Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

858 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Th e United States warned its U.S. outposts in Asia of the
imminence of war with Japan. Navy Captain McCollum, in charge
of the Far Eastern section of Naval Intelligence’s foreign branch,
drafted a warning message (December 3, 1941) to Admiral Hart
(Manila), Admiral Kimmel (Pearl Harbor), and to commandants
of the naval districts in Hawaii and the Philippines:
[I]nstructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and
consular posts at Hongkong x Singapore x Batavia x Manila x
Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and
ciphers at once and to burn all other important confi dential
and secret documents.
During the fi rst week of December 1941, several warnings
of impending Japanese aggression were received in Washington
from Purple code MAGIC intercepts. Th e Japanese consul
was asked to report to Tokyo, at irregular intervals but at a rate
of twice a week, on a system of grids, the location of “ships in
[Pearl] Harbor.” A special Japanese code based on false weather
reports, the “Winds Code,” had also been set up so Tokyo could
communicate secretly with its embassies and consulates around
the world if, as, and when, it was no longer possible to reach
them with coded messages after their code machines had been
destroyed. Th is code was implemented December 4, by a “Winds
Code Execute” indicating troubled relations with Great Britain,
the Dutch East Indies and the U.S., but not with Russia. Th ese
crucial intercepts, indicating that U.S territory, quite possibly the
U.S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor, was likely to be a target of Japan’s
aggression, were sent to all the top brass in Washington, but not
to our commanders in Hawaii—not to General Short, who was
responsible for the safety of the fl eet while in port, nor to Admiral
Kimmel, commander-in-chief of the Pacifi c Fleet based in Pearl
Harbor. Upon receipt of the “Winds Execute,” Saff ord, Chief of
Security of Naval Communications, alerted U.S. outposts in the
Pacifi c to destroy classifi ed documents, but his alerts were delayed
and didn’t reach their addressees until after the attack.