Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Epilogue 847
naval advisers, who pointed out that the harbor’s “narrow entrance,
inadequate anchorages and airfi elds, and its limited fuel supplies”
would make the Fleet vulnerable to attack. It is quite possible
that FDR’s decision was in response to British Prime Minister
Churchill’s suggestion, made earlier that very same day, May 15,
1940, that the U.S. “keep that Japanese dog quiet in the Pacifi c.”
By midsummer 1940, U.S. cryptographers had succeeded
in deciphering the very complex Japanese government’s diplomatic
code and duplicating the extremely intricate typewriter,
codenamed “Purple,” on which it was encoded—a tremendous
accomplishment. From then on, the U.S. had access to most of
the secret diplomatic messages the Japanese government sent on
this machine to its emissaries throughout the world.
As FDR campaigned in 1940 for a third term as president,
he continued to assure the public of the United States’s neutrality;
he was doing all that he could to keep war away from these
shores. He assured the voters that “Your boys are not going to be
sent into any foreign wars.”
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Yet Roosevelt continued to ask Congress to help the British
who were at war. At FDR’s urging, in early 1941 Congress passed
Lend-Lease, which provided many millions of dollars worth of
war supplies—ships, planes, munitions, food, etc.—to the nations
who were fi ghting Germany. Th e U.S. war plans, as Roosevelt
outlined them at this time, called on the United States to remain
on the defensive in the Pacifi c, with the fl eet based in Hawaii, but
supportive of Britain in the Atlantic. At the time, the possibility
of Japan’s attacking in the southwest Pacifi c was discussed in
Washington. Although it was felt that public opinion would support
U.S. “action in the Far East if the Japanese go into Singapore
or the Netherlands East Indies,” Germany was considered the
greatest threat.