Fighter Combat - Tactics and Maneuvering

268 DIVISION TACTICS
design began to stress aircraft speed and heavy armament and armor and to
neglect maneuverability and cockpit field of view.
With no war, we forgot about building airplanes we could see out of.
Colonel Erich "Bubi" Hartmann, GAP
The fighter formation almost universally accepted during this period
was the three-plane vee, or "vie," with the aircraft positioned almost
wingtip-to-wingtip for concentration of firepower. This formation (see
Figure 7-1) allowed the leader to maneuver fairly well and to fly through
clouds with little chance of losing his wingmen. He was able to hit quickly
to limit exposure to bomber defensive fire, and all fighters could fire at
once at the same target for maximum concentration of destructive power.
The vie had some drawbacks, however: only one bomber could be
targeted at a time, and the close formation allowed defensive fire to be
concentrated on all fighters simultaneously. The leader was also the only
one likely to have a good shot, since the wingmen had to be more concerned
with not running into somebody than with aiming their guns.
Firing range for the wingmen was also increased, since they had to cease
fire when the leader reached minimum range and broke off his attack.
Several of these vies could operate together and coordinate their attacks
to bring additional targets under fire and to spread the defensive fire. These
additional vies also offered each other some visual mutual support, since
the defensive effectiveness of individual divisions was very limited because
of formation requirements. One favorite arrangement of vies on
patrol was for several vies to form a larger vie spaced at wider intervals
than the individual elements. This was a fairly effective formation for
visual cross-cover, but it was difficult to maneuver, so the elements often
dropped into trail on each other when substantial maneuvering was required.
This arrangement still offered good defensive coverage for all
elements except "Tail-end Charlie."
This, then, was the thinking of most of the air powers of the world in the
1920s and 1930s. Some were able to test this doctrine during conflicts in
the late 1930s, notably the Spanish Civil War and the Sino-Japanese War.
These conflicts revealed that the relative superiority of bombers over
fighters of the period was greatly exaggerated. Whenever bombers were
met by determined fighter resistance, the bombers nearly always suffered
Figure 7-1. The Vic