semantics and pragmatics of evidentials in cuzco quechua
semantics and pragmatics of evidentials in cuzco quechua semantics and pragmatics of evidentials in cuzco quechua
78 CHAPTER 2. EVIDENTIAL HIERARCHIES of why languages have the evidential inventories they do. Lastly, I discussed how the conversational implicatures associated with evidentials lower on the scale can be accounted for. I argued that they are not quantity implicatures in the standard sense, but that they can be accounted for with a revised version of Grice’s Maxim of Quality, which takes into account that evidence is a concept gradable in terms of strength. It was also mentioned that Oswalt (1986) conceives of the universal evidential scale as the upper part of a larger scale, the lower part of which is occupied by (epistemic) modals. This proposal leads us directly to the next chapter and the question of how evidentiality and epistemic modality are related.
Chapter 3 Evidentiality and epistemic modality 3.1 Introduction In addition to defining the principles that structure a typological category such as evidentiality internally, typological theory is also concerned with delimiting these categories against each other. Since evidentiality was recognized only relatively recently as a grammatical category, its boundaries are still a matter of ongoing research, especially with respect to the somewhat more firmly established category of modality. In this chapter, I argue that evidentiality deserves category status, and should not be subsumed under modality. As Dendale and Tasmowski (2001) observe, most researchers would agree that there is a conceptual difference between indicating the type of one’s source of information and indicating one’s judgment as to how likely it is that that information is true. It is equally clear that one’s judgment of the truth of a proposition is at least in part influenced by one’s source of information. Thus, for Frajzyngier (1995) “it appears rather obvious that the different manners of acquiring knowledge correspond to different degrees of certainty about the truth of the proposition.” It is therefore reasonable to say that there is a close relationship between the two concepts. What is not so clear is the nature of this relation, and how it manifests itself linguistically. 79
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Chapter 3<br />
Evidentiality <strong>and</strong> epistemic<br />
modality<br />
3.1 Introduction<br />
In addition to def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples that structure a typological category such as<br />
evidentiality <strong>in</strong>ternally, typological theory is also concerned with delimit<strong>in</strong>g these categories<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st each other. S<strong>in</strong>ce evidentiality was recognized only relatively recently<br />
as a grammatical category, its boundaries are still a matter <strong>of</strong> ongo<strong>in</strong>g research, especially<br />
with respect to the somewhat more firmly established category <strong>of</strong> modality.<br />
In this chapter, I argue that evidentiality deserves category status, <strong>and</strong> should not be<br />
subsumed under modality.<br />
As Dendale <strong>and</strong> Tasmowski (2001) observe, most researchers would agree that<br />
there is a conceptual difference between <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g the type <strong>of</strong> one’s source <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g one’s judgment as to how likely it is that that <strong>in</strong>formation is<br />
true. It is equally clear that one’s judgment <strong>of</strong> the truth <strong>of</strong> a proposition is at least<br />
<strong>in</strong> part <strong>in</strong>fluenced by one’s source <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation. Thus, for Frajzyngier (1995) “it<br />
appears rather obvious that the different manners <strong>of</strong> acquir<strong>in</strong>g knowledge correspond<br />
to different degrees <strong>of</strong> certa<strong>in</strong>ty about the truth <strong>of</strong> the proposition.” It is therefore<br />
reasonable to say that there is a close relationship between the two concepts. What<br />
is not so clear is the nature <strong>of</strong> this relation, <strong>and</strong> how it manifests itself l<strong>in</strong>guistically.<br />
79