Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

860 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
December 6–7, 1941: A late night meeting of FDR’s “inner
circle” was held in the White House; they were waiting for what
they expected was coming—a Japanese strike against British
Malaya or Th ailand’s Isthmus of Kra, and possibly the Dutch
East Indies. Th ey had been agonizing over this for weeks and
FDR’s Cabinet Secretaries had been asked to draft statements
presenting the rationale for our going to war against Japan to
defend the British and Dutch.
In the Philippines, on the other side of the dateline (December
7, 1941) Admiral Hart, after talking with the top British admiral
who had been visiting Manila from Singapore, cabled Washington
for instructions concerning U.S. commitments to the British in
southeast Pacifi c, thousands of miles west of Pearl Harbor.
In the morning of December 7, 1941, Hull and Knox, at the
request of Secretary of War Stimson, each drafted a statement
as to what the United States should do in the event of Japanese
action in southeast Asia.
Hull: Th e Japanese government is dominated by “military
fi reeaters” who were aiming to acquire military control over
one-half of the world with nearly one-half its population. . . .
[A]ll of the conquered peoples would be governed . . . militarily,
politically, economically, socially, and morally by the worst
possible military despotism
such as that used by Japan in China and Hitler in Europe.
[C]ontrol of the South Sea area by Japan is the key to the control
of the entire Pacifi c area, and therefore defense of life and
commerce and other invaluable rights and interests . . . must be
commenced within the South Sea area. . . . Self-defense, therefore,
is the key point for the preservation of each and all of our
civilized institutions.