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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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76 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

bit, forcing her to look elsewhere for the supplies <strong>and</strong> materials<br />

she had been accustomed to buying from the United States.<br />

Th e Japanese had considerable commercial interests in southeast<br />

Asia, especially in French Indochina (now comprising the<br />

states <strong>of</strong> Vietnam, Laos, <strong>and</strong> Cambodia). After France fell in June<br />

1940, Japan had negotiated with the Vichy government <strong>of</strong> unoccupied<br />

France for permission to occupy French Indochina, to<br />

take over bases there, <strong>and</strong> to maintain order. Th e rather helpless<br />

Vichy government had agreed. As trade with the United States<br />

became more diffi cult, Japan’s interests in Indochina gained in<br />

importance <strong>and</strong> she turned more <strong>and</strong> more in that direction for<br />

the foods <strong>and</strong> raw materials she needed. Trade pacts concluded<br />

later with Indochina assured Japan <strong>of</strong> uninterrupted supplies <strong>of</strong><br />

rice, rubber, <strong>and</strong> other needed raw materials.<br />

U.S. Ambassador Grew in Japan kept Roosevelt fully advised<br />

<strong>of</strong> her precarious economic situation <strong>and</strong> urgent need for imports.<br />

Chief <strong>of</strong> Naval Operations (NCO) Stark had warned the president<br />

<strong>of</strong> the danger <strong>of</strong> imposing an oil embargo on Japan. Stark<br />

had “made it known to the State Department in no uncertain<br />

terms that in my opinion if Japan’s oil were shut <strong>of</strong>f , she would<br />

go to war.” He did not mean “necessarily with us, but . . . if her<br />

economic life had been choked <strong>and</strong> throttled by inability to get<br />

oil, she would go somewhere <strong>and</strong> take it . . . <strong>and</strong> if I were a Jap, I<br />

would” do the same. 2<br />

Many people, including Eleanor Roosevelt, the president’s<br />

wife, were concerned about what Japan might be planning. In<br />

the fall <strong>of</strong> 1940, she had asked her husb<strong>and</strong> about our continuing<br />

shipment <strong>of</strong> oil to Japan. FDR answered Eleanor on November<br />

13, 1940:<br />

2 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack. <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.:<br />

U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 32, p. 43. Testimony before the<br />

Naval Court <strong>of</strong> Inquiry.

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