Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

832 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Keefe reviewed some of the more vital information that had
been available in Washington but which had not been relayed to
Pearl Harbor—the evidence of Japanese intentions, the “bomb
plot” or “ships in harbor” messages, FDR’s several statements
concerning the imminence of war, the “Pilot Message,” the thirteen
parts of Japan’s reply, etc. All in all, Keefe’s objections to the
Majority Report were so substantial that Senators Brewster and
Ferguson were surprised and disappointed that he did not join
them in drafting their Minority Report.
JCC Minority Report
Th e two committee members who refused to sign the Majority
Report, Brewster and Ferguson, submitted their own Minority
Report. 10 In it they pointed out that “the fi rst purpose of the
investigation,” according to Barkley, was “that of ‘fi xing responsibility’
for the Pearl Harbor disaster ‘upon an individual, or a
group of individuals, or upon a system under which they operated
or cooperated or failed to do either’.” 11 Th ey proceeded to lay the
blame directly at the door of the Roosevelt administration.
Inasmuch as all decisions and activities connected with this
occurrence at Pearl Harbor were decisions and activities of
executive authorities of the Government of the United States,
the issue of responsibility for the degree of success attained by
the Japanese attack involves at least one general question and
four subsidiary and specifi c questions:
Th e general question is: Did all the civil, military and naval
authorities of the United States charged with responsibility
for the conduct of diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese
Government and for preparedness and defense at Pearl Harbor
competently, effi ciently, and with proper regard for the trust
10 Ibid., pp. 495–573.
11 Ibid., p. 495.