Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Epilogue 855
threatens United States, British or Dutch territory.” And Japan
should be warned “that advance beyond the lines indicated . . .
may lead to war.”
November 28, 1941: Th e members of FDR’s “War Cabinet”
all agreed that
if the [ Japanese] expedition were permitted to land in the Gulf
of Siam it would place a strong Japanese force in such a strategic
position as to be a severe blow at all three of the powers
in southeast Asia—the British at Singapore, the Netherlands
in the Indies, and ourselves in the Philippines. We all agreed
that it must not be allowed; that, if the Japanese got into the
Isthmus of Kra, the British would fi ght; and, if the British
fought, we would have to fi ght.
According to Stimson, “Th e possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor
was not [then] discussed since our thoughts were all focused on this
movement toward southeast Asia.”
November 28, 1941: We intercepted Japan’s instructions to
her ambassadors in Washington concerning our November 26
“ultimatum.”
Th e Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis
for negotiations. Th erefore . . . the negotiations will be de facto
ruptured. . . . However . . . [don’t] give the impression that the
negotiations are broken off . Merely say . . . that you are awaiting
instructions.
How should the United States respond if the Japanese
attacked British territory in southeast Asia? Secretary of State
Hull proposed that FDR present a message to Congress concerning
the Japanese aggression. Hull, Stimson and Knox drafted
such a message.
Th e supreme question presented to this country along with
many other countries by the Hitler-dominated movement of