Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

68 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
for foreign aff airs, Anthony Eden, that Roosevelt had agreed to
negotiate
a moratorium [with Japan] of, say, thirty days, in which we may
improve our position in Singapore area and the Japanese will have
to stand still. But he will make it a condition that the Japanese
meanwhile encroach no farther, and do not use Indo-China as a
base for attack on China. He will also maintain in full force the
economic measures directed against Japan. Th ese negotiations
show little chance of succeeding, but President considers that a
month gained will be valuable.
Churchill’s report to Eden continued:
At the end of the Note which the President will hand to the
Japanese Ambassador when he returns from his cruise in
about a week’s time he will add the following passage which is
taken from my draft: “Any further encroachment by Japan in
the Southwest Pacifi c would produce a situation in which the
United States Government would be compelled to take counter-measures,
even though these might lead to war between the
United States and Japan”. 42
During their private conference, FDR indicated to Churchill
that because he was uncertain that he could carry Congress with
him in a declaration of war, and because more time was needed
to strengthen America’s forces, he must seek to delay a break with
Japan. Churchill had hoped at this meeting to persuade Roosevelt
to have the United States declare war on the German-Italian Axis.
Churchill told him that he “would rather have an American declaration
of war now and no supplies for six months than double
the supplies and no declaration.” However, Churchill recognized
the president’s constitutional diffi culties: “He may take action as
Chief Executive, but only Congress can declare war.” According
42Winston Churchill, Th e Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, 1950),
pp. 439–41.