Fighter Combat - Tactics and Maneuvering

FIGHTER WEAPONS 57
detect the target LOS at much greater than the normal range, but by
denying range information, noise can prevent or delay missile launch,
force some missiles into less efficient pursuit trajectories, and possibly
degrade fuzing.
Deception jamming involves many techniques, including generation of
false targets and causing radars to lose automatic track. False targets may
be produced by delaying or altering the characteristics of the reflected radar
energy, by chaff, or by decoys, which either enhance the radar's return
energy or continuously transmit signals that may be mistaken for echoes,
thereby causing missile guidance on the wrong target. Inability to autotrack
may force less efficient manual tracking and may also degrade fuzing.
One of the earliest forms of ECM was chaff, generally large quantities
of radar-reflective material (often small lengths of foil or wire, but also
possibly gases) released into the air to produce false targets or large
"clouds" of clutter like noise. More than forty years after its first use in
World War II, it is still among the simplest and most effective ECM
techniques. Since the effects of chaff are much like those of ground clutter,
Doppler radars, if affected at all, are usually deceived only in beam
aspects, but missile fuzing may be vulnerable at any aspect. Doppler
radars may also be deceived if the chaff is blown by a strong wind.
The most common form of infrared countermeasure (IRCM) is the
decoy flare. When expelled by the target this flare presents a point source of
IR energy, generally more intense than that of the target, which tends to
attract a heat-seeking missile. IR deception is also possible by use of a
pulsing heat source, which tends to confuse IR-missile seekers. In the
future there may even be defensive laser systems that can be directed at the
missile to saturate its seeker.
As micro-electronics technology makes it possible to place larger
amounts of "intelligence" into small missile packages, these weapons are
becoming "smarter." Given sufficient information-processing capability,
electronic and infrared counter-countermeasures (ECCM and IRCCM) can
be devised for almost any defensive deception techniques. Such CCMs are,
however, more effective in some situations than in others. If enough is
known about any particular CCM technique, methods can be found to
defeat it.
The quantum advances in electronics over the past few years have made
the air-combat environment, and most other battlefields, virtual electronic
jungles. Few air combat engagements of the future can be expected
to be totally free of electronic-warfare (EW) considerations. Unfortunately
for fighter aircraft, which are inherently small in size, have limited aircrew
numbers, and have high aircrew task loads, most defensive ECM must be
highly automated. Except for the possibility of manual deployment of
chaff, flares, or small decoys, fighter aircrew involvement in ECM must be
limited essentially to turning the equipment on and off once during the
mission.
So far this discussion has centered on how to avoid or delay missile
shots; but what if, in spite of the defender's best efforts, he suddenly
receives warning, either visually or through a radar warning receiver