Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Epilogue 859
Captain McCollum, Naval Intelligence, Far Eastern Branch,
drafted a message based on the “Winds Execute” to warn Pearl
Harbor, but he learned later that it had not been sent.
On December 3, U. S. Army military intelligence cabled the
U.S. military attaché in Tokyo to destroy its codes. On December
4, the State Department suggested that the U.S. and British coordinate
their withdrawal or exchange of Americans from Japan,
Manchuria, and Japanese-occupied China in the event of British-
Japanese hostilities.
More indications of the imminence of war were intercepted
December 6, 1941: Messages from Italy, the Japanese Embassy
in Washington, and Tokyo, indicated that war was imminent.
Japanese offi ces worldwide acknowledged Tokyo’s code-destruct
order. Th e British and Dutch were on the qui vive in Southeast
Pacifi c. Admiral Hart in Manila reported U.S. overfl ights had
sighted Japanese convoys in South China Sea heading toward
Malaya and the Isthmus of Kra.
On Saturday, December 6, U.S. cryptographers started to pick
up Japan’s several-part response to the United States November 26
“ultimatum.” A “Pilot Message” announced that Japan’s 14-part
reply was en route to her ambassadors in Washington. Th e fi rst 13
parts were received, deciphered and delivered to top Washington
offi cials and to FDR about 9:30 p.m. After reading it, FDR said
to his aide, Mr. Hopkins: “Th is means war’.” Th e two men speculated
as to where and when the strike would come. Pearl Harbor
was not mentioned. Nor was there any indication that tomorrow
was the day. No mention was made of sending a further warning
or alert.
On December 6, 1941, FDR announced to the press and to
the world that he had sent Japanese Emperor Hirohito a pleafor-peace.
Th e State Department had completed on December
5, its draft of a message for the president to present to Congress,
possibly on December 8–9, depending on Hirohito’s response to
FDR’s “plea for peace.”