Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

836 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
movements in that region. Th ey also required reports on “lack
of movement.” For example, September 24, 1941, it ordered an
agent to subdivide the waters of Pearl Harbor into fi ve subareas,
as well as to report on ship movements there. Prior to
and after this date Japanese agents were, up to the Japanese
attack, reporting on ship movements, installations, and other
matters of military and naval signifi cance to the Japanese
government. 19
Witnesses before the Committee, it may be noted, in extenuation
of their lack of emphasis on the probability of an attack
on Pearl Harbor, called attention to the fact that Japanese
agents were also reporting on the military and naval installations
of the United States at Panama, the Philippines, the west
coast, and other points. But to men, competent, careful, and
watchful, men alert on their all-around and indivisible responsibility,
this fact provided no excuse whatever for minimizing
the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor any more than
at any other American outpost. Nor does it excuse the failure
of Washington authorities to note that far greater detail
was being asked for by the Japanese about Hawaii at a time
when Japanese movements in the Southeastern Pacifi c had to
contend with the strategic position of Hawaii where the real
American striking force, the fl eet, rested. 20
Basically, Brewster and Ferguson held Roosevelt to blame:
19 Ibid.
Th e President of the United States was responsible for the failure
to enforce continuous, effi cient, and appropriate cooperation
among the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the
[Army] Chief of Staff , and the Chief of Naval Operations, in
evaluating information and dispatching clear and positive orders
to the Hawaiian commanders. . . . In the fi nal instance of crucial
signifi cance for alerting American outpost commanders, on
20 Ibid., pp. 523–24.