Fighter Combat - Tactics and Maneuvering

222 SECTION TACTICS, TWO-VERSUS-ONE
engaged pilot should not follow any directions that would place him in
unacceptable jeopardy.
Another situation calling for rapid communications is when the bogey
pilot "switches" his attention from one fighter to the other. Such a switch
usually demands a swap in engaged fighter—free fighter roles and should be
called out instantly by whichever pilot first sees it. Loose deuce also leads
to problems in clearly defining the free fighter-engaged fighter roles, since
there are many instances when both fighters are attacking simultaneously.
Generally it is the free pilot's responsibility to announce his attack and call
for a role switch if he judges himself to be better positioned to assume the
duties of engaged fighter. In cases where both fighters remain engaged for
any period of time, offensive and defensive efficiency are both impaired.
Neither pilot can provide effective defensive lookout in this situation. In
addition, the two engaged fighters tend to drift toward the same piece of
sky (generally inside the bogey's turn), where they are easy to see and can
be fought as one aircraft, much like the situation with fighting wing
doctrine. The fighters also tend to get in each other's way, and the danger of
midair collisions increases. Double attack doctrine suffers fewer problems
in role definition because responsibilities are more clearly divided.
Communications have always been a problem in air combat, and they
probably always will be. Much attention is required in training to ensure
timely, descriptive, and brief commentary. Personal call signs and standardized
brevity codes should be used, and all transmissions by one pilot
must be acknowledged by the other. In combat situations there may be
hundreds of fighters in the area on the same radio frequency, which can
render even essential communications virtually impossible. This situation
should be avoided whenever possible by use of several different tactical
frequencies (but all fighters in any local engagement area should be on
the same frequency), and strict radio discipline must be observed.
Intentional comm-jamming might also be a fact of life in combat, and it
is usually accomplished by broadcasting high-power noise on the opponent's
tactical frequencies. Jam-resistant radios, very short transmissions,
and frequent channel changes may offer some relief. Very low altitude
operations may also enhance communications, as terrain may blank the
enemy's ground-based jamming transmitters. Quite often two pilots in
close proximity will be able to communicate adequately through the
noise. This fact, and the somewhat reduced communications requirements
of double attack, may favor this doctrine over loose deuce in heavy
comm-jamming conditions. Either doctrine is still usable in this environment
with practice, but reduced efficiency can be expected of both. Fighting
wing doctrine is probably least affected by comm-jamming (intentional
or otherwise), but depending on the bogey aircraft, its weapons, and its
pilot abilities, fighting wing may not be effective either offensively or
defensively.
Some forms of nonverbal communications can also be useful in commout
or limited-comm conditions. In very close pre-engagement formations,
hand signals may be used. In wider formations, coded movements of
the leader's aircraft, such as rolls, short repetitive turns, or short climbs