Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

864 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Kimmel and Short that Japan was reporting regularly to Tokyo
on a grid plot the locations of ships in Pearl Harbor. Th ey failed
to recognize the importance of the “East Winds Rain” message,
intercepted on December 4, 1941, indicating that an attack on
U.S. territory, as well as the British and Dutch, was a likely fi rst
target. As a matter of fact, no record has ever been found of what
happened to the “East Winds Rain” message after it was delivered
to Naval Communications on the morning of December 4, 1941.
Th e top Washington offi cials warned Kimmel and Short of Japan’s
advances being made thousands of miles west of Pearl Harbor,
toward the Philippines and southeast Asia—Th ailand, Borneo,
the Dutch East Indies and the Isthmus of Kra. U.S. intelligence
offi cials had lost track of the Japanese aircraft carriers. Apparently
they did not dream that they could be steaming across the Pacifi c
toward Hawaii with bombers and torpedo planes onboard, and
that November 29 was the Japanese ambassadors’ deadline for
completing their diplomatic negotiations because it might be the
deadline for recalling Japanese forces from an intended mission
several days away.
Roosevelt and his top Washington advisers were undoubtedly
concerned lest blame be attached to them for failure to fulfi ll their
responsibilities for the country’s defense. According to Roosevelt
confi dant and speechwriter Robert Sherwood, the President
may even have had qualms that his pre-attack dealings with the
British might be considered impeachable off enses. Secretary of
Navy Knox apparently felt guilty for not having more adequately
warned the Pearl Harbor commanders. And General Marshall
too, must have had qualms about his dilatory tactics in warning
the area commanders, for he began his own investigation almost
immediately into the delay in delivering his last minute message
to Pearl Harbor. Th us, the leading principals in Washington were
hesitant to have investigations that might reveal some of their
own actions as “derelictions in duty” and/or “errors in judgment.”