Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

822 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
whereabouts on the evening of December 6. 302 Barkley did not
feel he should sit on Stark’s letter. Nor did he think he should
simply put it in the record where it would in eff ect be lost and
buried. Th e matter could not be delayed as Stark was leaving for
London that afternoon. 303
Barkley hurriedly reopened the hearings just to hear from
Stark and his informant. Some of the ten committee members
were out of town and unable to attend on such short notice. Only
four Democrats appeared, and one Republican—Keefe—who,
having had only a few minutes notice by phone, arrived late.
Stark had written Barkley that Navy Captain Harold D. Krick,
a personal friend and Stark’s former fl ag captain, had reminded
Stark that the two men and their wives had spent that evening
together. Th ey had attended a performance of Th e Student Prince
at the National Th eater in Washington. When they returned
from the theater to Stark’s quarters, one of Stark’s servants told
him that the White House had called. Stark went immediately
upstairs to phone FDR from his study, where a direct line to the
White House was located. According to Krick, when Stark came
back downstairs, he told him “in substance that the situation with
Japan was very serious.” 304
When the two couples again met socially on Saturday, May
25, 1946, Krick happened to relate these events to Stark. Stark
did not remember the occasion, but he realized that this meant
that his testimony that he had not talked to FDR that evening
was incorrect. Th e more Stark thought about this, “the more disturbed”
he became. He thought “the committee should have this,
the record should have it straight.” He got up around 2 or 3 in
302Ibid., pp. 5543–44.
303Ibid., pp. 5544, 5555.
304Ibid., p. 5544, quoting Stark’s letter to Barkley.