Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

850 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Th ese discussions concerned Japan’s war in China, her role on the
Asian mainland, the Tri-Partite Pact binding Japan to the Axis
and the U.S. trade embargo of Japan. Th ese negotiations continued
off and on through November. During all this time, we
were reading Japan’s secret diplomatic messages to her emissaries
throughout the world.
In September, FDR issued a “shoot on sight order” to U.S.
Navy ships in the Atlantic.
[W]hen you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait
until he has struck before you crush him. Th ese Nazi submarines
and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic. . . . [O]ur
patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant ships—
not only American ships but ships of any fl ag—engaged in commerce
in our defensive waters. . . . From now on, if German or
Italian vessels of war enter the waters the protection of which is
necessary for American defense they do so at their own peril.
Th e Japanese moved forces into Indo-China. Th e U.S. offi cials
remonstrated. By mid-1941 it became apparent that as a result
of Japan’s war in China and her military ventures in S.E. Asia
her most serious shortage was of oil. Roosevelt told the Japanese
ambassador:
[I]f Japan attempted to seize oil supplies by force in the
Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch would, without the shadow
of a doubt resist; the British would immediately come to their
assistance; war would then result between Japan, the British
and the Dutch; and, in view of our own policy of assisting
Great Britain, an exceedingly serious situation would immediately
result.
FDR said that Japan would do much better if she tried to obtain
the supplies she needed peacefully rather than by occupying
Indochina. But the United States continued to embargo oil to
Japan. And she persuaded the British and Dutch to do the same.