POLITICS VERSUS SCIENCE: APPORTIONING ... - Buffalo State
POLITICS VERSUS SCIENCE: APPORTIONING ... - Buffalo State POLITICS VERSUS SCIENCE: APPORTIONING ... - Buffalo State
food regime. The EFSA’s Advisory Forum is a body of representatives of Member States’ food safety authorities, while scientists staff its Scientific Committee and Panels. The latter is advisory rather than regulatory. The regulatory function is carried out by the Commission’s Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health. The expectation of EFSA as part of a "vast network" of experts and decision- makers, brings us to our third question: how can we evaluate food safety policy within the broader framework of regulatory governance in the European Union? The European Commission has long cultivated policy networks to coordinate the single market, an alternative to the independent regulatory authorities found in many federal systems. The European Food and Safety Authority (EFSA) is at the center of a network of Member State regulatory bodies to exchange and disseminate scientific assessment of food safety. The EFSA, at the same time, belongs to the Commission’s network organized to manage risk and communicate risk measures. 16 The European food safety regime offers an opportunity to examine the 1) the Commission’s coordination and management of a critical policy area 17 and 2) an independent body’s development, implementation, and coordination of a network for food safety assessment. The EFSA is expected to resolve a longstanding problem, namely, to reconcile disparate risk assessments among Member States, which can either 16 “The Commission remains fully responsible for communicating risk management measures. The appropriate information should therefore be exchanged between the Authority and the Commission.” (Commission 2002a: 5). With regard to the rapid alert system: “A system for rapid alert already exists in the framework of Council Directive 92/59/EEC of 29 June 1982…The revised system should be managed by the Commission and include as members of the network the Member States, the Commission and the Authority.” (Commission 2002a: 5). 17 Critical because it is straddles low (economics) and high (security of citizens) politics. 24
undermine the internal market 18 or fail to protect consumers from unsafe food. 19 If consumers do not trust food from other Member States, national regulators will face pressure to invoke Article 30 (TEC). 20 While the Commission had expected a fully operational EFSA in January 2003, the EP’s budgetary committee withheld 2003 allocations as a lever to force a Council decision. Starved for cash, EFSA’s management board and its executive director, Geoffrey Podger), were delayed in staffing its scientific committees. Most scholars agree that the Commission’s promotion of policy networks is at least partially a result of the understaffing of European administration 21 (Dehousee 1997; Majone 1996b; Nugent 2001). To some observers, however, a comparatively small administrative organization is not seen as a fundamental weakness in the process of European integration. Competing notions of the ability of the Commission to glue (or string) together European governments, citizens, and interests shape interpretations and the extent to which multilevel governance and policy networks (two sides of the same coin) replace the need for traditional state institutions (Caporaso 1996; Joerges and Neyer 1997; Joerges 1999b; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Rosamund 2000; Peterson 1995; Peterson and Bomberg 1999) or undermine integration in a quasi-federalist state (Majone 18 David Byrne (2002) recognizes this in his speech at the EFSA’s first board meeting: “I have the very strong expectation that the development of the Authority’s reputation for independence and excellence in scientific matters appertaining to food will put an end to competition in such matters among national authorities in the Member States.” 19 For instance, the failure of national authorities to recognize the dangers posed by feed practices, BSE, and its hypothesized cross-over (nCJD) in the U.K.; the dioxin scandal in Belgium 20 Article 30 (TEC, Consolidated Version): “The provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions and restrictions imports, exports, or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy, or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals, or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic, or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial or commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.” 21 Permanent EU staff in 2002, 29,997; 21,750 in the Commission (Nugent 2003, 118). 25
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undermine the internal market 18 or fail to protect consumers from unsafe food. 19 If<br />
consumers do not trust food from other Member <strong>State</strong>s, national regulators will face<br />
pressure to invoke Article 30 (TEC). 20<br />
While the Commission had expected a fully operational EFSA in January 2003,<br />
the EP’s budgetary committee withheld 2003 allocations as a lever to force a Council<br />
decision. Starved for cash, EFSA’s management board and its executive director,<br />
Geoffrey Podger), were delayed in staffing its scientific committees.<br />
Most scholars agree that the Commission’s promotion of policy networks is at<br />
least partially a result of the understaffing of European administration 21 (Dehousee 1997;<br />
Majone 1996b; Nugent 2001). To some observers, however, a comparatively small<br />
administrative organization is not seen as a fundamental weakness in the process of<br />
European integration. Competing notions of the ability of the Commission to glue (or<br />
string) together European governments, citizens, and interests shape interpretations and<br />
the extent to which multilevel governance and policy networks (two sides of the same<br />
coin) replace the need for traditional state institutions (Caporaso 1996; Joerges and Neyer<br />
1997; Joerges 1999b; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Rosamund 2000; Peterson 1995;<br />
Peterson and Bomberg 1999) or undermine integration in a quasi-federalist state (Majone<br />
18 David Byrne (2002) recognizes this in his speech at the EFSA’s first board meeting: “I have the very<br />
strong expectation that the development of the Authority’s reputation for independence and excellence in<br />
scientific matters appertaining to food will put an end to competition in such matters among national<br />
authorities in the Member <strong>State</strong>s.”<br />
19 For instance, the failure of national authorities to recognize the dangers posed by feed practices, BSE,<br />
and its hypothesized cross-over (nCJD) in the U.K.; the dioxin scandal in Belgium<br />
20 Article 30 (TEC, Consolidated Version): “The provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude<br />
prohibitions and restrictions imports, exports, or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality,<br />
public policy, or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals, or plants; the<br />
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic, or archaeological value; or the protection of<br />
industrial or commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means<br />
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member <strong>State</strong>s.”<br />
21 Permanent EU staff in 2002, 29,997; 21,750 in the Commission (Nugent 2003, 118).<br />
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