Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

818 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
MacArthur, in the Philippines, was just beginning to get something.
His position was pitiable, and it was still in a state of
complete fl ux, with the ships on the ocean en route out there
and the planes half delivered and half still to go.
Th e Panama Canal was quite inadequate at that period, seriously
inadequate in planes, and, of course, of vast importance
to anything in the Pacifi c.
Th e only place we had any assurance about was Hawaii, and
for that reason we had less concern about Hawaii. . . . [W]e
had worked on it very industriously . . . and we felt reasonably
secure at that one point. 288
When Marshall was in Washington testifying, Ferguson
in the men’s room in the Capitol overheard him talking with
Barkley. Ferguson did not see the two men, but he recognized
their voices and heard Marshall tell Barkley that if Marshall were
to say where he was on the night of December 6–7, it would get
the “Chief ” (FDR) in trouble. 289
Th ese remarks may also have sparked the following line of
questioning by Keefe. He reminded Marshall that on Saturday
evening, after the president had read the fi rst 13 parts, he had
turned to Hopkins saying, in substance, “Th is means war.” Th e
President had then tried to get in touch with Stark.
288Ibid., part 11, pp. 5186–87.
289Th is story, related to me by Ferguson, lends credence to Stahlman’s assertion
that Marshall and Stark along with Knox, Stimson, and Hopkins, had
“spent most of the night before [the attack] at the White House with FDR.”
See James G. Stahlman’s November 26, 1973 letter to Admiral Kemp Tolley
(copy in author’s fi les). Several attempts were made in the course of the JCC
hearings to determine if there had been such a White House meeting. See for
instance the questioning of Marshall. Ibid., part 3, pp. 1110 and part 11, p.
5193. And the interlocutory with Stark at part 11, p. 5549.