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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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62 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

a world-wide agreement, covering all areas, l<strong>and</strong>, sea, <strong>and</strong> air,<br />

<strong>of</strong> the entire world in which it was conceived that the British<br />

Commonwealth <strong>and</strong> the United States might be jointly<br />

engaged in action against any enemy. On the conclusion <strong>of</strong> that<br />

agreement with the British, the WPL-46 [U.S. Navy war plan]<br />

was prepared after a great many talks with the Army <strong>and</strong> was<br />

approved by the Joint Board, the Secretaries <strong>of</strong> War <strong>and</strong> Navy,<br />

<strong>and</strong> by the President. Th e Navy issued their form <strong>of</strong> that war<br />

plan in May <strong>of</strong> 1941, <strong>and</strong> it is my recollection the Army form<br />

<strong>of</strong> it was issued about August. 25<br />

Turner wrote further,<br />

Th e plan contemplated a major eff ort on the part <strong>of</strong> both the<br />

principal associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was<br />

felt in the Navy Department, that there might be a possibility<br />

<strong>of</strong> war with Japan without the involvement <strong>of</strong> Germany, but<br />

at some length <strong>and</strong> over a considerable period, this matter was<br />

discussed <strong>and</strong> it was determined that in such a case the United<br />

States would, if possible, initiate eff orts to bring Germany into<br />

the war against us in order that we would be enabled to give<br />

strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe. 26<br />

Th us Turner reaffi rmed that the primary goal <strong>of</strong> the U.S.-British<br />

agreement was to help Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> to target Germany.<br />

In complete disregard <strong>of</strong> the Neutrality Act <strong>of</strong>fi cially in force,<br />

these conversations put the United States defi nitely in Britain’s<br />

camp in her war against Germany.<br />

25 Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 26, p. 264; Turner testimony at<br />

Hart Inquiry; part 15, p. 1485. Pencilled notation on United States-British<br />

Staff Conversations Report cover page: Secretary <strong>of</strong> the Navy Knox on May<br />

28, 1941, <strong>and</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> War Stimson on June 2, 1941.<br />

26Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 26, pp. 264–65; Turner testimony<br />

before Hart Inquiry.

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