Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Epilogue 857
conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China
. . . . [I]t is clear that the United States is now in collusion
with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with
Germany and Italy, as an enemy.
Th e United States continued to assure British and Dutch of
American support. FDR to British Ambassador Lord Halifax:
In the case of a direct attack on the British or the Dutch, “we
should obviously all be together.” According to Halifax, the president
said the British “could count on American support if we [the
British] carried out our move to defend the Kra Isthmus [on Th ai
territory] in the event of a Japanese attack.”
On December 2,Roosevelt told the Japanese ambassadors that
the continuing troop movements to southern Indochina portend
Japanese aggression against the Philippines, NEI, Burma, Malaya,
Th ailand. “Such new aggression would, of course, be additional to
the acts of aggression already undertaken against China, our attitude
towards which is well known.”
Th e next day FDR reconfi rmed his pledge of “armed support”
to the British and he told Halifax
that, when talking of support, he meant “armed support,” and
that he agreed with the British plan for operations in the Kra
Isthmus if the Japanese attacked Th ailand. Th e U.S. and British
talked about joint war plans, as to when and where the U.S. and
Great Britain should strike.
On December 4, Lord Halifax expressed his Government’s “very
deep appreciation” for FDR’s promises of “armed support.” He
thought the warning they had talked about should apply
to an attack by Japan on Th ailand, Malaya, the Dutch East
Indies, or the Burma Road (through Indo-China). Mr.
Roosevelt was doubtful about including the Burma Road, but
otherwise agreed to the warning.