Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Epilogue 851
In July, Japan was advised that the United States considered
it self-defense to protect the British against aggression in the
Atlantic—also in Singapore. Th e Japanese Ambassador spoke
of Japan’s deteriorating economic situation, her objections to
U.S. support of China, improving the Burma Road and supplying
planes and pilots to Chungking, also of her, Japan’s, plans to
occupy French Indochina and her need to station troops in Inner
Mongolia to suppress Chinese Communist elements and hinted
that were the United States to accept these conditions, Japan
would not be particularly concerned about any action the United
States might take in the Atlantic. In response, the U.S. Director
of the Navy’s War Plans equated protecting the British from the
Nazis with defending the U.S.:
[I]t is decidedly against the military interests of the United
States to permit the United Kingdom to be overcome by
Germany. . . . Furthermore . . . [t]he occupation of Indo-China
by Japan is particularly important for the defense of the United
States since it might threaten the British position in Singapore
and the Dutch position in the Netherlands East Indies.
Th e Joint Board of the Army and Navy was not eager for the
United States to become involved in a war with Japan. A major
war eff ort in the Pacifi c “would require an enormous amount of
shipping . . . from the Atlantic and other essential areas,” which
“would materially aff ect United States aid to England.” CNO
Stark warned his Admirals: “Since the US and Britain are held
responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is
also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers.”
Kimmel in Pearl Harbor had to rely on Washington for “intelligence.”
CNO Stark assured Kimmel that the Offi ce of Naval
Intelligence recognized its responsibility on that score. In mid-
October, Stark wrote Kimmel: