Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

862 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Post Attack
So the United States had been attacked. More than 2,500
soldiers, sailors and marines had been killed at Pearl Harbor on
that December 7, 1941. In his address to Congress the following
day, President Roosevelt called immediately for a declaration of
war against Japan. And Congress complied.
Th e people were mad at the Japanese and eager to revenge
the “dastardly attack.” Apparently Japan’s brilliantly planned and
brilliantly executed attack had caught the U.S. forces at Pearl
Harbor completely unawares. Th e people wanted to know who
was responsible. Th ey wanted to know why the U.S. forces at Pearl
Harbor had been caught off guard—unwarned, ill-equipped, and
poorly prepared.
It was obvious that Japan was directly responsible for the
attack. However, it is not so easy to determine responsibility for
the extent of the Pearl Harbor disaster—the element of surprise,
the tragic loss of life, and the catastrophic devastation of ships,
planes, etc. Th e Pearl Harbor commanders, Admiral Kimmel and
General Short, were held responsible and publicly blamed for the
disaster. However, it is now apparent that in the fi nal analysis it
was President Roosevelt himself, who was truly responsible for
Pearl Harbor’s lack of preparedness. It was he who determined
U.S. policy and who directed the Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy how to implement that policy. Th e top Washington offi cials
who were privy to MAGIC also contributed to the extent of the
disaster by not adequately warning Pearl Harbor in a timely manner.
Th eir contributions, however, were sins of omission rather
than sins of commission.
An Administration “cover-up,” under the guidance of FDR
and with the support of his loyal lieutenants, was apparently
aimed at keeping the public from learning of the Administration’s
role in failing to keep the Pearl Harbor commanders adequately
equipped and informed of the imminence of war with Japan, and