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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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820 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

this message was relayed to me from Colonel Bratton that he<br />

wanted to come out to the house with an important matter. 291<br />

When Stark appeared before this reconvened session <strong>of</strong> the<br />

JCC, his mind still drew a blank as to where he had been or<br />

what he had been doing Saturday evening. He remembered “very<br />

clearly having seen a revival <strong>of</strong> Th e Student Prince, but I had not<br />

connected it with that Saturday night.” Nor did he now. “My recollection<br />

was it was in Philadelphia” that he had seen the revival<br />

<strong>and</strong> he had “contacted my daughter <strong>and</strong> her husb<strong>and</strong> who were<br />

there, <strong>and</strong> they said no. Th e next I heard <strong>of</strong> it was in connection<br />

with Comm<strong>and</strong>er Schulz’s testimony.” But even that did “not ring<br />

any bell” with him. He could “only assume, in view <strong>of</strong> the testimony<br />

<strong>of</strong> Comm<strong>and</strong>er Schulz <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> others who tried to contact<br />

me . . . that I probably was there.” 292<br />

And Stark did not remember hearing from the president that<br />

evening. “To the best <strong>of</strong> my knowledge <strong>and</strong> belief, the president<br />

did not call me that night.” Nor did he think he had learned<br />

then that “there was a dispatch down there [at the White House]<br />

which was clear-cut <strong>and</strong> which meant war.” 293 In any event, he<br />

was “absolutely certain” that he “did not go to the White House<br />

that night, December 6” <strong>and</strong> that he “did not see the fi rst 13-parts<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Jap 14-part message that night.” 294<br />

Stark persisted in saying that his visit to the <strong>of</strong>fi ce Sunday<br />

morning had been “routine.” 295 He did not recall meeting there<br />

that morning with various <strong>of</strong>fi cers, as Kramer <strong>and</strong> Wilkinson had<br />

testifi ed that he had. 296<br />

291 Ibid., pp. 5191, 5194.<br />

292 Ibid., p. 5154.<br />

293 Ibid., pp. 5157, 5159.<br />

294 Ibid., p. 5232.<br />

295 Ibid., p. 5155.<br />

296 Ibid., p. 5163.

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