Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

830 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
everyone was surprised that Japan struck the Fleet at Pearl
Harbor at the time that she did. Yet offi cers, both in Washington
and Hawaii, were fully conscious of the danger from an attack;
they realized this form of attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan was
at least a possibility; and they were adequately informed of the
imminence of war. 6
Th e Report listed several failures on the part of the Hawaiian
commanders and concluded: “Th e errors made by the Hawaiian
commands were errors of judgment and not of derelictions of
duty.”
Th e principal recommendations were to institute “unity of
command . . . at all military and naval outposts” and to integrate
“Army and Navy intelligence agencies in order to avoid the
pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so
abundantly apparent.” 7
Keefe’s “Additional Views”
In his “Additional Views,” Keefe said that he agreed with
most of the Majority Report’s conclusions and recommendations.
For instance, he recognized, as the majority did, that both
Washington and Hawaii were surprised. Apparently neither
believed that Pearl Harbor would be Japan’s initial target; both
expected Japan to strike fi rst in the Asiatic area. “If this belief was
unjustifi ed,” as Keefe believed it was,
then the mistake lies on the Washington doorstep just as
much as it does upon that of Hawaii. Th roughout the long
and arduous sessions of the committee in the preparation of
the committee report [I had] continuously insisted that whatever
“yardstick” was agreed upon as a basis for determining
6 Ibid., p. 251.
7 Ibid., pp. 252–53.