Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Reports 835
opportunity to examine the manner of keeping records of this
character has never been satisfactorily explained. 16
Th e major criticism of Brewster and Ferguson was of the top
authorities in Washington—Roosevelt, the secretaries of state,
war, and navy, the Army chief of staff , and chief of naval operations.
17 Hours, even days, before the attack these men all had
access to detailed information about Japan’s intentions, information
that was not available to the fi eld commanders. Th ey knew
that a Japanese strike was imminent. Yet they did not act. Th ey
just waited. Th ey waited—for Japan to strike the fi rst blow. Yet all
this time they failed to advise the military men in the fi eld of the
seriousness of the threat. And the warnings Washington did send
to the fi eld were
couched in such confl icting and imprecise language that they
failed to convey to the commanders defi nite information on the
state of diplomatic relations with Japan and on Japanese war
designs and positive orders respecting the particular actions to
be taken—orders that were beyond all reasonable doubts as to
the need for an all-out alert. In this regard,
according to Brewster and Ferguson, “the said high authorities
failed to discharge their full duty.” 18
Th e Minority Report reviewed some of the crucial information
that had been available in Washington, but which had not
been transmitted to Hawaii:
Intercepts of Japanese messages made by the Army and Navy
intelligence services showed high authorities in Washington
that the Japanese Government had ordered its agents in Hawaii
to report on American military and naval installations and ship
16 Ibid., p. 500.
17 Ibid., pp. 503–06.
18 Ibid., pp. 504–05.