –
when I am at the office, I take a break or speak to
somebody. Even if I have the freedom to decide what to let
the others see, eventually the new digital technicalities
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make me the victim of other persons’ indiscretions and
“voyeurist” temptations. Consequently, I may sometimes be
forced to opt for other “masks” and “faces”, according to
the technological alternatives provided by the place I am
in.
As a general rule, the technical domain supposes
standardization, repetitiveness, activation of certain
human dimensions that resonate, to a certain extent, with
the algorithmicity peculiar to the external artefact. It
awakens and enhances the very “mechanical”
predispositions from within ourselves. Sometimes, it
“summons” man to become a robot, through a bizarre
mechanism, transforming him into an extension or into a
simple “tool” of the artefact. Technology abuse develops a
certain addiction (like any other excessive consumption)
and a spiritual laziness, which can alienate us from our
own existential essence and logic.
It is important that the interaction between man and
machines should not degenerate into an overlapping and
that each entity should stick to what it actually is. God
forbid that we reach the day when men would become
machines and machines would replace men!
In order to make a diagnosis of young people’s
representations and options concerning the present‐day
technologies, we have undertaken a survey, based on
questioning several youth groups – pupils and students –
from the educational system in Iasi. This will allow us to
draw a series of conclusions at the end of the survey that
would fuse the general theses developed above with the
empirical observations backed‐up by the field research.
II. Research on the Influence of the New
Technologies on Young People
The Research Hypotheses
As regards young people’s position towards the Media
universe and the digital culture:
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CUCOS ‐ The Impact of the Current Technologies on the Formation of the
Personality of Young People
1. There are differences, according to the education
level and the gender criteria, regarding the questionees`
opinions on the cultural valencies of the Internet.
2. There are differences, according to the education
level and the gender criteria, regarding the Internet usage
frequency.
3. There are differences, according to the education
level and the gender criteria, regarding the activity types
undertaken on the Internet.
4. There are differences, according to the education
level and the gender criteria, regarding the activated
mobile phone functions.
5. There are differences, according to the education
level and the gender criteria, regarding Internet usage for
academic purposes.
6. There are differences, according to the education
level and the gender criteria, regarding Internet addiction.
7. Internet usage frequency is to be associated, to a
greater extent, to Internet addiction, rather than to
Internet usage for academic purposes.
8. The pupils and the students are able to identify both
the advantages and the risks to which they expose
themselves through accessing the Internet and the Media.
The Method
The undertaken research was based on the
questionnaire‐based survey method.
The Respondents Group
The survey focused on a total of 224 respondents, high
school pupils from Iasi and students from the „Al. I. Cuza”
University in Iasi. 115 of the total number of the
respondents were second year students, while 109 were
tenth grade pupils. According to the gender variable, the
respondents group included 81 male subjects and 141
female subjects, two respondents refusing to specify their
gender.
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The following graph illustrates the respondents group,
according to the Gender and Education Level variables
(High School, University). (Graph No. 1. and Graph No. 2.)
Variables
Independent Variables:
• Education Level, two categories: High School and
University
• Gender, two categories: Male, Female
Dedependent Variables:
• The cultural valencies of the Internet
• The Internet usage
• The mobile phone accessed functions
• The Internet usage for academic purposes
• The Internet addiction
• Advantages and risks to which the young expose
themselves through accessing the Internet and the Mass
media.
Instruments
The cultural valencies of the Internet. The respondents
were assigned a list of six questions and asked to give
Yes/No answers to each of them, according to their own
opinions. The six questions were: 1. Do you think that the
classical culture can be replaced with the digital one, i.e
books replaced with the Internet? 2. Did watching certain
movies determine you to read the books that inspired
them? 3. Does the Internet represent an occasion for us to
become more sensitive to the spokespersons of other
cultures? 4. Did/Does the Internet encourage the inter‐
religious tolerance? 5. Is there a direct relationship
between the manifestation of the Islamic fundamentalism
and restricting/forbidding access to the new Media
technologies (Internet, Mass media, mobile telephony) to
the peoples referred to above? 6. Are you a member of an
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CUCOS ‐ The Impact of the Current Technologies on the Formation of the
Personality of Young People
Internet chat group? If so, what is the specific of the group
in question?
Internet usage. The respondents were asked to indicate
the Internet usage frequency (occasionally, twice a week,
weekly and daily), the time that they usually spend on an
Internet session (less than one hour, 1‐2 hours, 2‐4 hours,
more than four hours) and the extent to which they
frequently undertake different activities on the Internet
(using the E‐mail, searching for useful information,
reading/watching the news, accessing games, instant
messaging, listening to Mp3s and downloading movies ,
downloading software and documents, listening to
particular radio stations or watching TV shows, accessing
porno websites). The same Internet usage measurement
method was also used by Hong, Y., Li, X., Mao, R. & Stanton,
B. (2007) on the occasion of a survey undertaken on
Chinese students.
Internet usage for academic purposes was measured
through adapting the questionnaire made by Joiner et al
(2006). The questionnaire contains 10 items and the
answer variants are rated on a Likert scale of 5 steps (1 =
never, 2 = once a week, 3 = several times a week, 4 = once a
day and 5 = several times a day). The Cronbach alpha
internal consistency coefficient presented by the author in
the above mentioned survey was α =.93, while the stability
test‐retest coefficient was Spearman Rho = .88. In our
survey, the obtained Cronbach alpha fidelity coefficient
was α = .75.
Internet addiction was measured through adjusting the
Internet addiction scale (Hur, M. H., 2006). The scale has six
items and the answer variants are rated on a Lickert scale
of 4 steps (1 = never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = always).
The Cronbach alpha internal consistency coefficient
presented by the author in the survey referred to above
was α =.87. In our survey, the obtained Cronbach alpha
fidelity coefficient was α = .76.
The accessed mobile phone functions . The respondents
were asked to indicate the mobile phone functions that
they use in their everyday lives (games, information,
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written communication through SMSs and orientation
through GPS).
The Procedure (the undertaking of the survey)
The survey was conducted in October 2007. The
educational institutions where it was made were the
„Costache Negruzzi” College, the „V. Alecsandri” High
School and the „Al. I Cuza” University. The students who
participated in the survey were from the Faculty of History
and from the Faculty of Geography. The respondents were
guaranteed the confidentiality of their answers.
The Results Analysis
For the results analysis, the SPSS for Windows Version
10.0 was used. The results partly confirmed the launched
hypotheses. The used statistical methods were the
frequencies analysis, the Chi Square tests and the Mann‐
Whitney U tests.
The Cultural Valencies of the Internet
As the Table No. 1 shows, a considerable majority of the
respondents consider that the classical culture cannot be
replaced with the digital one, i.e. books by the Internet
(70%), the percentages being similar both for pupils and
students. For a change, although both girls and boys are in
favour of the classical culture, girls are considerably more
determined than boys regarding the fact that Internet
cannot replace books, that the digital culture is unable to
replace the classical one, χ 2 (1) = 13.096.
As for the fact that watching movies could lead to
reading the books that inspired them is regarded, the
respondents` opinion is favourable, 69.2% of the latter
considering that watching certain movies motivated them
to read the books that inspired those movies, the
percentages being similar in girls` case and in boys`.
Nevertheless, although the influence is greatly noticeable
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CUCOS ‐ The Impact of the Current Technologies on the Formation of the
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for both girls and boys, it is significantly more obvious in
girls` case, χ 2 (1) = 6.135.
As regards the Internet positive influence on making
people become more sensitive to the spokespersons of
other cultures, most of the respondents were in favour of
the hypothesis (57.7%), the percentages being similar both
in the case of pupils and in that of students, equally for
boys and girls.
As far as the contribution of the Internet to spreading
religious tolerance is concerned, only 41.4% of the
respondents agree with this hypothesis, the opinions
ressembling , whether pupils` or students`, boys` or girls`.
At the same time, the great majority of the respondents
(60%) consider that there is a direct relationship between
the manifestation of the Islamic fundamentalism and
restricting/forbidding access to the new Media
technologies, whether Internet, mobile telephony,
uncensored television or written press) to the peoples
referred to above. Opinions are similar both in pupils` case
and in students`. For a change, girls consider that the
relationship is far stronger χ 2 (1) = 3.985, the explanation
lying in the fact that they are naturally more sensitive than
boys or that the Islamic culture censors women’s rights
and gender equality does not exist.
Lastly, only a small part of the respondents are
members of Internet chat groups (31.5%), the same
holding true for both pupils and students. There is,
however, an important discrepancy between boys and
girls, the percentage of boys being registered in Internet
chat groups being considerably greater than that of girls, χ 2
(1) = 3.948. The results for the entire respondents group
are presented in Graph No. 1. (See Table No. 1 and Graph
No. 1).
Internet Usage
As far as Internet usage frequency is concerned, 59% of
the respondents declared that they access the Internet
every day, 17% every week, 2,7% once in two weeks and
21% occasionally (See Table No. 2 and Graph No. 2).
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At the same time, 15.2% of the respondents declared
that they spend more than four hours on an Internet
session, 33% 2‐4 hours, 37.1% 1‐2 hours and 14.7% less
than one hour (See Table No. 3 and Graph No. 3).
Our purpose was to check if there are significant
differences regarding Internet usage frequency and the
time spent on an Internet session, according to the
education level and gender variables. In order to do this,
we have applied the unparametric Mann‐Whitney U. test.
The results show that boys access a lot more often the
Internet (z = 4.056, p < .001) and spend more time on an
Internet session (z = 2.654, p < .01) than girls.
Likewise, pupils access a lot more often the Internet (z
= 5.873, p < .001) and spend more time on an Internet
session (z = 4.278, p < .001) than students.
Activities Undertaken on the Internet
The respondents reported that the activities most
frequently undertaken on the internet were, in order of
ranking: searching for useful information (91.1%),
followed by listening to and downloading Mp3s and movies
(76.8%), then by E‐mail usage (69.6%), instant messaging
(65.2%), downloading software and documents (43.8%),
reading or watching news (33%), accessing games (31.3%),
listening to particular radio stations or watching TV shows
(28.6%), and to a rather small extent, the accessing porno
websites (5.4%) (Table 4, Graph 4). The hierarchy is
approximately identical for pupils and students, for boys
and girls.
Likewise, there are considerable differences regarding
the activities undertaken on the Internet by the
responders, according to the education level and gender
variables. Thus, compared to students, pupils undertake
more frequently activities such as listening to and
downloading Mp3s and movies [χ 2 (1) = 6.912], instant
messaging [χ 2 (1) = 15.334], accessing games [χ 2 (1) =
6.644]. On the other hand, students considerably engage
themselves more than pupils on such Internet activities as
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CUCOS ‐ The Impact of the Current Technologies on the Formation of the
Personality of Young People
radio listening or watching TV shows [χ 2 (1) = 10.872] and
accessing porno websites [χ 2 (1) = 12.018].
At the same time, boys engage themselves considerably
more often than girls in activities such as downloading
software and documents [χ 2 (1) = 24.496], accessing games
[χ 2 (1) = 30.266] and accessing porno websites [χ 2 (1) =
8.120]. (See Table No. 4 and Graph no. 4)
The Functions Accessed on the Mobile Phone
Among the functions accessed on the mobile phone, the
most used one is the SMS messaging option, followed by
documentation, games, and, with a rather low percentage,
the GPS orientation (Table No. 5, Graph No. 5). The
hierarchy remains approximately the same, no matter the
respondents’ gender or their education level.
Likewise, there are significant differences, according to
the respondents` education level and gender, regarding the
three most frequently used mobile phone functions. Thus,
pupils access the mobile phone games function
considerably more often than students [χ 2 (1) = 9.331]. On
the other hand, students use the information mobile phone
function to a significantly greater extent than pupils [χ 2 (1)
= 12.316]. At the same time, boys are using the games
mobile phone option much more often than girls [χ 2 (1) =
9.589], whereas the latter use the SMS option of the mobile
phones greatly more often than boys do [χ 2 (1) = 6.378].
(See Tabel No. 5 and Graph No. 5)
Advantages and Risks the Young Submit Themselves
to by Accessing the Internet and Mass Media
Both pupils and students identified a series of
advantages that the new media technologies (the Internet
and the Mass media) provide (See Table No. 6 and Graph
No. 6). We have opted for those which were most
frequently referred to, noticing that most of the
percentages are similar, as far as pupils and students are
concerned.
Other advantages the respondents suggested were: the
alternative of becoming involved in a series of volunteer
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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activities and projects, receiving guidance regarding the
educational and the professional orientation, acquiring
new hobbies, shopping, making online payments, freedom
of speech, participating in different interactive activities
(forums etc.), being exposed to diversity and gaining new
perspectives and, in the pupils‘ case, being able to get
second opinions from the classmates, regarding
homework.
Furthermore, the pupils and the students have
identified a series of risks to which the new media
technologies (the Internet and the Mass media) could
submit them (See Table No. 7). What is to be noted is the
fact that, in most of the situations, the percentages are
similar in the case of the two respondents groups.
Other risks suggested by the respondents included:
neglecting oneself, setting bounds to one’s imagination and
critical spirit, a tendency towards monotony ("being a
vegetable on a chair or on a couch"), the fraud, the
possibility of encountering dangerous persons and also the
exposure to a whole range of viruses.
Internet Usage for Academic Purposes
Our purpose was to check if there are significant
differences regarding the Internet usage for academic
purposes, according to the gender and education level
variables. Since the Internet usage for academic purposes
variable was not normally distributed (the scores to this
variable are significantly different from a common curve,
being deviated to the left), we have applied the
unparametric Mann‐Whitney U. test. The results show that
there are no significant differences between pupils and
students, nor between the male and female respondents, as
far as Internet usage for academic purposes is concerned.
Internet Addiction
We have equally tried to evaluate the possible
significant differences, regarding Internet addiction,
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CUCOS ‐ The Impact of the Current Technologies on the Formation of the
Personality of Young People
according to gender and the education level variables.
Since the Internet addiction variable was also not normally
distributed, we applied again the unparametric Mann‐
Whitney U. test. The results show that, compared to
students, pupils manifest a far greater Internet addiction (z
= 3.861, p < .001). At the same time, boys are more
addicted to the Internet than girls (z = 3.623, p < .001).
Conclusions
The results of the present research confirm the fact that
the young are able to understand the cultural valencies of
the new media technologies, and also the advantages and
risks that such technologies can present for their
personality and behaviour. According to their opinion, the
classical culture cannot be replaced with the digital one
(despite the easiness of accessing the information
electronically). Young people also admit the important role
that the new media technologies play in making us aware
of the spokespersons of other cultures and equally of the
inter‐religious tolerance, the access to information being a
way towards diversity and the acceptance of the otherness.
Among the most accessed Internet activities by young
people are both the ones regarding formation and
documentation and those based on communication and
entertainment. As far as the mobile phone is concerned, the
most accessed of its functions by young people is the SMS
messaging documentation and games being used less often.
Among the advantages of the new media technologies
accessing, young people mention documentation and the
access to information from all domains (for their studies)
and communication and entertainment. As regards the risk
of the exposure to the new media technologies, the
respondents suggested addiction, the possible health
affections that can develop (the eyes fatigue, spine
problems etc.), the sometimes erroneous information, but
also neglecting friends, families and educational activities
or any other drawback.
It is equally important to mention the fact that Internet
usage for academic purposes is evenly undertaken by
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pupils and students, by both boys and girls. On the other
hand, Internet addiction seems more considerable in the
pupils` and boys` case, a plausible explanation being the
fact that students are more focused on their professional
formation (compared to pupils), whereas girls tend to put a
greater price on their social life (compared to boys).
Research Limits and Future Analysis Directions
Given that the present survey is of an observatory
nature, the long term effects of the new media technologies
exposure upon the personalities of young people have not
been thoroughly analysed, but simply mentioned. Further
studies could shed light on the connection between certain
advantages and risks peculiar to the new media
technologies and the different personality types, together
with the way through which certain advantages and risks
peculiar to the new media technologies could influence the
development of the personality of young people. Certainly,
risks should be neutralised. Education must aim at
maximising the advantages and minimising the risks to
which the youth could be submitted, through different
educational programmes.
III General Conclusions and Open Issues
The results of the survey allow us to conclude that the
current technology has become a prerequisite for a young
person, many of the latter`s activities being generated and
accompanied by today`s technological structures. Starting
from the activity of learning, that of getting informed, that
of working up to the entertainment and recreation activity,
having a pragmatic or an esthetic character, in a collective
perspective or an intimately individual one, all these
elements are built upon the new technologies or are
mediated through them. Rejecting technology, in the name
of a number of so‐called absolute theoretical values would
mean not paying attention to reality and rejecting it. The
best thing to do would be to subdue technology, to
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CUCOS ‐ The Impact of the Current Technologies on the Formation of the
Personality of Young People
humanize and spiritualise it, assigning it practices where
the values complementarity should be present.
Recognising the conduct that the youth have adopted
towards the new technologies makes us think that they are
not considerably negative and blamable, the way they may
be described at a first glance. Most of the youth use
technology very carefully and within reasonable limits, the
excesses not being greater than the ones peculiar to other
psycho‐behavioural contexts. Nevertheless, the delay and
the creation of certain habits – and also the awareness
regarding their existence! – makes us not loose from our
sight the possible slippings, that we can prevent at the
level of our educational activities. Especially when the
people had in view are still flexible and sensitive to the
different educogen stimuli.
As for the importance of the knowledge mediated
through these technologies, the respondents admit the fact
that technology is the main source of connecting to certain
values, but that, sometimes, it is an interface related to the
classical culture, enhancing, for some of them, the need to
go directly to such sources. Taking into account the fact
that the very classical culture got "digitalised”, through the
access to everyday more online libraries or through virtual
tours of some great museum, we consider that not even
this aspect is to be considered a fundamental danger. What
matters the most is the relation established with a
particular value, and not necessarily the path (medium) to
reach to it.
The youth treat the new connections as opportunities
of a mutual acquaintance with other spiritual forms, with
the spokespersons of different cultures. They know that
the feelings of tolerance and respect towards other persons
can be formed and enhanced through the digital
technologies. What I didn`t have in mind to check on this
occasion, but it would be very interesting to do that, would
be to see if the youth are aware of the situation and, at the
same time, of the possible dangers of the spiritual
dispersion and of the loss of identity.
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An important conduct associated with these
technologies is the communication of an instrumental,
informational and affective nature. Besides the knowledge
transfer, the youth “transfer” themselves, with their
interests, mind states, feelings and projections. This would
mean that this part of the communication process
complements or compensates for some losses undertaken
at the level of the alive, natural communication. Developing
some habits of remaining connected longer than needed
betrays the fact that, for some youth, this affection need is
met mostly in this manner, which is not appropriate.
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Bibliographical Reference
1. DUCLOS, Denis (2002), Société‐monde: le temps des ruptures,
Paris : La Découverte – MAUSS
2. HEBRARD, Christophe (2001) Le village virtuel 3d. Introduction à
une ethnologie des communautés virtuelles, http://alor.univ‐
montp3.fr/cerce/revue.htm.
3. HONG, Y., Li, X., Mao, R. & Stanton, B. (2007) Internet Use
Among Chinese College Students: Implications for Sex Education and
HIV Prevention. CyberPsychology & Behavior, 20, 161‐169
4. HUR, M. H. (2006) Demographic, Habitual, and
Socioeconomic Determinants of Internet Addiction Disorder: An
Empirical Study of Korean Teenagers. CyberPsychology & Behavior,
9, 514‐525
5. JOINER, R. et al (2006) Internet Identification and Future
Internet Use. CyberPsychology & Behavior, 9, 410‐414
6. LEVY, Pierre, Qu’est‐ce que le virtuel? (1995) Paris : La
Découverte
7. PERRENAUD, Philippe (1998) Cyberdémocratisation. Les
inégalités réelles devant le monde virtuel d’Internet in La revue des
Echanges (AFIDES), Volume 15, Issue 2.
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Captions for Figures
Graph No. 1. The Graphical Illustration of the Responders Group,
according to the Gender Variable
Female
62,9%
Missing
0,9%
Male
36,2%
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CUCOS ‐ The Impact of the Current Technologies on the Youth`s Personalities
Creation
Graph No. 2. The Graphical Illustration of the Respondents Group,
according to the Education Level variable
82
51,3%
Students
Pupils
48,7%

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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Tabel No. 1 The percentage results on the items regarding the cultural
valencies of the Internet, on the whole, and also differentiated according
to the education level and gender variables and the χ 2 tests results.
83
fn: the χ 2 test results are not to be taken into consideration

CUCOS ‐ The Impact of the Current Technologies on the Youth`s Personalities
Creation
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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Table No. 2
The percentage results on the items regarding the Internet usage
frequency, on the whole, and also differentiated according to the
education level and gender variables.
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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Table No. 3
The percentage results on the items regarding the time spent on an
Internet session, on the whole, and also differentiated according to
education level and gender variables the.
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Creation
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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Table No. 4. The percentage results on the items regarding the Internet
activities types, on the whole, and also differentiated according to the
education level and gender variables, together with the χ 2 tests results.
fn: the χ 2 test results are not to be taken into consideration
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CUCOS ‐ The Impact of the Current Technologies on the Youth`s Personalities
Creation
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
Table No. 5 The percentage results on the item regarding the mobile phone
accessed functions, for the whole respondents group, and also differentiated
according to the education level and gender variables, together with the χ 2 tests
results.
fn: the χ 2 test results are not to be taken into consideration
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CUCOS ‐ The Impact of the Current Technologies on the Youth`s Personalities
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Table No. 6. The percentage results on the item regarding the
advantages of accessing the Internet and of the exposal to Mass media,
differentiated for pupils and students
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No. 2, January 2008
Table No. 7. The percentage results on the items regarding the risks of
accessing the Internet and of the exposal to Mass media, differentiated
for pupils and students.
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Theology and Ecology. Hermeneutical Insigts for a
Christian Eco‐Theology
Rev. Gheorghe POPA *
* "Al. I. Cuza" University, “Dumitru Stăniloae” Faculty of Orthodox Theology,
Closca Street, No. 9, 700066, Iasi, Romania
E‐mail Address: gt_popa@yahoo.fr
Abstract
Nature has always “longed for salvation”,
nowadays more than ever, as man has abused Nature,
separated it from God and used it for his own selfish
purposes. It is a tragic fact that this autonomy has not
contributed in any way to the freedom of man, but to
slavery, to his submission to nature and the laws of
necessity. Consequently, general belief defines our
time as dominated by a deep spiritual crisis which
distorts the relationship between man and the
environment.
We consider that reestablishing patristic thought ‐
based on a Christocentric vision of Creation – could be
essential for the understanding and resolution of the
present state of crisis. This vision doubles the faith of
several contemporary humanists in restoring the sense
of “logos” or of “history in Christ” for our history,
meant to give transcendent freedom to human freedom
where all Creation could rest. Therefore, in the present
article I would like to outline a few hermeneutical
insights for a possible dialogue between contemporary
ecology and Christian theology.
I. Preliminaries
It is well known that, even from 1961, numerous
theologians actively involved in the ecumenical movement
started to ask themselves questions about nature, science,
technology and the impact of the technological society on
human dignity.
The third World Conference on Church and Society
(1966) discussed the issue of providing an answer for the
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Eco‐Theology
social technological revolutions that had determined new
structures of spiritual experience. The fourth Conference,
held in Uppsala in 1968 broadened the same problems
debated on at Geneva in 1966.
The United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (Stockholm, 1972) shared the increasing
concern of Churches for ecology 1 .
Finally, the seventh Assembly of the World Council of
Churches 2 , meeting in Canberra was centered on
rediscovering an integrative vision of creation that would
determine a new attitude of the modern man towards
environment.
These strong concerns were born because Nature
“longed for salvation”, nowadays more than ever, as man
had abused Nature, separated it from God and used it for
his own selfish purposes. It is a tragic fact that this
autonomy has not contributed in any way to the freedom of
man, but to slavery, to his submission to nature and the
laws of necessity. Consequently, general belief defines our
time as dominated by a deep spiritual crisis which distorts
the relationship between man and the environment.
We consider that reestablishing patristic thought –
based on a Christocentric vision of Creation – could be
essential for the understanding and resolution of the
present state of crisis. This vision doubles the faith of
several contemporary humanists in restoring the sense of
“logos” or of “history in Christ” for our history, meant to
give transcendent freedom to human freedom where all
Creation could rest. Therefore, in the present article I
would like to outline a few hermeneutical insights for a
possible dialogue between contemporary ecology and
Christian theology.
1 Paix et justice pour la creation entière. Intégralité des textes et
documents officiels édités par la Conférence des Eglises européennes
et le Conseil des Conférences Episcopales Européennes, avec une
introduction de M. Jean Fischer et de Mgr. Ivo Fürer, Paris, 1989, p.
264.
2 Held in February 7‐20, 1991.
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II. The Theological Vocation of Creation
The whole patristic theology states that God the Father
creates the world through His Son in the Holy Spirit 3 . The
world or “the cosmos” is ontologically based on God, not on
itself. The world does not exist since the beginning, in
coeternity with God; on the contrary, it is created out of
nothing (ex nihilo) as a proof of God – the Trinity in his
creative love and freedom. Hence the world bears the icon
of Trinity in its inner self, its structure is a Trinitarian and
a communitarian one.
In order to transfer the aforementioned theological
statement to conceptual language, the Church Fathers used
two concepts from the Gospel According to Saint John and
the Letters of Saint Apostle Paul, i.e. λόγος and πνεΰμα
which have been translated in Romanian by Cuvânt
(Word) and Duh (Spirit).
Saint Irenaeus considers the Word (Logos) and the
Spirit as the “hands” of God the Father that brought the
world to being from non‐being. Thus the world is
“animated” and “spiritual”. In other words, the world has a
“logical” rational structure with a message for man and a
divine finality.
The logical structure of our world has been accepted
even by the Ancient philosophers. For instance, the Stoic
philosophers considered λόγος to be a cosmological
principle, synonymous with the human being (ουσία) 4 .
The concept of λόγος is also employed by Philo of
Alexandria, a Jewish philosopher who stated that the world
had been created by God’s λόγος. His conception draws on
the text of Genesis in order to establish a link between the
Greek cosmology and the one present in the Old Testament.
3 St. Athanasius, О γαρ Πατιρ δια του λογου εv τω πvευματι κτιζει
τα παvτα (Letter III, S.P.G., XXVI, 632 B.C.), apud Părintele Galeriu,
Jertfă şi răscumpărare [Father Galeriu, Sacrifice and Deliverance],
Anastasia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1991, p. 52.
4 Deacon Prof. Dr. Nicolae Balca, Istoria filosofiei antice [The
History of Ancient Philosophy], IBMBOR Publishing House, Bucharest,
1982, p. 246.
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It was only natural for the Christian theologians to
make use of this concept, in their turn, both to bring
arguments for the teachings of the Holy Trinity and its
relationship with the created world.
The first scholars engaged in this argumentative path
were the Christian apologists living in the centuries 1‐3
AD. However, their purpose was not to clarify the precepts
on the Holy Trinity, but to bring arguments for the relation
of equivalence between God and Truth before the Greeks –
a very perilous enterprise, indeed. The starting point of
their reflection corresponds to the Prologue of The Gospel
according to Saint John in which Jesus Christ our Savior is
identified with God’s eternal Logos and “all things were
made by him” (John, 1, 3). If Christ is Logos, he is also
Truth, according to the Christian apologists.
By identifying Christ with Truth because he is the
Logos, the apologists did not succeed in completely
surmounting the static ontology of the Greeks. Such is the
case of Saint Justin Martyr who defines God as supreme
Truth: “That which always stays the same, and… is
discernible to the mind alone (υοΰς)” 5 .
Thus, the divine truth is an immovable object in the
Platonist sense of the word, being related to the world
through the mind or the human spirit (νοΰς) 6 .
5 Saint Justin the Martyr and Philosopher, Dialogul cu iudeul Trifon,
în Apologeți de limbă greacă [Dialogue with Trypho, a Jew in Greek
Apologists], IBMBOR Publishing House, Bucharest, 1980, p. 95‐96. See
http://www.piney.com/FathJustinDiaTrypho.html#P4044_787343 for the
English version of the dialogue.
6 Saint Justin agrees with Platon when it comes to the mind‐νοΰς –
“the mind’s eye is of such a nature, and has been given for this end,
that we may see that very Being when the mind is pure itself, who is
the cause of all discerned by the mind, having no colour, no form, no
greatness‐nothing, indeed, which the bodily eye looks upon; but It is
something of this sort, he goes on to say, that is beyond all essence,
unutterable and inexplicable, but alone honourable and good, coming
suddenly into souls well‐dispositioned, on account of their affinity to
and desire of seeing Him”. Cf. Sfântul Iustin Martirul şi Filosoful, op.
cit., p. 96 [Saint Justin the Martyr and Philosopher, Ibidem for the
English translation].
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This relationship between God and the world leads us
to the understanding of the concept of λόγος belonging to
Him. There is an ontological connection (σΰγγενετα)
between λόγος and human spirit, therefore, according to
Saint Justin, Christ as λόγος becomes the link between God
and the world, between God and human spirit.
It is important to notice that the distinction between
the divine λόγος and the human νοΰς is not clearly made,
either in Saint Justin’s works or in the ones of the other
Logos theologians such as Saint Clement of Alexandria or
Origen as they continued to pay tribute to philosophy.
However, they have shown the way to Christian theology
for the philosophers to follow but they could not elucidate
well enough the relationship between God and creation. As
a result, their ideas indirectly led to the emergence of a
series of heretical deviations, both theological and in
relation with spiritual life. Their ideas were corrected later
by other Church Fathers, especially Saint Athanasius the
Great and Saint Maximus the Confessor.
Saint Athanasius threw light on the Logos theology in
its intellectualism that identified God, the incarnate Logos
with God’s Son the Father, i.e. the second person of the
Holy Trinity.
This relation of equivalence between Christ – the Logos
with God’s Son the Father was possible due to another
theological movement, not epistemologically based or
intellectually relating God with humanity, but which
emphasized an existential relationship with Christ, the
Logos of incarnate God as “in him was life” (John 1, 4).
Identifying λόγος with life was unacceptable for the
Ancient philosophy which considered that life was a value
added to being and not the being itself 7 . Therefore, the
definition of λόγος as life belongs to the Holy Scripture.
Saint Irenaeus stated that the tree of life in the Garden of
7 Aristotle, De anima, 402 a‐b; 431b; apud Ioannis Zizioulas, Ființa
eclesială [The Ecclesial Being], The Byzantine Publishing House,
Bucharest, 1996, p. 77.
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Eden represented Christ – the Logos and if Adam had
tasted one of its apples, he would have become immortal 8 .
For Saint Irenaeus, Christ – the Logos is not an
epistemological principle that explains the mysteries of the
universe, but a second person of the Holy Trinity who
created the world and brought the promise of eternity for
it.
It is important to mention that this belief of Saint
Irenaeus was not intellectual, but rather developed from
the Eucharistic epiclesis of Church which does not separate
the work of Christ – the Logos from the work of the Holy
Spirit. The Book of Genesis clearly expresses the identity
between the work of Logos and of the Holy Spirit in the act
of creation that spreads the love of God the Father: “And
God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it” (Gen. 2, 3).
The blessing of the world is the work of λόγος, and its
sanctification belongs to the Holy Spirit, yet the two
actions are not separated, but united in a “whole” as works
of God – the Trinity. This fact is also underlined by Origen:
“The Holy Trinity is the beginning of all beings” 9 .
Consequently, all beings, i.e. the creation in its whole
originate in God – the Trinity.
Nonetheless, theology distinguishes between the
concepts of beginning and origin. While the former is only
temporal, as time itself begins with the creation, the latter
is eternal.
The Holy Trinity is origin and beginning of the creation
at the same time: it is origin because “the logical
paradigms” of the entire creation in God exist since
forever, on the one hand and beginning as the same
paradigms became “plastified reasons” due to the creative
will of the Holy Trinity 10 .
8 Saint Irenaeus, Adversus haeresis, 5, 20, 2; apud Henri de Lubac,
Catholicisme, Cerf, Paris, 1952, p.150.
9 Origen, In Psalmum, XVII, 16 P.G., XII, 1229 B; apud, Fr. Galeriu,
ibidem, p. 51.
10 The expression “plastified reasons” belongs to the terminology
of Rev. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae and defines the “logical” structure
and the Christological vocation of the creation in its whole. See
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The Holy Trinity does not only stand for the origin and
the beginning of the creation, but also for its end, the final
“rest” as presented in Genesis when God “is resting” in His
creation and the creation, in its turn, is resting in God.
God Almighty the transcendent is now to be felt by
means of the uncreated energies and He becomes the
“center” or the “heart” of the creation. Therefore, in its
inner self, the entire creation is oriented towards the God‐
Trinity communion.
Saint Dionysius the Pseudo‐Areopagite captured this
theological vocation of the creation in its whole: “Towards
God all beings turn and desire Him. The ones with wisdom (νοΰς)
and reason (λόγος) call Him through knowledge, whilst the sensible
beings through their sensibility; the creatures lacking sensibility
call Him through their life instincts and the inanimate ones that
possess only their being call Him through their attitude of
participation to all being (…) Light brings together and attracts all
beings with sight (wisdom) and all that move, all in light and
warmed by light, together with the ones existing only owing to the
rays of light. All beings want it, either to “see”(know), move or
receive light and warmth by its rays, or to continue their existence
in light” 11 .
As noted above, Saint Dionysius the Pseudo‐Areopagite
regards creation as a Church and the movement of this
creation towards God as a “cosmic liturgy” that comprises
all beings.
Therefore, the creation does have a theological vocation
but the way in which it is put into practice is not
highlighted well enough by Saint Dionysius. It was Saint
Maximus the Confessor who broadened Saint Dionysius’
theological reflections and he was considered by many
theologians to be the authentic Father of Eastern theology
as he showed how the theological vocation of creation was
fulfilled truly and completely in Christ.
Teologia dogmatică ortodoxă (Orthodox Dogmatic Theology), vol. I, p.
369.
11 Dionysius the Pseudo‐Areopagite, On the Divine Names,
translated in Romanian by Rev. Cicerone Iordăchescu and Theofil
Simensky, Iaşi, 1936, p. 30.
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According to Saint Maximus the Confessor, Christ, the
incarnate Logos is the centre and the sense of the entire
creation, its final aim for which it completed the journey
from non‐being to being. “This is the greatest and most
concealed mystery of all, writes Saint Maximus, the joyful aim and
in its virtue of which all have been created; this is the divine goal
established before the beginning of all things, and by defining it
we say it is the ultimate aim thought before time and for which all
exist, whilst for it nothing was made. Contemplating this final aim,
God bought to life the beings of creatures (…) to be announced by
God’s existing Word (λόγος) that became human. So He revealed, if
allowed to call in this way, the eternal deep of fatherly goodness
and showed in Him the end for which the creatures were offered
the beginning of existence. As for Christ, or for the Mystery of
Christ, they received all centuries from the beginning of existence
to their end in Christ” 12 .
Its is obvious that starting with this text, Saint Maximus
the Confessor adjusted the intellectual conception of
creation sustained by Origin, replacing it with a
Christocentric vision drawn on the incarnation of Logos.
The act of incarnation is explained by the existing
relationship between the “logical” structure of creation and
the divine hypostatic Logos because in Him the reasons of
the created beings subsist even before time and in the era
meant for creation “he gave birth to the seen and the unseen
from nothing as One who made all in reason and wisdom” 13 .
The divine reasons (λογοι) of creation mentioned by
Saint Maximus are not “pre‐existent‐spirits” as the ones in
the Origenist doctrine, but “thoughts” or “paradigms” that
God used to create the world according to his will and his
uncreated energies.
This adjustment brought to the Originist doctrine was
possible due to the choice of Saint Maximus the Confessor,
when establishing his theological reflection, for the Biblical
distinction between created and uncreated, rather than the
12 Saint Maximus the Confessor, Răspunsuri către Talasie (,
Questions to Thalassius), translated in Romanian by Rev. Prof Dr.
Dumitru Stăniloae, Filocalia, Sibiu, 1948, vol III, p. 327.
13 Idem, Ambigua, translated in Romanian by Rev. Prof Dr. Dumitru
Stăniloae, Bucharest, 1980.
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duality intelligible‐sensible on which the entire Platonist
philosophy rests.
God – the Trinity is uncreated and immortal; on the
contrary, His creation appeared in time with a vocation to
fulfill: take part in the eternal communion of the Holy
Trinity. According to Saint Maximus, this task had to be
carried out by Adam, the last element of the creation, a
culmination of it as conscious and free being, responsible
for the creation before God – the Trinity.
III. Man: Icon of God on Earth and Conscious
Hypostasis of Creation
The idea of “icon” (εικων) of God forms the nucleus of
the Old Testament anthropology. Still, Genesis does not
clearly establish the character of the icon of God which was
transferred only to the human being, mentioning only the
fact that man was created in a different way than the rest
of the creation by means of God’s special intervention. He
took dust of the ground with his hands (Logos and Spirit),
modelled him after His image and breathed into his nostrils
the breath of life; and man became a living soul (Gen. 2, 7).
Saint Gregory of Nazianzus gives his own interpretation
for the instance of Genesis described above: The Word
(Logos) of God modelled us with his immortal hands, by
taking dust from the newly created Earth, and breathed the
breath of life upon us: the spirit born is a part of the
unseen divinity. Thus, from dust and spirit, man was given
the image of God that lies both in body and soul and rules
over the spiritual nature. This is precisely why in my
relation to dust, I am submitted to my life on Earth and I
also bear inside me the wistfulness of life to come” 14 .
An overview of the way in which the other Church
Fathers interpreted the notion of “icon” or “image” of God
14 Poemata Dogmatica, VII, Despre suflet [On the Soul], 70‐75, P.G.,
t. 37, col. 4521; see also Olivier Clément, Întrebări asupra omului
[Questions about Man], Alba‐Iulia, 1997, p.44 .
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would reveal different connotations that complete one
another without revealing the mystery of human person.
Some Church Fathers have seen God’s reflecting image
in man due to his imperial dignity, i. e. his ability to “reign”
over the sensible creation and control his own body, others
believed that his wisdom (νοΰς) or reason (λόγος) is the
image of God, while others attributed to him the three
faculties of the soul: mind, will and feeling or his specific
freedom (αΰτεξουσία) that justifies his acts.
Apart from the diversity of opinions already presented,
two essential things must be pointed out: firstly, man is an
indefinite being because it bears the image of the
“indefinite” One; secondly, the Church Fathers proved
freedom of thought at the highest creative and innovative
level without contradicting the Revelation. They did not try
to “marginalize” man, but “unmarginalize” him in the
horizon of God’s vocation. The Church Fathers did not
depart from the image of God in man in order to form a
misconception about God derived from a psychological
analogy. On the contrary, they followed the Revelation and
what it says about God so as to find in man the
correspondent of the divine image that was given to him.
By adopting this theological method, the Church
Fathers succeeded in overcoming the dilemmas of Ancient
anthropology and the dualism between body (σωμα) and
spirit (νοΰς) or soul (πνεΰμα) in particular. They especially
underlined the positive content of the “image”, i.e. the
communion with God in which human nature – both body
and soul altogether – lies in the moment of creation in the
Logos and Spirit of God, that is in the Son of God and the
Holy Spirit respectively.
Due to a proper interpretation of the Biblical
anthropology, a series of Church Fathers such as Saint
Irenaeus of Lyon, Saint Gregory of Nyssa or Saint Gregory
Palamas clearly emphasized that not only the soul, but also
the human body shares the quality of being the “icon” of
God. Saint Gregory Palamas writes that “the name of God is
not given to the soul or the body separately, but to both
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altogether as they have been created as one in similitude
with the image of God” 15 .
There are some general aspects related to the “image”
of God in man that concern directly the present subject of
debate, therefore some clear specifications must be made.
The first chapter of Genesis, line 27 reads: “So God
created man in his own image, in the image of God he
created him; male and female he created them”.
An interpretation of this verse from the Trinitarian
perspective highlighted above would lead to the conclusion
that the notion of “image” or “icon” does not stand for the
sexual polarity of human nature, but to the quality of man
as person (προσωπον), comprising the entire human
nature in its ontological content, either as man or as
woman.
The man as person does not take part in the human
nature as the Persons of the Trinity are not parts of the
Divinity in their turn. Man is the “person” of nature; thence
he is free before any determinism or natural necessity.
The notion of man – Adam – which appears in the text
of Genesis, as quoted above, can also be interpreted as a
general notion encompassing the entire humanity, the
Universal Man that incorporates both the masculine and
the feminine principle. This is one interpretation provided
by Saint Gregory of Nyssa who was definitely inspired by
Saint Paul’s Letters: “the name given to the man created (Adam)
is not the particular, but the general name: thus we are led by the
employment of the general name of our nature to some such view
as this—that in the Divine foreknowledge and power all humanity
is included in the first creation (…) For the image is not in part of
our nature, nor is the grace in any one of the things found in that
nature, but this power extends equally to all the race: and a sign of
this is that mind is implanted alike in all: for all have the power of
understanding and deliberating, and of all else whereby the Divine
nature finds its image in that which was made according to it: the
man that was manifested at the first creation of the world, and he
15 Prosopeiae, P.G., t. 150, col. 1361; apud VI. Lossky, Théologie
mystique de l’Église d’Orient, Aubier, 1944.
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that shall be after the consummation of all, are alike: they equally
bear in themselves the Divine image. (…) Our whole nature, then,
extending from the first to the last, is, so to say, one image of
Him Who is” 16 .
As quoted above, there is an ontological unity of the
humanity in its whole, but it is precisely this unity that
does not exclude the persons’ plurality or does not have a
logical priority regarding it, in the same way in which the
persons’ plurality must not divide its ontological unity.
From this point of view, the identity of being and the
personal alteration form a way of existence to be shared by
both God and man. The only distinctive feature lies in the
eternal existence of God as opposed to man’s life which is a
gift of God who blessed the human existence with the ethos
of Trinitarian communion 17 in the act of creation.
Besides the ontological unity of the entire human race,
the first chapter of Genesis illustrates the ontological unity
between man and creation. This unity was also underlined
in the Ancient philosophy that considered man to be a
“microcosm”, a “small‐world” that bears within itself the
“macrocosm” 18 , the big‐world.
The Church Fathers borrowed the idea of “microcosm”
from the Book of Genesis, nevertheless they highlighted
that it was not this quality that offered man the position in
the “center” of creation, but his similitude to God as “icon”
of His.
This specific feature gives birth to another relationship
of man with cosmos. Thus, he is not solely a “gratification”
of creation, but its priest and poet altogether with the
mission to bring the entire sensible creation to complete
unity with God – the Trinity.
16 Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Despre crearea omului [On the Making of
Man], 22 P.G. 44, 204‐205; apud Henri de Lubac, op. cit., p. 330. See
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2914.htm for the English version.
17 Christos Yannaras, La liberté de la Morale, Génève, Labor et
Fides, 1982, p. 14.
18 The Stoic philosophers emphasized the central position of man
in the cosmos as a synthesis of it as the cosmos becomes through man
“logical” and reasonable.
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From this perspective, taken by the Church Fathers
from chapter two of Genesis, creation does not stand for a
simple “cosmos”, i.e. “an organized chaos”, one of the
demiurge’s works, but a “Church to become” 19 , that is a
place where man is to celebrate the Liturgy of God – the
Trinity with the other beings. Precisely for this reason
Genesis advocates that Adam has been invited to “name” all
beings, i.e. to discover their “logos” and their dynamic
orientation towards the supreme “Logos”.
The gathering of beings created by God before Adam
(Gen. 2, 19‐20) equals his investment with a sacerdotal
vocation. In other words, the onto‐logical Doxology of
beings must become a conscious one in the person of man.
The doxological and ecclesial dimension of creation,
fulfilled consciously in man and ontologically related to the
cosmic nature, can be clearly distinguished from the way in
which Genesis presents the relationship between nature
and person.
Not only does the cosmic nature have an ecclesial
vocation, but the human nature itself also, because it is
ontologically related to the cosmic nature which appears in
Genesis as church and the human person as its priest.
The human couple, man (iş in Hebrew) and woman
(işa) form “a single body” (Gen. 2, 23), i.e. a single nature
that is separated in two persons. Man is the one who
admits this identity of nature and personal alterity: “This is
now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called
Woman (işa in Hebrew), because she was taken out of Man (iş)”
(Gen. 2, 18).
The fact that, in his dialogue with woman, man proves
to be the leader, must be understood in an ecclesial,
Christological and theological sense which could be
rendered as follows: God – the Trinity creates the world
out of love and the world gives him love for an answer, in
19 Rev. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Spiritualitate şi comuniune în
Liturghia Ortodoxă [Spirituality and communion in the Orthodox
Liturgy], Craiova, 1986, p. 19.
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its turn; Christ gives birth to the Church, through His
crucified Love and the Church gives Him love for an
answer; man has to love his woman as much as Christ
loved the Church and the woman must give him love for an
answer.
Therefore, the lines in Genesis do not express a
subordinate relationship of woman to man; on the
contrary, they establish a divine order in the human
community through which the communitarian life of the
Holy Trinity reveals itself to humanity and from humanity
to the entire creation. In fact, the text overtly states that
God presented the woman to her man putting her in front
of him (“I will make him a help meet for him”, eter kenegdo)
(Gen. 2, 18).
In Hebrew, the preposition eter kenegdo does not
express a subordinate relationship, as many
interpretations in the history of culture have shown, but a
special work of God meant for the single sad man 20 .
Moreover, this preposition refers to the reality of an
interpersonal dialogue, a “face to face” one and not a
simple physical and objective recognition of the other. In
the centre of this dialogue lies the vocation of “naming” the
creation, i.e. the poetical and sacerdotal vocation of human
person.
This poetical and sacerdotal vocation was especially
emphasized by Saint Maximus the Confessor in the first
seven chapters of his Mystagogy. The work is closely
related to the ontological relation between man and
creation and to the five polarities that it comprises:
1. the distinction between God’s creation and His
uncreated energies;
2. the distinction, within creation, between the
intelligible nature and the sensible one;
3. the distinction between sky and Earth within the
sensible nature;
20 Francine Carrilo – Cvetbert, Une seule chaire: L’imaginaire à
l’épreuve du réel. In Bulletin du Centre Protestant d’Etudes, Génève, nr.
1., février, 1983, p. 25‐26.
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4. the distinction, on Earth, between Paradise and the
rest of the Earth;
5. the distinction, in Paradise, between man and
woman.
Starting from these distinctions, Saint Maximus the
Confessor articulates the original vocation of man to
overpass any aggressive dualism existing between the
aforementioned categories in order to share the divine life
of the Holy Trinity and turn the entire cosmos in a
“Trinitarian based” Church, if we were to employ Origen’s
terminology 21 .
Yet, this vocation, as I will prove in the following parts
of my study, did not succeed because of “the fall of man
into sin”, a failure which led both to the historical and
existential exile of man, and the decadence of the entire
creation.
IV. Man in Exile and the Decay of Creation
a. Man: center of all things?
In order to understand the historical and existential
exile of man, the Church Fathers used the symbolic image
of universal man, the first Adam who virtually contained
the entire human condition.
The inspired text of the Holy Scripture shows us how
man had to be subjected to the exercise of his personal
freedom so as to complete his vocation of poet and priest
of creation. This exercise was meant to take place in the
horizon of calling, of communion with God and the whole
creation.
Calling and liberty are, according to Saint Maximus the
Confessor, “the two wings of man” 22 which help him fulfill
21 Fr. Galeriu, ibidem, p. 51; see also VI. Lossky, Introducere în
Teologia Ortodoxă [Orthodox Theology: An introduction], translated in
Romanian by Lidia and Remus Rus, Enciclopedica Publishing House,
Bucharest, 1993, p. 101.
22 Cf. Paul Evdokimov, L’Orthodoxie, Paris, 1965, p. 102.
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his vocation. However, calling is never to replace freedom
because it represents the medium that secretly hosts God’s
calling and the answer of man. Consequently, in the
exercise of Adamic freedom, the Church Fathers distinguish
two main steps: the freedom of choice, a hypostasis of the
person as element of nature and the freedom in Truth that
arises on the way, every time good is chosen in the virtue
of the similitude with God.
So the real freedom of man lies in the horizon of God’s
calling, yet man has to accept freely the communion with
Him. In other words, “God created a free man so as to call
him to deification, to have a divine‐human condition. This
calling is based on a free answer from the part of man (…)
Adam was submitted to the exercise of freedom in order to
obtain a conscious love. Thus, man cannot truly love God if
he can also refuse Him” 23 .
In the symbolic language of Genesis, free will, called by
Saint Augustine “libertas minor” 24 , is a very important part
of man’s condition as only empowered by it, man can
defend himself against constraints and proclaim his
personal identity. In Genesis, it is this freedom that led
man to sin, i.e. to the separation from God, to exile and
death. In Blaise Pascal’s terms, the Adamic man was
“nothing” in relation to the infinite, all in relation to
“nothing”, a mean between nothing and everything,
between being and non‐being in his right to free will.
In Genesis, this possibility of choice is expressed in a
concrete‐intuitive language impersonated by the tree of
knowledge of good and evil (Gen. 2, 9).
The Church Fathers provided different interpretations
for this tree from the midst of the Garden of Eden.
Interesting for our debate is the interpretation given by
Saint Maximus the Confessor in his book, Questions to
Thalassius: “if one argued that the tree of knowledge of good and
evil represented the creation of what could be seen, one would not
23 Olivier Clement, Questions sur l’homme, Paris, 1965, p. 45.
24 De libero arbitro, 1, III, C. XIX; P.L. t. XXXII, col. 1297; apud
Constantin Pavel, Problema răului la Fericitul Augustin [The Problem of
Evil in Saint Augustine’s Works], Bucharest, 1937, p. 58.
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be far from the truth (…); creating what could be seen had its own
ecclesial reasons of bringing food to the mind and giving a natural
power to please the senses, on the one hand and corrupting the
mind, on the other hand. Thus, spiritual contemplation of what
could be seen leads to the knowledge of good, whether the physical
one results in sin and oblivion of the divine. Hence God forbade
physical contemplation, delaying it to man – as before, in the truly
awareness of his cause through communion with it in calling and by
means of this communion, man had to exchange his given
immortality for righteousness and immovability through calling –
until he became worthy of appreciating it without hurting himself
in freedom with God due to sublimation of his spirit and senses
through deification 25 ”.
Thus, according to Saint Maximus the Confessor, the
tree of knowledge of good and evil stands for the sensible
world in which we live. Assumed in God’s Spirit, it leads us
to the knowledge of good; on the contrary, accepted only
from a psychological or biological perspective, it induces a
false knowledge that mixes good with evil.
Saint Maximus provides this symbolic interpretation in
order to shed light on man’s possibility of choice between
the two existential paths: communion with God which is
the equivalent of life and separation from God that brings
death. Accordingly, the biblical terms of “good” and “evil”
are not just moral, social or legal categories, but also
ontological and existential ones.
The tree of knowledge of good and evil lies in the center
of Paradise, i.e. in the center of human existence. Good has
eternal life as his only goal, that is life in communion with
Christ, while Evil, according to Saint Maximus the
Confessor, does not have an ontological status in existence.
However, on account of the failure of freedom of choice, it
can appear as a tragic reality in human life, leading it to
separation and death.
25 Saint Maximus the Confessor, Questions to Thalassius, translated
in Romanian by Rev. Prof Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Filocalia, vol III, Sibiu,
1948, p. 12.
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Although evil does not have either an ontological status
delivered by God, or the command to refrain from the tree
of knowledge of good or evil, the issue is not centered on
the act of knowledge itself, because as we have already
seen, Adam was called to name all beings, i.e. to get
acquainted to them in the divine sense.
Tempted by a “Luciferian” knowledge, “Adam got the
wrong idea about God. He believed that God is self sufficient as an
independent, autonomous being and, in order to become like God,
he disobeyed Him and fell into sin. But when God revealed himself,
it happened in love (…). Believing that he was to become like God,
Adam was totally moving from Him…deepening himself in
singleness while God remained in communion” 26
Therefore, the Adamic sin does not consist in the act of
knowledge, but in the will to know and become a god, even
though without God’s calling. Knowledge of good is not a
sin, but the knowledge of good mixed with the knowledge
of evil as product of man’s egocentric orientation is.
Man proclaimed himself center of all things, center of
knowledge of good and evil and thus his axiological
conscience became corrupted, “Evil was placed along good and
the heart of Adam was converted into a “laboratory” of justice and
injustice” 27 .
Thence God does not restrain man from knowledge,
which in the biblical sense is to be identified with the true
life, only its corruption and the corruption of human
existence by means of a false understanding and practice of
freedom.
The restriction in Genesis was only a warning as man
was not allowed to eat without God’s “blessing”, i.e. not
“have a relationship with a thing before being prepared for
a proper relationship with it. However, contravening this
command given by God is determined by the devil, a
spiritual being that freely disobeyed God, reads the Book of
Genesis. The devil is the one who first brings doubt to the
soul of man, rephrasing God’s command by means of
restrictive “logics” in which the stress falls on the part (Yea,
26 Rev. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae Orthodox Dogmatic Theology,
vol. I, p. 12.
27 Ibidem, p. 16.
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hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden – Gen. 3,
1) and not on the whole (Of every tree of the garden thou
mayest freely eat – Gen. 2, 16) 28 ”. This holistic vision
determines the fall and man is tempted to live on his own.
He discovers his ego, becomes selfish, “falls in love” with
himself and forgets about God and his kind.
Becoming autonomous in his relationship with God,
man has the tendency to put himself in the absolute center
of the world, reduce everything to him, even the ones of his
kind. Yet, sooner or later, the world is to take revenge on
man and as an unreal, non‐absolute center, he will be
sentenced to bear the weight of his own rebellion through
the mists of history.
b. The corruption of creation and of human
existence in the state of exile
Exile is synonymous with the fall of human existence
from the order of spiritual values and it also corresponds
to a radical change in the way of “living” in the world. The
Holy Scripture employs the same symbolic terminology in
order to express this reality.
The first consequence of his fall gives man a sensation
of inner emptiness and a feeling of shame arises in his
conscience.
The “nakedness” felt by Adam in the state of fall is not
of biological, but of spiritual order. In the external
paintings of medieval churches in Bukovina, one can notice
that Adam and Eve were not “naked” in Paradise, as reads
the text of Genesis (2, 25). In fact, the painters transferred
28 Christos Yannaras, when interpreting the moment of God’s
temptation, specifies that “The devil first tempts the woman because in
archetypal terms, she is the image of nature whilst man impersonates
logos. The distinction between nature and logos, between the
feminine and the masculine principle is not an axiological, but an
existential one; nature is available for the incarnation of a life event,
yet it needs the seed of logos for this incarnation to come into being”;
see Christos Yannaras, La foi vivante de l’Eglise, Cerf, Paris, 1989, p.
104.
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the patristic interpretation to iconography, according to
which in Paradise, man was “dressed”, i.e. he was wearing
the blessing God’s – the Trinity in his being 29 . The painters,
most of them monks, grasped the theological and ecclesial
significance of the Biblical notion of “nakedness” and
illustrated Adam and Eve “naked” after their sending forth
from the Garden of Eden when they have already been
deprived, i.e. “undressed” by the divine blessing.
The feeling of shame and fear that accompanies the
sensation of ontological “emptiness” also expresses a state
of corruption in terms of interpersonal relations. God who
searched man in the “cool of the day” (Gen. 3, 8) is no
longer felt by man as the one who loves him, but the one
who “punishes” him. He is no longer felt as man’s intimate
“friend”, but as “another” being, a stranger who threatens
man’s individual autonomy by his simple presence.
Therefore, Adam stays hidden and it is this “hiding” that
expresses the corruption of his moral responsibility in the
state of sin. He “hid” when God called unto him (Gen 3, 9)
and when he was discovered he brought arguments for
accusing God: “The woman whom thou gavest to be with
me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat” (Gen. 3, 12).
Hence the fall into sin has as primary consequences a
spiritual crisis (a false representation of God and a
corrupted relationship with Him) and a moral one
(corruption of freedom and responsibility). The two
instances of crisis are followed by a social crisis (the
conflict between Cain and Abel).
Indeed, in the state of sin, freedom no longer stands for
giving as it comes to denote egocentrism and possessive
self affirmation. After being sent forth from Paradise,
according to Genesis, man (iş) did no longer recognize his
woman as işa, but he started calling her Eve, i.e. the
mother of all living (Gen. 3, 20). Sin which “objectified”
their bodies (and made them realize they were naked) also
turned the two biological hypostaseis into two individual
116
29 Fr. Galeriu, op. cit., p. 56‐57.

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beings guided by a possessive instinct: “thy desire shall be
to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee” (Gen. 3, 16).
The same instinct of possession will also guide the
relationship between man and creation by determining a
serious “ecological crisis”, if we were to employ the
contemporary terminology. Creation is no longer
transparent, a medium of communion for God and man
because the latter exiled the former from the creation, thus
opening the way to exile for him and the entire creation.
Man feels lonely and abandoned in the middle of a hostile
creation: “cursed is the ground for thy sake (…) Thorns
also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee” (Gen. 3, 17‐18).
In other words, Earth becomes a place that tears apart and
imprisons and which God no longer keeps in His blessing.
Thence, this is now man’s burying place: “In the sweat of
thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the
ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and
unto dust shalt thou return” (Gen. 3, 19).
It is obvious that man’s soul falls prey to despair due to
this state of crisis, Yet, in order for man not to be torn
apart by despair, God interferes once more: “Unto Adam
also and to his wife did the LORD God make coats of skins,
and clothed them” (Gen, 3, 21).
The “coats of skins” mentioned in Genesis were not part
of man’s original outfit. Therefore, there are several
possible interpretations regarding them. Some scholars
considered that these coats symbolically stood for the
biological hypostasis of man and were hiding his personal
alterity, thus orientating man towards death, as boundary
established by God so that man’s state of ruin which he
entered did not have to be eternal 30 .
This interpretation of the “coats of skins” can be found
in the works of Methodius of Olympus and Saint Gregory of
Nyssa.
30 Panayotis Nellas, Omul, animal îndumnezeit,[Man ‐ Deified
Animal], Deisis Publishing House, Sibiu, 1994, p. 40.
op.cit., p. 191‐192.
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Saint Methodius believed that “God made the coats of
skins so as to dress man in mortality for all evil in him to
die when his body opened” 31 .
According to Saint Gregory of Nyssa, in the tragic
horizon of exile, biological death actually brings a ray of
hope since “the soul arises from death and is brought to life
by means of it (if man had not died a biological death, he
would have remained dead forever)” 32 .
As a result, the horizon of death replaces the “tree of
life” in the center of existence after the fall into sin and
man’s auto exile. Man enters a process of decay due to the
empowerment of his soul by the seed of separation, instead
the one of communion; man dies because he has become an
isolated being in cosmos, fighting for survival; he dies
because he has ignored God’s love and justice.
The Church Fathers claimed that God’s justice did not
have only an ethical or legal content, but also an
ontological one. Justice is synonymous with love and is
displayed in creation by the order and the harmony it
contains.
The fall into sin ruined this order and harmony, that is
“the righteousness of creation”, yet the punishment does
not come from God as a legal act that calls for termination,
but from “the righteousness of creation” itself. This can be
clearly noticed in the dialogue between God and Cain after
having murdered his brother: “What hast thou done? the
voice of thy brother’s blood crieth unto me from the
ground.
And now art thou cursed from the earth, which hath
opened her mouth to receive thy brother's blood from thy
hand; When thou tillest the ground, it shall not henceforth
yield unto thee her strength; a fugitive and a vagabond
shalt thou be in the earth.” (Gen. 4, 10‐12).
Consequently, it is sin that corrupts “the righteousness
of creation” due to man’s disregard of its order and beauty,
pursuing only the satisfaction of his pleasures which will
finally lead him to pain and death.
118
31 Cf. Panayotis Nellas, op. cit., p. 191‐192.
32 Ibidem, p. 292.

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Through death, man arrives again at the “deeps” of
creation where he was brought to life: his body becomes
water, air, dust and light. Through death, man touches the
limits of cosmos, “the light of day one”, hence death
becomes the “antidote” of death, space of renewal and
restoration for the entire creation when a new Adam will
enter our history.
The Holy Scripture tells us that starting with the fall
into sin, biological death was guided by God to a Messianic
future: “And I will put enmity between thee and the
woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise
thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.” (Gen. 3, 15)
This line has been interpreted by the whole patristic
theology from the perspective of redemption, of salvation
from death meant for humanity and of its restoration in the
horizon of communion with God 33 .
V. The End of Human Exile and the Beginning of
Innovation for Creation
Christian theology, in its faithfulness to Revelation,
sustains that the end of human exile and the beginning of
restoration for the entire creation in the horizon of
communion have taken place at the same time with the
incarnation of Logos: “God, why did you descend on Earth
if not for the race of man spread all over its face? (…)
Proceed to the ascension of your man now, welcome the
one you sent forth, regain your image, Your Adam” 34 .
Thus, the incarnation of God’s Logos followed by His
crucifixion, death and resurrection restored creation in its
original vocation, the theological one. The reinforcement of
these three main events of history crosses the limits of the
33 The Septuagint mentioned that one of the woman’s sons will
smash the serpent’s head, yet Vulgata attributed this act to the woman.
In a way, the two translations are complementary as the former
centers on the figure of Messiah, while the latter on the figure of Virgin
Mary.
34 Sermo de anima, P.G., XVIII, 602; apud Fr. Galeriu, op. cit., p. 120.
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present study; therefore, I will make reference only to the
aspects that regard the relationship between God, man and
creation.
a. Creation and incarnation
The Church Fathers considered creation and
incarnation as two complementary realities. Creation
announces incarnation whilst the incarnation of creative
Logos completes creation, restoring and orienting it
towards its original vocation. “The personal acceptance of
human nature in its whole by the Son of God, the eternal
and transcendent Logos born from Virgin Mary, is an act
that recreates and restores the world” 35 , writes a
contemporary theologian that remains faithful to patristic
theology.
As a result, incarnation does not only stand for an
answer given to Adam’s rebellion, but also for the
beginning of man’s conversion and radical innovation
extended to the entire creation 36 .
Christ, the Son of God incarnated becomes the
beginning and foundation of the creation’s process of
innovation, when accepting human nature in His divine
Hypostasis, altogether eliminating its tendency to
autonomy so as to bring instead a complete opening and
giving movement towards God.
Once more, it must be mentioned that when the Church
Fathers discuss human nature, they have in view its dual
unity: body and soul as a whole. By the act of incarnation,
Christ united Himself with the body and soul as unifying
and innovating principle. In this sense, Saint Gregory of
Nyssa writes: “Becoming a part of both the sensible and the
reasonable part of human component, by His unspeakable
35 Rev. Prof. Dr. Ion Bria, Dicționar de Teologie Ortodoxă
[Dictionary of Orthodox Theology], p. 228
36 Boris Bobinsky, Le Mystère de la Trinité, Editions du Cerf, Paris,
1986, p. 11‐12.
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power and this union, i.e. body and soul, He will see to
their eternal unseparation” 37 .
Therefore, Christ ontologically repairs human nature by
the act of incarnation, reestablishing “the divine image in
its greatness that leads the soul to transformation in
consent with its free will so as to acquire similitude with
God” 38 .
As already mentioned, since the image of god regards
man’s entire being, its rebuilding and ontological renewal
also concerns his body which becomes a transparent
temple for God and a medium for the Holy Spirit in His
manifestation of love and transfiguring power. On this
account, Saint Athanasius the Great writes: “Who is so mad
as to tell God: break yourself from the body and we will
pray to You? (…) Was not the leper praying to God inside
His body? He recognized Him as God hoping that his
invocation would cure him and did not consider God as
creature due to the body, i.e. the Logos, Creator of all
beings or feel disguise for Him, therefore he got well” 39 .
Thus, by the incarnation of Logos, the resent against
body, specific to the Ancient thought can no longer find a
theological base. According to Saint Gregory of Nyssa,
“Logos is not interested in tearing apart the righteous life
due to a dualism, but rather see to the unification of body
and soul in superior harmony when the wall of evil
collapses” 40 .
37 Saint Gregory of Nyssa, P.G., 44, col. 28AB‐129A; apud Rev. Prof.
Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, vol. 3, Bucharest,
1978, p. 144.
38 Saint Maximus the Confessor, Filocalia Românească, vol. II, Sibiu,
1947.
39 Epistola către Adelfie[Letter to Adelphi], P.G., 26, col. 1076‐1077,
Cf. Rev. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Radu, Mântuirea, a doua creație a lumii
[Redemption, the second world creation], in Ortodoxia, year XXXVIII
(1986) n° 2, p. 56.
40 Saint Gregory of Nyssa, P.G., 44, 28AB‐129A; apud Rev. Prof. Dr.
Dumitru Stăniloae, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, vol. 3, Bucharest,
1978, p. 455. PP.
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Owing to the ontological relationship between human
body and the rest of the sensible creation, enriching the
value of the former through the act of incarnating God’s
Logos is synonymous with enriching the value of the latter,
as the ontological rebuilding and innovation of human
nature extends its process to the rest of creation.
However, incarnation is only the beginning of this
rebuilding and innovation for the world. In order to
actively restore His creation, Christ had to accept freely His
death by crucifixion, so as to reestablish the communion of
love between man and God, on the one hand and between
God and the whole creation, on the other hand. God’s
sacrifice is closely related to incarnation and resurrection,
being essential for man and the entire creation which was
doomed to despair and death because of man 41 .
b. Death and Resurrection
Without Christ’s crucifixion, the end of human exile
and the possibility of the prodigal son to “return home”
could not have been completed.
This aspect was particularly underlined by Saint Cyril
of Alexandria who borrowed this idea from Saint Apostle
Paul and enriched it. In his opinion, we can only be
received by God the Father in a state of truthful offering.
Man in a state of sin, exiled in the horizon of death, i.e.
in God’s absence or man who fell prey to false
representations of Him cannot offer himself to God.
“Therefore, Christ as man sacrificed Himself to God the
Father in truthful offering, not to provide Father with a
legal equivalent, but to transfer us the powerful state of
sacrifice by his union with us, so we can enter, along with
Him, the world of the Father. Hence we are brought to
Father by means of Christ’s Cross and his crucified body” 42 .
41 Rev. Prof. Dumitru Gh. Radu, Caracterul ecleziologic al Sfintelor
Taine şi problema intercomuniunii [The Ecclesiological Character of
Sacraments and the Issue of Intercommunion], doctoral thesis, in
Ortodoxia, year XXXVIII (1986), n° 2, p. 56.
42 Ibidem, p. 47.
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So Christ’s death means renunciation at every form of
selfishness, as instance of sin for truthful offering to God.
Nevertheless, Christ accepted death not for Himself, but for
us and Saint Maximus the Confessor and Saint Athanasius
the Great especially underlined this issue.
Since Christ’s death equals truthful offering to God the
Father, death cannot control Christ because the cure for
death is love and all that is involved in an offering for
love’s sake in its supremacy is separated from death and
kept for eternal life. Consequently, Christ’s death virtually
comprises His Resurrection, too.
As an expression of supreme love for God, Christ’s
death represents a painful experience that marks the
passage to another way of existence. On account of Christ’s
status as Son of God incarnated, different from every each
other human individual, along with His death, an entire
world emerges, the world born from Adam’s rib, but also
the world prepared by God for Adam who was tempted and
fell into sin. The ancient world, the one of the exile,
separation and death dies; it evaporates like a “small drop
in the abyss of love” 43 and communion of God with His
creation.
Owing to this love, Christ’s death actually stands for the
death of death itself and the beginning of another eternal
life. Thus, death becomes Easter, a passage to Resurrection
and in this way, humanity and the entire creation take back
their place according to the original rhythm and
orientation of creation towards the infinite happiness of
communion felt in the morning of Resurrection.
When considered from this perspective, the
Resurrection of Christ is not a “final” act for humanity, but
the beginning of His Ascension in blessing. The divine gift
of Holy Spirit will bless men and cosmos altogether
starting with the Pentecost, thus leading “the entire
creation to incorruptibility and transparency, i.e. a
complete transformation and communication between
43 O. Clement, L’Orthodoxie, p. 42; apud Fr. Galeriu, op. cit.
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persons and Spirit and to a total personalization of cosmos
in Christ and human beings” 44 .
c. Creation, renewal and deification
Incarnation, death and Resurrection of Christ, Son of
God and Son of Man are all historical events and
Sacraments of His Person 45 that enlighten from the inside
both the general sense of history and man’s particular
existence in the middle of creation.
Incarnation of this sense supposes an ontological and
moral conversion. In its turn, this conversion is not a work
of man as human individual, but of Christ, through the Holy
Spirit in collaboration with man as a liturgical and ecclesial
person.
The Conversion that took place on the day of Pentecost
clearly expresses this fact. The question that arises in the
soul of the ones that participated at the event is a
consequence of the Descent of the Holy Spirit and of the
inspired discourse belonging to Saint Peter. According to
the Acts of Apostles, the witnesses, when “(were) pricked
in their heart” (2, 37), asked: “what shall we do?” And
Peter gave them the answer: “Repent, and be baptized
every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the
remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy
Ghost.” (Acts 2, 38)
Thence, on Pentecost, a deep conversion, a crucifixion, a
death and a resurrection take place in the conscience and
life of the Saint Apostles and of the witnesses to this main
event. The same conversion is to take place in the life of
Saint Apostle Paul when meeting God in the Holy Spirit on
the road to Damascus. After this encounter, “he was three
days without sight, and neither did eat nor drink.” (Acts 9,
9)
In the theology of Church Fathers, the Pentecost
represents the ultimate moment of salvation, coinciding
with the beginning of conversion, renewal and deification
44 Rev. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology,
vol 2, p. 180.
45 Rev. Prof. Dumitru Gh. Radu, op. cit., p. 41
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of every human person who becomes member of the
sacramental body of Christ, i.e. of Church through the Holy
Spirit 46 .
To conclude, the Pentecost stands for the historical
beginning of Church and for the commencement of revision
for man’s original vocation to become Church of God the
Logos, i.e. a place of communion with God‐the Trinity
together with the entire creation.
When entering the Church in Holy Sacraments, man’s
being becomes a church in its turn. The Church Fathers
particularly insisted on the point that man can become a
church, his being converted, deified and renewed only in
relation to Church 47 .
Not only man, but also “cosmos in its whole cannot find
renewal and transfiguration outside the relationship with
Church, the liturgical center of the entire creation 48 ”.
VI. In guise of Conclusion
The communion of man with Christ realized in Church
by means of the blessing of the Holy Spirit completely
changes the attitude towards creation. For man, creation is
no longer to be identified with a neutral datum, an
objective nature he can submit to his selfish wishes and
pleasures.
The spiritually renewed man, through communion with
Christ becomes the priest of creation, while a part of the
same creation becomes body of Christ by means of the
Eucharistic elements. Owing to this fact, man no longer
identifies creation with pure “essence” or a “substance”
(υλŋ) coeternal with God, but identifies it as a “gift” which
46 Paul Evdokimov, Prezența Duhului Sfânt în Tradiția
Ortodoxă,[The presence of the Holy Spirit in the Orthodox Tradition],
Anastasia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, p. 109.
47 Rev. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Biserica în sensul de locaş şi de
largă comuniune în Hristos, [Church in the sense of shelter and large
communion in Christ] in Ortodoxia, year XXXIV (1982) n°3, p. 341.
48 Olivier Clement, Le Christ, Terre des vivants, Essais théologiques,
Abbaye de Bellefontaine, 1976.
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must be received with a contemplating attitude and not a
possessive one.
It is a well known fact that the contemplating attitude
of man determines one state of creation and the possessive
attitude another one. In other words, the balance of
creation and its harmony is a consequence of man’s
spiritual state. The balance of creation is maintained
thanks to man’s rest in God.
Saint Symeon the New Theologian grasps this fact in his
sensitive poeticism: “When they saw Adam expelled from
Paradise, all the creatures showed rebellion towards him;
neither the sun, nor the moon or stars accepted him;
springs refused to end his thirst and rivers continued their
course; winds no longer flew to bring coolness for Adam
the sinner; wild animals and all creatures on Earth were
ready to attack man at the sight of his decay following the
previous blessing; sky was almost to fell and crush him
while Earth could not bear his sight anymore”.
Yet God who created all things and man, altogether,
what did He do? He did not let their forces release against
man, but ordered the whole creation to stand still and
depend on man, become mortal, serve him in his mortality
as it was for man that He created the other beings; and this
state is not to end until the renewed man becomes ecclesial
(πνεΰματικος), incorruptible and eternal. Only in that
moment to come the entire creation will be freed from
submission so as to become as renewed, incorruptible, and
ecclesial as man himself 49 .
Therefore, the egocentric and selfish man cannot
release creation from separation and death. Creation
becomes for him “opaque materiality, mirror of his
spiritual death in a place where God is absent and where
the Earth “deprived” of Him becomes a “grave” for Oedipus,
the blind” 50 .
49 Saint Symeon the New Theologian, Traité éthique I, ch. 2, 29‐90;
Sources chrétiennes, 122, p. 189‐190.
50 Olivier Clement, Le Christ, Terre des vivants, Essais théologiques,
Abbaye de Bellefontaine, 1976.
126

Bibliography
Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
1. ARISTOTLE, De anima; apud Ioannis Zizioulas, Ființa eclesială
[The Ecclesial Being], The Byzantine Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996
2. ATHANASIUS the Great, Saint., γαρ Πατιρ δια του λογου εv τω
πvευματι κτιζει τα παvτα (Letter III, S.P.G., XXVI, 632 B.C.), apud
Părintele Galeriu, Jertfă şi răscumpărare [Father Galeriu, Sacrifice and
Deliverance], Anastasia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1991
3. ATHANASIUS the Great, Saint, Epistola către Adelfie[Letter to
Adelphi], Rev. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Radu, Mântuirea, a doua creație a lumii
[Redemption, the second world creation], in Ortodoxia, year XXXVIII
(1986)
4. AUGUSTINE, Saint, De libero arbitro; apud Constantin Pavel,
Problema răului la Fericitul Augustin [The Problem of Evil in Saint
Augustine’s Works], Bucharest, 1937
5. BALCA, Nicolae, Istoria filosofiei antice [The History of Ancient
Philosophy], IBMBOR Publishing House, Bucharest, 1982
6. BOBINSKY, Boris, Le Mystère de la Trinité, Editions du Cerf,
Paris, 1986
7. BRIA, Ion, Dicționar de Teologie Ortodoxă [Dictionary of
Orthodox Theology]
8. CARRILO, Francine – Cvetbert, Une seule chaire: L’imaginaire à
l’épreuve du réel. In Bulletin du Centre Protestant d’Etudes, Génève, nr.
1., février, 1983
9. CLEMENT, Olivier, Întrebări asupra omului [Questions about
Man], Alba‐Iulia, 1997
10. CLEMENT, Olivier, Le Christ, Terre des vivants, Essais
théologiques, Abbaye de Bellefontaine, 1976
11. DIONYSIUS the Pseudo‐Areopagite, On the Divine Names,
translated in Romanian by Rev. Cicerone Iordăchescu and Theofil
Simensky, Iaşi, 1936
12. EVDOKIMOV, Paul, L’Orthodoxie, Paris, 1965
13. EVDOKIMOV, Paul, Prezența Duhului Sfânt în Tradiția
Ortodoxă, [The presence of the Holy Spirit in the Orthodox Tradition]
Anastasia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995
14. GREGORY of Nazianzus, Saint , Poemata Dogmatica, VII, Despre
suflet [On the Soul],
15. PALAMAS, Gregory, Saint, Prosopeiae; apud VI. Lossky,
Théologie mystique de l’Église d’Orient, Aubier, 1944
16. GREGORY of Nyssa, Saint, Despre crearea omului [On the
Making of Man]; apud Henri de Lubac
17. IRENAEUS, Saint, Adversus haeresis, apud Henri de Lubac,
Catholicisme, Cerf, Paris, 1952
127

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Eco‐Theology
17. JUSTIN the Martyr and Philosopher, Saint, Dialogul cu iudeul
Trifon, în Apologeți de limbă greacă [ Dialogue with Trypho, a Jew in
Greek Apologists], IBMBOR Publishing House, Bucharest, 1980
18. LOSSKY, VI., Introducere în Teologia Ortodoxă [Orthodox
Theology: An introduction], translated in Romanian by Lidia and Remus
Rus, Enciclopedica Publishing House, Bucharest, 1993
19. MAXIMUS the Confessor, Saint, Ambigua, translated in
Romanian by Rev. Prof Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Bucharest, 1980
20. MAXIMUS the Confessor, Saint, Questions to Thalassius,
translated in Romanian by Rev. Prof Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Filocalia,
vol III, Sibiu, 1948
21. NELLAS , Panayotis, Omul, animal îndumnezeit,[Man ‐ Deified
Animal], Deisis Publishing House, Sibiu, 1994
22. ORIGEN, In Psalmum; apud, Fr. Galeriu, Sacrifice and
Deliverance, Anastasia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1991
23. RADU, Dumitru Gh., Caracterul ecleziologic al Sfintelor Taine şi
problema intercomuniunii [The Ecclesiological Character of Sacraments
and the Issue of Intercommunion], doctoral thesis, in Ortodoxia, year
XXXVIII (1986)
24. STĂNILOAE, Dumitru, Biserica în sensul de locaş şi de largă
comuniune în Hristos, [Church in the sense of shelter and large
communion in Christ] in Ortodoxia, (1982)
25. STĂNILOAE, Dumitru, Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, vol. I
26. STĂNILOAE, Dumitru, Spiritualitate şi comuniune în Liturghia
Ortodoxă [Spirituality and communion in the Orthodox Liturgy],
Craiova, 1986
27. SYMEON the New Theologian, Saint, Traité éthique I; Sources
chrétiennes, 122
28. YANNARAS, Christos, La foi vivante de l’Eglise, Cerf, Paris,
1989
29. YANNARAS, Christos, La liberté de la Morale, Génève, Labor et
Fides, 1982
128

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
The real distinction between essence and existence and
the relation between information and energy
Alessandro CORDELLI *
* Pontifical Lateran University, Roma, Italy
Abstract
In the Thomistic development of the Aristotelian
metaphysics a central role is played by the actual distinction
between the essence (i.e. the totality of characteristics and
capabilities) and the concrete existence of any being. Even if
these two components of the being of any thing are truly
distinct, nevertheless they are not separable, since one cannot
observe the existence if not within the essence of a determined
thing, nor the essence if not in a concrete existing object.
Moreover, they depend to different orders of causation:
internal to the physical world for the essence, transcendent as
a First Cause for the existence. It is very interesting that a deep
analogy can be found with the couple from the physical realm
information/energy. In fact, even though information and
energy are well distinct concepts, any information exchange
requires energy transformations and energy never appears if
not in a given form (kinetic, gravitational, heat, nuclear...). The
two ever occur together; actually no physical process is
possible without information and energy exchange. This paper
is devoted to investigate this analogy, which bridges the gap
between natural science and metaphysics.
1. Introduction
If we carefully look at the physical, chemical or biological
processes, at every scale and in every field, we notice that a
transformation of energy always happens. If this fact may be
sometimes not apparent, it is due only to our description of the
phenomenon, not to the phenomenon itself. For example, in
the kinematics of a free falling body we focus our attention
only in the square‐dependence of the distance by the time, but
in the real fall of a body its gravitational potential energy
transforms into kinetic energy. A hypothetical process which
could take place without any energy exchange would have the
features of a perpetuum mobile, and therefore would violate
129

CORDELLI ‐ The real distinction between essence and existence and the relation
between information and energy
both first and second thermodynamics laws, two of the much
better ascertained physical principles.
On the other hand, energy never comes if not in a
determined form, depending upon the particular structure and
features of the system it belongs to. We cannot have something
like “pure” energy. Also, the possibility of a give energy
exchange (and therefore the possibility for the corresponding
process to be realized) strictly depends upon the features of
the physical systems involved, or – in other terms – the
information associated with their structure. So, the concrete
possibility for a physical process to take place depends upon
the availability of a proper energy amount, otherwise the
process itself will remain a mere possibility.
So, we can individuate two main factors in every physical
process: the structure of the systems involved which says how
the process evolves, and the energy needed by the process to
actually take place. Information is responsible for the way the
process happens, energy determines if the process happens.
From these considerations there appears a strong analogy
between the physical concepts of information and energy on
one hand, and the metaphysical ones of essence and existence
on the other. The actual distinction between the way the things
are (essentia, quidditas, natura) and their concrete existence
(actus essendi) is typical of St. Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine 1 . The
net of causality relations between beings completely
determines the features of a given thing, but it is not sufficient
to assure its actual existence, which comes instead from
another (transcendental) order of causality.
So, the analogy between physical and metaphysical realms
has the structure shown in figure 1. (See Caption and
Figures)
The aim of this paper is to investigate in detail the
structure of such an analogy, trying to get a real improvement
in the understanding of the concepts involved in it. We will
focus first on a horizontal reading of the two relations, within
each ambit, and then we will analyse the vertical relation
1 Gianfranco Basti, Antonio L. Perrone, Le radici forti del pensiero
debole. Dalla metafisica, alla matematica, al calcolo, Il Poligrafo,
Padova, 1996.
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
between physics and metaphysics. Finally, we will draw the
conclusions of our reflections.
2. The “horizontal” relation between essence and
existence
In the history of the western thought, since Parmenides, a
rationalistic position has ever been present, which identifies
the logical possibility with the real existence. Plato, for
example, considered our world an imperfect copy of the world
of ideas 2 , so that the only possible knowledge is the deductive
one (like Euclidean geometry) without any reference to
empirical reality. In the middle age, Anselm of Aosta based his
celebrated ontological proof of God’s existence 3 on the
argument that if God is the one about whom one cannot think
anything greater (Id quo maius cogitari nequit) and if He would
not exist, something greater could be thought, i.e. a being with
the same characteristics plus existence. It is clear that Anselm
considered existence just like a quality to be added to the
other determinations of the subject, in order to make it
actually existent. St. Thomas Aquinas did not agree to this
position; in fact, even if he admits that for God – but only for
God – the existence belongs to his essence, we cannot get this
evidence since we do not know God’s essence. In other words,
the necessity of God’s existence is only in se, while quoad nos
that necessity is missing. In general, our knowledge of a being
(not only of God) is never exhaustive, so a distinction can be
made between essentia, being’s complete determination, and
quidditas, what we know of the essence 4 .
The essence is the way things are, the inseparable bond
between form and matter that constitutes a being, completely
determined by the whole of contingent causes, according to
the Aristotelian four causes’ doctrine. This doctrine defines
2 Plato, Republic, VII.
3 Anselm of Aosta, Proslogion.
4 There is a third interpretation of the essence, expressed by the
term natura. The nature of a being is given by its typical operations; by
observing these operations we can infer the determinations
constituting the essence of the being (since agere sequitur esse).
131

CORDELLI ‐ The real distinction between essence and existence and the relation
between information and energy
four orders of causality for all the transformation processes,
and in particular for the generation processes where a new
being comes along:
1. material cause: the matter of a being, capable to receive
its particular form;
2. agent cause: another being acting on the object causing
it to change into the new form;
3. formal cause: the new form to be assumed by the
changing being;
4. final cause: the purpose which will be reached with the
transformation process or the generation of the new
being (for not human being the formal cause and the
final one coincide).
None of these causes can produce the existence of a being,
they only are responsible of the way a thing is, but not whether
it exists or not.
So, if existence is actually distinct from essence it must have
also a different order of causality. This transcendental cause of
the existence is to be identified with the only substance which
does not receive its being from other things, but is its own
being, i.e. the Ipsum Esse Subsistens, or – in other terms – God.
It is very important to notice that, according to Aquinas’ view,
God’s creative intervention does not force physical processes
in some arbitrary way, but allows them to realize, making a
concrete existence what would be otherwise only a mere
possibility. In other terms, nothing must be added to positive
science in order to explain the way the universe is; God is the
answer to the question “Why?”, not to the question “How?”, so
that there cannot be any conflict between science and
theology.
Finally, the Cause of existence acts out of the time. It is a
common misunderstanding, in fact, that creation happens at a
timely moment, say the Big Bang. But, if creation is the
beginning of time, it would be within the time, and could not
be transcendent. Rather, creation is simultaneous with any
instant of time, and the doctrine of a transcendent cause of the
reality’s existence is consistent either with an absolute
beginning of time or with a world lasting since ever.
132

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
3. The “horizontal” relation between information and
energy
Every physical process involves energy transformations.
This is true up to the lowest level of reality. Consider a
microscopic quantum system, say an atom. It is characterized
by a number of energy levels whose values can be computed
by means of Schrödinger equation5 . If the atom occupies its
ground state, corresponding to the lowest energy level, there
is no way to establish the values of the other levels if one does
not allow the system to interact with electromagnetic
radiation or particles like, for example, electrons. Upper levels
are in the possibilities of the system, but they are not realized
without a proper energy transfer, according to the reaction:
∗
A + γ → A ,
where A is the atom in its ground state, γ is a quantum of
electromagnetic radiation (photon) and A * the atom in the
excited state6 . Since the energy E of a photon is proportional to
the frequency f of the electromagnetic wave which it belongs
to, according to the well known relation:
E = h ⋅ f (h being the Planck constant),
it is possible to measure upper energy levels by the
frequency analysis of the electromagnetic radiation after its
interaction with the atoms.
The inverse process is also possible, in which an atom in an
excited state comes back to the ground state emitting
electromagnetic radiation of proper frequency:
∗
A → A + γ .
5 Lev D. Landau ‐ Evgenij M. Lifšits, Quantum Mechanics. Non‐
Relativistic Theory, Elsevier, Oxford, 1958, ch. 3.
6 Max Born, Atomic Physics, Blackie & Son, London‐Glasgow, 1969,
ch. 5.
133

CORDELLI ‐ The real distinction between essence and existence and the relation
between information and energy
If we call E0 the energy of the ground state and E1 the
energy of the excited one, the energy of the emitted photon
must equal the energy gap7 E E − ,
1
so that its frequency will be
E1
− E0
f = .
h
So, the atom is potentially capable to emit photons of
frequency f – we can say that such a capability is contained in
the structure (the information) of the atom – but the actual
emission of a photon of frequency f depends upon the fact
whether the atom is in the excited state A * after having
received proper amount of energy (by means, for example, of
electric sparks), or not. There are two fundamental conditions
in order to obtain from a given atom a photon of frequency f:
1. in the structure of energy levels must be two levels Em
and En such that:
Em
− En
f = ;
h
2. a proper amount of energy must be given to the atom in
order to put it on the upper level.
If we turn our attention to macroscopic systems, the
situation is exactly the same. A pendulum in vertical
equilibrium position, for example, has the possibility to
perform oscillations with a given period which can be easily
calculated, if nobody gives it a push, no oscillations at all will
occur.
Even phenomena of static and dynamic equilibrium require
energy inputs; not to sustain the process, but to build the
system. Let us consider for example a satellite following a
circular orbit around Earth 8 . There is no variation of potential
as well as kinetic energy during the motion, but a certain
7 This condition can be generalized to any arbitrary couple of
energy levels, so no need to consider only couples where the lower
level is the ground state.
8 Bruno Bertotti ‐ Paolo Farinella, Physics of the Earth and the Solar
System. Dynamics and evolution, Space Navigation, Space‐Time
Structure, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990, ch. 18.
134
0

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
amount of energy however must be supplied in order to put
the satellite into its orbit.
It is finally worthwhile to notice that nothing like “pure
energy” exists; energy transfers ever take place according to
specific features of the systems involved in the processes.
4. The “vertical” relation between physics and
metaphysics realms
After the discussion in the previous sections it should be
clear that there is a strong analogy between the roles of
information/energy in the occurrence of physical processes
and essence/existence in the metaphysical constitution of
beings. Let us analyse explicitly the main points of such an
analogy.
Physical processes are dynamical transformations
characterized by well defined variations of the parameters of
the underlying systems. Once the system is given, kind and
extent of the process(es) it can undertake are also fixed. In the
same way, qualities and capabilities of a being are uniquely
determined by the whole of the causes those constitute it. So,
we can draw a parallel between the essence of a being and the
set of the determinations of a physical system. Notice that the
two concepts do not overlap, since, even if physical
determinations are indeed parts of the essence, this one has a
wider meaning, including proper ontological determinations.
In both cases, however, the key concept is information. But, if
we know exactly the features of the systems involved in a
physical process, can we undoubtedly state if it will take place
or not? And if we should know as much as possible of the
essence of a being, can we affirm that it is actually existent?
Clearly, the answers to both the questions are “no”. In the first
case a data is missing: if the system is in an initial state with
enough potential energy to activate the process, or if proper
quantity of energy is supplied by an external source. In the
second case, the point is that a set of essential determinations
consistent with each other and with environment is not
enough to imply existence.
135

CORDELLI ‐ The real distinction between essence and existence and the relation
between information and energy
On the other hand, energy’s manifestation is possible only
within a given physical process, since there is no way to access
directly to energy in any experimental situation (even if we
find sometimes in textbooks sentences like: “Let us consider
an amount of energy E...”), and according to the common
accepted in modern physics position of operationalism 9 , a
physical definition which does not correspond to feasible
operations makes no sense. So, energy does not appear but
qualified by the particular process; we have energy of a body,
of a system of bodies, of a field, but never energy without any
further specification. Similarly, existence, though distinct from
essence, never appears but as the existence of a given essence;
in other terms existence is existence of something, never pure
existence. There is however a major exception to this
statement, i.e. God. In fact, according to Thomistic doctrine,
God is the only being whose essence is its own existence. Its
existence is necessary, while all other beings are indifferent to
existence and not‐existence, they may also not exist, while God
must exist. Just as things receive their being, so God is His own
being. Things become visible after they are lighted, while the
Sun is the source of light. Similarly, God is the source of be, the
Ipsum Esse Subsistens, which means that in God existence is not
existence of something, but pure existence.
Clearly, this fact represents a difference in the analogy
between energy and existence, since no exception is allowed to
the rule that energy ever comes in a particular form,
depending upon the system involved.
There is another important difference between existence
and energy, i.e. the conservative character of the second one,
not shared by existence. In fact, one of the better tested
physical laws is the conservation of energy: in every physical
process energy never disappears or is created, instead it
changes continuously from a form to another. Typically, in
macroscopic processes potential energy, associated to
system’s structure, is converted partially or totally into kinetic
energy associated to the motion of the parts, and eventually
this one is fully converted into heat. The initial amount of
9 Percy W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics, Macmillan, New
York, 1961.
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
energy required to constitute complex structures like nuclei,
atoms and molecules is taken from gravitation. In fact the
energy associated to gravitation is ever negative, so we can
gain energy simply letting gravity to act. This, for example, is
what actually happens in stars cores, where, due to the
overwhelming pressure of the external shells, nuclei are
subjected to fusion reactions in which electromagnetic
radiation is produced. Moreover, the fact that potential
gravitational energy is negative is fundamental to explain the
origin of the universe. In fact, both the models based on an
absolute beginning of time 10 and the ones stating a repetitive
evolution 11 explain the appearance ex nihilo of matter at the
Big Bang as a process in which the positive energy associated
with matter and radiation is exactly compensated by the
negative contribution of gravitation; so there is no need to
postulate a violation of physical laws in the initial singularity.
Clearly, nothing similar to energy conservation holds for
existence. Existence is not conservative, there is no need for
the generation of a new being to be compensated by the
corruption of another one (even if in the case of living beings,
and more generally whenever resources are limited, death of
present individuals is necessary to free space and resources
for next generations).
5. Conclusions
The real distinction between essentia and actus essendi
characterizing the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas suggests
a strong analogy in the physical realm with the concepts of
information (the structure of a system) and energy (the
concrete possibility that a process take place). However, the
two couples of concepts do not overlap, since they apply to
different subjects (ontology the first, physics the second) and
there are important differences, especially between existence
10 Alan Guth, The Inflationary Universe. The Quest for a New Theory
of Cosmic Origins, Basic Books, New York 1997.
11 Paul J. Steinhardt ‐ Neil Turok, Endless Universe. Beyond the Big
Bang, Doubleday, New York 2007.
137

CORDELLI ‐ The real distinction between essence and existence and the relation
between information and energy
and energy. In fact, while Aquinas’ ontology states that essence
of God is His own existence, no physical object is fully
identified by only an amount of energy. Moreover, the energy
conservation principle holds, while for existence, conservation
is not strictly required (even if matter cannot sustain but a
finite number of different beings at once).
The analogy discussed in the present paper may be
impressive, but it is important to stress that any mixing
between the two fields may be dangerous; scientific research
has to follow its own positive methods and philosophical
reflection must be as free as possible from aspects contingent
upon material world. Nevertheless, as a consequence of a
wider perspective, a better insight in each field may be
obtained. In this sense, all the above considerations can be of
some help for a better understanding of concepts usually
thought with no reciprocal relation, so representing a fecund
case of mutual enrichment between theoretical philosophy
(and theology) and natural sciences.
138

Bibliography
Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
1. ANSELM OF AOSTA, Proslogion.
2. BASTI, Gianfranco, Antonio L. PERRONE, Le radici forti del
pensiero debole. Dalla metafisica, alla matematica, al
calcolo, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 1996.
3. BERTOTTI, Bruno - Paolo FARINELLA, Physics of the Earth and
the Solar System. Dynamics and evolution, Space Navigation,
Space-Time Structure, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990, ch. 18.
4. BORN, Max, Atomic Physics, Blackie & Son, London‐Glasgow,
1969, ch. 5.
5. BRIDGMAN, Percy W., The Logic of Modern Physics, Macmillan,
New York, 1961.
6. GUTH, Alan, The Inflationary Universe. The Quest for a New
Theory of Cosmic Origins, Basic Books, New York 1997.
7. LANDAU, Lev D. ‐ Evgenij M. LIFŠITS, Quantum Mechanics.
Non‐Relativistic Theory, Elsevier, Oxford, 1958, ch. 3.
8. PLATO, Republic, VII.
9. STEINHARDT, Paul J. ‐ Neil TUROK, Endless Universe. Beyond
the Big Bang, Doubleday, New York 2007.
139

CORDELLI ‐ The real distinction between essence and existence and the relation
between information and energy
Caption for Figures
140

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
Neuroscientific Explanations of Religious
Experience are Not free from Cultural Aspects
Anne L. C. RUNEHOV *
* Department of Systematic Theology,
Copenhagen University, Denmark
Abstract
We cannot disregard that the neuroscientific
research on religious phenomena such as religious
experiences and rituals for example, has increased
significantly the last years. Neuroscientists claim that
neuroscience contributes considerably in the process of
understanding religious experiences, because
neuroscience is able to measure brain activity during
religious experiences by way of brain‐imaging
technologies. No doubt, those results of neuroscientific
research on religious experiences are an important
supplement to the understanding of some types of
religious experiences. However, some conclusions drawn
from neuroscientific research on religious experiences are
arguable. For example, one such conclusion is that
religious experiences are actually nothing but neural
activity, i.e. there is nothing ‘religious’ to the experiences
at all. Another such conclusion is that a person’s religious
experiences actually derive from some ultimate reality,
meaning that religious experiences are real. It is the latter
assertion that will be analyzed in the present paper. The
question is asked whether neuroscience alone is able to
affirm that religious experiences are real or whether there
are, besides neuroscientific issues, also cultural‐religious
assumptions that underlie this conclusion.
Introduction
The study I choose as a passage to the analysis is an
empirical neuroscientific study titled “The Measurement of
Cerebral Blood Flow during the Complex Cognitive Task of
Meditation using HMPAO‐Spect Imaging”, by Andrew
Newberg, Abass Alavi, Michael Baime, Michael Pourdehnad,
141

RUNEHOV ‐ Neuroscientific Explanations of Religious Experience are Not
free from Cultural Aspects
Jill Santanna and Eugene d’Aquili. 1 For the sake of what I
aim to discuss below, I had to simplify Newberg et al.’s
study and ignore its original aim, which is to understand
the correlations between the brain and religious
experiences obtained by way of meditation. My purpose
instead is to show that neuroscientific explanations of
religious experiences cannot stand aloof from the cultural
understanding of religious experiences. I will start with a
presentation of the study, where after I will discuss the
results and some conclusions that Newberg et al. arrived
at. Thereafter I will account for cultural presuppositions
that underlie some of Newberg et al.’s explanations of
religious experiences and argue that their neuroscientific
explanations are not free from cultural assumptions. Let us
now consider the study.
The Study
The participants in the neuroscientific study
performed by Newberg et al. on religious experiences
obtained by meditation were male and female Tibetan
Buddhist meditators and Franciscan nuns between the ages
of 38 and 52. All persons had more than 15 years of
practice of meditation or prayer. They practiced at least
one hour per day and at least five days a week.
Furthermore, all of them had participated in several
retreats lasting a minimum of three‐months and in one
yearly retreat of one month. The control group existed of
nine healthy persons who did not perform any meditation.
They were brain‐scanned once during 20 minutes.
However, even if both the participants who meditated and
those who did not were SPECT‐scanned at baseline, only
the meditating persons were also SPECT‐scanned in a later
phase of the experiment.
The task of the participants began with the
instruction to put themselves in their preferred position
for meditation or prayer. They were allowed to surround
themselves with objects that they generally use when they
142
1 Newberg, A. et al. (2001b).

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
meditate or pray and/or which facilitates meditation, for
example, candles and sticks of jasmine incense. Before
starting their meditation, they were injected with a specific
radioactive tracer and brain‐scanned 20 minutes later in a
Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT).
To whom it may concern, the radioactive tracer contained
7 mCi (milli‐Curie) HexaMethyl Propylene Amine Oxime
(HMPAO). Newberg et al. registered the values for the
regions of interest of the brain. To be able to measure
neural activity during meditation the participants were
connected to the research team by way of a common cotton
twine, which they had to pull as soon as they felt that they
approached their most intensive moment of meditation,
(called Absolute Unitary Being by Newberg et al.) Twenty
minutes later, they were SPECT‐scanned during 30 minutes
and Newberg et al could register the new values.
Generally considered, Newberg and d’Aquili observed
that the meditators, during the act of meditation, had
increased rCBF (reginal Cerebral Blood Flow) in the
inferior and orbital frontal cortices, the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortices (i.e. the cortices situated right back of
the side of the brain), the sensorimotor cortices, the
dorsomedial cortices (i.e. the cortices at the backside of the
middle of the brain), the midbrain, the cingulate gyri and
the thalami. The other parts of their brains did not show
any significant changes in neural activity.
More specifically, when the values of the baseline
scans were compared with the values of the scans taken
during meditation, they discovered that there was a
significant increase of activity in the frontal lobes, known
as the seat of cognition and emotion. However Newberg et
al. did not find a significant decrease in the posterior
superior parietal lobes (PSPL) as they previously had
suggested. 2 The SPECT images of the brain of the
participants taken before they began to meditate showed
that there was furious neurological activity in this brain
2 d’Aquili, E./Newberg, A. (1993)/(1999).
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RUNEHOV ‐ Neuroscientific Explanations of Religious Experience are Not
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area. This activity appeared on the computer screen of the
SPECT as vibrant bursts of brilliant reds and yellows. The
images taken during the act of meditation however,
showed the same area in green and blue, i.e. darker colours
indicating a reduction in activity. The darker the colours
the stronger the decrease of activity. When the colour
turns black, there is no activity at all, i.e. the brain died.
Newberg et al. had hypothesized that there would be
a decrease in activity of the sensorimotor areas during
meditation, because meditation is said to bring about a
decrease in sensory awareness and motor activity.
However, this was not confirmed, rather, the opposite
occurred and an increase was measured. Newberg and
d’Aquili guessed that, to maintain the posture of the
meditator, (for example the lotus position); there might be
a significant degree of activity required in the
sensorimotor areas. Furthermore, there may be some form
of visual input from the internal images generated during
this type of meditation.
However, in a previous study, Newberg and d’Aquili
designed neurological models of different meditation
techniques. One of them, called the Via Positiva implies
that the meditator focuses on a preferred inner or outer
image to put her in a meditative state. Hence, that could
explain the unexpected increase of activity in the
sensorimotor areas. 3 A for the present study perhaps
secondary remark but which I found important to make in
Sacred or Neural is that if they had not only paid attention
to the neural activity that is specifically active during the
meditation process but had also paid attention to the type
of meditation technique that was performed at the moment
of the scanning, we probably would have known whether
the results are related to Tibetan meditation or Franciscan
praying or to both. 4 The brain‐images also showed
increased activity in the midbrain because of autonomic
144
3 d’Aquili, E./Newberg, A. (1993)/(1999).
4 Runehov, A.L.C. (2007) chap.6.

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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changes during meditation. However, there were no
significant neural changes in the cerebellum, superior
frontal, or occipital areas, since the function of these brain
structures are normally not associated with meditation.
However, and unexpectedly, they found significantly
increased activity in the thalamus, something that may be
important for the overall complex processes associated
with meditation, including both cognitive and affective
responses. Finally, Newberg et al. discovered that the
meditators had a significantly different thalamic laterality
index at baseline than had the non‐meditators.
Discussion
The results show whether the hypotheses were
confirmed or not and they show which brain structures
and functions that underwent increased or decreased
neural activity at the most intensive moment of meditation
and prayer. However, they do not tell us anything about the
phenomenon religious experience itself, about the quality
of the experiences, about the core characteristics of the
religions to which the meditators belonged, nor about the
reality status of the experiences. Furthermore, they do not
tell us anything about the experiencers themselves or
about how they interpret their religious experiencers.
Nevertheless, Newberg et al. emphasize neuroscience’s
weight when they present their neuroscientific view on the
reality of religious experiences, as follows.
Firstly, Newberg et al. equal all human experiences,
neuroscientifically seen, and they mean that everything we
experience we experience in a second‐hand‐way, i.e. all our
experiences are mediated by our brain. They write:
If God exists, for example, and if He appeared to you in some
incarnation, you would have no way of experiencing His presence,
except as part of a neurologically generated rendition of reality.
You would need auditory processing to hear His voice, visual
processing to see His face, and cognitive processing to make sense
of His message. Even if He spoke to you mystically, without words,
you would need cognitive functions to comprehend His meaning,
and input from the brain’s emotional centers to fill you with
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RUNEHOV ‐ Neuroscientific Explanations of Religious Experience are Not
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rapture and awe. Neurology makes it clear: There’s no other way
for God to get into your head except through the brain’s neural
pathways. Even if there were a soul through which God could
communicate, it would have little cognitive meaning to us without
a brain. 5
Thus, if God exists and wants to communicate with us,
God cannot do this otherwise than by using different brain
structures and functions. Newberg et al. suggest that,
neurologically seen, experiencing Absolute Unitary Being
or God is identical to experiencing eating a piece of apple
pie, because brain‐scans of a person eating a piece of apple
pie show the neural activity involved in eating apple pie.
For example, the olfactory areas that registering the aroma,
the visual areas picturing the piece of apple pie, the centres
of touch holding the piece and the areas responsible for
taste show, similar to the brain‐scans, the neural activity
involved in experiencing Absolute Unitary Being. Secondly,
Newberg et al, write, “there can be little doubt that Absolute
Unitary Being exists, even if it is a relatively rare state”. 6
In another study, Newberg and d’Aquili also maintain
that so real do these experiences appear when recalled in
baseline reality that they have the ability to alter the way
the experiencers live their lives [...] “[T]he word real is not
here used poetically or metaphorically. It is used in the same sense
as in the utterance “This rock and this table are real”. 7 Newberg
et al. support their view by referring to plenty of evidence
for its existence in cross cultural religious literature and
the testimonies of living mystics and other people who
experienced Ultimate Reality, (among them the subjects of
their neuroscientific studies) regardless of which religion
they belong to. These people, they say, remember the
Ultimate Reality experience with the same degree of clarity
and sense of reality as they remember everyday events of
the past, something that is not the case with, hallucinations
among others. In fact, where Ultimate Reality experiences
are remembered as superior to baseline reality, dreams
146
5 Newberg, A. et al. (2001a) 37/183: note 1.
6 d’Aquili, E./Newberg, A. (1996) 248.
7 d’Aquili, E./Newberg, A. (1999), 192.

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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and hallucinations are remembered as inferior to baseline
reality. 8 It hence seems that they want to give Absolute
Unitary Being or God an identical reality status, for
example, a piece of apple pie when they maintain that
Absolute Unitary Being doubtlessly exists.
The problem with the first assertion, however, is that
it is not clear at all how we should understand Newberg et
al.’s claim that all experiences are identical on a
neurological level. Firstly, assume that Peter and Nancey
eat a piece of the same apple pie. They will probably not
describe their experience identically. Peter might say that
the apple pie was not sweet enough while Nancey might
say that it was too sweet. Peter might have been hungry
when eating the pie while Nancey might have eaten it
because it was served at coffee time in the office. The latter
clearly implies that different brain structures and functions
had to be activated for example, the brain structure that
has to do with being hungry, which will not be activated in
Nancey’s brain. Hence, Peter and Nancey’s experience of
eating a piece of apple pie cannot be equal neurologically
seen. Similarly, Mark and Rita, who have been practicing
the same meditation technique for twenty years and have
been practicing at least two hours per day etc., probably
had and still have different religious experiences.
However, Newberg et al. could counter argue that
what they mean is that the experiences are identical
neurologically seen in the sense that, whatever the person
experiences it has to be mediated through brain structures
and functions, and that this is so for all types of experience,
religious and others. We can agree upon that, however,
there is yet another problem namely, some
neuroscientists claim that every brain is unique, that
brains are like faces. Since there are no identical faces, not
even identical twins have identical faces; there cannot be
identical brains either, at least by nature. Advanced plastic
surgery might, be it today or in the future, be able to create
8 d’Aquili, E./Newberg, A. (1999), 192.
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RUNEHOV ‐ Neuroscientific Explanations of Religious Experience are Not
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two identical faces. Furthermore, we do not know what
cloning techniques might bring about in the future.
Furthermore, besides these nature aspects, (i.e. genes,
nutrition, disease, laws of physics and chemistry) we also
have to consider the nurture aspect (i.e. our interaction
with our environment –culture – from the day we are born
until the end of our days), as well as the personal aspects
(i.e. our action and choices). Every brain thus changes
constantly and uniquely. Neuroscientists call this
continuous modification of the brain for the brain’s
plasticity.
People do things differently at different times and do
different things, which must imply that our brains develop
differently and thus are different. For example, even if the
identical twins, Maddy and Maggy, who were my
classmates in ground school, dressed alike and practically
did the same things all the time, they did not do everything
in the same order or with the same motivation or intensity.
For example, Maddy loved geography while Maggy did not
but was much better at drawing and painting than Maddy. I
do not know whether Maddy became a geographer and
Maggy an artist but it is clear that their brains developed
differently due to their interests. As identical twins, their
brains might have looked very similar at the beginning of
their lives but today, their brains are unquestionably very
different. Connected with this is my last remark that every
experience is associated with a complexity of neural
activity in different brain structures. Carol Rausch Albright
writes that the “many forms of religious experience may
involve almost every part of the brain’. 9 Thus, the
experience Absolute Unitary Being has to involve more
neural structures than the posterior superior parietal
lobes. This implies that, if two experiences are to be
identical, all the neural activity involved has to be identical.
Hence, I believe we may conclude that meditation and the
accompanying religious experiences have to affect Mark’s
and Rita’s brains differently and that their experiences
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9 Albright, C.R. (2002), 167.

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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cannot be identical, not even neurologically seen.
Furthermore, we may conclude that such is the case for all
human experience.
Let us now take a closer look at Newberg et al.’s
second claim that Absolute Unitary Being exists. 10 The
problem is that, from a neuroscientific perspective, it is not
possible to maintain that Absolute Unitary Being, which
they also refer to as God, exists or is absolute reality. Let us
also for the time being disregard the philosophical
problems surrounding the concepts “ exist, real and
reality” which I am afraid do not room within the frame of
the present paper. Neuroscientists cannot detect any object
of experiences by way of brain scans at all for the reason
that the red, blue or green spots on the computer screen of
the SPECT do not refer to an object of experience, for
example God or a piece of apple pie. What these spots refer
to is neural activity, in other words, what the
neuroscientists see on the screen is chemistry and not God
or a pie. Newberg et al. hence cannot establish that
Absolute Unitary Being or God exists or is real from a
neuroscientific point of view only. Thus, they clearly must
rely on other arguments than neuroscientific ones to
support their view that Absolute Unitary Being exists or is
absolute reality.
Cultural Implications
Let us return to Newberg et al.’s first inference based
on their studies and ask what arguments that could
underlie their claim that all experiences are identical seen
from a neuroscientific point of view. To discover these we
have to dig deeper into Newberg et al.’s reasoning
concerning the equality of experiences, especially religious
experiences. They maintain that there cannot be two
different experiences of Absolute Unitary Being as such.
However, this claim does not derive from the results of the
10 Newberg, A. et al. (2001).
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RUNEHOV ‐ Neuroscientific Explanations of Religious Experience are Not
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empirical neuroscientific study above, but is related to
their study in which they design neurological models and
hypothesize how the correlation between brain structures
and functions and religious experiences obtained by way of
different meditation techniques might look like. It is in this
study that they maintain that Absolute Unitary Being
correlates with a total deafferentation of the left and right
PSPL. However, the results of Newberg et al.’s empirical
study do not show a total deafferentation in the PSPL, only
a tendency towards deafferentation.
However, there is also a problem from a
neuroscientific point of view, because some neuroscientists
maintain that a total deafferentation of the left and right
PSPL is simply not possible. For instance, the
neuroscientist Mogens Dalby maintains that the condition
of persons who suffer from two‐sided infraction in the
PSPL (which is a partly deafferentation of the left and right
PSPL), is such that they lack bodily perception, they cannot
follow a line of argument, they do not recognize the objects
which are placed in their hands or they cannot walk, etc.
Hence, they do not seem to have the same control over
what happens, as the meditators seem to have. Dalby
argues that one cannot compare the neurological condition
of these persons with the neurological condition of
meditators experiencing ultimate reality. The neurological
condition of the persons suffering from damage to the PSPL
is regarded as a proper deafferentation of that brain area,
(the condition is invariable), while the neurological
condition of the meditators is considered to be a
modulation of the functions of that brain area. Proper
deafferentation means that all neural input or flow into a
certain brain structure is cut off. The decrease in neural
activity (the blood flow decrease) that Newberg and
d’Aquili see in the PSPL area does not have to imply that
the PSPL is completely cut off from its normal input. 11
There is an important difference between the “shutting down
or cutting off of the [PSPL] area. [...] Shutting down neural activity
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11 From my correspondence with Dr. Dalby.

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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is known as inhibition, and inhibition of a brain area may result in
decreased blood flow to that area.” 12 Thus, Newberg and d’Aquili
should have been more precise in what they meant by total
deafferentation of the left and right PSPL, because their models
seem to “require that the [PSPL] area remains active while it is cut
off from its normal neural input”, 13 but they probably mean
while it is shut down from its normal neural input. Newberg
and d’Aquili could have added that during the experience
of Absolute Unitary Being, the left and right PSPL are
deafferented but not deefferented, i.e., even if there may
not be information to generate a sense of orientation,
information on how to interpret this lack of orientation
will still be sent to adequate parts of the brain. While
deafferentation refers to the inhibition or blockage of input
into a brain structure, deefferentation refers to the
inhibition or blockage of output from a brain structure.
Nevertheless, since we are analyzing how Newberg et
al., reason, let me account for how I think they may have
proceeded. Thus, from a previous non‐empirical study,
Newberg et al. borrow the idea that total deafferentation of
both left and right posterior superior parietal lobes (PSPL)
are correlated with the experience Absolute Unitary Being
(AUB). They then maintain that there cannot be two
different total deafferentated PSPL because, brain‐imagine
of various such deafferentated brain‐structures show
exactly the same neural activity (here non‐activity) in the
PSPL. Furthermore, since, according to them total
deafferentation of both the PSPL corresponds with that
religious experience AUB, they conclude that there cannot
be two different experiences of Absolute Unitary Being.
Newberg et al. write, “While in the state of Absolute Unitary
Being, [t]here is only absolute unity, and there cannot be two
versions of any unity that is absolute”. 14 Let me reconstruct
their argument.
12 Spezio, M.L. (2001), 482.
13 Spezio (2001) 482.
14 Newberg, A. et al. (2001), 123.
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1. If there is AUB then there is a total deafferentation
of both PSPL
2. There are no two different total deafferentations of
PSPL possible
3. Conclusion: there cannot be two different AUB
A problem is that not all mystics would agree that 3
follows from 1 and 2, i.e. that there are no different
Absolute Unitary Being experiences possible even if they
might recognize certain experiences that are associated
with Absolute Unitary Being, for example, the experience of
union, of timelessness, etc. Some Christian mystics for
example would not describe their experience of ultimate
reality as an experience of nothingness but of love. Some
may say that they felt united with God, others may say that
they felt as being a drop of water in the ocean, again others
will interpret their experience as an experience of total
emptiness or nirvana, etc. Let me propose the following
stories by way of illustration. I want you to imagine Sister
Helen, a Christian nun, in kneeled position before the altar
of a little chapel. Assume that she has been praying in the
same position for hours, her eyes fixed on the candle light
on the altar. Assume further that she experiences feeling
one with the light of the candle she was focusing on, and
after a while experiences Absolute Unitary Being. Thus,
afterwards, she will remember this experience as having
been one with the light. Furthermore, belonging to a
Christian theistic religion, Sister Helen will probably say
something like “the Light is one nature consisting of the oneness
of life which is the Father, the Light itself which is the Son and the
glare of the Light which is the Holy Spirit.” 15 Imagine now
Rajeev who belongs to the Hindu tradition and who
experienced Absolute Unitary Being. Belonging to the
Hindu tradition, Rajeev will remember his experience as a
feeling of being a passenger of his body. He will probably
say that he did not feel any anxiety, nor doubts, fears,
ambitions, goals, desires, pains, etc. He might even say that
152
15 Nijs, P./Meyers, K. (ed.) (2001), 23, my translation from Dutch.

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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he does not long for anything else anymore than for
Brahman. To return to Mark and Rita, they also will put
their experience in their respective frame of cultural,
religious and personal reference, when describing their
experience to other people. Moreover, descriptions are
related to language and language is related to culture.
Hence, instead of only one description of what it is to
experience Absolute Unitary Being, there probably are
many versions.
However, Newberg et al. could counter argue that the
experience of Absolute Unitary Being at the very moment
of the experience and before the experiencer puts the
experience in words (i.e. as she or he remembers the
experience afterwards) is identical for all. Maybe they are
right, however, the problem is that this is something that
neuroscience may not be able to demonstrate. Some would
raise the question whether it is possible to have non‐
interpreted experiences at all. Another aspect is that the
way of meditating, for example, via negativa, via positiva,
transcendental meditation, praying, is culture related.
Hence, the cultural‐religious background of the
experiencer may be more significant for the experience
itself than was hitherto believed. The cultural‐religious
background may not only be significant for the
interpretation of the religious experience by the
experiencer but also even for the religious experience
itself.
Let us return to Mark and Rita and assume that Mark
practices via negativa and Rita via positiva. Assume that
Mark practices via negativa because he has studied this
technique in Taiwan during his youth because his parents
worked at the Swedish embassy in Taiwan at that time.
Assume that he continued practicing meditation by way of
the via negativa technique ever since. Assume further that
Rita participated in several long‐time retreats in Christian
convents. Assume that both Mark and Rita experience
Absolute Unitary Being during their meditation sessions.
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Mark’s experience then will probably be an experience of
wholeness, of unity, of absolute oneness, where there is no
time, no space, no distinctions, and no self. This is so
because, roughly, via negativa is a meditation technique in
which the meditator concentrates on emptying his or her
mind completely. Rita’s experience will probably also be an
experience of union but of union with the inner or outer
image of her meditation, because, roughly, via positiva is a
meditation technique in which the meditator focuses on a
chosen image, (may it be an inner image or an image
situated somewhere in the room or place where the
meditation takes place). Thus, not only will Mark and Rita
refer to their experiences in a different way ‐not only will
they interpret their experience differently ‐they will
actually experience them differently due to the different
meditation techniques they used. Furthermore, as already
pointed out, their brains, i.e. their neurology will develop
in a different manner as well and will hence be different. I
believe that it becomes difficult to agree with Newberg et
al. that all experiences are identical, even if Newberg et
al.’s intention concerns equality of experiences on a
neurological level.
Conclusion
Even though Newberg et al. agree that one has to take
into account both the material and the spiritual side of the
world when studying religious experiences, they would
profit from further considering the strong impact of the
culture‐religious implications of religious experiences. If
neuroscientists want to study the spiritual side of the
world, they also need to study its cultural side more
seriously. Nevertheless, this does not exclude that the
experience Absolute Unitary Being, everything else being
the same, is as Newberg et al. describe it. Neither does it
exclude that when somebody says that she experienced
Jesus, that she really did so. However, these queries belong
to another debate.
154

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Need for Interdisciplinarity”, European Journal of Science and Theology,
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
Distinct Ways of Thinking
and Distinct Experiences of Truth
Ştefan AFLOROAEI *
* "Al. I. Cuza" University, Faculty of Philosophy,
Blvd. Carol, No. 11, Iasi 700506, Romania,
E‐mail Address: aflor@uaic.ro
Abstract
This article aims to bring into discussion three issues
that are not necessarily new but that have received little
consideration in current philosophical discussions. First,
one can notice that the space of freedom that thinking has
is much larger than the one described by Kant in his first
critical work. This new space of freedom is no longer
strictly delimited by the classical principle of non‐
contradiction, on the one hand, and by sensitive intuition,
on the other. Second, one can distinguish different modes
of thinking without believing that we would be situating
ourselves outside reasonable and meaningful thinking.
Such are, for instance, the thinking that strictly observes
the logic of non‐contradiction and the thinking that
exceeds this logic. Last but not least, we consider the fact
that the thinking that exceeds the logic of non‐
contradiction induces another image of the world in which
we are situated and can describe other experiences of
truth (to use Gadamer’s expression), such as symbolic and
religious experience. Consequently, we have reasons to
believe that one can talk about alternative in another,
stronger and more radical sense of the word as well, as can
be seen with authors and ages that had a disposition for
genuinely alternative visions.
1. A modern distinction: to think and to know
As already known, Kant wrote extensively about the
question of the very way of thinking. His reasons, however,
were different from those of Johann M. Chladenius who,
more than a century before Kant, asked how it is possible
to understand the people who lived in another age and
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AFLOROAEI ‐ Distinct Ways of Thinking and Distinct Experiences of Truth
thought totally differently from us 1 . Kant does not
necessary raise the question of historical difference, a
difference that may become, to a certain extent, abyssal. He
rather prefers to consider a distinction that could
ultimately uncover that which is within the powers of the
human mind. This is the distinction between thinking, on
the one hand, and intuiting originally, on the other hand.
As he understood it, thinking is essentially a logical and
conceptual exercise. With the help of some concepts,
various representations are bound in one same conscience.
Or, to use his terms, thinking binds the diversity of a
sensitive intuition by subjecting it to the shape of a
concept.
But let us return to one of his examples and consider the
situation of the one who, pondering upon his own will, would
first say that it is subject to natural causes and laws. One can
indeed notice, under certain circumstances, that what he
wishes depends on certain causes of nature. By making such a
judgment, the individual relates what he has sensitively
intuited to the concept of causality. In this case, “Thought is the
act which relates given intuition to an object” 2 . Yet one does
not always deal with intuitions given in a sensitive experience.
For instance, when the same individual thinks differently,
telling himself that his will is free and not subject to external
causes, what he thinks cannot be given in the situation of a
sensitive experience. He cannot empirically verify such a
situation where his will would appear unconditionally free.
Nevertheless, one accepts this idea in many cases. One does it,
for instance, whenever one has reasons to consider that one’s
soul is not subjected to time or death as such. The soul, of
course, seen in its power to defeat death, is not the object of a
sensitive experience. And thought does not entail certain
knowledge but rather a form of self‐understanding.
In a footnote, Kant returns to this bifurcated path of
thinking and insists on a distinction that he deems essential for
what he will discuss next. “To know an object I must be able to
1 Cf. Einleitung zur richtigen Auslegung vernünftiger Reden und
Schriften, Leipzig, 1742.
2 Critque of Pure Reason, 1929, Palgrave, p. 263.
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prove its possibility, either from its actuality as attested by
experience, or a priori by means of reason. But I can think
whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict
myself, that is, provided my concept is a possible thought. This
suffices for the possibility of the concept, even though I may
not be able to guarantee that, in the sum of all possibilities
there exist indeed, an object corresponding to it. But
something more is required before I can ascribe to such a
concept objective validity, that is, real possibility; for the
former possibility is merely logical. This something more need
not, however, be sought in the theoretical sources of
knowledge; it may lie in those that are practical” 3 . The
distinction is not at all random here. On the contrary, it
doubles the radical difference between phenomenon and the
thing in itself. It is what Kant mentions in the text: “Although
we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must
be in position at least to think them as things in themselves;
otherwise we should reach the absurd conclusion that a
phenomenon can exist without anything that appears.” 4
Therefore, there is a serious difference between thinking and
knowing. The scope of the former is much larger: “I can think
whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict
myself”. This scope seems unlimited: “for thought the
categories are not limited by the conditions of our sensible
intuition, but have an unlimited field. It is only the knowledge
of that which we think, the determining of the object, that
requires intuition. 5 When I do not contradict myself “my
concept is a possible idea”. However, this is a risky, uncertain
idea. As Kant argues, one cannot guarantee that there is an
object that corresponds or not to a certain concept. When
there is no real object that corresponds to thought, the
exercise of the latter is purely logical and the possibility it
explores is just logical. Kant illustrates this distinction in the
3 Ibidem, p. 27 infra; § 21‐22.
4 Ibidem, p. 27.
5 Ibidem, pp. 175 infra.
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case of one of the three ideas of pure reason, namely the idea
of freedom.
Let us follow his idea for a while in this last issue, since
in this case, everything seems to take the shape of
philosophical belief personally assumed.
If we consider human will as a thing in itself or as
simple phenomenon only, we will definitely reach absurd
conclusions about what we think. Yet, if we consider it in
two ways, on the one hand as phenomenon and on the
other hand as thing in itself, then we will avoid such
absurd consequences and we will better understand the
assertion of those persons who, pondering on their will,
think that it is either perfectly free or subject to natural
laws. In what way will we better understand it? Only when
it is seen as phenomenon does human will appear
“according to the laws of nature and, so, as non free”. But
as a thing in itself, the will appears to be totally free. As
these two judgements deal with different points of view,
they no longer contradict each other. The slightly strange
conclusion that Kant reaches via this bifurcated path is,
nevertheless, different: namely, human beings cannot
know their free soul – neither analytically, nor by empirical
observation. They can contemplate it, ponder upon it in
many ways, but not know it because it cannot be
determined the way other things subject to observation
are 6 . When I can know something, I use a sensitive
representation. When I only think that something, I deal
with a non‐sensitive, intellectual representation. If the
latter is non‐contradictory, thinking is possible. I can think
what ignores the conditions of intuition, but not what
would ignore the principle of non‐contradiction. If ”non‐
6 I do not know if Kant resumes here, even in a free, secularised
interpretation, the meaning of old verses, such as those in Luke 16, 27
sq. We know that this passage in the New Testament assures us that
such an experience concerning the condition of the soul after death is
not only impossible via one’s own effort, nor would it be convincing for
the non‐believer. The last answer given by Abraham to the one who
had asked for the most obvious proof concerning man’s fate after
death is very telling: ”If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither
will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead” (16, 31).
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contradictory” means ”possible” (Christian Wolff), it
follows that we can think that which is possible. The simple
converse sentence of this assertion would say that all that
is possible can be thought. We are not talking here, under
the umbrella of possibility, about something subjective or
simply arbitrary, but about the very logical scope of an
object, as Alois Riehl will later comment.
2. Two limits of thinking: self‐contradiction and
original intuition
Let us reconsider the above question differently, by asking
what precisely is not given to the human being to think, from a
Kantian perspective. Above all, as we have seen, one cannot
think that which is contradictory from a logical point of view,
nor can one think that which is totally foreign to concepts,
either of the intellect or of reason. Wouldn’t it be more
appropriate, therefore, to say that in fact, thinking is a
categorial approach? To a certain extent, this is how things are
because there are original concepts of the intellect, namely the
categories, of a really decisive force in the act of thinking. They
appear as pure functions because each establishes how a
concept relates to objects. In their exercise, prudence must be
greater. “The principles of pure understanding can apply only
to objects of the senses under the universal conditions of a
possible experience, never to things in general without regard
to the mode in which we are able to intuit them.” 7 Moreover,
categories do not apply concretely to the thing in itself and
cannot transform it in an object of knowledge. It is true that, in
their functions, "they go beyond the field of sensitive intuition,
because they think objects in general, without considering the particular
mode in which they can be given." 8 Their significance is not
completely limited by sensitive experience. 9 Yet one cannot
7 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 263. As pure forms of thought, categories
contain the merely logical faculty of uniting a priori in one consciousness
the manifold given in intuition (267).
8 Cf. Ibidem, p. 263.
9 Cf. Peter F. Strawson, The Bounds of Senses: An Essay on Kant’s
«Critique of Pure Reason», 1966, London: Methuen, Fourth part, 7.
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talk about non‐conceptual, purely intuitive thinking, as
Schelling argued a few years later. Nor can one talk about the
thinking that would know itself in an absolute manner (Hegel).
Other possible formulas, explored later, would have seemed
truly outrageous, such as the idea of non‐rational thinking,
supported by needs and instincts (Nietzsche) or, even stranger
than that, the idea that there would exist pre‐reflexive,
unconscious thinking (Collingwood), and a certain diffuse
thinking, at the level of carnal sensitivity (Merleau‐Ponty).
Such a thing would have been unacceptable for Kant. Whatever
is not subject to the concept in any way cannot be thought. We
can think something in itself, but in this case, we do not deal
with the absence of any kind of concepts but an orientation of
the gaze, as it happens when we think something as an
indeterminate object or an endless problem.
Kant will state this in other words as well: one cannot
think archetypically, in order to have a full intuition of
something only with the help of the intellect. One’s
intuition is not original (intuitus originarius) but receptive
only or derived (intuitus derivativus), compelled to refer to
what one’s senses offer. The same hold true in the case of
human intellect: it does not act as original intellect
(intellectus archetypicus). One thinks ectipically and
discursively, as if one were working with images or copies
(ectipa) of that which has been created. If one were to
think archetypally, then one would have the truly divine
possibility to create the very thing that one thinks. One’s
intellect would then be genuinely intuitive; it would be the
efficient cause of a thing as far as its very existence is
concerned. Yet this latter possibility belongs to God only.
In fact, one cannot properly say that the intellect thinks,
even if it had the power to originally intuit the object as
such, namely to proceed ex nihilo, “as, for example, a divine
understanding” 10 . Here lies a truly decisive limit of human
thinking. In this latter aspect, there is however a small
window of opportunity for human beings, granted to them
as a gift and not necessarily as power of subversion.
10 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 162. This issue is resumed in
Prolegomena, §§ 57‐58, then in Critique of Judgment, § 77.
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Namely, human beings can think and achieve that which is
grounded in the freedom of their will. This truly noumenal
element, the good as such, will be thought as the purpose
of their deeds and will have its own reality. In other words,
it will have, to invoke Kant, that “something more” than the
logical possibility that reason ensures 11 . What is at stake
here is a distinct reality, non‐similar to that proper to the
natural thing, whose matter can be given in the experience
of the senses. This is the reality of Sollen, something that
must be, possible as an ultimate purpose or as an ideal
path to follow.
So, the principle of non‐contradiction indicates the
lowest possible limit of human thinking is possible. The
level where the freest concepts are active, such as those of
reason, indicate the upper limit of human thinking. Beyond
this level there could be only the intuitive intellect. Yet, as
Kant assures us, human beings do not have access to such a
thing. Human thinking would be situated precisely
between these two limits: total self‐contradiction, on the
one hand, and the original intuition of a thing, on the other
hand.
3. The image of a finite, bivalent and purely actual
world
I would like to make a comment here: Aristotle had
once intuited the same thing, namely that the principle of
non‐contradiction is ”the most certain of all”, both with
respect to our knowledge and with respect to the mode of
being of all that exists. 12 However, for him, this principle
implies a purely metaphysical meaning as well, and it
enables another interpretation, that is different from the
logical one. In other words, the idea of an alternative world
11 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 27. In this case, the human being will
not be considered in his phenomenal data, under the common
conditions of space, time or causality, but as a noumenal being; cf.
Critique of Judgment, § 84.
12 Metaphysics, IV, 1005 b – 1006 a sq.
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would not have been foreign to him. When he discusses
about contingent or future facts, he accepts exceptions
from the rule of non‐contradiction. He knows well that
each time human deliberation, i.e. an alternative occurs,
the principle is exceeded. To paraphrase him, in those
things that are not actual, there is the possibility that a
thing either exists or does not exist 13 . This holds true for
facts that are subject to time, that are uncertain or
incidental.
If we distinguish between that which breaks the formal
law of non‐contradiction and that which exceeds it (the
case where it is neither broken nor observed), we could
accept another situation than that described by Kant. Yet
when exactly could we talk about the excess of the rule of
non‐contradiction?
We know that this principle asks us to avoid self‐
contradiction under well‐established circumstances. Since
we are told that a sentence that contradicts itself cannot be
true, one could talk in this case about the principle of
formal, absolute non‐contradiction (Ştefan Lupaşcu). Or, to
put it differently, one could talk about the principle of
excluded contradiction. 14 Let us recall its old formulation:
“the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not
belong to the same subject and in the same respect.” 15
Aristotle resumed this idea immediately with reference to
the mode of being of a thing: “obviously it is impossible for
the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to
be and not to be”. If, however, one could do this, “he would
have contrary opinions at the same time”. As we can see, a
few validity conditions of this principle are already made
explicit: the temporal condition (“at the same time”) and
the perspectival condition (“in the same respect”). Another
condition is easily perceived: that of self‐identity (“the
same subject” and “the same attribute”). There is also a
certain way of negation that can transform the relation
13 On Interpretation, 19 a.
14 Ernst Tugendhat & Ursula Wolf, Logisch‐semantische
Propädeutik, beginning of 4th chapter.
15 Metaphysics, IV, 3, 1005 b.
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between propositions into one of contradiction. To resume,
there are four conditions: temporal, perspectival, the
subject’s self‐identity and the negation mode. The
condition of self‐identity becomes also clear from the
absurd consequences that its breach would lead to: the
disappearance of any essential characteristic feature, the
total confusion of different things and the confusion of
truth with falsity 16 . Hence we will understand that, in fact,
this principle operates infallibly when thinking ignores
temporality or any other metaphysical accomplice of
temporality: contingence, the multiple perspective on the
existent, its contradictory dispositions etc. In other words,
it operates faultlessly in a situation that Euclidian
geometry could perfectly describe. The modification of just
one of the conditions mentioned above weakens a lot the
force of the principle of non‐contradiction. This is what
happens, for instance, when the predicate of a sentence
does not have a single and exclusive meaning. If we take
predication to mean the situation of an object on the one
side and not on the other of a classifying demarcation line,
to paraphrase Strawson, then we will better know what the
principle of non‐contradiction says. Its validity area can be
more strictly delimited, namely to the relation between
two predicates that are mutually incompatible, for instance
blue and yellow. Either announces a demarcation line, a
border. A contradiction emerges when we situate the
object on both sides of the boundary. It is just that things
do not easily obey operations of this kind. The boundary is
always more or less imprecise. This is the situation which
leads to difficulties in those cases when the object is
situated exactly on the imprecise strip between the two
fields.” 17 Indeed, we are less certain about what is
contradictory, but the uncertainty is further preserved:
16 Cf. Petre Botezatu, Introducere în logică (Introduction to Logic),
Iaşi, 1997, pp. 32‐35.
17 Ernst Tugendhat, op. cit., p 53. The author references Peter F.
Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, chap. I, § 1‐8.
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either the boundary in question has proved to be
imprecise, or the object under discussion is situated
precisely on this demarcation line. And, in many situations
that we encounter in life, this is precisely how things
happen.
In fact, the total trust in this principle supposes a
certain representation of our world and of the self. The
world is seen as ultimately finite, actual and perfectly
bivalent, dominated by necessary relations. The states of
things that compose such a world can be said to present
themselves in one way: they are true or false, existent or
non‐existent, real or illusory. Thus, in its content, the
conjunction or has some genuinely huge force. One can no
longer talk, in this case, about a possible interval between
the two logical variants, nor about a real intermundium,
similar to the one in which some Stoics would place the
beings that were not subject to binary logic, such as
daimonic beings, who were neither mortal, nor immortal,
neither earthly nor heavenly. In other words, one cannot
talk now about a mode of intermundial existence, where
strange translations and unsolvable antinomies are
present. 18 All this will be left aside, either as simple images
of the mind or as simple and pure possibilities in the logic
of that which exists.
I do not mean to imply in the above statements that a
principle such as the principle of non‐contradiction would
be valid only in abstracto, in a purely formal world or only
in a world that is completely foreign from the world we
live in. My argument is that this principle, as it has been
formulated by classical logic, is active only within certain
boundaries of thinking. It is valid when we represent the
world in a certain way: bivalent, purely actual, finite or
well established. Such a representation – never the only
possible one – belongs itself to this world of life and it is
only within this world that it has or it could produce
18 We have pondered on such issues in the article Eminescu.
Memorie şi spațiu intermundiar (Eminescu. Memory and Intermundial
Space), published in Dumitru Irimia (coord.), Studii eminesciene, Iaşi,
2006, pp. 5‐14.
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reality. But when it is deeply affected, the rule of non‐
contradiction is exceeded. The same happens when
another representation or another way of being in the
world becomes more active. Yet it will not be simply
flouted and lead to absurd, scandalous consequences, but
simply exceeded. This means that once its requirement is
observed, the demarcation lines within which it is valid
will also be noticed. This is likely to become visible as soon
as the rule of non‐contradiction is no longer capable of new
forms or modulations. One of these modulations is already
well‐known: its extension from the relation of
contradiction – which is valid only in a bivalent world– to
that of contrariety. 19 Another one is its presence, under
much relaxed forms, in the world of factual truths and not
only in that of the truths of reason, if I were to use
Leibniz’s differentiation.
4. Three situations in which the non‐contradiction
rule is exceeded
As we can see, human beings can think that which
exceeds the logical rule of non‐contradiction. I will invoke
here three situations that are quite frequent in our
everyday speech and life.
One of them seems to indicate the weakest place of
thinking, when we talk lightly about that which we call
some thing. What could, in our everyday speech, some
thing mean? It can mean, for instance, that which is
perceived at first, somehow non‐mediated or non‐
reflected. But it can also signify that which appears to us
contingently or by chance, without confusing these two
modes of appearance. Consequently, some thing represents
the object of a simple opinion or belief, as in the situation
when someone says that he or she believes in the
unexpected change of weather overnight. Anyone can
realise that in these cases we deal with a belief that is
totally different from religious belief. Latin, via one of the
19 Petre Botezatu, op cit, pp. 38, 45.
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AFLOROAEI ‐ Distinct Ways of Thinking and Distinct Experiences of Truth
meanings of the word res, illustrates well the condition of
some thing. This noun, as we know, is related to the verb
reor, which means both to judge, to carefully consider, as
well as to think, to suppose or to believe no matter what. In
fact, this verb allows us to give thought meanings that fall
within broad boundaries, as long as “thinking” can be the
equivalent of “believing” or of “being of an opinion.” The
extension that these lax meanings ensures tends to become
maximal. Yet it is not only the act of thinking that will
know such an extension but that thing that is presupposed
or believed in one way or another will be equally extended.
Consequently, the meaning of the word ”thing” comes to
have in this case a range compared to which no other
larger range could possibly be imagined. After all, anything
can appear as a thing of contingent opinion or belief, both
that which has minimal evidence and that which pertains
to a phantasmatic or even nightmarish world. But one can
no longer say that some thing is invariably one and the
same, nor that it is real or non‐real, true or false. The
logical rule that this or expresses becomes utterly optional.
Some thing no longer belongs to a world that accepts the
logic of bivalence. It does not obey those minimal
conditions required by the rule of non‐contradiction. Yet,
despite all this, it can be a matter for thought, at least in
certain aspects. And to the extent that anything can appear
to us as a thing, we can say that anything can be thought:
the square circle, the images of a nightmare, the phantasms
that visit us in our daily life, to say nothing of the
monstrous beings described in the old bestiaries or in
various stories. Anything can be thought, but not
necessarily as a well determined object of an
intersubjective experience.
What would be, here, the limit case, metaphysically? It
would probably be the case when we would be talking
about the thing deprived of any determination, i.e. the pure
and simple thing. This is what has been noticed about the
non‐determined being, as it was understood in a few pages
in the Science of Logic. The lack of content makes it
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identical, ultimately, to nothing itself. 20 Cautious, Hegel
says, in a previous paragraph, something totally
unexpected, namely that the only determination of a pure
being is constituted by the lack of any determination. Its
only quality is ensured precisely by the lack of any quality,
its non‐determined mode of being. Although actually non‐
determined, “the character of indeterminateness attaches
to it only in contrast to what is determinate or
qualitative.” 21 Or, in this latter case, the rule of non‐
contradiction proves weak or optional. The contradictory
fact – the result of the pure being and the pure nothing
meaning one and the same thing – finds its way into what
we think and in the act of thinking.
The third situation in which the human being feels that
something exceeds the rule of non‐contradiction takes us
to a rather difficult point of thinking. More precisely, it
uncovers the point where thought contradicts itself. The
data of thinking that determine, via assertion or negation,
that a predicate belongs to a subject, have long been
known. This type of thinking has been called apophantic
thinking, that which asserts or determines an object. It is
the way we think when we say, for instance, that the forest
is wild. Such a statement, which does nothing else but
declare or determine something, can be true or false. It is
not difficult to establish the truth or falsity of the
statement that the forest in Valea Seacă is wild. The
difficulty increases, however, when we do not deal with
simple statements but other modes of stating. This is what
happens, for instance, when we consider a question, a plea,
a story, an order, a commendation, and especially a prayer
addressed in solitude to an unseen power, or when what
we think can be neither a subject nor a predicate, in the
20 ”Pure being /.../ is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There
is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is
only this pure intuitng itself /.../. Being, the indeterminate immediate,
is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing” (Book
Volume 1, Book 1, Section 1, Chapter 1, A).
21 Ibid., § 131.
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logical meaning of these terms. In other words, it cannot be
an object, in the modern understanding of the term. This
happens, for instance, when thinking seeks to understand
the condition of a living image, the person as such, fully
aware that the latter cannot be an object in the proper
meaning of the word. The same holds true for what we call
a historical event, the life of a human community.
5. Objectifying logic and antinomic logic
To transform something into an object, to institute an
object, to operate with all sorts of objects and to follow the
criteria of objectivity, fall unquestionably under the
umbrella of the faculty of thinking. Yet it does not follow
from here that the act of thinking is exhausted in this
modality, nor that such a modality would be justified any
time and with reference to anything.
Objectifying thinking does not necessarily represent the
generic mode of thinking. It rather means a species of
thinking, under well‐determined circumstances, and with
its own justifications and possible fallacies. It is distinct,
for instance, from the mainly symbolic thinking, although,
to a certain extent, it is not always deprived of symbolic
elements. It stands under different presuppositions and
under different criteria than symbolic thinking. It indicates,
as Heidegger argued, a different experience of the human
mind than, for instance, the meditative experience, 22 or
than the experience proper to creation in general. Under
such circumstances, the phenomenon investigated can be
original, such as language. No one doubts that thinking is
present in any of these experiences, not as diffuse, implicit
or vague thinking, as we might be tempted to believe, but
as critical thinking, in the proper meaning of the word. In
Heidegger’s opinion, to think critically means to
permanently differentiate (krínein) between those things
that, in order to be justified, require a demonstration, and
those that, in order to be confirmed, require simply to be
22 Cf. Letter from March 1964, written for the debate at Drew‐
University, Madison, 9‐11 April 1964, published later together with the
work Phenomenology and Theology.
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surprised and accepted. One can no longer say in this case
that the only critical thinking is theoretical thinking.
However, one prefers sometimes to assimilate any mode of
thinking to objectifying thinking. The latter proves
necessary to a certain extent, even in our everyday and
technical space of living. It is just that when it becomes
hypertrophied, it can make unrecognisable that fact of
living that it approximates and to which itself belongs.
Yet when we consider that which cannot be an object,
or when thinking follows another path than that proper to
the objectifying attitude, the rule of non‐contradiction will
be easily exceeded. One encounters then, in certain
situations, something that announces a deeply antinomic
nature. This is not just a formal antinomy, as in the case of
the one noticed in Epimenide’s statement on the Cretan,
with reference to Cretans themselves
,
23 . We are talking
here about the formal character of an antinomy with no
intention to diminish in any way its force to scandalise the
human mind. In fact, the Greek philosopher Philetas of Kos
is said to have died because of his huge efforts to logically
solve Epimenide’s antinomy. And since his time, such
efforts have never ceased to be made, even though
philosophers have not risked their life any more for such a
cause. Yet this is not how things stand when we are
concerned with the deeply antinomic nature of a reality.
The latter situation is well known to some interpreters,
for instance to Rudolf Otto. What appears to thinking as
totally other, ganz Andere, makes one notice this antinomic
mode that the totally other thing has to manifest itself.
According to Otto, the most acute form of mirum, that
23 ”Cretans are always liars, evil brutes, lazy gluttons”, Epimenides
is credited to have uttered, prophetically, according to Apostle Paul in
the Epistle to Titus 1, 12. And he adds immediately: This testimony is
true. Therefore, rebuke them sharply so that they will be sound in the
faith...” (1, 13). The Greek philosopher will hand over a much simpler
and somehow ludic variant. Just that, as Aristotle had well noticed, ”he
who says that everything is false makes himself a liar” (Met. IV, 8, 1012
b).
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which is truly mirable is that which we call antinomy. It is
more than a simple paradox. It enables the emergence of
sentences that are not only contrary to reason, to its norms
and laws, but also of divergences between them, thus
stating the opposita about the same object and creating
antitheses that seem irreconcilable and irreducible. Thus,
mirum shocks the human will to understand 24 . This occurs
due to several reasons, at least. First, this mysterium
tremendum is unperceivable and incomprehensible,
akatálepton, as St. Joan Chrysostomos argued, so that “it
cannot be grasped by our categories.” Then, it will make
reason see its own limits and ceaselessly upset it via its
paradoxical character (to paraphrase Otto, now it is not
only above any reason, but it seems to be “against reason”).
He thus discovered a dissimilitas that was irreducible vis‐à‐
vis that which obeys the rule of non‐contradiction. Finally,
this dissimilitas concerns its very nature (it is made itself
out of contrasts, oppositions and contradictions), which
means that it is not a simple effect of perception. Thus,
apart from the habitual or common logic, one can recognise
another one that is much more different. Both the situation
called coincidentia oppositorum (easily recognised in
teachings such as Mahayana or, later, in the pages of
authors such as Meister Eckhart), and Jobian judgments,
are proper to this different logic. We refer here to those
judgments that take the shape of irreducible antinomies,
frequently met in the scriptures (the Old and the New
Testament) and in patristic writings, or even in the
thinking of some modern, more eccentric interpreters such
as Luther.
The phenomenologist invoked above noticed something
else as well, namely that the incomprehensible element is
not discovered in a pure and absolutely singular state.
Should this happen, the communication between the
human being and the divine power would be blocked for
good. In the case of Job, for instance, such a mysterium
could have at the most made him keep quiet but not
24 Rudolf Otto, Das Heilige – Über das Irrationale in der Idee des
Gőttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen, 1917, chap. 5.
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persuaded him deeply. 25 Since it does convince him deeply
and brings peace to his soul, it means that the
incomprehensible element has, in this case, a rather
ineffable positive value. What appears as mirum
simultaneously becomes ”both an admirandum and an
adorandum, as well as a fascinans.” Such a value is situated
on another level than that of regular thinking, “the one of
searches for a purpose or an intelligible meaning.” It is not
exhausted in an act, as if it were to avoid its own mystery.
What matters immensely is that it should be perceived as
such, as it happens in the episode in the Testament when
“Elohim is justified, and Job’s soul is at peace”. The non‐
contradiction logic is not simply cast aside but taken
beyond itself, in another space of communication and
understanding.
So, the presence of the antinomy becomes utterly
obvious when a personal and absolute, truly revealed
reality is to be perceived. Christian writers noted this fact
very well in their work. In fact, they realized that the truth
of the Testaments cannot be expressed in the Aristotelian
logic of non‐contradiction. This does not go too far when it
comes to notice something absolutely different, such as
that which is uncovered as one and multiple in itself, or
that which announces itself as the perfect double nature,
neither separate, nor mixed. In such an apophatic
experience, antinomy is real and irreducible. According to
Lossky, God is nothing of all that pertains to creation or to
things manifest; in His nature, He is impossible to be
known. He ‘is not.’ This is where the Christian paradox
occurs: He is the God whom I address as ‘You,’ Who calls
me, Who reveals Himself as personal, living 26 . The
25 Ibidem, chap. 13.
26 Cf. Vladimir Lossky, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction, 2001.
Cf. In the Image and Likeness of God, 1974, or Pavel Evdokimov, La
Connaissance de Dieu selon la Tradition Oreintale, 1969. As he mentions
at one point, the ”blinding darkness” is a mode to express the proximity
of the inaccesible: the more God is present, the more he is hidden. (p.
26 in the Romanian translation). An older source of such
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antinomy is also real when one hears that one must love
those who hate you, do good to the one who wishes for the
worst for you, and to pray for the one who persecutes you
(Mathew 5, 44). It cannot be translated in the terms of a
formal contradiction, a situation in which it would be in
fact degraded, nor does it have a purely logical, cognitive
sense. However, if we were to talk about contradiction,
then we should see that in this case, it does nothing but
hide a true paradox. “God Himself is a union of contrasts or
paradoxes. For He is One, but in three hypostases. And
since He has all possibilities, all powers, He doesn’t need to
move towards anything. Yet, He moves, resting in the love
between the three hypostases and with love for all things
created” 27 . Such a paradox cannot be accessible to
analytical thinking. The heresy of Arius, who was a great
scholar after all, expresses among other things precisely
this wish of thinking to translate in the logic of non‐
contradiction that which exceeds it boundlessly In such a
case, the resources of the alternative, as a distinct or
original figure of thinking, seem to be simply forgotten.
This is why, in what follows, I will ponder on this issue.
6. On the included third party and the idea of an
alternative
Whoever would argue that the non‐contradiction logic can
be doubled by an antynomic logic does not necessarily
consider the premeditated flouting of certain rules of logic.
Nor is such a thing possible in the regular exercise of
thinking. What is considered is only the possible access to
another level of understanding, where the respective rules
are no longer valid in their restrictive use. What sets the
considerations can be found in Pavel Florenski’s work, namely in
Pillar and Ground of the Truth. We find out there, especially in the
”Letter on Contradiction,” that the truly concrete fact manifests itself
antinomically, which is an unavoidable situation for reason. The latter
sees itself forced to give up itself and its non‐contradictory logic, so as
to have access to the original truth of the person and of divine
revelation.
27 Dumitru Stăniloae, Studii de teologie dogmatică ortodoxă
(Studies on Orthodox Dogmatic Theology), Craiova, 1990, p. 194.
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limits of these rules does not exhaust the comprehension field
which is proper to humans. This field is much larger and,
naturally, active at levels that are much different among
themselves. Consequently, thinking can overcome the rule
that it itself formulates in a certain way. It can deliberately
flout that which, at a given moment, is strictly limited by it, or
that which itself needs to approximate in time. It does not
necessarily contradict itself by operating in this mannen. Nor
does it follow from here that it could overcome anyway those
presuppositions or beliefs on the grounds of which it works
continuously. If it asks, as it has done numerous times, how it
can think that the same thing is both one and multiple
simultaneously, it does not suspend itself with such a
question, nor does it flout the non‐contradiction axiom. Yet
what can be formulated in time from a logical point of view–
under severe determinations – can also be overcome. This
follows simply from the thesis that any determination means
negation, omnis determinatio est negatio. And what cannot be
thus determined further unfolds itself in front of our mind’s
eyes and attracts it to it. Finally, it proves to be the non‐
determined and free source of all that is subject to certain
forms of time as such.
When thinking exceeds certain rules of logic, it does
nothing but reach their validity limits. It does not do this by
suspending itself, but by orienting itself towards another
mode of comprehension.
Let us recall that Stefan Lupaşcu supports with sufficient
arguments the validity of a non‐classical principle, that of the
included third party, especially when he aims to describe the
microphysical or psycho‐mental world. He explicitly
disscused about this principle after 1950, which created
much confusion and reserve among the French academic
milieux. The idea stands in relation with the dynamic logic of
the contradictory, as he himself calls it. The basic tenet of this
logic is explicitly resumed in the opening of the first chapter
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of The Principle of Antagonism and the Logic of Energy 28 . The
weakening of the non‐contradiction principle is inspired,
argues the author in a footnote, by certain scientific
experiments, such as those of Riemann and Lobacevski in
geometry, Louis de Broglie in ondulatory mechanics, or
Heisenberg, with respect to relations of indetermination. It
also considers certain phenomena in psychology and human
history, “in which contradiction seems to have found its
favourite place”. He was initially suspected for his eccentric
or strange ideas, but later he was invoked in discussions
about the multiple levels of reality and the non‐classical
forms of logic.
What precisely should I restate here, from Lupaşcu’s
arguments? When two terms make up an opposition, for
instance simultaneous/successive, continuous/discontinuous,
neither is sufficient to define a certain phenomenon on its
own. Each supports a type of partiality in what it alone
indicates: when one term is actualised, the other is
potentialised, but only together do the two tendencies
describe the phenomenon as such. This means that each term
can be found, no matter how precarious it might be, in the
reality zone of the other. In their partiality and co‐
dependence, they make room, thus, to a third term. Or, the
latter names precisely the element on which they are
grounded or to which they make constant reference. Thus, I
would now adopt the idea that the third term is included: it is
already there, just that it is in another mode or at another
28 ”Any phenomenon or element, or logical event, as well as the
thought that thinks it, the sentence that expresses it or the sign that
symbolises it: e, for instance, needs to have always associated, structurally
and functionally, an anti‐phenomenon or anti‐element, or a logical anti‐
event, and therefore a judgment, a proposition, a contradictory sign: non‐e
or ē; and in such a way that e or ē can never be more than potentialised by
the actualisation of ē or e, and not made to disappear, so that either ē, or e
could be sufficient to themselves in independence and therefore in
rigorous non‐contradiction, as in any logic, be it classical or of any other
nature, which is grounded on the allmightiness of the principle of non‐
contradiction” (translation from the Romanian translation from French by
Vasile Sporici, Iaşi, 2000, p. 11). The idea will be refined in other works
such as Les trois matières, Julliard, Paris, 1960, or in La tragédie de
l’énergie, Casterman, Paris, 1970.
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level than the other two terms that ensure the relation of
opposition. As antithetic terms appear as distinct dynamisms,
they cannot “fuse in the creation of a third synthetic term”.
Either one dominates the other, or neither prevails. In fact,
each dynamism leads to potentialisation or actualisation,
tendencies which never reach their end. And the third term,
the included third term, represents the moment “of the
strongest contradiction”, when neither opposite dynamism
can actualise or potentialise itself 29 . Apart from to the two
opposed tendencies– one towards identification, the other
towards diversification – there emerges a third one, that is
contradictory or dubitative and that constantly challenges the
others. This means that, ultimately, “the dynamic logic of the
contradictory is a trialectics.”
In an earlier work, Lupaşcu had identified a single
element for which this mode of logical expression would not
be appropriate: affection as such. It is only about affection
that one can say that it is that which it is. In other words, only
affection would recover the tautology proper to the being as
such. 30 It is the only one that makes visible the signs of
transcendence: it is inexhaustible or excessive, and it
transgresses the common thinking operations, like an
original, indefinite source. Of course, it is not easy to accept
the idea that such a reality, about which a metaphysical
statement can be made, would be the only one that announces
a type of radical alterity. What Lupaşcu says about affectivity
does not concern only this intentional act. After all, the flux of
living, although one and the same, can become excessive with
each individual act and yet allow some profound schisms in
itself. And the statement under discussion, “something that is
that which is”, seems to bring to the same point, via their late
echoes, two completely different sources, one from the
Testaments (Exodus 3, 14) and another one, from Aristotle
(Metaphysics, IV, 1, 1003 a). They do not compose a single
29 Ibidem, pp. 25‐26.
30 Cf. Logique et contradiction, ed. cit., p. 128.
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impersonal voice in time, but rather an alternative, in a more
special meaning of this word.
However, what I mean to say about these ideas of Lupaşcu
is different. He does not argue that the rule of non‐
contradiction should ever be discarded as invalid. As we have
seen, nor will the axiom of the excluded third term be
abandoned, but only restricted in its validity field 31 . This
axiom, after all, does not lead to contradictory statements. To
accept it does not mean to suspend the data of classical logic
in the air. In fact, a few distinctions have been made in this
respect, so as to make things clearer. One can talk, as Lupaşcu
does, about an excluded third logical term that can relax
contradictory terms in quantum or psycho‐mental
phenomena, for instance. There is also an ontological
included third term, i.e. a third state that concerns another
level of reality, where the contradictory relation of some
initial terms becomes a relation of unity. On this latter level
there can emerge new contradictory couples, whose solution
is possible at another proximate level. Therefore, the included
third term requires us, ontologically, to consider the idea of
some multiple levels of reality. Eventually Michel Camus
suggested the idea of a “secret included third term,” the place
of recognition and protection of a truly irreducible mystery 32 .
Such a tendency that orients towards an included third term
does not annihilate antagonic terms. It only takes them out of
their singular expansion and relaxes them immensely. The
excessive potentialisation of one no longer entails the
excessive actualisation of the other. Lupaşcu talks about the
tendency towards a kind of balance of these terms, though it
is unstable, oscillating. Thus, reality itself takes the shape of
an elementary and ceaseless balance, a rhythmics that is,
nevertheless, impossible to express in logical formula. The
orientation towards the included third term indicates in fact a
third tendency that would be constitutive in any
31 Cf. Basarab Nicolescu, Noi, particula şi lumea (We, the Particle and
the World), translated by Vasile Sporici, Iaşi, 2002, p. 210. In other words,
the law of the included third party – should it be a law – does not lead in
any way to contradictory statements, as we might think at first.
32 Ibidem, pp. 189, 212.
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contradictory dynamism. If manifest or visible tendencies are
antagonic, under a movement that can bring everything to
self‐destruction, the third tendency transforms such an
elementary logic. More precisely, it transforms primary
opposition into an alternative. Lupaşcu does not use this
latter term, but I think it can express the new situation of
antagonic tendencies. In fact, the alternative is not given now
by either of the terms in confrontation, nor by their possible
synthesis, similar to the Hegelian one. The alternative does
not mean an other opposed term, nor a tendency that differs
from the dominant one. On the contrary, it becomes possible
only in a ternary configuration of the phenomenon. It is given
precisely by the possibility of orienting these tendencies
towards something else, beyond them. However, the latter
tendency does not imply another term alongside the other
two, a third angle in an elementary triangle of manifestation.
It rather implies a different economy of the whole procession.
In order to name the separate difference of the third
tendency, Lupaşcu singles it out. For instance, if the first two
mean homogenisation and heterogenisation, the third will be
proper to the quantum world, where the two tendencies are
inseparably intersecting. If the first two mean forms of
prevalence, the third names precisely their confrontation,
“their inhibiting conflict/for both of them/” 33 . If the first two
33 Stéphane Lupasco, Les Trois Matières, Juillard, Paris, 1970, p. 52.
The true matter of things is no longer time or their becoming, as in
Hegelian phenomenology, but in their inner conflict. In other words, what
defines them ultimately is of agonal nature. In L’énergie et la matière
vivante, 1962, p. 90, Lupaşcu argued that contradictory dynamisms ”are in
agony till the end of the world.” We know that these words were used by
Pascal with reference to Christ’s sacrifice, in its absolute difference from
this world. What happens here, therefore, is totally different from what
the Hegelian contradictory movement announces. Cf. in this matter
Constantin Noica, Forward to Stéphane Lupasco, Logica dinamică a
contradictoriului (Dynamic Logic of the Contradictory), translated by
Vasile Sporici, 1982, pp. 10‐12. Some interpreters have sought to relate
this vision to the Qual idea (original tension or effort, trouble, that grants
the true quality of a thing) from Jacob Böhme’s philosophy; cf. Jean‐
Jacques Wunenburger, op. cit., p. 153.
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can become visible in the mineral and living world, the third
finds a certain evidence in the subtle world of quantum and
psycho‐mental phenomena. In an extreme case, it could be
seen as a source of certain phenomena that cannot be
understood in terms of non‐contradiction. 34 Differences point
to other lines of ontology as well: the third state does not
manifest itself as such in continuous space or in successive
time. It cannot be experimented in the data of such
categories, it does not lend itself to our common perception,
it can be neither measured nor described in terms of quantity.
It actualises itself, in fact, as unusual intensification of
quality, making a totally distinct nature become perceivable.
Yet, as we have seen, everything will be found again only in a
ternary configuration of the phenomenon or of life.
In other words, to observe the rule of non‐contradiction,
especially when thinking operates legitimately with objects,
is natural and essential, at any time. But it is equally natural
to admit that there is something that does not observe this
rule, i.e. that which is not determined as a logical object. The
latter, although decisive in the order of existence, does not
reveal itself as such to analytical or technical thinking. As
Gadamer said, there does not exist just one experience of
truth only 35 . Other experiences, apart from the analytical or
technical one – for instance, aesthetic or religious experience
– attract thinking where the antinomy accepts a new
significance, apart from the one already known. Both paths
are essential, which means that both define us in our relation
with ourselves, with the other and with our world. To say at a
given moment that a statement does not observe the non‐
contradiction rule does not mean the exclusion of the path
opened by this rule. On the contrary, it remains where it
belongs and leads to what is proper to it. When it is not
obviously followed, it is still there, either as a common place
of thinking, or as a certain solution when faced with obscure
indistinctions.
180
7. Disposition for alternative visions
34 Cf. Basarab Nicolescu, op. cit., pp. 207 sq.
35 Cf. Hans‐Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, second part, II, 3 b.

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Thinking often has to accept a certain competition of the
paths followed, yet without proceeding by exclusion. The
non‐exclusion of the competing path entails great difficulties.
Yet it can also bring in its proximity foreign symbolic
experiences that are much different from those legitimated in
the common space of living.
We know now that, with respect to the delimitation of the
sciences of the spirit, Dilthey accepts at a given moment the
possibility of different attitudes towards one and the same
thing. This is what happens when we consider, for instance,
the human body, the language in which a poem is written, the
legislation of a certain epoch or the human psychological life.
In the case of such phenomena, thinking can be doubly
oriented. On the one hand, it tends to clarify certain possible
causes, their recurrent classifiable data that are easy to be
expressed in statistics or even in a calculus. In this case, it
delimits homogeneous fields of facts: causal relations,
structures and regularities. This is how someone preoccupied
by the poetical technique of an author would proceed: they
would try to see what the proportion of nouns and verbs is in
a poem, how many of them come from one language and how
many come from others, to what extent adverbs are more
frequent etc. It is the same with the one who, when talking
about the legislation of a country, would like to know, for
instance, if it makes possible the easy and certain capture of a
criminal. On the other hand, thinking tries to find a larger
meaning of these phenomena, their possible meaning in that
horizon that the course of life can offer. It orients now
towards what we call inner life, will and intentionality, faith
and long‐term purposes. It tries to distinguish, as much as
possible, precisely the sensitivity of a person and of an age,
self‐consciousness. This is what Ihering did when, in his
preoccupation for the ancient Roman law, he wished to
understand its very spirit, its historical difference. It is just
that these two orientations of thinking are not at all separate
because they are not two different classes of objects, nor are
they two foreign paths of thinking. Dilthey foresaw this but
he did not write about it clearly enough. When thinking
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follows a certain path, it does not bracket completely that
path that would be opposed to it. In fact, I think that this
would not even be possible because it would entail that we
could talk either about the Adamic chance of pure thinking, or
about the absence of memory and of preliminary data. Yet,
when any of its distinct modes actualises itself, the other
modes of thinking are actualised as well, at least as echoes,
background response or vague beliefs.
Let me bring to your attention another situation that takes
this issue further on. Mircea Eliade retells in Memoirs, II, a
discussion that he had in the summer of 1958 in Tokyo, with a
Japanese professor of philosophy, after an international
congress on the history of religions. The Japanese professor
was an expert in German philosophy, especially in Heidegger
but, strangely enough for a Japanese, he ignored Buddhist
history and philosophy. Like many Japanese philosophers
after the war, he considered Buddhism as belonging to the
prehistory of thinking and that what really mattered only
happened later, i.e. a perfectly systematic philosophy. Apart
from Buddha’s life, he was almost a complete ignorant in
basic Buddhism. Eliade’s comment on this situation did not
tarry: “You have close at hand the most daring logic that the
world has known before Hegel – the Buddhist logic, as it was
elaborated by Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, Dinnaga, Dharmakirti
– and you leave it exclusively in the hands of historians and
Orientalists. Your philosophers do not know it or, in any case,
do not use it. Maybe it does not seem ‘present‐day’ to you. But
this just proves that you don’t know it because this is
Nagarjuna and his followers’ problem: to logically prove that
Samsara is identical with Nirvana, that becoming (cosmic
‘irreality’) is the same as being (i.e. ontological beatitude). At
another level, pursuing another aim and using other means,
Madhyamika philosophers were confronted with the same
mystery – namely coincidentia oppositorum – that Cusanus
will be faced with /in Europe/“ 36 . Ultimately, what is at stake
36 Memorii (Memories), volume II (1937‐1960), edition coordinated
by Mircea Handoca, 1991, pp. 178‐179. Eliade then tried to translate in
the philosophical language of his time this old problem: ”Or, one can
encounter coincidentia oppositorum today in some principles of nuclear
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here is that states of things never have a single and exclusive
meaning. The eye can continuously grasp their double
condition, as simple phenomena and as signs. And signs – in
any symbolic economy– obey rules or codes that are not
always obvious. As Eliade argued, “the world is that which
appears to be and at the same time a cipher” 37 . As a simple
phenomenon, a human act seems to be perfectly contingent
and equal to itself. When it is seen as a game of signs, it can
orient the gaze towards completely different meanings. Some
of them appear at first really strange. For instance, when we
talk about the modern image of progress, we can see in it,
beyond what it offers at first, an exalted and quite vain
ideology. Upon closer inspection, however, one can realise
that there is more at stake, namely a new mythology of the
human being in history, whose meaning must be connected
with its radical solitude. The same holds true for the atheism
of “Enlightenment” or for the late feeling of the “death of
God”: they express, in fact, as Eliade argues, the new religious
creativity of the modern world. Such phenomena can be
interpreted both technically, literally, and religiously. Eliade
often returns to this double image of our existence and avoids
reducing one of them to the other, for instance, the world of
appearances to its possible cipher. He prefers rather to
describe a subtle dialectics of camouflage that probably
nothing can escape.
In his pages of dogmatic theology, Dumitru Stăniloae
writes with much clarity about the real presence of the
alternative, as it is constitutive to the human mode of being.
He starts from what was well understood in patristic
literature, namely that the human being, as a person, is
situated both between the boundaries of this world and
physics (for example, Bohr’s principle of complementarity), but we are
increasingly and forcefully asked, at this historical moment where we
are: for instance, how is freedom possible in a conditioned universe ?
how can one live in history without betraying it, without negating it,
and yet participating in a trans‐historical reality? After all, this is the
problem: how can one know the real camouflaged in appearance?”.
37 Ibidem, p. 355.
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beyond them. To be beyond this world does not mean to be
separated from it, which would be, in fact, impossible, but to
be in relation with that which transcends it infinitely. This is
a situation that generates many strong contrasts, true
bifurcations of nature in the human life 38 . They appear as real
paradoxes, that do not necessarily require a logical or
technical solution, such as the human person’s character, that
is inexhaustible and yet touched by finitude, or our stable will
to know even what the mind cannot seize, in which case non‐
knowledge could mean “knowledge of the sacrament”. One
could also mention the double tendency that humans show
continuously, towards spiritual edification and at the same
time towards the fall in the world (“towards passionate
pleasures”) 39 . This is the doubling process that “makes
another possibility of alternative movement understood,” for
the human person. Some contrasts can be connected with the
antynomic economy of the being. Such are the ones that
uncover the person as one and the same in its very
fascinating transformation. Other contrasts follow from here:
unique and yet equal with the others, in itself and yet
oriented towards another, always the same and yet always in
evolution, ineffable and yet explainable in some of its data. It
is continuously subjected to the laws of matter and at the
same time it goes beyond them 40 . Truly strange are those
contrasts that concern the temporality proper to the human
being. Although subjected to the present time and,
apparently, totally lost in it, the human beings make room at
38 Cf. Dumitru Stăniloae, Studii de teologie dogmatică ortodoxă (
Studies on Orthodox Dogmatic Theology), section B, chap. II, Craiova, 1990,
pp. 173‐200.
39 Ibidem, p. 179.
40 Ibidem, pp. 181‐184. As he writes somewhere else, ”a paradox of the
person, as well as a manifestation of its boundless depth and resilience, is
the endless irradiation of light or darkness” (p. 190). Man proves to be
indeed a ”creature made of nothing, and this must preserve in him the
awareness of humility. But he is also God’s conscious creation, capable to
gain knowledge about Him, and this gives him, at the same time, a
priceless value” (p. 188). The obviousness of such paradoxes ultimately
justifies the idea of a distinct type of apophatism, that is proper to the
human person (p. 191).
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any moment for their past and continuously expose
themselves to future moments. Consequently, the present, the
past and the future are simultaneously manifest in their
being. We are temporal beings and yet we are able to go
beyond our well dated chronology. “Both time and eternity”
have a dense value for us; this means that one could talk
about a double character of the person, “on the one hand
temporal, on the other hand eternal”. Hence the “eternal
importance of the temporal moment”, when the moment finds
in eternal things its true content.
Invoking St. Gregory of Nazianz, Staniloae will restate his
suggestion that one “ought not to suppress /from the mind/
so many things that one has not understood”, such as the
incomprehensible things about the very presence of God.
Similarly, one ought not to ignore the much different
tendencies that the human being manifests. “The two sides of
the paradoxical human composition, the tendency towards
holiness and the necessity to satisfy bodily needs, do not
justify the despise of either, but require the infusion of the
latter by the power of the former” 41 . This idea will be
resumed in the discussion about the complicated relationship
between spirit, body and the world. “Man can also delude
himself by thinking that he is satisfying this ever fuller thirst
for knowledge by directing it towards the world as an
exclusive reality and towards taking joy in it, exclusively
though the body, which brings monotony and spiritual
impoverishment up to what we consider to be death” 42 . The
idea that the human beings manifest through their very
nature a real alternative is expressed forcefully and clearly in
these pages. One’s chronological time and the durée that is
discovered in the mind or in hope cannot be separated, nor
can one separate one’s limited space from that which is, to a
certain extent, a‐spatial. 43 . A true paradox endures in all this,
namely the possibility to live simultaneously both one’s own
41 Ibidem, p. 181.
42 Ibidem, p. 183.
43 Ibidem, p. 182.
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finitude and the presence of divine non‐finitude 44 . Nobody
can limit himself to himself or to what which is simply
human. Genuine self‐value cannot be obtained only through
human effort alone 45 . What is even more serious is that these
contrasts that are proper to the human being can become
fully degraded. For instance, the inexhaustible character of
the person can easily degenerate in simple monotony or lead
to that endless balance in which there is an alternation
between “joys and pains, fear of death and boredom with
life” 46 . What appears to the human being as sacred can hide a
grounding ambiguity and lead to self‐delusion 47 . After all, no
matter how spectacular such a paradox could be, if it ends in
exclusion it will lead to utter poverty in the human being.
Hence, the attention that will be given to the third term, if we
temporarily accept this latter expression. As he argues at one
point, the antinomic unity of the person “cannot be explained
without the absolute One in which all is virtual and which has
created and supported all in unity” 48 . If antinomic unity, for
instance, concerns the relation between what someone has
received as gifts and what is later offered, its name will be
that of kindness. It is precisely the latter, kindness, which
represents the third term, because, after all, it “unites them
all” 49 . Probably this situation becomes maximally evident in
what we call dialogue. When it takes place between two
persons, dialogue becomes possible as such via the presence
of a third instance. The latter is given by what is to be
reached in such a dialogue. And what is to be reached, either
as a sense that is above subjective sense or as a mode of life
and communion, precedes to a certain extent any
consciousness that enters into dialogue. When the dialogue is
perfect, it takes place in God, “in Whom there are three
persons for this purpose” 50 . The human desire to accede to
186
44 Ibidem, p. 184.
45 Ibidem, p. 188.
46 Ibidem, p. 176.
47 Ibidem, pp. 179‐180.
48 Ibidem, p. 193.
49 Ibidem, p. 197.
50 Ibidem, p. 201.

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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this original dialogue is natural, but it cannot be satisfied only
through human effort. For this purpose, one of the divine
persons has become man, while remaining God at the same
time. So, the third term can be seen in the way logos brings in
its light the two voices in the real procession of a dialogue.
As we can now realise, the alternative, as a mode of
thinking or as a mode of being, does not entail divergence or
separation, nor the simple disagreement with itself or with
that which appears foreign, which, sooner or later, ceases to
be so. The simply divergent thinking, as well as dialectic
thinking, fail to achieve that which is proper to the
alternative. The image of the divergence of two rays of light
that, in their forward movement, become more and more
distant one from the other, is not at all appropriate to
illustrate the fact of the alternative. Yet if we talk about a
distinct path that thinking simultaneously and unevenly uses,
this means that each of them affects the other, lies in its
proximity like a necessary relation or like a shadow that it
cannot part with. This means that, in fact, each of them is to a
certain extent constitutive of the other, no matter how little
obvious this would be.
(translated by Drd. Sorina Chiper)
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AFLOROAEI ‐ Distinct Ways of Thinking and Distinct Experiences of Truth
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2. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, IV
3. BOTEZATU, Petre, Introducere în logică (Introduction to
Logic), Iaşi, 1997
4. CHLADENIUS, Johann M., Einleitung zur richtigen Auslegung
vernünftiger Reden und Schriften, Leipzig, 1742
5. EVDOKIMOV, Pavel, La Connaissance de Dieu selon la
Tradition Oreintale, 1969
6. GADAMER, Hans‐Georg, Truth and Method, second part, II
7. HANDOCA, Mircea (coord), Memorii (Memories), volume II
(1937‐1960), 1991
8. FLORENSKI, Pavel, Pillar and Ground of the Truth
9. HEIDEGGER, Martin, Letter written for the debate at Drew‐
University, Madison, 9‐11 April 1964, published later together with
the work Phenomenology and Theology.
10. IRIMIA, Dumitru (coord.), Eminescu. Memorie şi spațiu
intermundiar (Eminescu. Memory and Intermundial Space),
published in Studii eminesciene, Iaşi, 2006
11. KANT, Immanuel, Critque of Pure Reason, Palgrave, 1929
12. LOSSKY, Vladimir, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction,
2001
13. LUPASCO, Stéphane, Les Trois Matières, Juillard, Paris,
1970
14. LUPASCO, Stéphane, Logica dinamică a contradictoriului
(Dynamic Logic of the Contradictory), translated by Vasile Sporici,
1982
15. LUPASCO, Stéphane, La tragédie de l’énergie, Casterman, Paris,
1970.
16. NICOLESCU, Basarab, Noi, particula şi lumea (We, the
Particle and the World), translated by Vasile Sporici, Iaşi, 2002
17. OTTO, Rudolf, Das Heilige – Über das Irrationale in der Idee
des Gőttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen, 1917
18. STĂNILOAE, Dumitru, Studii de teologie dogmatică ortodoxă
( Studies on Orthodox Dogmatic Theology), section B, chap. II,
Craiova, 1990
19. STRAWSON, Peter F, The Bounds of Senses: An Essay on
Kant’s «Critique of Pure Reason», 1966, London: Methuen,
20. STRAWSON, Peter F., Introduction to Logical Theory,
21. TUGENDHAT, Ernst & WOLF , Ursula, Logisch‐semantische
Propädeutik,
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
Politik und Religion.
Zur gegenwärtigen Neu-Annäherung zweier
gesellschaftlicher Felder
Roland BENEDIKTER *
*University of Vienna and University of Innsbruck, Austria
E-mail Address: rolandbenedikter@yahoo.de
Abstrakt
Für die überwiegende Mehrzahl der Intellektuellen in der heute gerade
entstehenden ersten Weltgesellschaft - jedenfalls für diejenigen unter ihnen, die
ihren eigenen Identifikations-Begriff im Unterschied zum selbst-„dekonstruktiven“
Habitus der „Postmodernen“ nicht fallengelassen oder gar todgeredet haben,
sondern aktiv öffentliche Intellektuelle sind und dies auch bewusst weiterhin sein
wollen - kann kein Zweifel daran bestehen: Religion erlangt seit dem Fall der
Berliner Mauer 1989, seit dem Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus 1991 und seit
den Terroranschlägen vom 11. September 2001 eine rasch zunehmende politische
Bedeutung.
Diese Bedeutungszunahme des Religiösen erfolgt einerseits perspektivisch in
mindestens drei einander zum Teil zeitverschoben überlagernden
ideengeschichtlichen Inkubationslinien, die drei großen „Ende-Bewegungen“
unserer Zeit entsprechen: 1. dem Ende der Epoche der „Neuen Weltordnung“ im
Bereich der Politik; 2. dem Ende der Epoche des „Neoliberalismus“ im Bereich der
Ökonomie; 3. dem Ende der Epoche der „Postmoderne“ im Bereich der Kultur.
Diese drei Enden lagern sich weitgehend übereinstimmend um das Symptom-
Datum (nicht: Ursachen-Datum!) des 11. September 2001, haben aber ihre
Ursprünge bereits in Entwicklungen der zweiten Hälfte der 1990er Jahre. Die
globale „Renaissance der Religionen“ durchdringt seit damals alle drei genannten
gesellschaftlichen Kernfelder und ihre typologischen Makro-Logiken und
Diskurspraktiken in zunehmender Weise – und zwar sowohl sichtbar wie
unsichtbar.
Die Bedeutungszunahme des Religiösen erfolgt andererseits dimensional auf
allen drei Ebenen des Politischen: sowohl auf der Makro- und der Meso- wie auch
auf der Mikro-Ebene.
Mit dem Aufstieg religiöser Logiken in das Zentrum des Politischen nun nicht
mehr nur in Ländern der sogenannten „dritten“ und „zweiten“, sondern
zunehmend auch der „ersten“ Welt erfolgt eine der bestimmenden, langfristig
bedeutsamen ideengeschichtlichen Verschiebungen der Gegenwart. Mit dieser
Verschiebung ist eine welt- und gesellschaftspolitische, aber auch, langfristig
vermutlich noch wichtiger, eine hinter ihr stehende ideengeschichtliche und
paradigmenpolitische Tiefen-Entwicklung gekennzeichnet. Diese Verschiebung
wurde aber bisher weder in politikwissenschaftlichen noch in
zivilisationstheoretischen Forschungs-Zusammenhängen ausreichend beachtet,
geschweige denn bearbeitet.
Inwiefern? Und welche Schlüssel-Herausforderung ist mit dieser Tatsache für
die „kerneuropäischen“Intellektuellen der post-9-11-Generation verbunden?
Religion erlangt seit dem Fall der Berliner Mauer 1989,
seit dem Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus 1991 und seit
den Terroranschlägen vom 11. September 2001 eine neue
politische Bedeutung. Diese Bedeutungszunahme erfolgt auf
allen Ebenen des Politischen: Auf der Makro- Meso- und
Mikro-Ebene.
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BENEDIKTER - Politik und Religion.
Zur gegenwärtigen Neu-Annäherung zweier gesellschaftlicher Felder
Die entsprechende welt- und gesellschaftspolitische, aber
auch, langfristig vielleicht noch wichtiger, die dazugehörige
ideengeschichtliche und paradigmenpolitische Tiefen-
Entwicklung wurde in der internationalen politik- und
sozialwissenschaftlichen Analyse des vergangenen Jahrzehnts
vielfach unter dem Schlagwort „Globale Renaissance der
Religionen“ (Francis Fukuyama, Jürgen Habermas, Volkhard
Krech, Dirk Asendorpf) zusammengefasst. Dieses Schlagwort
korrespondiert zumindest in Teilen mit dem Schlagwort vom
„Kampf der Kulturen“ (Samuel P. Huntington), weil sich alle
großen Weltkulturen aus religiösen Kernen entwickelt haben
(Arnold Toynbee, Carroll Quigely) und sich in ihrer
gesellschaftlichen Prägekraft weiterhin, wenn auch zum Teil
nur mehr unbewußt, in ihrem Politik- und
Institutionenverständnis sowie in ihrer öffentlichen
Organisation um solche Kerne zu gruppieren scheinen. So ist
in den europäischen Gesellschaften der Begriff kritischer
Öffentlichkeit nicht ohne die vorausgehende Geschichte des
Christentums und dessen sozialen Prägeleistungen,
insbesondere nicht ohne die durch es hervorgebrachte
Verbindung einer sozialen und individuellen forma mentis mit
entsprechenden gesellschaftlichen Selbstverständnissen zu
denken (Jürgen Habermas).
Die „Renaissance der Religionen“ greift seit mehr als
eineinhalb Jahrzehnten nicht nur in der sogenannten „zweiten“
und „dritten Welt“, sondern zunehmend auch in der
sogenannten „ersten Welt“ Raum. Wladimir Putins Russland,
George W. Bushs USA, weite Teile des indischen und
südostasiatischen Subkontinents, des Nahen Ostens und
Lateinamerikas: Sie alle stehen seit 1989-91 für die - sich
allerdings in unterschiedlichen Kontexten sehr unterschiedlich
realisierende - Tendenz zu einem „neuen Unitarismus“
zwischen Politik und Religion. Genauer: für die wachsende
Rolle von Religion als Amalgam heterogener Gesellschaften im
aus typologischer Sicht mindestens vierdimensionalen
Spannungsfeld politischer, ökonomischer, kultureller und
religiöser Rationalitäten und Diskursformationen, welches
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ausdifferenzierte Gesellschaften neben technologischen und
demographischen Entwicklungen in wachsender
wechselseitiger Interdependenz kennzeichnet.
Die Migrationsbewegungen im Rahmen der Globalisierung
verstärken die Begegnung und den Dialog, aber auch den
Konflikt zwischen den mit verschiedenen religiösen
Traditionen verbundenen sozialen und kulturellen
Selbstverständnissen und den historisch zum Teil aus ihnen,
zum Teil gegen sie erwachsenen gesellschaftlich-politischen
Organisations-Modellen. Sie stärken andererseits umgekehrt
die Rolle der Religion als Kern von lokalen, regionalen und
nationalen „Identitätsbildungen“ einzelner Gesellschaften.
Im Rahmen dieser größeren Entwicklung war „Kern-
Europa“ (Jürgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida, Umberto Eco,
Fernando Savater, Adolf Muschg) bis mindestens zum 11.
September 2001, vielleicht auch noch bis zum Tod des
katholischen Papstes Johannes Paul II. (Karol Wojtyla, eines
ideengeschichtlichen Anti-Thomisten, Existentialisten und
Max-Scheler-Anhängers) im April 2005, die einzige
gesellschaftlich nicht-religiös organisierte Weltgegend, welche
seit den 1970er Jahren in nachhaltiger Weise durch eine
säkular-„postmoderne“ Paradigmen-Prägung ging.
Diese Paradigmen-Prägung ging auf eine mindestens
fünffache anti-religiöse Schichtung der demokratischen
gesellschaftlichen Avantgarden Kern-Europas zurück: a) den
anti-klerikalen Impuls der französischen Revolution; b) die
anti-substantialistische (aber nicht anti-religiöse) Philosophie
Kants; c) die Wirkung der Gegenreformation bis ins frühe 20.
Jahrhundert als Jansenismus und die entsprechenden
Befreiungs-Reaktionen; d) die Erfahrung der Totalitarismen
des 20. Jahrhunderts (Jürgen Habermas); e) den antiautoritären
Impuls der 1968 Bewegung. Dazu kam die
Abtrennung der traditionell stärker als Europas Westen
191

BENEDIKTER - Politik und Religion.
Zur gegenwärtigen Neu-Annäherung zweier gesellschaftlicher Felder
religiös geprägten Gesellschaften des Ostblocks durch den
kalten Krieg.
Diese Gründe führten dazu, dass zwischen 1970 und 2001
religiöse Logiken im ausschlaggebenden politischgesellschaftlichen
Zentrum der kerneuropäischen
Gesellschaften (Ausnahme: Schweiz) weitgehend delegitimiert
waren. Es herrschte, sowohl in den akademischen wie in den
politischen Eliten, eine Grundhaltung vor, die einer der
gesellschaftspolitischen „Väter“ der „Postmoderne“, Jean-
Francois Lyotard, insgesamt, wenn auch bei
Binnendifferenzierungen, stellvertretend für die Avantgarden
auf beiden Seiten des Rheins treffend in zwei Sätzen
zusammenfasste: „Metaphysik ist, wie man weiß, immer und
ausnahmslos ein Irrweg. Sie muß deshalb in jeder Form
zurückgewiesen werden – zugunsten der Ehre der Namen und
der radikalen Pluralität der Sprachspiele. Dem, der keine
Sprache hat, zu seiner eigenen Sprache verhelfen, und dadurch
den Widerstreit unschlichtbarer und inkommensurabler
Widerstreite fördern und aufrechterhalten – darin besteht
zeitgemäße Politik.“ Diese Politik muss, so ergänzen in der
Nachfolge Lyotards Martin Sexl und Beate Bechter-Burtscher,
„von einem Partikularismus des Konkreten geprägt“ sein,
„der… sich am Enzyklopädischen, Zufälligen, Regionalen,
zeitlich Begrenzten oder gar Willkürlichen orientiert.“
Das war das - weniger artikulierte, als vielmehr
paradigmatisch wirksame - Grundverständnis des radikalpluralistisch
geprägten Kerneuropa zwischen 1970 und 2001.
Doch auch das solcherart - mit allen Vor- und Nachteilen -
stark, wenn nicht gar einseitig nominalistisch geprägte Kern-
Europa der „Postmoderne“ wird seit einigen Jahren zusehends
von der globalen „Renaissance des Religiösen“ erfasst. Diese
hat hier – ebenso wie die bisherige Zurückweisung religiöser
Ansprüche auf jedwede explizite politisch-öffentliche
Rationalität – komplexe Wurzeln und konstituiert derzeit
einen widersprüchlichen, zum Teil paradoxalen Prozeß.
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Aktuelle Beispiele für den Aufstieg religiöser
Rationalitäten ins Zentrum des ansonsten „postmodern“
konturierten Politischen sind etwa die österreichischen und
deutschen Jugendstudien der Jahre 2005-07, in denen sich
übereinstimmend mehr als 70% der deutschsprachigen
Jugendlichen als religiös - wenn auch zugleich ausdrücklich als
nicht konfessionell-religiös - erklären und der Religiosität eine
größere politische Bedeutung wünschen; ähnliche Ergebnisse
zeitigen Umfragen bei Erwachsenen seit 2005.
Aktuelle Beispiele sind aber auch konkrete
gesellschaftspolitische Richtungsentscheide wie etwa die
Verschärfung der religiösen Schmähparagraphen in Bayern
vom September 2007; die Diskussionen um ein Minarettverbot
in der Schweiz seit 2006; oder die zunehmende Bedeutung
religiöser Debatten im öffentlichen Raum für den Entscheid
grundlagenpolitischer und -gesellschaftlicher Fragen wie etwa
Klondebatte oder Stellung zu anderen neuen Technologien
(etwa Gentechnologie).
Beispiele sind aber auch kultur- und gesellschaftspolitisch
vieldiskutierte Fälle mit weitausstrahlender Symbolwirkung
insbesondere im großen Umkreis der „Integrations“-
Problematik. Sie betreffend die inhärenten Gegensätze
zwischen den religionsgeprägten Kulturen und ihrem
Gesellschafts-, Freiheits-, Individualitäts- und
Öffentlichkeitsverständnis. Zu diesen Beispielen gehören
zuletzt etwa der Van Gogh Mord im November 2004 in den
Niederlanden, der dänische Karikaturenstreit vom September
2005 bis Ende 2006 (der im September 2007 eine Neuauflage
erfuhr), die Vorstadt-Unruhen in Frankreich vom Oktober und
November 2005, der deutsche Opernstreit vom Herbst 2006,
der deutsche Integrationsgipfel seit Juli 2006, die Debatte über
sogenannte „Ehrenmorde“ in Deutschland, die Debatte über
die ultrapluralistische sogenannte „Ursprungskultur-
Rechtssprechung“ und ihre möglichen Konsequenzen für das
Grundgesetz, die allgemeine Zunahme religiöser Gründe für
den Entscheid politischer Wahlen, u.a.
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BENEDIKTER - Politik und Religion.
Zur gegenwärtigen Neu-Annäherung zweier gesellschaftlicher Felder
Ein Beispiel ist aber auch die unverhohlene Strategie
des „Heiligen Stuhls“, Kern-Europa, insbesondere die
deutschsprachigen Länder, zu re-konfessionalisieren und
Teile der von Spaltung bedrohten anglikanischen Kirche an
Rom rückzubinden bzw. wiederanzugliedern. Zugleich
erfolgt seit einigen Jahren innerhalb der katholischen Kirche
eine „Re-Thomisierung“ und „Re-Missionarisierung“ im
Rahmen einer neokonservativen Evaluation der
existentialistisch-liberalen Paradigmen- und Sozial-
Errungenschaften des zweiten Vatikanischen Konzils,
welche mit einem sich - offiziell und inoffiziell - rasch
verändernden Politik- und Öffentlichkeitsverständnis
einhergeht. Nicht nur in Italien, sondern zunehmend auch in
den deutschsprachigen Ländern erreichen die
konfessionellen Kirchen eine neue, explizit politische
Präsenz in der Öffentlichkeit.
Ein Zentrum unter mehreren der gegenwärtigen
Entwicklung im Spannungsfeld zwischen säkularpolitischen
und religiösen Rationalitäten in Kerneuropa
scheint bei alledem derzeit ein zunehmender innerer
Kulturkampf zwischen den traditionellen, mythologischkonfessionell
konstituierten Religionen selbst zu sein. Ein
Hinweis darauf sind u.a. die wiederholten, öffentlichprotopolitisch
gemeinten Warnungen des
deutschstämmigen katholischen Papstes Benedikt XVI.
(Joseph Ratzinger) nicht mehr nur vor der „strukturalen
gesellschaftlichen Selbstgefährdung radikalsäkularer
Gesellschaften“, sondern auch vor der „Kulturgefahr“ des
Islam für die politische und gesellschaftliche Freiheits-
Organisation Europas. Benedikts Hinweis auf die kultur-
und öffentlichkeitsbildende Rolle der Religionen als Kräften,
von denen die gesamte Entwicklung der europäischen
Gesellschaft politisch langfristig entscheidend mit abhänge,
richtet sich vor allem auf die Fragen nach individueller
Selbstverantwortung und freiem Willen sowie nach dem
Zusammenhang zwischen personaler Rationalität und
Struktur des allgemeinen Gesetzes (Logos in individueller
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und allgemeiner Form) als Grundlagen des modernen
Selbstverständnisses und als Keime der offenen
Gesellschaftsordnung der Demokratien im Vergleich der
Kulturtraditionen.
An dieser explizit proto-politischen, implizit
grundlagen-politischen Diskussion haben sich zuletzt zur
Überraschung vieler nicht nur konservative Kirchenkräfte
(wie etwa aufsehenerregend anlässlich des Moscheen-Baus
in Köln), sondern verstärkt auch namhafte liberale
Intellektuelle wie etwa Ralf Dahrendorf oder Jürgen
Habermas weitgehend kritisch-affirmativ beteiligt. Die
entsprechende Debatte um den Zusammenhang zwischen
Gesellschaftsorganisation und religiöser Kulturbildung im
Spannungsfeld zwischen den säkularen Errungenschaften
der „Postmoderne“ und „substantialistischen“ Werte-
Clustern wird zum Teil allerdings von verschiedenen
intellektuellen (Orianna Fallaci, Botho Strauss) sowie
parteipolitischen Rechts-Kräften mit unterschiedlichen,
meist nicht-inklusiven Intentionen vereinnahmt. Auf der
anderen Seite sorgen ähnlich voreingenommen-einseitige
linkskritische Pamphlete wie „Heiliger Krieg in Europa“
(Udo Ulfkotte) ebenfalls für paradigmatisch gemeinte
Grundlagen-Polarisierung und damit für neues
binnengesellschaftliches, aber auch interkulturelles
Konflikpotential.
Zusammenfassend dominieren religiöse Fragen seit
einigen Jahren zunehmend zahlreiche „große“ öffentliche
Politik-Themen Kern-Europas – und zwar mittlerweile
deutlich über die traditionellen Kompetenzfelder religiöser
Rationalitätsformen und Legitimationsgrenzen hinaus.
Religion tritt in den politischen Raum ein in einer Weise, die
in Kontinental-Europa seit Jahrzehnten nicht mehr der Fall
war.
Im Rahmen der sich damit auf verschiedenen Seiten
vollziehenden Vereinseitigung von Positionen steht nicht
nur eine latente gesellschaftliche Entsäkularisierung als
195

BENEDIKTER - Politik und Religion.
Zur gegenwärtigen Neu-Annäherung zweier gesellschaftlicher Felder
mögliche Tendenz im Raum, sondern im Gegenzug zugleich
auch neue säkulare Abwehr-Kämpfe seitens des
laizistischen Staates samt entsprechenden
Kollateralschäden. Zu beobachten ist jedenfalls die Gefahr
der Schwerpunkt-Verschiebung des bisherigen Diskussions-
Klimas kritischer Offenheit von radikal-pluralistischselbstkritischen
Diskursen hin zu einer neuen
Konfrontation „objektivistischer“ Paradigmenformationen
sowohl auf religiöser wie auf säkular-„postmoderner“ Seite.
Verlierer dieser tiefenambivalenten Tendenzen könnte das
bisher weltweit einmalige politische Klima Kern-Europas
einschließlich seiner öffentlichen Debatten-Kultur sein.
Insgesamt kann, soll ein roter Faden im Innern einer
zunehmenden Zahl von sehr unterschiedlichen
Phänomenbildungen der politischen und proto-politischen
Gegenwart aufgefunden werden, gelten: Die beiden
gesellschaftlichen Felder Politik und Religion sind in einer
ebenso problematischen wie produktiven (Wieder-
)Annäherung begriffen. Während Religion als langfristiges
(am Schnittpunkt zwischen Ideengeschichte, Kultur und
Politik wirksames) Zentrum aller großen Weltkulturen
immer und von jeher von Tiefenbedeutung für das
Politische war, insbesondere für dessen
Paradigmenkonstellation und –Ausrichtung, wurde diesem
Zusammenhang seit der „Wende“ 1989-91 und seit dem 11.
September 2001 eine besondere Dimension hinzugefügt:
die verstärkte Begegnung zwischen dem säkularaufgeklärten
Selbstverständnis des „postmodernen“
Politischen Europas und der globalen „Renaissance der
Religionen“ rasch zunehmend sowohl von aussen wie auch
von innen. Diese Begegnung beginnt derzeit damit, eine
völlig neue, allseits ebenso problematische wie produktive
Konstellation zu generieren.
Ein entscheidendes Problem in dieser Lage scheint nun
aus gegenwärtiger Sicht zu sein, dass Kern-Europa aufgrund
seiner ebenso paradigmenpolitischen wie
politikparadigmatischen Grundierung der vergangenen 30
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Jahre in der Philosophie der „Postmoderne“, unbeschadet
von all deren unverzichtbarer Errungenschaften und
Vorzügen, bislang denkbar schlecht auf den
gesellschaftlichen Aufstieg „substantialistischer“ Diskurse,
d.h. auf den Aufstieg von religiösen Rationalitäts- und
Diskurs-Formationen zu politischer Bedeutung vorbereitet
ist – seien diese nun regressiv-mythologisch oder, wie in
wenigen Fällen ebenso beobachtbar, progressiv-rational
ausgerichtet. Da die „Postmoderne“ über die konsensfähige
forma mentis der heute an der Macht befindlichen
Generation von Politikerinnen und Politikern, aber auch
über das Empfinden politischer Korrektheit der Mehrzahl
öffentlicher Gegenwarts-Diskurse einen weitreichenden
Paradigmen-Bann verhängt hat, und zwar weitgehend
unterschiedslos betreffend a) konfessionell- und glaubensreligiöse,
b) philosophisch-metaphysische und c)
erfahrungs- und individualitäts-spirituelle
Rationalitätsformen, ist Kern-Europa in seinem politischen
Selbstverständnis hinsichtlich allen – faktisch jedoch sehr
unterschiedlichen – Formen von Religion und deren
politischer Grundierung, Bedeutung und Wirkung
tendenziell unerfahrener als andere Weltgegenden.
Kern-Europa verdrängt damit zugleich einen
wesentlichen Teil des Ursprungs der westlichen
Demokratie-Tradition, die sowohl im Rahmen der US-
Verfassung von 1776 wie der Französischen Revolution von
1789 entscheidend mit aus den „rational-spirituellen“
makro- und meso-politischen Intuitionen von Freimaurerei
und Rosenkreuzertum hervorging, ja ohne diese in ihren
historisch realisierten Formen nicht denkbar wäre (Helmut
Reinalter). Der Zusammenhang von Religion, genauer: Von
rational-aufgeklärter, individuell-erfahrungsgestützter
Spiritualität und Politik stand am Ursprung der modernen
Demokratie. Es war dies allerdings nicht der Unitarismus
von mythisch-konfessioneller Religion und „statistischer“
Politik, welcher die Vormoderne bis ins 18. Jahrhundert
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BENEDIKTER - Politik und Religion.
Zur gegenwärtigen Neu-Annäherung zweier gesellschaftlicher Felder
(und später vor allem im Rahmen der Bildung der späten
europäischen Nationalstaaten noch zyklisch
wiederkehrend) kennzeichnet, sondern die Verbindung von
liberal-aufklärerischen Emanzipationsbestrebungen aus
„allgemeinmenschlichem“ Geist mit genau der Gegenkraft zu
den konfessionellen Religionen, welche von diesen als
zweiter großer, unsichtbarer Strom des abendländischen
Geisteslebens der Neuzeit historisch mit allen Mitteln
bekämpft und in den Untergrund gedrängt wurde: mit den
erfahrungsgestützten und individualistisch-rational
ausgerichteten Strömen des Christentums, deren Ziel es seit
dem 12. Jahrhundert war, Objektivismus und
Subjektivismus, Realismus und Nominalismus, Substanz
und Rationalität nicht nur „auszusöhnen“, sondern zu einem
originären, gemeinsamem Dritten zu verbinden.
Aus diesem „genealogisch-pluralen“ Bestreben, nicht
aus einem rein „säkular-radikalpluralistischen“ Anliegen,
gingen US-Verfassung und Französische Revolution als Teil
einer humanistischen Vision politischer Emanzipation
hervor. Diese war keineswegs weltanschaulich neutral,
sondern verband des rationalen Teil der Aufklärung mit
dem allgemeinmenschlichen Vermögen einer „individuellen
moralischen Vernunft“, in der sich Subjektives und
Objektives zum je einmaligen Ereignis eines „individuellen
Allgemeinen“ oder eines „individuell realisierten objektiven
Logos“ verbanden.
Ins Politisch-Gesellschaftliche projiziert, wurde daraus
die Vision einer großen Ausdifferenzierung, die aufgrund
dieser ihrer erfahrungs-spirituellen Grundierung und der
damit verbundenen Anerkennungsfähigkeit des
Individuellen als Allgemeines (und bis zu einem gewissen
Grad „Absolutes“) nun unter dem trinitarischen Leitstern
von Freiheit, Gleichheit und Brüderlichkeit stehen konnte.
Ergebnis war nicht nur die sich zyklisch - allerdings nur
unter schweren Kämpfen und bei erheblichen Rückschlägen
- durchsetzende freiheitliche Organisationsform
europäischer Gesellschaften, sondern auch ans positive
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Werte-Substanzen gebundene Kern-Errungenschaften der
Moderne wie etwa die Menschenwürde und, davon
abgeleitet, die politischen Menschenrechte.
Gerade aber solche „erfahrungs-substantiellen“
philosophisch-politischen Errungenschaften wie die
Menschenwürde und später die Menschenrechte als eine
Grundlage des Rechtsstaates im Kern des westlichen
Demokratieverständnisses waren für die nominalistische
Radikalisierung und Vereinseitigung des kerneuropäischen
Politikparadigmas nach dem 2. Weltkrieg stets ein Kern-
Problem, weil sie nicht mit dem Tabu des Substantiellen als
angeblichem Garanten säkular-pluralistischer
Gesellschaftsorganisation vereinbar waren (Jacques
Derrida).
Das lag - mindestens zwischen 1970 und 2001 - nicht
ausschließlich, aber zumindest mit an der
Unausgewogenheit des mittleren politischen Paradigmas
des „postmodernen“ Kern-Europa (und zwar hierin nur bei
Detailunterschieden zwischen Frankreich und
Deutschland), welches „realistische“ Dimensionen
zugunsten „nominalistischer“ verdrängte und daher eine
gewisse Einseitigkeit entwickelte. Diese Einseitigkeit
bestand und besteht - zumindest in den akademischen und
erzieherisch-paradigmatischen Grundlagen politischer
Korrektheit - bis in die Gegenwart in der tendenziellen
Tabuisierung positiver Werte sowie aller
substantialistischen Weltanschauungs-Aspekte zugunsten
von negativen und indirekten Werte-Formen und -
Beschreibungen. Es dominiert in Kern-Europa ein nicht
selten einseitiger politischer (De-)Konstruktivismus, dessen
„negative“ nominalistische Weltsicht in merkwürdiger
Weise mit dem ebenso einseitigen politischen
Substantialismus und Objektivismus der meisten anderen
Weltregionen außen und den wachsenden proto-politischreligiösen
Überzeugungs- und Handlungsformen innen
konstrastiert. Dieser politische (De-)Konstruktivismus
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BENEDIKTER - Politik und Religion.
Zur gegenwärtigen Neu-Annäherung zweier gesellschaftlicher Felder
dominiert als Universal-Nominalismus unter dem Signum
„konstruktiver Sachlichkeit“ die Interpretation der
kantianischen Tradition, und damit den Kern der zu Recht
bis heute weitgehend eigenständigen forma mentis des
Politischen Kontinental-Europas.
Die Herrschaft dieses politischen (De-
)Konstruktivismus brachte in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten
einen unvergleichlichen Reichtum an pluralen Diskursen
und eine nie dagewesene öffentliche Diskussionskultur
hervor, die das unverlierbare Erbe der „postmodernen“
Epoche darstellen – und zwar weniger philosophisch, als
vielmehr gesellschafts- und paradigmenpolitisch. Doch
zugleich entstanden - wie unvermeidbar in der Dialektik der
Aufklärung - entsprechende Defizite. Eben weil religiöse,
metaphysische und erfahrungs-spirituelle Diskurse seit
Ende der 1970er Jahre unterschiedslos und weithin
pauschal aus dem Gesichtskreis der kritischen Öffentlichkeit
und ihrer anerkennenswerten Diskurs-Politiken verdrängt
wurden, konnten die entsprechenden realpolitischen
Dimensionen, Anteile und Konsequenzen des
emergierenden regressiv Religiösen seit 1989-91 kaum in
Betracht gezogen - und noch weniger ideengeschichtlich
antizipiert - werden. Daß führende Attentäter des 11.
September ihre Basis im deutschsprachigen Kern-Europa
hatten, müsste aus diesem Gesichtspunkt mehr Anlaß zur
kritischen Selbstvergewisserung politischer
Diskurskompetenzen und herrschender
Paradigmenformationen geben.
Zugleich gilt es andererseits jedoch stets mit
mindestens ebensolchem Nachdruck zu bedenken, dass der
politische Kantianismus entscheidend für die positive
Ausnahmestellung Europas im Konzert der
Weltgesellschaften verantwortlich ist (Sozialstaat, kritische
Öffentlichkeit, partizipative Demokratie), und dass daher
die kerneuropäischen liberalen Gesellschaften ohne ihren
nominalistischen Kern in der (de-)konstruktiven
Interpretation und öffentlichen Verwirklichung des
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Kantianismus und seiner „fiktiven“ Stellung zur Religion
nicht mehr das wären, was sie heute sind.
Als wahrscheinlich kann in dieser komplexen
ideengeschichtlichen und gesellschaftspolitischen
Konstellation insgesamt jedenfalls gelten, dass wir uns
bereits seit 1989-91, und symptomatisch – nicht kausal –
verstärkt seit dem 11. September 2001, in einer
allgemeinen Lage des Übergangs von
Paradigmenformationen befinden. Dieser Übergang
konstituiert sich politisch als mindestens vierdimensionale
„globale Systemverschiebung“ (Laboratoire Europeén
d’Anticipation Politique LEAP Paris). An dieser seit einigen
Jahren beginnenden Systemverschiebung mit Auswirkung
sowohl auf politische wie auf ökonomische und säkularkulturelle
Rationalitäts- und Diskursformationen hat, neben
anderen Faktoren, die globale Renaissance der Religionen
mutmaßlich maßgeblichen Anteil.
Aus dieser Lage der politischen Ideengeschichte und
aus der ihr wenigstens in Teilen in wechselseitiger
Abhängigkeit korrespondierenden allgemeinen
weltpolitischen Lage ergeben sich heute erst noch wenige
fundiert mögliche Schlussfolgerungen, denen aber
möglicherweise ein umso größerer Wert für die
Antizipation kommenden Entwicklungen zukommt. Unter
diesen Schlussfolgerungen sind:
1. Das Religiöse muss von den politisch gestaltenden
Kräften in Bürgergesellschaft und Staat weit genauer „von
innen“ gekannt und als (paradigmen)politischer Faktor
berücksichtigt werden, als es die dekonstruktivistische
kerneuropäische „Postmoderne“ (oder „reife Moderne“) mit
ihrer Tabuisierungs-Strategie bisher anerkennen konnte.
Diese erweiterte Kenntnis „aus dem Inneren der
Rationalitätsdimension“ des Religiösen / Metaphysischen /
Spirituellen heraus, die auch im Sinn einer
Paradigmenbalancierung zwischen Nominalismus und
Realismus verstanden werden muss, wird nun notwendig,
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BENEDIKTER - Politik und Religion.
Zur gegenwärtigen Neu-Annäherung zweier gesellschaftlicher Felder
wenn Europa den Anschluß an die und die Dialogfähigkeit
mit der zunehmend religiös geprägten Globalisierung
wahren und von einer bisher weitgehend einseitig
nominalistisch-diplomatischen Worte-Politik zu einer
paradigmenpolitisch erfahrungsgegründeten
Inklusionspolitik voranschreiten will, die sich nicht als
„Integrations-Politik“ missversteht (Niall Ferguson). Ohne
paradigmenintegrative Position zwischen Nominalismus
und Realismus, d.h.: ohne die Genese einer „subjektivobjektiven“
dritten forma mentis scheint in den
kommenden Jahren kaum eine inklusive Stellungnahme zu
Terror, Krieg oder weltpolitischen und ideengeschichtlichen
Großentwicklungslinien der Gegenwart möglich.
2. Für die Konturen dieser forma mentis kann ein
ideengeschichtlicher Rückgriff auf die Ursprünge der
westlich-europäischen Demokratietraditionen sinnvoll sein.
Daß es im Innern der abendländischen Entwicklung
durchgängig bereits seit dem 12. Jahrhundert einen
konstitutiven Binnenkampf zwischen zwei großen
dialektisch-konträren Strömungen gab, die beide zum
europäischen (christlichen) Geistesleben gehörten, dieses
aber gerade in der Dialektik eines unbarmherzigen Kampfes
zwischen sich generierten und voranbrachten: nämlich
zwischen regressiver Glaubensspiritualität (Kirche) und
progressiver Erfahrungsspiritualität (Rosenkreuzertum,
Freimaurerei), könnte heute in der ideengeschichtlichen
Rekonstruktion zu einem wesentlichen, wenn auch auf die
Bedingungen der zeitgenössischen Situation
umzuwendenden Aspekt vertiefter Analyse der
gegenwärtigen inneren Paradigmen-Kämpfe Europas
geraten. Dies gilt insbesondere in einer Situation, in der
dieser Binnenkampf in vielen Phänomenbildungen neu
aufflammt als ein „geheimer“ neuer „Kulturkampf“ im
Innern der Logik auch der säkularen Gesellschaften.
3. Manche glauben deshalb, eine mögliche Perspektive
für die Genese einer ausbalancierenden, inklusiven,
„dritten“ forma mentis könnte in einem zeitgemässen Neu-
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Geltendmachen der vom Machtkonglomerat Politik-
Konfessionsgemeinschaften historisch-politisch und
ideengeschichtlich in den Hintergrund gedrängten,
aufgeklärt-rationalen Formen von Spiritualität bestehen,
welche der Genese der Französischen Revolution und damit
der Entstehung der modernen Demokratie zugrunde lagen.
Selbstverständlich ist diese Perspektive nichts weniger als
problematisch. Sie könnte möglicherweise aber auch
Chancen im Sinn einer Besinnung auf ein
„Allgemeinmenschliches“ in der „individuellen moralischen
Intuition“ und eines „sich der Idee erlebend
Gegenüberstellens“ bergen, welches die erfahrungsspirituellen
Ströme Europas im Gegensatz zu den
konfessionellen Glaubenskongregationen seit dem 12.
Jahrhunderts kennzeichnete, und durch welches die
Aporien des „Kampfes der Kulturen“ ebenso wie des
Kampfes zwischen dem „postmodernem“ Subjektivismus
der säkularen Gesellschaftsorganisation und dem
„vormodernem“ Objektivismus der Renaissance der
Religionen auf rationalitätskongeniale Weise ausbalanciert,
vermittelt und schließlich überwunden werden könnten.
4. Eine solche „dritte“ forma mentis einer „subjektivobjektiven
politischen Rationalität“ gilt es nun jedenfalls
politikwissenschaftlich - neben einer verstärkten
Einbeziehung ökonomischer und kultureller Logiken - auch
deshalb zu erarbeiten, weil das „realistische“ Politik- und
Gesellschaftsverständnis heute nicht nur von einer
Renaissance christlicher Kräfte, sondern insbesondere auch
von nicht-europäischen Immigrantenkulturen in die
politische Öffentlichkeit der „Postmoderne“
wiedereingebracht wird, und zwar zum Teil in regressiven
und illiberalen Formen, ohne dass es mit diesem vonseiten
des einseitigen politischen Säkularismus einen
authentischen, d.h. erfahrungsgestützten Dialog geben kann
Die bisherige Nichtwahrnehmung der empirischen
Eigenrationalität des Religiösen und seiner langfristigen
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BENEDIKTER - Politik und Religion.
Zur gegenwärtigen Neu-Annäherung zweier gesellschaftlicher Felder
Tiefenfolgen für gesellschaftliche und politische
Entwicklung stellt mutmaßlich mit einen Grund dafür dar,
dass „Integration“ bislang misslingt, und daß sich
Gegenkulturen in der säkular-offenen Gesellschaft des
Westens bilden, von deren regressiven oder Stagnations-
Tendenzen diese offenen Gesellschaften nicht
unbeeinträchtigt bleiben können. Es geht deshalb heute im
Kern der Wiederannäherungstendenzen zwischen Politik
und Religion um Ausbalancierung entsprechender
Radikalisierungen durch Einbindung in ein subjektivobjektives
oder nominalistisch-realistisches öffentliches
Grundlagen-Paradigma. Dieses müsste mittels
Ideengeschichte und Philosophie auf möglichst breiter
Ebene eine inklusive Grundlagen-Stimmung und –Haltung
mit generieren, wenigstens bei den Eliten, in der Erziehung
der künftigen Politiker-Generationen und in der politischen
Korrektheit des öffentlichen Empfindens.
Für das Drängende dieser Herausforderung, die gewiß
groß ist, vielleicht auch übergroß, aber die zumindest klar
ins Auge gefasst werden muss, gibt es eine schnell
wachsende Zahl beredter Beispiele – wie gesagt sowohl auf
der Makro- wie auf der Meso- und der Mikro-Ebene des
Politischen der Gegenwart.
So sprechen etwa auf der weltpolitischen Bühne das
bisherige Versagen Kerneuropas im Nahen Osten, sowie die
Fälle Iran und Irak eine Symptom-Sprache, die kaum länger
ignoriert werden kann. Wenn etwa die gegenwärtige
(ihrerseits radikal-fundamentalistische und protofaschistische)
iranische Führung äußert: „Die Europäer
verstehen uns nicht, weil sie uns nicht verstehen können.
Wir können mit ihnen reden so lange wir wollen, aber sie
anerkennen das Religiöse als eigenständige
Rationalitätsdiskurs nicht, und daher gibt es eigentlich nur
ein Worte-, aber kein wirkliches Gespräch. Sie aber glauben,
reden führe irgendwann zur gelingenden Kommunikation,
zum Konsens. Das ist nicht der Fall. Der Dialog mit Worten
ist selbst nicht die Lösung“ (Mahmud Ahmadinedschad),
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dann bringt sie – ungeachtet ihrer eigenen Aporien, die
ungleich abgründiger gelagert sind als jene des
konstruktivistischen Nominalismus des „kantianischen“
Europa – eine Kritik am kulturell-„postmodernen“
Nominalismus der „Postmoderne“ und seiner
Vereinseitigungstendenz im Gesellschaftlichen und
Politischen an, der von breiteren Kreisen geteilt wird, als
dies bisher öffentlich diskutiert wird. Die Einsicht in die
Vorteile, aber auch in die unter den Bedingungen der
Globalisierung wachsenden Aporien dieser Einseitigkeit
sollte für die kommenden Jahre zur Bemühung um eine
Paradigmen-Balancierung in den Grundlagen des
politischen Denkens Kern-Europas führen – gerade um den
Fundamentalisten begründet mit der Alternative einer
„dritten Position“: nämlich eines „rationalen Nominalismus-
Realismus für das künftige Europa, welcher die realistische
Paradigmendimension nicht länger verdrängt, sondern sie
nicht mythologisch, sondern kritisch-rational integriert“
(Slavoij Zizek), entschieden auf ihrem angeblich eigenen
Kompetenzfeld entgegentreten zu können.
5. Aus dieser Lage folgt schließlich aber auch, daß das
Politische Europas in seiner öffentlichen Logik und seinen
Diskursformationen makro-systemisch stärker als bisher
von Religion, Kultur und Wirtschaft mit ihren typologisch
anders gelagerten Rationalitätsformen unterschieden
werden muss. Die entsprechenden Unterschiede in den
Logiken und Zielen dieser unterschiedlichen makrosystemischen
Diskurse sollten deutlicher als bisher
herausgearbeitet, öffentlich diskutiert und mittels formeller
und informeller Geltungsgrenzen verteidigt werden. Das gilt
zum Beispiel für das oben angeführte Beispiel der
kerneuropäischen Tendenz zur „postmodernen“
„Ursprungs-Gesetzgebung“.
Wir benötigen also paradigmenpolitisch eine subjektivobjektive
Ausbalancierung, systempolitisch eine rückhaltlose
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BENEDIKTER - Politik und Religion.
Zur gegenwärtigen Neu-Annäherung zweier gesellschaftlicher Felder
Verteidigung der bisherigen radikal-säkularen Grundlagen
der offenen demokratischen Gesellschaft.
Gegen diese „nun dringend notwendige
Paradigmenbalancierung zwischen politischem
Nominalismus und Realismus“ (Slavoij Zizek) wehrt sich
jedoch derzeit noch die radikalsäkulare akademische
Kanonisierung des Politischen der Spät-Moderne als
„Postmoderne“. Diese lehnt Religion, Metaphysik und
Spiritualität insgesamt pauschal als „Irrweg“ ab (und
behauptet zugleich das Prinzip der Gleichheit als Prinzip
nicht nur des Rechts- und Politiklebens, sondern auch des
Kulturlebens, wo es kontraproduktiv wird, weil dort laut
der Ausgangs-Intuition der Französischen Revolution
Freiheit die Maxime sein muss).
Das gilt etwa für die akademische Kanonisierung
gesellschaftspolitischer Vordenker der vergangenen
Jahrzehnte wie Jean-Franois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida oder
des mittleren Jürgen Habermas, welche in den
Tiefendimensionen des politischen Denkens Europas weit
einflußreicher waren und sind, als meist angenommen, und
die wie Kant und Hegel mittels proto- und para-politischer
Grundlagenarbeit an gesellschaftlichen Paradigmen (Michel
Foucault) sowie mittels einer „philosophischen Politik“
(Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida) faktisch „Millionen
regiert haben, die nichts von ihnen wussten“ (Albert
Schweitzer).
Zugleich haben jedoch eben diese säkularen
Nachkriegs-Avantgarden, bislang weitgehend unbemerkt,
im Verlauf ihres intellektuellen und politischen Weges
zwischen 1970 und 2001 nach und nach ein paradoxales
Verhältnis zum Religiösen in Form einer - wenn auch in der
Nachfolge Kants stark ästhetisch konturierten - „negativen
Metaphysik“ oder „negativen Spiritualität“ entwickelt. Viele
führende gesellschafts- und paradigmenpolitische
Vordenker der späten „Postmoderne“ wie Jean-Francois
Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault oder Paul
Feyerabend entwickelten in ihren letzten Werken eine Art
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Proto-Spiritualität, die viele überraschen mag, aber einer
wachsenden Einsicht in die „inklusive Notwendigkeit“ der
Epoche nach 1989-91 geschuldet ist. Andere – wie etwa
Jürgen Habermas, Helene Cixous oder Slavoj Zizek – haben
sich in den letzten Jahren ebenfalls aus Einsicht in die
Notwendigkeit einer inklusiven forma mentis für das
Politische zögerlich einer Paradigmenerneuerung geöffnet,
aber vorerst meist nur passiv-permissiv, noch nicht aktivaufbauend.
Wenn aber ein Leit-Satz eines der wichtigsten Vorreiter
der „Postmoderne“: der Satz von Andrè Malraux’ zumindest
als Richtungstendenz zutreffen sollte: „Das 21. Jahrhundert
wird religiös sein, oder es wird nicht sein“, worauf heute,
wenn auch gewiß nicht in der von Malraux angedachten
Form, verschiedene Phänomenkomplexe in der Politik- und
Kulturkonstellation hinzuweisen scheinen, dann stellt sich
die Frage nach möglichen Perspektiven der Situation mit
Nachdruck.
Bestehen diese Perspektiven in die Verteidigung der
säkularen Gesellschaft gegen die neuen politischen
Ansprüche des regressiv-konfessionellen Religiösen? Oder
liegen sie in der Geltendmachung religiöser Rationalität in
einem Politischen, das sie ungerechterweise verdrängt hat?
Und wenn beides zugleich als Notwendigkeit der Fall wäre –
was könnte das für die Zukunft des Politischen in Europa
bedeuten? Welches Denken wäre damit für die
Neukonturierung des Politischen angeschlagen? Bestünde
dieses Denken in der Entwicklung eines inklusiven, über die
Postmoderne hinausgehenden „subjektiv-objektiven“ und
„nominalistisch-realistischen“ Paradigmas - also eines
„dritten“ Weges, wenn auch nur und ausschließlich
eingedenk der unübersehbaren Gefahren dieses Vorhabens,
die zu keinem Augenblick unterschätzt werden dürfen?
In diesem Spannungsfeld ergeben sich zahlreiche, bis
auf weiteres notgedrungen offen bleibende Fragen, die für
die Zukunft des Politischen in Kern-Europa in den
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BENEDIKTER - Politik und Religion.
Zur gegenwärtigen Neu-Annäherung zweier gesellschaftlicher Felder
kommenden Jahren bedeutsam werden könnten. Darunter
sind unter anderem:
a) Wie soll sich Europa zum heutigen Trend der
globalen Renaissance der Religionen verhalten?
b) Wie wäre die Tradition der rationalen Aufklärung in
ein inklusives Paradigma nominalistisch-realistisch oder
subjektiv-objektiv angemessen einzubinden?
c) Ist dazu synchrone Inklusion oder diachrone
Dialektik das bessere Entwicklungsmodell?
d) Politik und Religion - kann man in dieser
Verhältnisbestimmung von „der“ Religion sprechen oder
müssen dabei erstens die Tendenzen der Religionen und
zweitens die Unterschiede zwischen den Begriffen Religion,
Metaphysik und Spiritualität differenziert werden?
e) Welche Rolle können in den kommenden Jahren
ideengeschichtliche Erwägungen für den konkreten
realpolitischen Prozeß spielen – auf der Mikro-, Meso- und
Makro-Ebene?
Wir alle sind aufgefordert, an der Diskussion dieser
ebenso schwierigen wie wichtigen, für die Zukunft der
offenen Gesellschaften und ihrer inneren Rationalität in den
kommenden Jahren voraussichtlich mit entscheidenden
Fragen mitzuwirken.
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Changes of Religious Pluralism with Regard to
Conditions in the Czech Lands
Ján MIŠCOVIČ *
* The Teological Faculty of South Bohemia University
in České Budějovice, E‐mail Address: misovic@volny.cz
Abstrakt
Der Beitrag befasst sich mit der Frage des
Glaubenspluralismus, so wie er sich im Laufe der Zeit in der
Gesellschaft manifestiert hat, und anschließend auch im Rahmen
der einzelnen Kirchen. Die erste neuzeitliche gesellschaftliche
Äußerung war die Glaubenstoleranz, die offiziell von dem
Herrscher im 17. Jahrhundert bestätigt wurde, die aber erst zwei
Jahrhunderte später eine praktische Auswirkung hatte. Eine
Form des Glaubenspluralismus, der Ökumenismus, fand
Widerhall in der tschechischen Gesellschaft vor allem nach dem
Zweiten Weltkrieg. Einen wichtigen Schritt in Richtung
Glaubenspluralismus in der katholischen Kirche stellten die
Beschlüsse des II. Vatikankonzils dar. Ein Anstoß für die
Änderungen waren auch der politische Wandel in Mittel‐ und
Osteuropa und die parallel verlaufenden
Globalisierungsprozesse. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser
historischen, religiösen und politischen Änderungen erreicht der
Pluralismus eine bestimmte Entwicklungsstufe und spiegelt sich
dann konkret in einzelnen Kirchen, bzw. in der katholischen
Kirche wider. Die Folge ist auch Auffächerung der Theologie in
viele Disziplinen und der damit verbundene Pluralismus.
Abrégé
Cette contribution traite du pluralisme religieux, de la façon
dont il est progressivement apparu d’abord dans la société puis
dans les Eglises elles‐mêmes. Ses premières manifestations
modernes se sont traduites par la tolérance religieuse,
officiellement confirmée au XVIIème siècle par le souverain, mais
véritablement instaurée seulement deux siècles plus tard. Une
des formes du pluralisme religieux, l’écuménisme, a trouvé un
écho dans le contexte tchèque, surtout après la seconde guerre
mondiale. Les conclusions du Concile Vatican II constituèrent un
pas marquant vers l’établissement du pluralisme au sein du
clergé catholique. Les changements des systèmes politiques en
Europe centrale et orientale ainsi que, parallèlement à cela, la
mise en marche des processus de globalisation, ont donné une
impulsion au pluralisme. En toile de fond à ces changements, le
pluralisme est arrivé à un certain stade et s’est exprimé
concrètement dans les différents clergés, dont le clergé
catholique. Il y a aussi comme résultat le morcellement de la
théologie en un grand nombre de branches et partie liée à cela
son pluralisme.
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MIŠCOVIČ ‐ Changes of Religious Pluralism with Regard to Conditions in
Czech Lands
Introduction
The scientific reflection of religious pluralism has a
variety of aspects, the “external one“ being the most
frequent. An article called Secularisation or Pluralisation of
Christianity, published by a leading international religious
sociologist, Martin D., is a good illustration of this
phenomenon – two exceptions, no rule to analyse the
relation between the church and the state. The
contribution is based on a different ideological
background. It uses a rather broad historical approach,
seeking to define the “internal“ dimensions of religious
pluralism first and, subsequently, its “external” incentives.
In my opinion, the key aspect is the way plurality has
manifested itself in Christian churches, especially in the
Catholic Church. I will also point out the circumstances of
pluralisation processes of Christian churches in Central
Europe and the Czech Lands. However, in connection with
the so‐defined approach, let me mention the importance of
Martin‘s universal methodological standpoint that any
church would compromise itself if affected and co‐formed
by political power.
Development of Pluralism in Christianity
Evaluating processes associated with pluralism in
Christianity, we cannot help mentioning the historical
background as provided through irony by an outstanding
ancient critic of Christianity, philosopher and writer
Celsus. He speaks of fractionalisation in the Christian
church, claiming that it is just the name that links the
fractions 1 .
There was no church unity at all in the first centuries
(Filipi 2000: 68). The plural form of the term church
(ekklesiai) occurred, along with the singular, as early as
1 The work is called The True Word on Christianity and Judaism,
dated 178. The author‘s ideas are known from Origen‘s polemic
response (approximately 185 – 250).
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the New Testament. This fact, however, evokes the
existence of local churches with separate developments,
full autonomy, peculiar liturgical traditions and,
presumably, unique confessional and adoration practices.
Despite these specific variances, the churches were aware
of and obeyed the principle of interrelated community
(Filipi 2000: 94).
Later developments resulted in such gaps between
individual ecclesiastical formations that any further
Eucharist was out of the question. Nevertheless, the
emerging system was accompanied by separation‐
preventing efforts during the whole history of Christianity.
It is difficult to define the separating factors on the
basis of historical studies because almost all the cases were
influenced by “theological, less theological and non‐
theological“ aspects at the same time (Filipi 2000: 94).
Moreover, it is uneasy to pinpoint the moment in which the
legitimate pluralism changed so much that the Eucharistic
community ceased to exist.
The German theologian Edmund Schlink openly
admitted three types of motives leading to religious
streaming: a) The fight for unity in the church took place
on the confessional and theological levels. Concurrence in
the importance of Christ is the core of unity despite all
ecclesiological variances. b) The second group includes
differently perceived consequences of the faith in Christ.
The separating factors got further and further from the
Christologic core, approaching the worldly and religious
consequences of this faith. c) The third group includes
“political“ factors in the widest sense of the word. They had
the following two contrasting forms: 1. hegemonic
demands of some centres, 2. emancipation efforts of
certain marginal regions aiming at higher independence of
the centre (Filipi 2000: 95‐96 ).
The Christianity‐splitting processes continued in the
nineteenth century too. For example, the conclusions of the
First Vatican Council held in 1870 aroused some
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differentiation in the Catholic Church. As a result, the Old
Catholic Church separated from the main stream.
Reunion efforts expressed by Ecumenism 2 occurred at
that time. Common grounds were consciously sought that
could draw the Christian churches, so distant in their
theories, concepts of office and sacrament, close to each
other again. Simultaneously, Ecumenism expresses a view
that “streaming is inappropriate and should not be
accepted without an attempt at a change“ (Filipi 2000:
122).
However, it was not until the foundation of the World
Council of Churches in Amsterdam 3 in September 1948,
which instituted a fellowship of churches, that the
ecumenical ideas started to spread widely. The Catholic
Church joined the negotiations through five observers in
New Delhi in 1961 for the first time.
The Second Vatican Council brought another incentive.
The ecumenical movement was recognised by a Decree on
Ecumenism 4 . Chapter 2 of this comprehensive and
manifold document called Practical Implementation of
Ecumenism says that it is unconditionally necessary to
elucidate the whole theory clearly. Nothing is so alien to
Ecumenism as the false irenism, which impairs the purity
of the Catholic doctrine and obscures its genuine and
undoubtful sense. Catholic theologians should bear in mind
the existence of a certain hierarchy of various dogmas of
the Catholic doctrine. Some authors refer to the texts of
the Second Vatican Council, in which compromise is
repeatedly expressed by means of so‐called contradiction
pluralism (Pesch 1996: 150). Studying the council
2 The original meaning of the word was “decisions generally
accepted by the church, i.e. unity with the universal church“, later it
described efforts to promote cooperation, mutual understanding and
close interrelations of Christian churches.
3 The founding assembly was attended by 351 delegates
representing 145 churches from 45 countries. The number of churches
had doubled by the end of the 20 th century.
4 The introduction says that there exists no Catholic Ecumenism,
that there are just Catholic rules for participation in the common
ecumenical movement.
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documents with the compromising nature, some “adhere
and refer to them, claiming that “the Second Vatican
Council said so“”, while others argue that “the Council did
not mean it like that“ (Pesch 1996: 150‐151). Either party
may be right. 5
In practice, Ecumenism is implemented through various
activities on many levels under more prosaic
circumstances. Communities and local parishes represent
the basic ecumenical cooperation level, providing the
largest space for mutual understanding without obeying
strict formal principles.
Multi‐church worship practices have specific, precisely
defined rules. A common ecumenical mass, however,
cannot replace regular divine services attended by the
Catholics because ecumenical masses are a lower, marginal
form of religious celebration due to the absence of
Eucharist (Filipi 2000: 145‐146).
The ecumenical dialogue represents another field of
cooperation between churches. However, the considerable
portion of energy invested in such common dialogues has
yielded poor results so far. The American theologian
Lindbeck G. called for a higher efficiency of the dialogue to
make the churches “mutually structurally vulnerable“
(Filipi 2000: 152).
The history of Christianity gives a clear evidence of
temporarily suppressed religious diversity arisen at early
times. The era of “unity“ of the western Christianity was
5 Article 8 of the Decree on Ecumenism says to liturgical
fellowships: “The expression of unity mostly forbids participation in
divine services. The effort to attain grace is sometimes recommended.“
This note is included among the general directives for implementation
of Ecumenism and, moreover, is not limited to certain liturgies. This
means that it basically does not exclude the Last Supper Fellowship. It
is written elsewhere in the Decree that the reformation churches “did
not keep the original and full essence of the Eucharistic secret because
they are lacking the sacrament of priesthood.“ (Pesch 1996:152). Not
even Article 22 says explicitly that a Catholic is forbidden to take part
in the Holy Last Supper with the reformation church (Pesch 1996:
153).
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followed by reforming efforts leading to a rise of separate
churches. Logically, this trend had to be completed with
the search for the ecumenical dialogue. Both the
“centrifugal“ and “centripetal“ processes represent the
internal sources of religious pluralism.
Religious Pluralism in Central European and Czech
Contexts
Along with the “internal“ factors, there are “external“
circumstances that influenced religious pluralism. They are
characterised by responses of the public, scientists and
particularly the ruling classes to the prevailing situation in
religion and society.
The Christian communities in the Late Middle Ages in
Europe had diverse and specific approaches to church
practices.
Let us point out two relevant circumstances. First, the
ongoing religious disputes and disorders accompanying the
development of Protestantism and Reformation in the
Renaissance era in the 16 th century in Europe and the
related problem of tolerance. Tolerance meant primarily
non‐persecution of people adhering to different religious
faiths and practices at that time. Tolerance supporters
sought to reform the law, i.e. prevent the state from
defending the official religion “by sword“ (Kolakowski
2004: 27).
Second, a somewhat different proportion of internal
forces in the Czech Lands in the course of two centuries,
from the beginning of the religion and society reforming
movement, Hussitism (1419), until the defeat of the Czech
Estates on the White Hill (1620), who, after the tolerance
era 6 , succeeded in enforcing another stage – legality of
various forms of religious and ecclesiastical pluralism. 7
6 The tolerance era started in 1436 by an agreement between the
Basil Council and Czech Hussites. It anchored and, particularly,
authorised communion in both kinds in the Czech Lands.
7 At the end of this period, in 1609, Rudolph II issued the Imperial
Charter, thus providing the most liberal religious law in Europe. The
Charter guaranteed religious freedom for Old and New Utraquists,
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Both the Reformation streams, one initiated by Luther
and the other by Jan Hus, raised “internal“ challenges of
their own.
Lutheranism did not lay stress on activities and deeds
of Christian believers. No deeds or religious acts were
necessary for salvation – a good Christian just needed firm
belief and devoutness to God. Luther preferred the Bible
and the priest. He acknowledged the existing arrangement
of human relations in a society and the necessity to have a
secular authority that may not be opposed 8 (Pojar 1995:
49). According to Luther, the only salvation lies in faith.
The spiritual concept of the Czech Reformation, which
preceded the Lutheran movement, was different. The Law
of God was in the first place. A Christian had to fulfil the
Law through all deeds, activities and the daily life. The
principle of God‘s Law, which establishes the standards of
the social life and calls for rectification of social relations,
became the carrying element of the movement. The Czech
Reformation drew upon international resources:
Wycliffism, Waldenses and Chiliasm, on which Jan Hus‘ and
Chelčický‘s theories 9 were also based.
The Counter‐Reformation era, however, put the Czech
Lands on the level of the rest of Europe.
A significant step towards religious tolerance in the
Czech lands and other national countries of the Habsburg
Empire was not taken until 150 years later.
The Emperor Joseph II laid foundations for a long‐
lasting respect to other religions by issuing a key document
in the ecclesiastical policy, generally called the Tolerance
Act (1781). This solution was adopted thanks to the
influence of Enlightenment as well as for political and
economic reasons because the main purpose of the
Lutherans, Czech Brethren (Unitas Fratrum), and Catholics. It related
both to the aristocracy, citizens of royal towns and serfs.
8 Lutheranism accepted the social arrangement much more than
Catholicism.
9 They are the leaders of the reforming movement.
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Tolerance Act was to integrate different, economically
relevant layers of the population. 10
The Tolerance Act meant a definitive end of the
spiritual “monopoly“ of Catholicism in the empire. The
religious freedom declared in 1848 had not been fully
enforced until the Protestant Act was issued in 1861, which
not only tolerated but also made equal all Protestant
confessions to the official Catholic religion.
The late 19 th and early 20 th centuries were
characterised by a “consolidation“ of the active non‐
Catholic churches and creation of spiritually oriented
associations and organisations.
Now, we could conclude this brief general survey on the
development of religious pluralism with regard top Czech
conditions. Before we do that, let us mention that the
variances between the Roman Catholic Church and other
churches deepened after the Second World War and,
especially, after the Communist coup d‘etat. For example,
the Evangelic Bohemian Brethren joined the international
family of Protestant denominations in 1948 and non‐
Catholic churches founded the Ecumenical Council of
Churches in Czechoslovakia in 1955.
A brief historical excursus indicates essential changes
in religious pluralism. Despite respecting people‘s spiritual
interests and needs, religious pluralism had to struggle
hard for its “place in the sun“. It was mainly the powerful
of this world that fundamentally accelerated or decelerated
pluralistic processes until the end of the 19 th century, thus
giving pluralism its basic features.
On Pluralistic Phenomena in Present‐day Theology
and Christianity
Plurality of today‘s theological streams is derived from
the multilateral character of human life. The theological
dictionary from K. Rahner and H. Vorgrimler says to this
entry that “through unity in God and through common last
10 As the Emperor Joseph II said, over 60,000 serfs, labour forces,
tax payers and one thousand soldiers had left the Czech Lands for
Saxony and Prussia during the preceding 50 years (Pithart 1995: 162).
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metaphysical structures, man and one‘s existential space is
created of so many diverse and multiple facts that one‘s
experience comes from originally diverse sources“
(Rahner, Vorgrimler 1996: 247). The innovativeness of
today‘s theological pluralism is based on specific theses
and ways of thinking, which “exist beside each other as
heterogeneous and incommensurable entities“ (Rahner,
Vorgrimler 1996: 248).
Like other disciplines, theology is divided into a high
number of fields nowadays, each of them providing a lot of
material and a specific methodology (Rahner 2004: 40).
Another aspect that influences theological plurality is
associated with pluralism of human life. "The Christian is
unable to integrate these diverse moments of his or her
existence into a clear and easily controllable system“
(Rahner 2004: 538).
Because of pluralistic trends in the present secular
world, the church has been levelled with other
organisations and evaluated using the same criteria. This
significantly affects the life of laymen who directly
participate in the church service. In this context, the
presence of lay people in the church life is a natural thing
and a consequence of confrontation of the Christian
community with the ordinary secularised society rather
than a secondary or historically forced service (Ambros
2002: 42). Today, theology occupies an irreplaceable
position in one‘s orientation in the pluralistic world and
religion because any fellowship or community combines
both unity and plurality (Ambros 2002: 209).
Historically, religious pluralism used to draw new
incentives for further development from social changes
too. One of the changes was the reunification of Europe in
1990. The Christian churches joined this unification.
For the first time in the history, the Roman Bishops‘
Synod convened a meeting of representatives of European
Bishops‘ Conferences to be held at the turn of November
and December 1991, with the aim to discuss the key topics
of the time. They included: liberation of Eastern Europe,
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dialogue with the secular culture and new evangelisation of
Europe. The participants pointed out the necessity of a
dialogue and cooperation with all Christian churches and
the Jews. However, there was no effort to establish a more
detailed dialogue with the Western culture and Western
pluralism from the very beginning (Maier 2005: 167).
The European Evangelic Assembly, the first assembly of
its kind since the times of Reformation, held in Budapest
March 1992, addressed its message to: “Evangelic Christian
men and women, communities and churches in Europe“,
emphasising, like the Catholics, the challenge following
from the new turn, and pointed out two values of historical
heritage to be preserved: Reformation heritage and
Enlightenment traditions (Maier 2005: 168).
The ecumenical dialogue between the Catholics and
Protestants was hit by stagnation (Maier 2005: 169).
The All‐Orthodox Convention at Istanbul in March 1992
was held in a spirit different from the preceding
assemblies. The new developments were regarded as “a
jeopardy to the Orthodox Church, which will have to
confront itself with the Western secularism and Catholic
and Protestant missionaries‘ demands‘“ (Maier 2005: 169).
The relations between the Orthodox and Catholic churches
“deteriorated“ for over one decade. The new conditions
brought “new and hard problems“ to the existing
ecumenical practices. The dialogue was not restored until
the first half of 2006. 11
The pluralistic phenomena in today’s theology and
Christianity indicate an unparalleled width and variety of
pluralism. Theology is “forced“ not only to take the existing
situation into account but also to respond properly to the
reality of a secularised society. Christian church practices
are facing a similar assignment. Hence, the ecumenical
dialogue should also include an “obligation“ to follow and
11 An international conference took place in Vienna in May 3‐5,
2006, co‐organised by the Department of Foreign Church Relations of
the Moscow Patriarchate and the Pope Council for Culture. Among
others, the contributions put the accent on the importance of a
dialogue between the Orthodox and Catholic churches.
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analyse events that take place outside the Christian sphere
and perceive all processes in the world actively.
Pluralism and Its Consequences from Second
Vatican Council till Today in Czech Lands
The Czech Catholic Church ceased to occupy traditional
positions, being influenced by both the conclusions of the
Second Vatican Council and the Prague Spring events. The
development was not free of conflicts both in the church
and the society. Every event became a source of a certain
diverse tension. The priests, deprived of power by the
Prague Spring, became a source of political tension.
Ideological conflicts escalated between those who accepted
the Council, liturgical reform, Ecumenism and enhanced
rights and obligations of laymen in the church with
pleasure, and those who opposed the Council and its
conclusions with distrust and even hatred. “Thus, Catholic
fundamentalism was restored in our country, including
symptoms of intolerance and reluctance to conduct a
dialogue with those who think differently“ (Vaško 1999:
289). This was probably one of the reasons why the home
authors emphasised repeatedly the necessity of cultivated
discussions.
Mádr Oto a leading Czech theologian, pointed out that
part of the Vatican Council conclusions that urged the need
to give both the clergymen and laymen “a proper freedom
of research, thinking and humble yet brave interconnection
of views of things they are experts at“ (Mádr 1992: 28). He
also presents his concept of a dialogue that avoids arguing,
battles of words, self‐assertion, and situations in which
emotions prevail and the “might is right“ principle is used
instead of “let‘s know the truth“. The core of the dialogue is
a discussion based on humbleness. “Everyone may be
wrong, so I can be wrong too; everyone may be right, so the
opponent may be right too. Let‘s seek the truth jointly“
(Mádr 1992: 28). He placed a scientific dispute, i.e. a
critical evaluation of an issue from various aspects, on a
different level. The essence is the same – search for truth.
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But an ethical public or scientific discussion has one more
aspect ‐ a good relation to the partner (Mádr 1992: 29),
who is not a mere mediator of knowledge. The above‐
mentioned attitude is characterised as “polite and tactful
yet ready to use emphatic words if necessary to defend the
truth and man‘s interests“ (Mádr 1992: 29). This is the
genuine dialogue, one of the foundation stones of the
civilisation of love.
The necessity to specify the principles of a discussion
concerning the present‐day church was also considered by
Ambros P. . He approaches them a bit differently,
considering the following four criteria: truthfulness, love,
refusal of disregard, and quality of language used (Ambros
2002: 13). If these criteria are applied, no “monologue"
instead of "dialogue“ arises.
The post‐Council discussion dealt with rather general
topics, which related, e.g., to the Czech history and thus
gained an ecumenical dimension. For illustration, such
names as Saint Wenceslaus, Charles IV, Saint Jan
Nepomucky, Master Jan Hus , Jan A. Komensky and T. G.
Masaryk are approached differently in the Catholic and
Evangelic environments. These personalities have become
symbols of two ideological lines since a certain time. How
to explain this? “ It is because we seek our truth and fear
for our certainty“. In this context, an essential question has
arisen: “Can I be a Catholic when my church was not right
all the time“? (Mádr 1992: 260). There is one answer to
both the questions. Let us seek the truth jointly,
objectively, no matter whether it is “light and dark“ or
“famous and shameful“ and accept the whole truth. This
approach could be proved right, e.g., by liberation of
Master Jan Hus from the then and later purpose‐bound
ideological engagement (Mádr 1992: 262).
Logically, the development of pluralistic views resulting
from the proceeding democratisation of the society after
1989 initiated significant changes in the approach to
theological issues and religious practices. It also made it
possible to react more profoundly to the conclusions of the
Second Vatican Council.
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For example, the President of the Christian Academy,
Halík T., noticed changes among Catholic believers at that
time. He states that the numbers of both standard believers
and convinced atheists keep falling. “No matter if we like it
or not, the type of a believer with reservations will prevail
clearly in the future“ (Jandourek 1997a: 49). Despite this,
church pastorship focuses on the traditional believer, who
is “dying out“.
The Evangelic Church also contemplates the believers‘
characteristics. Dividing ordinary believers into
confessions is a mere chimera today (Vokoun 2005: 198).
Non‐Catholic churches are dying of consumption, while
numerous crowds of Roman Catholics long for such church
as the Czechoslovak Evangelic and Czechoslovak Hussite
churches and believe their doctrine because Protestantism
is a chimera too. These processes are symptoms of a post‐
confession age according to Vokoun (Vokoun 2005: 199).
The fact that shared values represent the linking
element of Christianity fails too. “The theoretical
expression of these values, however, is not bound to one
specific ideological direction and Christian values are
contemplated in various philosophical directions today“
(Kašný 2005: 274).
Some theologians contemplate the hierarchy of God,
man and church. One legitimate approach believes that God
created the church as an intermediate stage between
Himself and the believers and it is the church that
addresses individuals, turning them into believers. A
reforming concept, also complying with the Holy Scripture,
points out that “God addresses individuals and it is
individuals, people who form alliances and create
churches, and so there is nothing holy about the church“
(Kohák 2005: 229). In this approach, the church is a
framework for cohabitation, “which is created, for their
purpose, by people who felt the touch of holiness“ (Kohák
2005: 229).
In addition to general theological issues, specific
situations in churches are discussed. The Catholic bishop
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Malý V. evaluated the post‐Council situation in the Czech
Republic in the course of three decades. “We have found
out that hardly anybody is ready to meet the incentives of
the Second Vatican Council. In this respect, we are very far
from the door opened by the Council.“ (Jandourek 1997b:
27). He identified the following key objectives of the
Catholic Church in connection with the beginning of the
new millennium:
– seeking of points of contact between international
religions and Christianity,
– role of a woman in the church,
– perception of the church unity,
‐ revealing of rich traditions of other churches
including mutual enrichment (Mišovič 2001: 143‐144).
The Czech church representatives expressed
different opinions on the last‐named issue. The Cardinal
Vlk M. evaluated the Protestants in the “traditional“ spirit
of the documents. In his opinion, they had no faith
guarantee. They even refused things that had been
maintained in the church for a long time. These things
included not only religious sediments, but also some
essential things (Pirnosová 1997: 64).
Štampach I., an ex‐Dominican, now a representative of
the Old Catholic Church, has adopted an absolutely
different approach to non‐Christian religions. He regards
Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism as religions despite
the fact that God is not always mentioned in them. “These
ways had been religious or spiritual long before the first
Taoistic and Confucian temples appeared“ (Hanuš 1997:
85). Similarly, Halík T. finds a certain similarity between
the three streams of the three biggest religions: Zen in
Buddhism, Franciscanism in Christianity, and Chassidism
in Judaism (Mišovič 2001: 146). The representatives of
different churches show readiness to promote the inter‐
religious dialogue 12 by publishing texts and arranging
public meetings.
12 One of the first talks concerning the Spiritual Development of
Mankind took place in the Ball Games Pavilion of the Prague Castle in
October 1998, attended by the representatives of the Catholic Church,
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Both mutual communication and practical cooperation
were achieved. The strive after mutual understanding
between churches, the present‐day situation in the society
resulting in low religiousness 13 and lack of clericals create
“a sociological background for forming of inter‐church
ecumenical structures in the Czech conditions“ (Přibyl
2005: 194), which are active in the penal system and army
on the basis of an agreement between the churches and the
state. An example is an religious service agreement in the
sector administered by the Minister of Defence, concluded
between the Ecumenical Council of Churches and the Czech
Bishops‘ Conference in 1998, which is based on the
principle of mutual substitutability 14 (Filipi 2000: 142). It
is a unique agreement in the world. 15
Pluralism is reflected specifically not only in
approaches to religious issues but also within the Czech
Catholic structures. The layout of various approaches in
the present‐day Catholic Church is indicated in the
Cardinal Vlk‘s Statement published in late July 1999. This
document was commented on by the representatives of the
Kairos 98 Initiative. They claimed that they had read the
characteristic of the right‐left division in the church
mentioned by Vlk with anxiety and bitterness, considering
it an example of simplification that is unable to capture the
complexity and variety of the church life and that makes
Evangelic Czech Brethren and svámí Mahéšvaránanda, and arousing
great interest in the public (Mišovič 2001: 146).
13 This situation was proved by the Gfk research in 2004 for the
last time, which recorded the lowest rate of belief in God in the Czech
Republic of all European countries.
14 The agreement says: “In the sector of the Ministry of Defence,
every clergyman represents not only the church he or she is a member
of but also and primarily is a common representative of all churches
associated in the EC and CBC, which, jointly, appoint him or her to
execute the spiritual mission” (Filipi 2000: 143).
15 According to the Pope‘s constitution Spirituali militum curae, it
is the responsibility of the Catholic Church to form its own military
bishoprics instead of joining the ecumenical structures in the army as
stipulated in the Czech agreement ( Přibyl 2005: 194).
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the church image too political (Mišovič 2001: 146). Vlk‘s
approach and all responses to it indicate the existence of
contrasting attitudes in the Catholic Church, which polarise
and even take the shape of a certain typology. The
following four groups of people can be identified according
to their approach to polarisation :
a) indifferent or disparaging people, indicating
aloofness and superiority;
b) pragmatic people, preferring proper work of an
institution or organisation and trying to get along with
polarisation;
c) involved or engaged people, showing an interest to
understand polarising trends and overcome them;
d) people identifying themselves with polarisation,
showing strong commitment aimed at victory (Ambros
2002: 230).
di) The roots of the polarisation‐arousing tension are
connected with a number of processes: from the ability to
understand the modern world, via fear of negation of one‘s
identity, to fear of moral and spiritual relativism prevailing
in the society (Šebek 2002: 232), and with the effort to
defend the position of the Catholic Church in the society
(Kabele, Spousta 2002: 232). Sociologically, polarisation
occurs between: the active minority and the majority on
the church margin, the minority young generation and the
majority older generation, the “Moravian“ and Czech parts
of the church, and the “orthodox” minority and “syncretic“
majority (Kabele, Spousta 2002: 232). Polarisation is
clearly seen in positive or negative attitudes towards
cultivation of views in the church based on the desire to
argue or predetermine topics to be discussed in the church
(Frei 2002: 232). Polarisation manifests itself in pastoring
practices too. There are diverse approaches to the world,
authority, church, and sources of hope, i.e. to elements that
influence and determine the Christians‘ views and
behaviours. Diverse views result in different pastoring
procedures and strategies, which arouse consent and
acknowledgement, or opposition and hostility (Opatrný
2002: 233).
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The diversity of views is reflected in religiously
oriented periodicals. In late 1990s, the Report magazine
was politically linked with the Civic Institute, the
Perspektivy monthly became a forum interpreting views of
a narrow group whose views were close to Ota Mádr’s and
Prague Dominicans, and the diversity of views and
interests within the Czech Bishops‘ Conference affected the
character of the Catholic Weekly (Štampach 1999: 199‐
202).
Recently, a Catholic two‐monthly Te Deum has
appeared among the religious magazines. It obviously
addresses traditionalistically oriented Christians. A close
relationship to the schismatic Lefebre‐influenced priests‘
fellowship of St. Pius 16 can be noticed (Machula 2006: 1).
The Czech Bishops‘ Conference commented on the rise and
orientation of the magazine too.
Speaking of pluralism in the Catholic Church, which
often shows signs of polarisation, it is stated that “this
polarity is not primarily a cognition‐deepening
phenomenon, but an effort to monopolise its cognition of
truth“ (Ambros 2002: 285‐286). The recent rise of a
conservative Catholic magazine proves this evaluation
right.
Let us illustrate a situation in the context of the Czech
Catholic Church: Where social circumstances are stagnant or
“conserved“, attention is paid mainly to the inner religious and
church life and all the other things “take a back seat“. However,
the moment a political change occurs, the church gets
activated and “vitalised“, unveiling the diversity of views,
“veiled“ by the everyday requirements of the church
organisation before.
16 The second issue of the magazine presents an idea of Pius X‘s
saying that endeavours may come to nothing unless a suitable
offensive and defensive weapon is at hand – a faithful and genuine
Catholic press (Te Deum s.1).
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Conclusion
Obviously, religious pluralism is a natural part of the
Christian life. The variety of forms of relations to sanctity
cannot be incorporated in clear and unambiguous
requirements. Even the early Christian communities did
not try to do so and the entire history of Christianity has
mostly tended to diversity.
The organisation of the religious life, however, was a
factor that, through political and social circumstances,
affected the state of pluralism significantly. By seeking
support only among the powerful of this world, the church
reinforced its structures yet often to the detriment of
pluralism and connections with ordinary people, believers.
The times of stability were always beneficial to the
common church life. Any significant political turmoil
resulted in new approaches to the surroundings and the
whole world both in social structures and inside the
church. In this context, it was the upheavals in Europe
around 1990 that brought the most relevant stimuli for
pluralism in Christianity, accentuating the need to conduct
a mutual internal dialogue and discussions with the wide
public. Moreover, it is obvious, in the Czech church in
particular, that thanks to “unfavourable external objective
conditions“, opponents, who normally negotiate only, are
ready to cooperate actively.
Religious pluralism is accompanied by a diversity of
attitudes and views between and inside the churches.
Multilateral discussions may have contrasting effects. They
include both people who flexibly promote the Christian,
inter‐religious and social dialogues, and individuals who
adhere to their positions tenaciously. The endeavour to
spread love is anchored in the very essence of Christianity
and supports the assumption that religious pluralism can
substantially enrich the church life now and in the future.
226

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Le Soleil de Justice dans le Nouveau Testament et les
ouvrages des écrivains ecclésiastiques
Iulian MOGA *
*"Al. I. Cuza" University, Faculty of History,
Blvd. Carol, No. 11, Iaşi 700506, Romania,
E‐mail Address: chairman_me2000@yahoo.co.uk
Abstract
In the Christian sources, whether we speak about the
New Testament or the works of the Apostolic Fathers, those
of the Apologetic ones or of all the church writers up to John
of Damascus – and we can include here the ones belonging to
Asia Minor, the Cappadocian Fathers –, the concept of Sun of
Justice, which strictly refers to one of the personnae of the
Holy Trinity or to the concept of divinity as a whole, acquires
new meanings. It emphasizes most of the doctrinary aspects
from the Nicaean credo much before the first two
Ecumenical Synods. Therefore, we will at first try to present
the context in which the expression occurs at the Holy
Fathers, confining our examples up to the second half of the
fourth century, in order to underline its importance with
direct reference to the iconomy of redemption.
Abrégé
Dans les sources chrétiennes, soit qu’il s’agisse du
Nouveau Testament ou des écritures des pères apostoliques,
des apologètes ou de tous les écrivains ecclésiastiques
jusqu’à Jean de Damas – y compris bien sûr ceux qui sont
originaires de l’Asie Mineure, les pères cappadociens –, le
concept de Soleil de Justice, qu’il se réfère strictement à
l’une des personnes de la Sainte Trinité où à la divinité en
ensemble, acquiert de nouvelles valences. Il arrive à
souligner la majorité des aspects doctrinaires du symbole
nicéen de croyance beaucoup avant les deux synodes
œcuméniques. On essayera donc de présenter d’abord le
contexte où l’expression (Soleil de Justice) apparaît aux
Pères Saints, en donnant des exemples représentatifs pour la
période jusqu’à deuxième moitié du VI e siècle, et puis on va
souligner son importance, surtout dans l’iconomie de la
rédemption.
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Le texte de l’Évangile parle de l’astre levant venu d’en haut
pour donner au peuple le salut par le pardon des péchés par la
grâce de Dieu. «Il est apparu à ceux qui se trouvent dans les
ténèbres et l’ombre de la mort, afin de guider nos pas sur la
route de la paix» 1 . Etant lumière spirituelle, il n’a pas pu être
vaincu par l’obscurité, mais il l’a emportée 2 . L’Apôtre avait été
appelé pour parler de la lumière 3 et de l’incarnation du
Verbe 4 , le Fils Unique du Père, qui n’est pas né du sang, ni d’un
vouloir de chair, ni d’un vouloir d’homme, mais de Dieu 5 . C’est
comme ça que l’ange Gabriel aussi avait annoncé la naissance
de ce qui allait s’appeler soi même «la Lumière du monde» 6 :
«Voici que tu vas être enceinte, tu enfanteras un fils et tu lui
donneras le nom de Jésus. Il sera grand et sera appelé fils du
Très‐Haut. Le Seigneur Dieu lui donnera le trône de David son
père. (…) L’Esprit Saint viendra sur toi et la puissance du Très‐
Haut te couvrira de son ombre; c’est pourquoi celui qui va
naître sera saint et sera appelé Fils de Dieu. (…) car rien n’est
impossible à Dieu» 7 .
Dans l’article précedant on a parlé du rapprochement entre
les notions de germe/rejeton et celui de Levant, à partir du
double sens du mot anatole qui traduit celui de semah du texte
hébraïque. C’est l’interprétation que Justin le Martyr (100‐
165 ap. J.‐C.) donne trois fois aux passages des livres des
prophètes Zacharie et Jérémie. Toujours avec cette
signification on doit percevoir l’expression «l’astre levant venu
d’en haut», que Zacharie, père de Jean‐Baptiste, utilise lorsqu’il
bénit Dieu et prophétise l’apparition du petit Jésus 8 . Mais
outre le sens de Levant, Justin indique d’autres dénominations
utilisées dans l’Ancien Testament pour désigner Jésus‐Christ:
ange, étoile, Fils de l’homme, sagesse, Fils de Dieu, jour, aube,
1 Luc, 1, 77‐79.
2 Jean, 1,5; Athénagore, Supplique au sujet des chrétiens, 31 (SC,
3, p. 157‐158); Clément d’Alexandrie, Les Stromates, V, 5, 29, 6 (SC,
278, p. 72‐73); Eusebiu de Cezareea, Despre sfântul mormânt (Du Saint
Sepulcre), 8 (PSB, 14, p. 225); Sf. Ioan Damaschin, Dogmatica, IV, 12.
3 Jean, 1, 9.
4 Ibidem, 1, 13‐14.
5 Ibidem, 1, 13.
6 Jean, 8, 12; 8, 18‐19; 9, 5.
7 Luc, 1, 31‐37.
8 Luc, 1, 68‐79.
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bâton, fleur, la pierre du bout de l’ongle 9 , Homme unique, sans
péché 10 . Mais de même que Saint Irénée de Lyon (130‐200
ap. J.‐C.), St. Justin mentionne deux aspects dogmatiques très
importants: la préexistence du Fils Unique du Père depuis
toujours et la double nature de Jésus, divine et humaine, élu en
ce qui concerne le corps de la dynastie de David 11 . Autrement
dit, c’est le Fils de Dieu et le Fils de l’Homme. On peut y ajouter
l’affirmation de la consubstantialité, de l’évangile selon Jean:
«Moi et le Père nous sommes un» 12 . C’est donc beaucoup avant
que les dogmes respectifs soient définitivement établis dans le
credo nicéen. La même importance a la mention de Justin sur
la triple qualité sous laquelle a actionné Jésus dans le monde et
qui a été préfigurée dans les prophéties de l’Ancien Testament:
celle de prêtre éternel, d’empereur des cieux et de prophète 13 .
Au sujet de la préexistence du Fils, St. Justin ajoute, en
complétant le tableau doctrinaire avec des arguments de la
Bible, qu’avant tout, Dieu a crée de Lui‐même un principe et un
certain pouvoir rationnel, appelé par le Saint Esprit Gloire de
Dieu ou Fils ou Sagesse, ange, Dieu, Seigneur, Verbe, et parfois
Il s’appelle soi‐même Maître principal de l’armée, par exemple
lorsqu’il apparaît à figure humaine à Josué Navi. Car il se
nomme toujours selon la manière dans laquelle il servit la
volonté divine et du fait qu’il est né du Père par volonté 14 .
Celui qui renforcera les affirmations de Justin au sujet de la
perception de la divinité en général, mais aussi au celui des
personnes de la Trinité c’est son contemporain, Théophile
d’Antioche (deuxième moitié du II e siècle ap. J.‐C.). Il est bien
connu d’ailleurs l’apport des Antiochiens à l’enrichissement du
vocabulaire théologique chrétien. Si son prédécesseur, Ignace
le Théophore, a été le premier écrivain ecclésiastique à avoir
9 Sf. Iustin Martirul, Dialog cu iudeul Trifon (Dialogue avec le Juif
Tryphon), 100; 106; 126 (PSB, 2, p. 210, 217‐218, 240).
10 Ibidem, 17.
11 Ibidem, 100; DTO, p. 190‐191.
12 Jean, 10, 30.
13 Sf. Iustin Martirul, op.cit., 36; 42; 45 (PSB, 2, p. 130‐131, 137,
140‐141).
14 Ibidem, 54 et 61.
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utilisé les termes de christianisme (christianismos) et d’Église
universelle (katholike Ekklesia), Théophile a eu le mérite
d’avoir utilisé le terme de Trinité (Trias) justement pour
souligner l’unité de Dieu dans les trois personnes de la Trinité
– Dieu le Père, le Verbe et la Sagesse ou le Saint Esprit. Ainsi
que lui‐même le montre, le Verbe c’est Dieu, Fils de Dieu, né de
Dieu 15 . Dans son dialogue avec Autolycus, il dit que la déité ne
peut pas être perçue avec les yeux du corps, parce que Dieu est
illimité et il ne peut pas être saisi par ceux qui n’ont l’âme
pure. Car les péchés, dit‐il rendent obscure et sont comme une
impureté qui, une fois entrée dans l’œil, t’empêche de voir la
lumière du soleil, c’est à dire Jésus‐Christ 16 . Pour lui la
différence entre l’homme et son créateur est semblable à celle
entre le soleil et la lune. C’est une différence basée non
seulement sur l’importance, donnée par le pouvoir et par la
gloire, mais aussi parce que l’homme, de même que la lune, a
besoin de la lumière du soleil. De manière pareille, les étoiles,
en fonction de leur luminosité sont des images des prophètes
et des justes; les étoiles errantes seulement, auxquelles
l’obscurité des ténèbres se garde pour eux dans l’éternité 17 ,
représentent ceux qui quittent la loi, les apostats, associés par
l’apôtre Juda avec ceux qui suivent la voie de Caïn ou celle des
errances des Balaam 18 . De la même manière que Justin,
Théophile d’Antioche énumère les principaux dénominations
attribuées à la divinité dans un des plus beaux passages de la
littérature chrétienne qui parlent de l’essence et de la nature
de Dieu: «Sa gloire le rend sans limite, sa grandeur sans
bornes, sa hauteur au‐dessus de toute idée, sa force
incommensurable, sa sagesse sans équivalent, sa bonté
inimitable, sa bienfaisance indicible. Si je l’appelle «lumière»,
c’est une de ses créatures que je nomme; si je l’appelle
«Verbe», c’est son principe; l’appelé‐je «intelligence»? c’est son
intelligence; l’appelé‐je «souffle»? c’est sa propre respiration;
l’appelé‐je «sagesse»? c’est ce qu’il engendre; l’appelé‐je
15 Théophile d’Antioche, Trois livres à Autolycus, II, 22 (SC, 20, p.
154‐157).
16 Ibidem, I, 2 (SC, 20, p. 60‐63).
17 Juda, 1, 13.
18 Théophile de l’Antioche, op.cit, II, 14; 29 (SC, 20, p. 134‐137,
174‐175).
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«force»? c’est sa domination; l’appelé‐je «puissance»? c’est son
activité; l’appelé‐je «providence»? c’est sa bonté; l’appelé‐je
«souveraineté»? c’est sa gloire; l’appelé‐je «seigneur»? c’est le
dire juge; l’appelé‐je «juge»? c’est le dire juste; l’appelé‐je
«père»? c’est dire tout ce que j’en puis dire; l’appelé‐je «feu»?
c’est sa colère que je nomme. (…) Il n’a pas de commencement
parce qu’il n’est pas engendré; il est immuable autant
qu’immortel. (…) Il est Seigneur parce qu’il est maître de tout;
Père parce qu’il existe avant tout; Fondateur, Créateur, parce
qu’il a tout produit et crée; Très‐Haut, parce qu’il est supérieur
à tout; universel Souverain, car lui‐même il est maître de tout
et il contient tout» 19 .
Méliton de Sardes, dont la christologie se rapproche de
celle d’Irénée et de Justin le Martyr, offre une parallèle
intéressante entre le lever quotidien du soleil de l’Océan
universel et son plongeon dans l’eau froide au coucher d’une
part et le baptême de Jésus dans le Jourdain de l’autre 20 . Une
des appellations qu’il attribue à l’océan est celle de «baptistère
du soleil». Un tel rapprochement entre l’idée de baptême et
celle de lumière se retrouve d’ailleurs chez Justin le Martyr 21 ,
chez Clément d’Alexandrie 22 ou chez Tertullien, où le baptême
est appelé couramment «illumination», parce que ceux qui
sont baptisés deviennent éclairés. Le baptême est d’habitude
mis en relation avec l’idée de Levant, car celui qui va être
baptisé reconnaît sa foi en priant tourné vers l’est 23 . En
prenant certains éléments de la philosophie païenne, surtout
d’Héraclite et des stoïciens, Méliton croyait que le soleil se
renouvelait chaque matin et qu’il se nourrissait de l’eau où il se
19 Ibidem, I, 3‐4 (SC, 20, p. 62‐67).
20 Méliton de Sardes, Fragments (Sur le baptême), VIIIb, 3 (SC,
123, p. 229‐233); J. Daniélou, Simbolurile creştine primitive (Les
symboles chrétiens primitifs), p. 79, n. 19, ou l’on indique de façon
éronée le numéro du fragment, VI au lieu de VIIIb.
21 Sf. Iustin Martirul, Apologii, I, 61 (PSB, 2, p. 67); idem, Dialogul
cu iudeul Trifon (Dialogue avec le Juif Tryphon), 39, 6 (PSB, 2, p. 134).
22 Clément d’Alexandrie, Les Stromates, V, 2, 15, 3 (SC, 278, p. 46‐
49=PSB, 5, p. 319); idem, Le pédagogue, I, 6, 26, 1‐I, 6, 30, 3 (SC, 70, p.
158‐167).
23 A. Hamman, La prière, dans ANRW, II, 23.2, p. 1211.
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levait à chaque coucher comme «un baptême mystique» 24 . La
lune et les étoiles ne faisaient que suivre son exemple et
plongeaient eux aussi dans ce baptistère du soleil en se
purifiant le scintillement. Brûlant comme une torche qui ne
s’éteint jamais, il montait chaque matin dans son char tiré par
des chevaux de feu, pour parcourir sa route quotidienne à
travers les cieux. D’une manière pareille, Jésus‐Christ a plongé
dans le Jourdain, Lui qui est Maître de la création, le Soleil de
l’Orient qui apparaît tant aux morts de Hadès qu’aux mortels.
St. Hippolyte (170‐236 ap. J.‐C.) ajoute de nouvelles
valences en plan symbolique, en appelant Jésus jour, soleil et
an. C’est la raison pour laquelle les apôtres sont associés aux
heures du jour et aux mois de l’année. C’est une image
symbolique prise du milieu judéo‐chrétien qui sera
développée ultérieurement par de nombreux autres auteurs
chrétiens comme Méthode d’Olympe, Origène, St. Cyprien, St.
Ambroise, Zénon de Vérone et St. Augustin. C’est l’image qui a
facilité la comparaison avec les douze tribus d’Israël, mais
aussi avec les douze signes du cycle zodiacal 25 .
Clément d’Alexandrie (vers 150‐entre 211 et 215 ap. J.‐
C.), en associant Jésus au soleil, il lui donne trois
dénominations: le Soleil de l’âme d’abord, parce qu’il se lève
des profondeurs de l’esprit et illumine le regard de l’âme 26 ,
une image très proche de celle présentée au V e siècle par St.
Maxime le Confesseur, lorsqu’il parle du soleil intelligible de la
justice, qui doit être différentié de celui sensible 27 . On doit faire
la différence entre le premier, nommé d’ailleurs «le maître du
feu» ou «le maître des vents», et sa création, l’astre solaire, car
c’est le Créateur qui est l’illuminateur du soleil sensible 28 .
En deuxième lieu, il est le Soleil de la Résurrection qui
existe avant l’acte de la Création, parce qu’il est né avant
l’étoile du matin. Il «a donné de la vie par ses rayons» avec
lesquels il peut éveiller et faire lever de l’obscurité même, ceux
24 F. Cumont, Lux perpetua, p. 289‐293.
25 J. Délumeau, op.cit., p. 111‐113; F. Tristan, op.cit., p. 310.
26 Clément d’Alexandrie, Le protreptique, VI, 68, 4 (SC, 2, p. 133‐
134=PSB, 4, p. 126).
27 Maxim Mărturisitorul, Ambigua, 41.
28 Clément d’Alexandrie, op.cit., VI, 67, 2 (SC, 2, p. 132‐133=PSB,
4, p. 125).
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qui s’y sont égarés 29 . Il est le maître du jour éternel, car le
véritable «aujourd’hui», c’est le jour continu de Dieu, «l’image
de l’éternité, et le jour est le symbole de la lumière et le Logos
est la lumière des hommes, par laquelle nous voyons Dieu» 30 .
C’est pourquoi St. Cyprien de Carthage (210‐258 ap. J.‐C.)
conseillait les croyants de prier le vrai Soleil et la vraie lumière
le matin et le soir et dans chaque moment du jour et de la nuit,
car pour les fils de la lumière, la nuit est jour aussi 31 . Et on ne
doit pas prier n’importe comment, ajoute Clément
d’Alexandrie, mais en regardant vers l’est, car c’est de là qu’est
montée la lumière qui a fait que les ignorants connaissent la
vérité; et c’est pourquoi l’Orient représente «l’image du jour de
naissance» 32 .
Troisièmement, Jésus‐Christ est le Soleil de Justice. Au ce
sujet, Clément donne les plus détaillées et le plus intéressantes
explications de l’utilisation de cette formule par tous les
écrivains ecclésiastiques. D’abord la justice est le résultat de sa
bonté et de sa patience illimitées, parce que Dieu répand
partout sa lumière, non différentiée, en donnant à tous la
possibilité de la recevoir n’importe quel soit leur état et
n’importe s’ils lui obéissent ou non. La lumière de Jésus est
beaucoup plus forte et beaucoup plus importante que celle du
soleil sensible, car c’est par elle que les aveugles retrouvent
leur vue, la nuit disparaît, le feu prend peur et la mort s’en
29 Ibidem, IX, 84, 1‐2 (SC, 2, p. 151=PSB, 4, p. 137).
30 Ibidem, IX, 84, 6 (SC, 2, p. 152=PSB, 4, p. 138).
31 Sf. Ciprian, Despre rugăciunea domnească (La prière du
Seigneur), 34‐35.
32 Clément d’Alexandrie, Les Stromates, VII, 43, 6‐8 (SC, 428, p.
150‐153=PSB, 5, p. 503): «Et puisque l’orient est une image du jour de
naissance et que de la grandit la lumière qui resplendit hors des
ténèbres, mais que (de la) aussi s’est levé à la façon du soleil le jour de
la connaissance de la vérité pour ceux qui erraient dans l’ignorance,
c’est vers le soleil matinal que se font les prières. Aussi les plus
anciens des temples regardaient‐ils vers le couchant; cela permettait
aux gens
debout face aux statues d’apprendre a se tourner vers
l’orient». Pour la prière vers l’est, A. Hamman, op.cit., p. 1209‐1212.
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va 33 . Ce qui est intéressant aussi c’est la parallèle que l’auteur
fait entre la route parcourue chaque jour par l’astre solaire à
travers la voûte céleste à l’ordonnance du Père et la voie
éternelle suivie par le Fils à travers toute l’humanité en tant
que Soleil de Justice: «„le Soleil de justice”, qui passe partout
dans sa chevauchée, visite également toute l’humanité, imitant
Son Père qui „sur tous les hommes fait lever son soleil” distille
la rosée de la vérité», la rosée de la vraie croyance 34 . Bien que
dans le texte ne soit mentionnée explicitement l’existence d’un
certain véhicule du soleil, le rapprochement avec le motif
iconographique représenté par la fresque de la catacombe des
Saints Pierre et Marcellin ou celui de l’hypogée de Vatican est
évident 35 . On entrevoit une association avec le motif du
Rédempteur comme «eau de la vie» ou comme «source de l’eau
vive» 36 , un symbole du principe créateur, régénérateur et
purificateur 37 , ainsi qu’il apparaît mentionné dans les écritures
bibliques 38 , esséniennes 39 ou chez les apologètes 40 .
Pour Clément, Jésus‐Christ est nommé Soleil de Justice
parce qu’Il a offert à tout le monde la possibilité de recevoir le
vrai héritage, en plantant la nouvelle loi dans les âmes et en
donnant le prêche qui divinise l’être humain. Dieu a voulu
débarrasser l’homme des chaînes du péché, de la volupté, avec
lesquels Adam s’est lié au moment où il avait été attiré par le
serpent et a cause duquel il avait été jeté du jardin du paradis.
Mais par le miracle de l’incarnation et puis par la soumission
33 Clément d’Alexandrie, Le protreptique, XII, 119, 3 (SC, 2, p.
189=PSB, 4, p. 159): «Le Christ brille plus que le soleil, lui qui fait voir
les yeux des aveugles; la nuit fuira loin de toi, le feu prendra peur, la
mort s’en ira; tu verras les cieux, ô, vieillard…».
34 Ibidem, XI, 114, 3 (SC, 2, p. 182=PSB, 4, p. 155).
35 J. Daniélou, op.cit., p. 78‐79.
36 Jérémie, 2, 13; Ézechiel, 47, 1; Zacharie, 14, 8.
37 Sf. Iustin Martirul, Dialog cu iudeul Trifon (Dialogue avec le Juif
Tryphon), 14 (PSB, 2, p. 106).
38 Isaie, 41, 18; Jean, 4, 10‐14.
39 Dans l’Hymne O, 4‐8 de Qumrân, Le Maître de justice est
envisagé tant comme «un jaillissement d’eau dans une terre aride» et
plantateur «des arbres de la vie» de la plantation éternelle, que comme
«fontaine éternelle» (Écrits intertestamentaires, p. 264‐265); voir aussi
F. Tristan, op.cit., p. 36.
40 Sf. Iustin Martirul, op.cit., 69 (PSB, 2, p. 175).
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du serpent et de la mort, à savoir du péché 41 , «Le Seigneur est
étendu et l’homme s’est relevé; celui qui était tombé du
paradis reçoit une récompense encore plus grande de sa
soumission, le ciel» 42 . C’est le rôle même de la transformation
symbolique de l’obscurité en lumière et du coucher en lever,
car ceux qui avaient été «emprisonnés à l’ombre de la mort»
ont pu recevoir la lumière éternelle de la dignité, une lumière
plus pure que celle du soleil: «C’est lui qui a changé le couchant
en orient, la mort en vie par sa crucifixion, qui a arraché
l’homme à la perdition pour l’attacher au firmament; il
transplante la corruption pour qu’elle devienne
incorruptibilité, il transforme la terre en cieux, lui le laboureur
de Dieu, „qui répand des signes favorables, excite les peuples à
l’œuvre” du bien, „rappelle le moyen de vivre” selon la vérité; il
nous gratifie de l’héritage paternel, réellement grand et divin,
et inamissible; il divinise les hommes par un enseignement
céleste, „donnant des lois à leur intelligence et les inscrivant
dans leur cœur”» 43 .
Jésus‐Christ est aussi juge et maître des armées: le Christ‐
Logos prononce l’homélie de la justice – qui peut conduire vers
la mort éternelle de ceux qui ne la suivent et peut être parole
rédemptrice pour ceux qui suivent l’ordonnance – et en même
temps il convoque ses soldats pour la guerre invisible contre le
Mauvais 44 . L’Evangile de la paix est perçue comme une
trompette destinée à réunir «son armée non sanglante» et
d’annoncer la guerre pour «éteindre les flèches enflammés du
diable». Ce qui est promis aux soldats c’est le royaume des
cieux: «les armes non vulnérables» de l’armée de Jésus‐Christ
ne sont, paradoxalement, de nature matérielle, car ce n’est
ainsi qu’on peut lutter contre les esprits malins. Ce sont les
armées de la paix, du Saint Esprit, les mêmes que celles
énumérées par St. Apôtre Paul dans son épître aux Ephésiens:
41 Clément d’Alexandrie, Le protreptique, XI, 115, 2 (SC, 2, p. 183‐
184=PSB, 4, p. 156).
42 Ibidem, XI, 111, 1‐3 (SC, 2, p. 179=PSB, 4, p. 153).
43 Ibidem, XI, 114, 1‐4 (SC, 2, p. 182‐183=PSB, 4, p. 155).
44 Ibidem, XI, 116, 1‐3 (SC, 2, p. 184‐185=PSB, 4, p. 156‐157).
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la cuirasse de la justice, le bouclier de la foi, la casque du salut,
l’épée de l’Esprit, qui est la parole de Dieu 45 .
Dans un autre ouvrage, Clément fait une comparaison
entre la philosophie hellène et l’écriture chrétienne. La
philosophie païenne a joué son rôle jusqu’à la propagation du
Verbe. Cette idée à été mise en rélief plusieurs fois par des
Pères de l’Église comme Clément d’Alexandrie, Lactance ou
Eusèbe de Césarée, qui ont essayé de prouver qu’il avait
vraiment existé une période de préparation évangélique et que
certains écrivains d’avant l’apparition de Messie avaient pu
arriver à une connaissance assez profonde de la vérité. Mais
cet essai avait été partial et tronqué. C’est pour cela que la
philosophie est semblable à la lumière de la lampe qui n’est
utile que pendant la nuit et qui ne représente que la lumière
habilement volée du soleil par les hommes, c’est une imitation
faible du feu, du «Soleil si grand de la lumière spirituelle» 46 .
Selon Grégoire de Nazianze (329‐389 ap. J.‐C.), le
baptême de Dieu constitue une possibilité de parallélisme avec
le même symbolisme solaire qu’on a trouvé chez Méliton de
Sardes, chez St. Justin ou chez Clément d’Alexandrie. Le
baptême représente l’image de l’enterrement symbolique
d’Adam l’Ancien et de la sanctification à l’intermédiaire de
l’eau et du Saint Esprit. La réplique que St. Jean‐Baptiste donne
à Jésus permet à Grégoire de Nazianze de faire une
comparaison entre les deux personnages sous la forme d’une
série de correspondances homologues 47 . On trouve le même
symbolisme en ce qui concerne les Pâques, les lumières de la
nuit de la résurrection annonçant la grande lumière qui brille
dans les cieux et qui couvre tout le monde 48 , et l’agneau qui a
un an, par son symbole de soleil de justice est couronne bénie
45 Éphesiens, 6, 10‐16; voir aussi Romains, 13, 12: «La nuit est
avancée, le jour est tout proche. Rejetons donc les œuvres des ténèbres
et revetons les armes de la lumière»; Ps. 45 (44), 7; Ps. 7, 12‐13; Sf.
Ciprian, Despre gelozie şi invidie, 10‐11; Sf. Iustin Martirul, Dialog cu
iudeul Trifon (Dialogue avec le Juif Tryphon), 38 (PSB, 3, p. 499‐500).
46 Clément d’Alexandrie, Les Stromates, V, 5, 29, 5‐6 (SC, 278, p.
72‐73=PSB, 5, p. 327‐328); à comparer avec Matthieu, 5, 15‐16.
47 Sf. Grigorie de Nazianz, Cuvântare la Sfintele Lumini (Sur la
fête des lumières), 15.
48 Idem, Cuvântare la Sfintele Paşti (Homélie prononcée au temps
de Pâques) (1), 2.
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de la bonté 49 , mais aussi Dieu crucifié, soleil assombrit et
illuminé à nouveau 50 .
Dans un des ses commentaires aux textes des psaumes, St.
Basile le Grand (330‐379 ap. J.‐C.) souligne que, bien que le
Soleil de Justice soit venu pour éclairer tout homme qui vient
au monde, ce ne sont pas tous qui reçoivent, par la grâce
divine, l’illumination et la communion de son éclat n’est pas
prise «que par ceux qui mènent une vie digne de Lui». En
prenant comme argument un verset des Psaumes où l’on
montre que la lumière s’est levée non pas pour le pécheur,
mais pour le juste 51 , il continue: «De même que le Soleil s’est
levé, mais non pour les chauves‐souris, ni pour les autres
animaux qui paissent durant la nuit, la lumière a, par sa nature,
l’attribut de briller, mais ce ne sont pas tous qui prennent
communion de sa brillance». L’évêque cappadocien se réfère
ici au moment du jugement final et du retour de la mort à la vie,
«le jour du juste jugement de Dieu, quand il viendra illuminer
les obscurités et de dévoiler les pensées» 52 . En ce moment‐là
ceux qui ont péché et ne se sont approchés de la vraie lumière,
bien qu’ils aient eu cette opportunité pendant toute leur vie, ils
iront vers la réprimande et vers la honte. Il ajoute que, pour
que la honte soit plus terrible que l’obscurité et le feu éternel –
appelé parfois «le feu purifiant» ou «le feu du jugement» 53 ”–,
ils auront tout le temps devant les yeux l’image des péchés
qu’ils ont commis, «comme une teinture qu’on ne peut pas
effacer».
Un autre commentaire de l’évêque cappadocien met en
évidence des points de vue communs avec ceux exprimés par
les autres Pères de l’Église, surtout Clément d’Alexandrie. Dieu
se trouve au milieu de la cité qui n’est pas ébranlée, car «Dieu
49 Ibidem, 13; J. Délumeau, op.cit., p. 117.
50 Sf. Grigorie de Nazianz, Cuvântare la Sfintele Paşti (Homélie
prononcée au temps de Pâques) (1), 29.
51 Ps. 97 (96), 11‐12.
52 Sf. Vasile cel Mare, Omilie la Psalmul XXXIII (Homélie sur le
Psalme XXXIII), 4.
53 Sf. Iustin Martirul, Dialog cu iudeul Trifon (Dialogue avec le Juif
Tryphon), 56; idem, Apologii Apologies), II, 7‐9.
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la secourt dès le point du jour», dit le psalmiste 54 . Qu’il s’agisse
du Jérusalem céleste ou de l’Église visible, la cité ne s’ébranle
pas, car la divinité s’est fait foyer au milieu d’elle, et c’est d’ici
que celle‐là propage ses rayons dans tous les coins : «Dieu est
au milieu d’elle et répand partout ses rayons. C’est ainsi que la
justice divine est gardée: Il distribue avec la même mesure sa
bonté». Il aide la cité en y emmenant l’aurore par le lever du
Soleil de justice, l’éternelle lumière spirituelle qui éclaire les
âmes et évanouit l’obscurité de la méconnaissance et de la
méchanceté. Ceux qui sont dignes de la recevoir deviennent
des fils de la lumière. Mais l’aide divin doit être reçu au point du
jour, car Jésus‐Christ a vaincu la mort dans le matin du
troisième jour après sa crucifixion 55 .
Ces rayons du Soleil de Justice desquels parlait Saint Basile
le Grand sont, selon Grégoire de Nysse (335‐395 ap. J.‐C.), les
vertus qui doivent guider la vie des croyants. Elles ont leur
source en Jésus qui représente, entre autres symboles et
significations profondes qu’on a lui donnés, la vraie lumière
éloignée du mensonge. En laissant de côté les actes tus de la
honte, nous devenons nous‐mêmes une telle lumière et nous
pouvons éclairer d’autres personnes à notre tour par nos
propres actes. De la même manière que ses antécesseurs qui
ont indiqué le rapprochement entre le baptême et la lumière, il
montre que par la naissance du haut, de l’eau et du Saint
esprit, c’est‐à‐dire par le bain du baptême, les chrétiens
deviennent des fils du jour et de la lumière et des frères de
Messie, car ils ont choisi la voie de la lumière, celle vers «la vie
pure et sainte» 56 .
Le témoignage de Saint Macaire l’Egyptien (300‐390 ap.
J.‐C.) est important non seulement de la perspective de
l’interprétation et du déchiffrement de la vision allégorique
d’Ézéchiel au sujet du chariot céleste et de la main qui le dirige,
mais aussi pour avoir expliqué le rôle du Soleil de Justice dans
l’économie de la Rédemption. Selon lui, Dieu a conçu le corps et
54 Ps. 46 (45), 5‐6.
55 Sf. Vasile cel Mare, Omilie la Psalmul XLV (Homélie sur le
Psalme XLV), 5.
56 Sf. Grigorie de Nyssa, Despre desăvârşire, către monahul
Olimpiu (PSB, 30, p. 459‐460, 462, 470‐471) (Lettre à Olympios
touchant la perfection).
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l’âme de telle manière qu’ils n’aient pas d’autosuffisance, c'est‐
à‐dire que pour pouvoir vivre, ils doivent recevoir du dehors
ce qui est nécessaire pour leur existence. Le corps a été
construit en état nu et il a besoin de nourriture, de liquides et
de vêtements. C’est pareil pour l’âme qui, sans la lumière
divine qui l’a créé, n’est pas capable d’acquérir la vie éternelle
et elle meurt: sans la lumière divine, lui qui a été créé à l’image
de Dieu périt. Car Dieu a voulu que l’âme ait la vie éternelle
non par soi même, mais de la divinité, du Saint Esprit 57 . C’est
exactement ce que Tatien disait deux siècles plus tôt aux Grecs,
que l’âme de l’homme n’est pas immortelle en soi que
seulement par l’apport de Dieu, comme don de celui‐ci par la
résurrection de Jésus 58 . L’homme était incapable d’un acte
pareil par lui‐même. Le Vrai Archange est venu dans le monde
pour détruire le corps pécheur des ténèbres que l’homme a
acquiert lorsqu’Adam a transgressé l’ordonnance de Dieu et a
obéi le serpent malin. Tout ce qui est visible représente
seulement une ombre des vraies réalités de l’âme. Outre
l’homme visible il existe aussi un autre, profond rendu aveugle
et sourd par Satan. C’est dans ce but que Jésus‐Christ est venu,
pour guérir cet homme profond 59 . Par suite, le croyant doit
s’éloigner de l’homme ancien 60 , sacrifier son âme et mourir
dans la ration et dans la vie qu’il a menés antérieurement et
acquérir un nouveau mode de vie, en Dieu, c’est à dire que
l’esprit du péché soit détruit, que nous revêtions et que nous
recevions l’âme de l’Esprit céleste, que nous soyons transférés
de la méchanceté des ténèbres à la lumière de Jésus‐Christ 61 . Il
est impossible que l’esprit arrive à la vie éternelle s’il ne naît
pas pendant la vie terrestre pour la patrie des vifs en se
nourrissant des biens qui s’y trouvent, revêtant l’habit divin et
57 Sf. Macarie Egipteanul, Omilii (Homélies), I, 10 (PSB, 34, p. 92).
58 Tațian Asirianul, Cuvânt către greci (Diatessaron), 13; J.
Pelikan, Tradiția creştină. O istorie a dezvoltării doctrinei, I, Naşterea
tradiției universale (100‐600) (La Tradition chrétienne), traduction par
Silvia Palade, Éd. Polirom, Iaşi, 2004, p. 53.
59 Sf. Macarie Egipteanul, op.cit., XXXIII, 4 (PSB, 34, p. 241).
60 Ibidem, II, 2 (PSB, 34, p. 94).
61 Ibidem, I, 6‐9 (PSB, 34, p. 90‐91).
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augmentant sa croyance en Dieu. Donc il peut obtenir la vie
éternelle, par patience, par obéissance, par vertu par croyance
et en s’efforçant beaucoup durant la vie terrestre 62 , en ouvrant
les yeux de son âme et en recevant la vraie lumière – Jésus‐
Christ en tant que Soleil de la justice, le vrai Soleil ou le dernier
Adam – en transformant son âme en foyer où son Seigneur
puisse siéger 63 . Ainsi le croyant arrive à recevoir pendant sa
vie le trésor éternel, c'est‐à‐dire le pouvoir ou la grâce du Saint
Esprit. Il ne craint pas, mais il est heureux au moment où il
quitte le corps, parce qu’il a ce foyer céleste du Saint Esprit et
la grâce qui au jour de le résurrection construira le siège du
corps 64 . Et au dernier jour son corps sera aussi illuminé et
glorifié tout comme l’âme 65 , avec la gloire de la lumière
céleste 66 . Toujours en ce moment‐là on rendra vraiment
justice à ces fils de la lumière et ils recevront l’héritage et se
transformeront en nature divine en devenant des Christs 67 .
Le motif du péché qui empêche l’homme d’orienter les
yeux de son esprit vers le Soleil de Justice, comme le montrait
d’ailleurs Théophile d’Antioche, est repris par St. Jean Cassien
(360‐435 ap. J.‐C.) dans sa lettre à l’évêque Castor. Il fait
référence surtout à huit péchés qui rend sombre l’âme, appelés
aussi «les huit esprits de la perdition». D’entre eux, l’esprit de
la fureur verse sa poison sur celui en cause en lui troublant la
raison et ne lui permettant pas de saisir ses propres fautes,
mais plutôt celles des autres. C’est le souffle qui couve de façon
insaisissable dans notre cœur en obscurcissant les yeux de
l’âme pour qu’on n’aie plus le pouvoir de discerner ce qui lui
est nécessaire et pour qu’on ne puisse arriver à regarder la
lumière divine, le Soleil de justice. C’est pourquoi, dit St.
Cassien, le conseil que St. Paul adresse dans sa lettre aux
Ephésiens, «que le soleil ne se couche pas sur votre
ressentiment» 68 ne doit être perçu strictement littéralement,
avec référence directe au fait que Dieu sait tous nos péchés et à
244
62 Ibidem, I, 11‐12 (PSB, 34, p. 92‐93).
63 Ibidem, XXVIII, 1‐5; XXXIII, 2‐4 (PSB, 34, p. 224‐225; 240‐241).
64 Ibidem, V, 6‐8 (PSB, 34, p. 118‐119).
65 Ibidem, XXXIV, 2 (PSB, 34, p. 242).
66 Ibidem, V, 9 (PSB, 34, p. 119).
67 Ibidem, XXXIV, 2‐3 (PSB, 34, p. 242‐243).
68 Éphessiens, 4, 26.

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la fureur du jour respectif, jusqu’au coucher du soleil, mais il se
réfère à un autre aspect, plus profond. Le Soleil de Justice c’est
Jésus‐Christ même, qu’on ne doit pas faire coucher dans nos
âmes pour que plus tard, par l’éloignement de Lui on perde la
lumière de la connaissance te le jugement droit et, sans le Saint
Esprit, qu’on fait lieu au diable 69 .
En conclusion, l’analyse des témoignages relève un fait
significatif, celui de l’existence d’un imaginaire symbolique
très élaboré et complexe en même temps, non seulement par
rapport à la personne de Jésus‐Christ, mais aussi en ce qui
concerne l’orientation des prières, des vaisseaux de l’église, la
signification de la résurrection et des saints sacrements de
l’eucharistie et du baptême. Tous ces éléments montrent un
profond symbolisme solaire. Malgré leur grand nombre, les
sources littéraires n’offrent beaucoup de détails relatifs au
sens de l’expression «Soleil de Vérité» ou aux implications
eschatologiques qui en découlent. L’explication la plus
détaillée en ce sens appartient à Clément d’Alexandrie, sur la
typologie tripartite duquel on s’est basé au moment où l’on a
parlé de l’iconomie de la Rédemption, au début du deuxième
chapitre. Jésus‐Christ n’est seulement un soleil intelligible de
l’âme, autre que le soleil sensible, qui dévoile les choses
profondes de tout homme. Sa justice est un acte de l’amour, de
la bonté, de la patience infinie de Dieu qui distribue sa lumière
physique et spirituelle dans le monde d’une manière égale. Il
offre à tous avec la même mesure et ne punit dès que l’homme
a péché, mais Il laisse à celui‐ci une période pendant laquelle il
puisse se redresser. Dieu a donné à tous la possibilité de
devenir des fils de la lumière, de recevoir l’héritage éternel, le
royaume divin, en suivant le modèle christique du repentir et
du pardon. Il a donné aux hommes l’opportunité de devenir
semblables à la divinité, comme au début de l’humanité,
pouvant se sacrer par obéissance et par vertu et par la lutte
incessante contre le Malin. Et ce qui est le plus important c’est
qu’Il a donné la possibilité de se débarrasser, du péché, car
69 Sf. Casian Romanul, Cele opt gânduri ale răutății (Les huit
mauvaises pensées), 4 (Filocalia, I, p. 145‐147).
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l’individu était incapable de se sauver lui‐même à cause de son
impuissance. Le Soleil de Vérité est en effet le Soleil
rédempteur, qui rachète les péchés. C’est celui par lequel Le
soleil de Vérité est en fait le Soleil Rédempteur, qui rachète les
péchés. C’est lui par lequel s’est accomplie toute la vérité, s’est
révélé l’économie, c’est‐à‐dire le projet divin de restauration
de l’esprit humain déchu lors du péché d’Adam, par le miracle
de l’incarnation et par le rachat de tous les péchés du monde
pal l’Agneau de Dieu. C’est la signification même de la
transformation du Couchant en Levant, car, par sa crucifixion,
il a changé la mort en vie et il a délivré l’homme des chaînes du
plaisir et du péché en le faisant partie de l’éternité. Ainsi son
âme est devenu immortel seulement par l’intervention de
Dieu, comme don de celui‐ci par la résurrection de Jésus‐
Christ.
Le Fils de Dieu est aussi le juge éternel, impartial, qui
jugera les actes des hommes au moment du jugement dernier.
Lors de sa venue dans le monde, il a prononcé ce que l’on a
nommé le prêche de la vérité, qui est pour la perte éternelle de
ceux qui ne suivent les ordonnances et ne prennent en
considération la demande de la divinité, ou comme parole
guérisseuse pour ceux qui ont fait de leur âme l’abri du Saint
Esprit.
246

Abréviations
Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
I. Dictionnaires. Encyclopédies
DGF ‐ Bailly, A., Dictionnaire grec‐français, Ed. Hachette, Paris, 1996
(1950).
DTO – Bria, I., Dicționar de teologie ortodoxă (Dictionnaire de
théologie orthodoxe), A‐Z, Éd. IBMBOR, Bucarest, 1994.
EChr ‐ Ferguson, E., McHugh, M.P., Norris, F.W. (ed.), Encyclopedia of
Early Christianity, second edition, Garland Publishing Inc., New York‐
London, 1999.
PGL ‐ Lampe, G.W.H., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford University
Press, London, 1968.
II. Collections
LCL ‐ Loeb Classical Library
PSB ‐ Părinți şi scriitori bisericeşti (Pères et écrivains
ecclésiastiques)
SC ‐ Sources Chrétiennes
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écrivains ecclésiastiques
Bibliographie
I. Dictionnaires. Atlas. Encyclopédies
1. Bailly, A, Dictionnaire grec‐français, Ed. Hachette, Paris,
1996 (1950).
2. Bria, I., Dicționar de teologie ortodoxă (Dictionnaire de
théologie orthodoxe), A‐Z, Éd. IBMBOR, 1994.
3. Daremberg, Ch., Saglio, Ed. (ed.), Dictionnaire des Antiquités
Grecques et Romaines, Akademische Druck ‐ u. Verlag Sanstalt, Graz
‐Autrrche, 1963‐1968.
4. Ferguson, E., McHugh, M.P., Norris, F.W. (ed.), Encyclopedia
of Early Christianity, second edition, Garland Publishing Inc., New
York‐ London, 1999.
5. Lampe, G.W.H., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford University
Press, London, 1968.
II. Sources. Éditions
1. Antologie din scrierile părinților latini (Anthologie des
ouvrages des pères latins), livre paru avec la bénédiction de Î.P.S.
Nicolae Corneanu, le métropolite du Banat, traduction du latin de
prof. Vasile Goraş, sous la direction de prof.pr.dr. Ştefan Alexe, Éd.
Anastasia, Bucarest, 2000.
2. Apologeții de limbă greacă (Les Apologistes de langue
grecque), PSB 2, traduction, introduction, notes et glossaire de T.
Bodogae, O. Căciulă, D, Fecioru, Éd. IMBBOR, Bucarest, 1997.
3. Apologeții de limbă latină (Les Apologistes de langue latine),
PSB 3, traduction de N. Chițescu, E. Constantinescu, P. Papadopol et
D. Popescu, introduction, notes et glossaire de N. Chițescu, Éd.
IBMBOR, Bucarest, 1981.
4. Athénagore, Supplique au sujet des chrétiens, SC 3,
introduction et traduction de Gustave Bardy, Éditions du Cerf /
Éditions de l’Abeille, Paris‐Lyon, 1943.
5. Biblia sau Sfânta Scriptură (La Bible), imprimée sous la
direction et avec le soin de PFP Teoctist, le patriarche de l’Eglise
Orthodoxe Roumaine, avec le consentement du Saint Synode, Éd.
IBMBOR, Bucarest, 1991.
6. La Bible. Ancien et Nouveau Testament, traduit de l’hébreu et
du grec en français courant, Société Biblique Française, Pierrefite,
1988.
7. La Bible, traduction œcumenique de la Bible comprenant
l’Ancien et le Nouveau Testament, traduits sur les textes originaux
hébreu et grec, avec introductions, notes essentielles, glossaire,
nouvelle édition revue, Alliance biblique universelle / Le Cerf,
Paris, 1995.
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
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8. La Bible. Écrits intertestamentaires, édition publiée sous la
direction d’André Dupont‐Sommer et Marc Philonenko, Éditions
Gallimard, Paris, 1987.
9. Clément d’Alexandrie, Le pédagogue, I, SC 70, texte grec,
introduction et notes de Henri‐Irénée Marrou, traduction de
Marguerite Harl, Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1960.
10. Clément d’Alexandrie, Le protreptique, I, SC 2, introduction,
traduction et notes de Claude Mondésert, deuxième édition revue et
augmentée du texte grec, avec la collaboration de M. André
Plassart, Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1949.
11. Clément d’Alexandrie, Les Stromates, V.1, SC 278,
introduction, texte critique et index par Alain Le Boulluec,
traduction de Pierre Voulet, Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1981.
12. Clément d’Alexandrie, Les Stromates, V.2, SC 279,
commentaire, bibliographie et index par Alain Le Boulluec, Les
Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1981.
13. Clément d’Alexandrie, Les Stromates, VII, SC, 428,
introduction, texte critique, traduction, et notes par Alain Le
Boulluec, Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1997.
14. Clement Alexandrinul (Clément d’Alexandrie), Scrieri
(Ecrits), traduction, avant‐propos, notes et index de pr. D. Fecioru,
Éd. IBMBOR, Bucarest, 1982,
I, Cuvânt de îndemn către eleni/Protrepticul (Le protreptique).
Pedagogul (Le pédagogue), PSB 4,
II, Stromatele (Les Stromates), PSB 5.
12. Sf. Grigorie de Nazianz (Saint Grégoire de Nazianze),
Cuvântări teologice (Lettres théologiques), traductin du grec pr. Gh.
Tilea et Nicolae Barbu, préceédées de La vie de Saint Grégoire Le
Théologien, écrite par le prêtre Grégoire (le VIII ème siècle),
traduction de N. Donos, Éd. Herald, Bucarest, s.a.
13. Sf. Grigorie de Nazianz (Saint Grégoire de Nazianze), Opere
dogmatice (Œuvres dogmatiques), traduction du grec de pr. dr. Gh.
Tilea, Éd. Herald, Bucarest, 2002.
14. Sf. Grigorie de Nyssa (Saint Grégoire de Nisse), Scrieri, II,
Scrieri exegetice, dogmatico‐polemice şi morale (Ecrits, II, Ecrits
exégétiques), PSB 30, traduction et notes de prof.pr.dr. Teodor
Bodogae, Éd. IBMBOR, Bucarest, 1998.
15. MACARIE Egipteanul (Macaire l’Egyptien), Sf. Scrieri. Omilii
duhovniceşti (Les Saints Écrits. Homélies spirituelles), PSB 34,
traduction de prof.dr. Constantin Cornițescu, introduction, index et
notes de prof.dr. N. Chițescu, Éd. IBMBOR, Bucarest, 1992.
16. Maxim Mărturisitorul (Saint Maxime le Confesseur),
Ambigua. Tâlcuiri ale unor locuri cu multe şi adânci înțelesuri din
sfinții Dionisie Areopagitul şi Grigorie Teologul (Ambigua. Questions
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écrivains ecclésiastiques
et difficultés sur des écrits de Denys l'Aréopagite et St Grégoire le
Théologien), PSB 80, traduction du grec, introduction et notes de
prof.dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Éd. IBMBOR, Bucarest, 1983.
17. Méliton de Sardes, Sur la Pâque et fragments, introduction,
texte critique, traduction, et notes par Othman Perler, SC 123, Les
Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1969.
18. Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, edited by James H.
Charlesworth, Doubleday, London‐New York‐Toronto‐Sydney‐
Auckland,
I, Apocalyptic Literature and Testaments, 1983;
II, Expansions of the ‘Old Testament’ and Legends, Wisdom and
Philosophical Literature, Prayers, Psalms, and Odes, Fragments of
Lost Judeo‐Hellenistic Works, 1985.
17. Scrierile părinților apostolici (Écrits des pères apostoliques),
traduction, notes et index de pr.dr. Dumitru Fecioru, Éd. IBMBOR,
Bucarest, 1995.
18. Tațian Asirianul (Tatien le Syrien), Cuvânt către greci (Le
Diatessaron), traduction du grec, introduction sur la vie et sur
l’oeuvre de l’auteue de Ion I. Popescu‐Piscu, Éd. du Saint Évêché de
Râmnic‐Noul Severin, Râmnicu‐Vâlcea, 1936.
19. Sf. Vasile cel Mare (Saint Basile‐le Grand), Tâlcuire
duhovnicească la Psalmi (Homélies sur les Psaumes), traduction et
notes de pr.prof. Dumitru Fecioru, Éd. IBMBOR, Bucarest, 2000.
III. Ouvrages
1. DANIELOU, Jean, Les symboles chrétiens primitifs, traduit en
Roumain par A. Oprić et E. Arjoca Ieremia, Éd. Amarcord, Timişoara,
1998.
2. Pelikan, J., Tradiția creştină. O istorie a dezvoltării doctrinei, I,
Naşterea tradiției universale (100‐600)(La Tradition chrétienne, I, La
Naissance de la tradition universelle (100‐600)), traduction de Silvia
Palade, Éd. Polirom, Iaşi, 2004.
3. TANTILLO, Ignazio, Attributi solari della figura imperiale in
Eusebio di Cesarea, dans MedAnt, 6, 2003, 2.
4. TRISTAN, Frédérick, Les premières images chrétiennes. Du
symbole à l’icône: II e ‐VI e siècle), traduit par E. Buculei et A. Boroş, Éd.
Meridiane, Bucarest, 2002.
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Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
JOURNAL FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH
ON RELIGION AND SCIENCE
(ISSN 1843 – 4142)
The journal is an international and inter‐confessional forum for
interdisciplinary research on religion and science.
Edited by
Center for Advanced Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and
Science
“ Dumitru Stăniloae” Faculty of Orthodox
Theology
“Al. I. Cuza” University of Iasi, Romania
PUBLICATIONS POLICY
Purpose
JIRRS aim is to develop the interdisciplinary research component
regarding Religion and Science by publishing original research.
Its title highlights the general framework of the scientific
contributions of those who will support it with their studies and
articles; it is quite a generous framework that allows for many‐sided
approaches and interpretations of the dialogue between the scientific
rationality and the existential experience of religious faith, with all their
posit ive or negative effects uponthe human conscience and its life
environment.
We are keenly aware of the painstaking efforts that need to be
made in this area, on the one hand, in order to rethink, in a critical way,
the potential, the means and the limits of the dialogue between Religion
and Science, and on the other, in order to escape two irrelevant
attitudes to this dialogue, namely: the propensity towards a totalising
monism of knowledge, based on the desire to achieve a balanced
synthesis between scientific data and metaphysical and religious truths,
and the tendency towards a dividing dualism, which precludes any
systematic correlation between the domains of scientific knowledge and
those of religious knowledge.
In order to surpass these two extreme attitudes, which could block
the edifying dimension of dialogue, we consider it necessary that all
those interested in this dialogue assume intellectual diligence and a
permanent concern for being up‐to‐date, both in their own field of
research and in those of their partners in dialogue; acknowledge that
the ultimate statements of religious faith, called metaphysical in
traditional language, are not the conclusions of an epistemological
undertaking, part of a continuum of scientific effort. The aim of their
application is not the instrumental scientific reason, but the integral
251

JOURNAL DESCRIPTION
reason illuminated by the faith in a transcendental sense of life in
general and of the human person in particular.
All artic les should be consistent with an interdisciplinary perspective from Religion , Philosophy and Science.
Papers
in the following categories will be considered for
publication:
1. Theoretical or applied articles dealing with interdisciplinary
subjects on science and religion.
2. Research articles that have relevance to interdisciplinary
dialogue, studies, or advanced research in one of the following
interdisciplinary
domains:
a. Systematic Theology, Hard and Natural Sciences (fields:
Systematic Theology, Mathematics, Theoretical Physics,
Chemistry, Biochemistry, Biology, Genetics, Geophysics,
Ecology, Astrophysics, Cosmology, Neuroscience,
b.
Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy of Science)
Religious Anthropology, Hermeneutics and Human/Socio
Sciences (fields: Religious Anthropology, Anthropology,
hermeneutics, social psychology, sociology, cultural
studies, theories of arts, media sciences)
c. Religious Ethics, Bioethics and Medical Sciences (fields:
Medical Sciences, Behavioral Sciences, Personal
Development
Neurology).
Sciences, Bio‐ethics,
Law, Genetics,
3. Reactions to current or past journal articles.
4. Reviews of relevant books from the field of psychology and
theology.
Submission Information on www.jirrs.org
252

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
REVUE DE RECHERCHE INTERDISCIPLINAIRE
EN
R ELIGION ET SCIENCE
(ISSN 1843 – 4142)
La revue
est un forum international et interconfessionnel, pour la
recherche interdisciplinaire en religion et science.
Editeurs
Centre de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Avancée Religion
et Science
Faculté de Théologie Orthodoxe “Dumitru
Stăniloae”
Université “Al. I. Cuza”, Iaşi, Roumanie
LA POLITIQUE DE LA PUBLICATION
But
JIRRS a comme but le développement de la composante
interdisciplinaire des recherches concernant la religion et la science, à
travers la publication d’études et recherches.
Son titre établit le cadre général, où s’inscriront les contributions
scientifiques de ceux qui la soutiendront avec leurs études et leurs
articles; c’est un cadre assez ample qui permet de nombreuses
approches et interprétations du dialogue entre le rationnement
scientifique et l’expérience existentielle de la foi religieuse avec tous
leurs effets positifs ou négatifs sur la conscience humaine et sur son
milieu de vie.
Nous sommes conscients, d’une part, de l’effort immense qui doit
être fait dans cette direction en vue de reconsidérer, d’autre part, d’une
manière critique, les possibilités, les moyens et les limites de dialogue
entre Religion et Science, afin qu’on dépasse deux attitudes discutables
de ce dialogue, notamment: la tendance vers un monisme étendu de la
connaissance créée au fond du désir d’élaborer une synthèse
harmonieuse entre les données de la science et les vérités
métaphysiques et religieuses et la tendance vers un dualisme séparateur
qui écarte toute liaison systématique entre les domaines de la
connaissance scientifique et ceux de la connaissance religieuse.
Pour dépasser ces deux attitudes exagérées, qui pourraient bloquer
la dimension édifiante du dialogue, on considère que tous ceux
intéressés à ce dialogue devraient s’assumer une rigueur intellectuelle
et une préoccupation continue pour le renseignement, tant dans leur
domaine de recherche, aussi bien que dans les domaines des partenaires
du dialogue; il devraient admettre le fait que les affirmations ultimes de
la foi chrétienne, appelées métaphysiques selon le langage traditionnel,
ne sont pas les conclusions d’une démarche épistémologique, qui se
253

JOURNAL DESCRIPTION
trouve dans la persistance de l’effort scientifique. Ce n’est pas leur
horizon de pertinence qui est la raison scientifique instrumentale, mais
la raison totale éclairée par la foi dans un sens transcendant de
l’existence en générale et de la personne humaine en particulier.
Tous les articles doivent faire preuve d e la perspective
interdisciplinaire de la Religion, Philosophi e et la scienc e.
L es matériels faisant part ie des catégories suivantes seront
considérés
en vue de publication:
1. Articles théoriques ou appliqués concernant des sujets
2.
interdisciplinaires sur la religion et la science;
Des articles sur des recherches relevantes pour le dialogue
interdisciplinaire sur la religion et la science, ou des recherches
avancées dans un des domaines interdisciplinaires suivants:
a. Théologie Systémique, Sciences exactes et sciences
naturelles (champs : Théologie systémique,
Mathématique, Physique théorique, Chimie, Biochimie,
Génétique, Géophysique, Ecologie, Astrophysique,
Cosmologie, Neuroscience, Psychologie cognitive,
b.
Philosophie de la science);
Anthropologie de la religion, Herméneutique et Sciences
socio­humaines (champs: anthropologie de la religion,
herméneutique, psychologie sociale, sociologie, études
culturels, théorie des arts, sciences des media);
c. Ethique religieuse, Bio – éthique et Sciences Médicales
(sciences médicales, sciences du comportement,
3.
sciences du développement personnel, bio ‐ éthique,
droit, génétique, neurologie);
Réactions envers des articles présents ou passés
du journal;
4. Revue des livres de psychologie et théologie.
254
Information en vue de soumission – www.jirrs.org

Journal for Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science,
No. 2, January 2008
DIE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERDISZIPLINÄRE FORSCHUNG
IN RELIGION UND WISSENSCHAFT
(ISSN 1843 – 4142)
Die Zeitschrift ist ein internationaler und interkonfessioneller
Ausgangspunkt für die interdisziplinäre Forschung im Bereich Religion
und Wissenschaft
Herausgeber
Das Zentrum für Fortgeschrittene Interdisziplinäre Forschung
Religion
und Wissenschaft
Die
Orthodoxe Theologische Fakultät “ Dumitru
Stăniloae”
Die Universität “Al. I. Cuza “ Iasi, Rumänien
DIE POLITIK DER ZEITSCHRIFT
Ziele
ZIFRW hat als Ziel die Entwicklung der interdisziplinären
F orschung in Bezug auf Religion und Wissenschaft durch die
Veröffentlichung.
Der Titel deutet auf den allgemeinen Rahmen hin, der die
wissenschaftlichen Beiträge ihrer Autoren mit deren Studien und
Artikeln bestimmen. Es ist ein großzügiger Rahmen, der viele
Gesichtspunkte und verschiedene Deutungen des Dialogs zwischen der
wissenschaftlichen Rationalität und der Existenzerfahrung des
religiösen Glaubens erlaubt, mit all ihren negativen und positiven
Auswirkungen auf das menschliche Bewußtsein und seine
Lebensumgebung.
Wir sind der großen Anstrengungen bewußt, der weiter in diese
Richtung gemacht werden sollen, einerseits zu einer kritischen Analyse
der Möglichkeiten, Arten und Grenzen des Dialogs zwischen Religion
und Wissenschaft, andererseits zur Überwindung der zwei nicht
aufklärenden Haltungen in diesem Dialog: die Tendenz zu einem
totalisierenden Monismus der Erkenntnis, ausgehend von dem Wunsch,
eine harmonische Synthese zwischen den wissenschaftlichen Daten und
den metaphysischen und religiösen Wahrheiten zu verwirklichen und
die Tendenz zu einem trennenden Dualismus, der jede systematische
Beziehung zwischen den Bereichen der wissenschaftlichen und
religiösen Erkenntnis ausschließt.
Zur Vermeidung dieser zwei extremen Haltungen, meinen wir, daß
alle Beteiligten an diesem Dialog eine intelektuelle Strenge und
ständige Sorge, informiert zu sein, nachweisen sollten, sowohl in seinem
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JOURNAL DESCRIPTION
eigenem Forschungsgebiet als auch in denen seiner Partner; sie sollten
zugleich zugeben, daß die letzten Aussagen des religiösen Glaubens,
herkömmlicherweise bekannt als metaphysisch, nicht die
Schlußfolgerungen eines epistemologischen Vorgehens sind, sondern
eine Fortsetzung des wissenschaftlichen Aufwandes. Ihr Horizont
beschränkt sich nicht auf die instrumentale wissenschaftliche Vernunft,
sondern auf die einheitliche Vernunft, von Glauben beleuchtet in einem
transzendenten Sinn der Existenz, im allgemeinen und vor allem der
menschlichen Person.
Alle Artikel müssen eine interdisziplinäre Perspektive in Bezug auf
Religio n, Philosophie und Wissenschaft darstellen.
F ür die Veröffentlichung werden folgende Artikel berücksichtigt:
256
1. Theoretische oder angew andte Artikel, d ie interdisziplinäre
Themen über Wissenschaft und Religion behandeln
2. Forschungsartikel, die sich auf die interdisziplinären
Besprechungen und Studien oder auf die fortgeschrittene
Forschung aus einem der folgenden interdisziplinären
Bereichen beziehen:
a. Systematische Theologie, angewandte Wissenschaft und
Naturwissenschaft (Bereiche: systematische Theologie,
Mathematik, theoretische Physik, Chemie, Biochemie,
Biologie, Genetik, Geophysik, Ökologie, Astrophysik,
Kosmologie, Neurowissenschaft, kognitive Psychologie,
Wissenschaftsphilosophie)
b. Religiöse Anthropologie, Hermeneutik und sozialhumanistische
Wissenschaft (Bereiche: religiöse
Anthropologie, Anthropologie, Hermeneutik, Sozio‐
psychologie, Soziologie, kulturelle Studien,
Kunsttheorie, Mediawissenschaft)
c. Religiöse Ethik, Bioethik und Medizinwissenschaft
(Bereiche: Medizinwissenschaft, Verhaltungswissen‐
schaft, Wissenschaft für die Selbstentwicklung,
Bioethik,
schaft).
Jura, Genetik, Neurologie, Neurowissen‐
3. Reaktionen auf die laufenden und vorherigen Artikel.
4. Zusammenfassungen der Fachbücher aus den Bereichen der
Kosmologie, Astrophysik, Wissenschaftsphilosophie, Neuro‐
philologie, Theologie, und besonderes der Fachbücher, die sich
auf das Dialog zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft beziehen.
Bewerbungsunterlagen ‐ www.jirrs.org

The Journal for Interdisciplinary Rresearch on Religion and Science is edited by
The Center for Advanced Interdisciplinary Research on Religion and Science
Address
"Al. I. Cuza" University of Iasi, “Dumitru Stăniloae” Faculty of Orthodox Theology,
Closca Str., No. 9, 700066, Iaşi, ROMANIA, Tel/fax +40 332101
800/+40 332 101801
Guide for Authors ‐ http://www.jir rs.org/en/policy.html
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Contact ‐ contact.jirrs@gmail.com
On line ‐ www.jirrs.org