Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

856 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
world conquest is that of self-defense. . . . We do not want war
with Japan, and Japan does not want war with this country. If,
however, war should come, the fault and the responsibility will
be those of Japan. Th e primary cause will have been pursuit by
Japan of a policy of aggression.
At a meeting on December 1, 1941, the Japanese ambassadors
told Hull that the U.S. “ultimatum’s” ten points, “had been
communicated” to their government which was studying the
case. Hull responded: Th e “heavy Japanese troop movements into
Indochina. . . . create an increasing menace to America and her
friends. . . . [W]e will not allow ourselves to be kicked out of the
Pacifi c.” Hull accused the Japanese of using Hitlerian methods
in China. “[W]e cannot lose sight of the movement by Hitler to
seize one-half of the world.” Th e Japanese militarists, Hull said,
were “moving in a similar direction to seize the other half of the
earth. . . . [T]his Government cannot yield to anything of that
kind.”
On December 1, Roosevelt directed Admiral Hart in Manila
to dispatch three small ships [minimally armed and equipped to
be classifi ed as “men of war”] to take up positions in the path
of the southbound Japanese convoys—“to observe and report by
radio Japanese movements.”
On December 1, Japan ordered her embassies worldwide to
destroy their codes and code machines.
On December 3, 1941: Japan ordered its embassy in
Washington to destroy all secret fi les, documents and codes but
those now being used with their code machine. A December 1
Tokyo to Berlin “Purple” intercept decoded and translated in
Washington read in part: “war may suddenly break out between
the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms
. . . quicker than anyone dreams.” A second Tokyo-Berlin message
intercepted, decoded, and translated read: Before rejecting Japan’s
modus vivendi, the United States