Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

854 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Stark sent a warning to Kimmel. Neither FDR nor Hull
“would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. . . . [A]n
attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing
that could happen to us.” Stark didn’t believe the Japanese would
proceed against Russia; he considered “an advance into Th ailand,
Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.”
November 26, 1941: Stimson told FDR that a Japanese
expedition of fi ve divisions had gone south from Shantung and
Shansi to Shanghai, whence they had embarked on 30, 40, or 50
southbound ships.
November 26, 1941: Th e modus vivendi was jettisoned. And a
10-point “ultimatum” was issued to Japan.
After this November 26 “ultimatum” had gone out, Washington
offi cials discussed what to tell MacArthur in the Philippines. It
was agreed “we should send the fi nal alert; namely, that he should
be on the qui vive for any attack.” FDR was “particularly concerned
. . . by current southward troop movements from Shanghai
and Japan to the Formosa area,” preparing
for an early aggressive movement of some character . . .
directed against the Burma Road, Th ailand, Malay Peninsula,
Netherlands East Indies or the Philippines. . . . [T]his next
Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of hostilities
between the U.S. and Japan.
November 27, 1941: Washington warned (1) Manila, (2)
Hawaii, (3) Atlantic fl eet that Japanese southbound convoys were
heading for the Philippines, Th ai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly
Borneo.
November 27, 1941: Marshall and Stark ask for time to prepare
U.S. defenses. Th ey were especially concerned about the
Philippines: “Th e most essential thing now, from the United
States viewpoint is to gain time.” It is recommended that: “military
counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly