Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Epilogue 863
of the likelihood that Pearl Harbor could be a target. Moreover,
it has never been explained how the secret Japanese intercepts,
which had been received, decoded, translated and distributed
before the attack, which had revealed a great deal—not all—
of Japan’s thinking to those in Washington who were privy to
MAGIC, disappeared from both Army and Navy fi les where
they had been held under tight security.
Upon a review of the events that took place over the months
preceding the attack—as revealed in the several investigations—
the top Washington offi cials had ample reason to expect that a
Japanese attack on U.S. territory was imminent. Yet they did not
relay that sense of urgency to Kimmel and Short. Moreover, their
warnings directed the attention of the Pearl Harbor commanders
to the southeast Pacifi c.
It seems in retrospect that the U.S. diplomatic negotiations,
which were offi cially still ongoing at the time of the attack, were
not always conducted in completely good faith; time and again
U.S. offi cials rejected compromises off ered by the Japanese. Th e
U.S. embargoed the sale to Japan of oil and other commodities
she needed, and persuaded the British and Dutch to follow suit.
U.S. offi cials in Washington apparently failed to realize that Japan
might consider the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor a threat to Japan’s
plans for military expansion in the southwest Pacifi c, and thus
might try to put it out of commission before embarking on a war
against the U.S. Th ey not only failed to furnish the Pearl Harbor
commanders with the men, planes, munitions and other materiel
they requested, but a substantial number of the Fleet’s ships
had been transferred to the Atlantic thus reducing substantially
the U.S. defensive strength in the Pacifi c. Moreover, Washington
offi cials had reminded Kimmel and Short again and again that
the United States’s principal enemy was Hitler, and that the war
was in the Atlantic.
Top Washington offi cials failed repeatedly to relay important
“intelligence” to the commanders in the fi eld. Th ey failed to advise