Fighter Combat - Tactics and Maneuvering

ONE-VERSUS-ONE MANEUVERING, DISSIMILAR AIRCRAFT 175
Enemy RQ missiles cause two serious problems for the low-wingloaded
gunfighter. Since an attacker can fire at much greater range with
these weapons, initial visual detection of an attack is more difficult. In
addition, the missile further complicates the chances of this fighter being
able to escape once it is engaged. Tactics for the gunfighter would not
change appreciably, however, with angles tactics still being appropriate.
Maintaining an angular advantage at close range with angles tactics effectively
removes the RQ missile threat. When the high-T/W bogey is not also
equipped with a gun, the pilot of the low-wing-loaded gunfighter can be
even more aggressive. Lack of a short-range, all-aspect weapon leaves the
bogey defenseless against radical lead turns, and makes it more difficult for
the bogey pilot to capitalize on an overshoot by the gunfighter.
A fighter without a gun ... is like an airplane without a wing.
Brigadier General Robin Olds, USAF
During the early years of the Vietnam conflict the low-wing-loaded,
low-T/W MiG-17 Fresco opposed the U.S. F-4 Phantom. With nearly a
ten-year technology advantage, a powerful air-to-air radar, semi-active
radar-guided Sparrow missiles, RQ heat-seeking Sidewinders/ and supersonic
speed capability, the Phantom might have been considered more
than a match for the subsonic, guns-only MiG-17. Several extenuating
circumstances, however, greatly altered the balance. The long-range, allaspect
Sparrow missile, for instance, often could not be used, since it was
usually impossible to identify the target as hostile except visually at close
range. By that time the MiG-17 was probably inside the weapon's minrange
capabilities and tended to remain there during subsequent maneuvering.
Since this missile was not "dogfight compatible," and the
Phantoms generally lacked gun armament, only the RQ Sidewinder remained
viable against the more maneuverable MiG. Even so, energy tactics
should have allowed the F-4 to escape or to remain neutrally engaged
until the MiG pilot lost sight or had to retire. Unfortunately for the
Americans, the Phantom crews often were poorly trained in energy techniques,
were faced with a much smaller enemy aircraft that was hard to track
visually, and sometimes lacked the combat endurance for extended engagements
far from their bases. These circumstances often led to hardturning
engagements, to the advantage of the MiGs. The MiGs also were
generally blessed with better ground-based radar control and could spot
and identify the Phantoms at long distances because the F-4 engines
smoked badly. Therefore, the MiGs often reached a firing position, or at
least gained substantial advantage, before being detected. The Vietnamese
pilots, however, generally lacked the proficiency necessary to take full
advantage of their many opportunities, and they lost somewhat more
fighters than they downed in air combat.
Late in the war, U.S. Navy pilots reaped the benefits of improved air
combat training provided by the newly formed Navy Fighter Weapons
School (TOPGUN) at Miramar Naval Air Station in California. The following
excerpt is found in Fox Two by Commander Randy "Duke" Cunningham.
In this engagement Cunningham and his backseat Radar Intercept
Officer, "Willie" Driscoll (sometimes called "Irish"), bagged their fifth