Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

838 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
obvious duty dictated by common sense—that is—draw up a
brief plan for telling the outpost commanders just what to do
in a certain contingency [a Japanese attack on American possessions
somewhere] on receipt of orders from Washington. . . .
Th ey had plans for action or actions by the armed forces of the
United States if Congress declared war or if by some process
the United States got into or entered the war. War plans (for
example, Rainbow No. 5 which was WPL 46) were to go into
operation only after war had begun and were not intended for
preparation in meeting a surprise attack.
Th ey prepared no plan giving the outpost commanders instructions
about the measures they were to take in preparing for
and meeting a Japanese attack on American possessions when
and if it came. Th is plan could have been drawn up in a few
hours at most and set down in two or three typewritten pages
at most. 23
As to Kimmel and Short, Brewster and Ferguson said,
Whatever errors of judgment the commanders at Hawaii committed
and whatever mismanagement they displayed in preparing
for a Japanese attack, attention to chain of responsibility
in the civil and military administration requires taking note
of the fact that they were designated for their posts by high
authorities in Washington. . . .
Th e defense of Hawaii rested upon two sets of interdependent
responsibilities: (1) Th e responsibility in Washington in respect
of its intimate knowledge of diplomatic negotiations, widespread
intelligence information, direction of aff airs and constitutional
duty to plan the defense of the United States; (2) the
responsibility cast upon the commanders in the fi eld in charge
of a major naval base and the fl eet essential to the defense of the
territory of the United States to do those things appropriate to
23 Ibid., p. 558.