Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Epilogue 853
[W]hen Hitler starts on a march of invasion across the earth
with ten million soldiers and thirty thousand airplanes, . . . this
country from that time was in danger. . . . [T]his country with
no other motive except self-defense has recognized that danger,
and has proceeded thus far to defend itself before it is too
late.
Th e president and Hull “made it clear that we were not the
aggressors in the Pacifi c but that Japan was the aggressor.”
Th e U.S. cryptographers intercepted a message from Tokyo
setting a deadline for the U.S.-Japanese diplomats to reach agreement
in their negotiations:
Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary
that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement [being
negotiated with the United States] be completed by the 25th
of this month [later extended to the 29th]. . . .
On November 20, the two Japanese Ambassadors suggested
a modus vivendi, a temporary arrangement, to continue the status
quo while negotiations continued. Both Japan and the United
States would make some concessions. Th e United States would
“supply Japan a required quantity of oil.” China’s Chiang Kaishek
“bombarded Washington with demands that no further
concessions be made to Tokyo.”
Japanese ship movements in Far East grabbed the attention
of Washington’s top offi cials. At a November 25, 1941, meeting,
FDR said “we were likely to be attacked [by Japan] perhaps [as
soon as] next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making
an attack without warning.” Stimson remarked: “Th e question
was how we should maneuver them into the position of fi ring the
fi rst shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.” Hull
was asked to prepare an “ultimatum” to Japan like that of August,
notifying her that “if she crossed the border into Th ailand she was
violating our safety.”