Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

852 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us.
. . . Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long
pow-wows in the White House, it was felt we should be on
guard, at least until something indicates the trend.
In early November 1941, Army Chief of Staff General
Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark advised
FDR that United States policy in the Far East should be based
fi rst on the defeat of Germany. War between the United States
and Japan should be avoided while the U.S. built up her defensive
forces in the Far East. Th ey told FDR that it was all right to
continue to send U.S. armed forces and other aid to China for
intervention against Japan. However; Marshall and Stark wanted
time before the eruption of any confl ict and they recommended
that “no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.” [italics added]
U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew warned FDR,
November 3, 1941, that “war between Japan and the United
States may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness.”
At the Cabinet’s weekly Friday meeting at the White House,
November 7, 1941, FDR took
the fi rst general poll of his Cabinet . . . on the question of the
Far East—whether the people would back us up in case we
struck at Japan down there. . . . It was unanimous in feeling the
country would support us.
Secretary of War Stimson believed the vote would have been
much stronger if the Cabinet members had known “what the
Army was doing to reenforce the Philippines and how ready the
Army was to pitch in” in case of an attack on the British or Dutch
in southeastern Asia.
To facilitate the U.S.-Japanese diplomatic negotiations
in Washington, Japan sent a second ambassador, Kurusu, to
Washington in November. When Hull presented him to the president,
Hull reminded Kurusu of Japan’s alliance with Germany: