Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

840 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
today as yesterday. Here, too, much cannot be known regarding
all the petty episodes that fi nally add up to war. No war comes
in a moment. War is the sum of many minor decisions and
some that are major. In this diplomatic aspect the Pearl Harbor
investigation has sadly failed to live up to the lofty prospectus
with which it was launched. . . .
In our opinion, the evidence before this Committee indicates
that the tragedy at Pearl Harbor was primarily a failure of men
and not of laws or powers to do the necessary things, and carry
out the vested responsibilities. No legislation could have cured
such defects of offi cial judgments, management, cooperation,
and action as were displayed by authorities and agents of the
United States in connection with the events that culminated in
the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
Th is demonstrates the weakness of depending on the political
head of the Government to bring about the necessary coordination
of the activities of the military branches, particularly
in the area of intelligence, and unifi cation of command. Th e
major lesson to be learned is that this coordination should be
accomplished in advance of a crisis. . . .
Th e failure to perform the responsibilities indispensably essential
to the defense of Pearl Harbor rests upon the following
civil and military authorities:
Franklin D. Roosevelt — President of the United States and
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
Henry L. Stimson — Secretary of War
Frank Knox — Secretary of the Navy
George C. Marshall —General, Chief of Staff of the Army
Harold R. Stark — Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations
Leonard T. Gerow — Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff
of War Plans Division
Th e failure to perform the responsibilities in Hawaii rests upon
the military commanders: