Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Reports 839
the defense of the fl eet and outpost. Washington authorities
failed in (1); and the commanding offi cers at Hawaii failed in
(2). 24
Th e Minority Report acknowledged that, “Th e question of
the wisdom of the foreign policy pursued by the Government of
the United States [was] excluded by the terms of the committee’s
instructions.” 25 However, the two Senators did approach the matter
as it related to military tactics. Th ey asked why Japan’s request
for a modus vivendi had been rejected.
Wholly apart from the merits or demerits of . . . the Japanese
proposal of November 20, here was an opportunity at least to
prolong “the breathing spell” for which General Marshall and
Admiral Stark were pleading in their eff orts to strengthen the
armed forces of the United States for war.
Although Roosevelt had at fi rst approved of a three-month
modus vivendi, as opposed to the six-month version previously
proposed, Hull had rejected it after talking with FDR. In doing
this, he [Hull]
gave no advance notice to General Marshall and Admiral Stark,
who were then preparing their second careful memorandum to
the President begging for a postponement of war with Japan
until the Army and Navy could make better preparation for
waging it. 26
As they closed their Minority Report, Brewster and Ferguson
said,
How to avoid war and how to turn war—if it fi nally comes—to
serve the cause of human progress is the challenge to diplomacy
24 Ibid., p. 505.
25 Ibid., p. 497.
26 Ibid., pp. 561, 563.