Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 815
after 8:00 on the morning of Sunday, the 7th.” He thought it was
about 9:15 when he and McCollum “went to the offi ce of the
Chief of Naval Operations [Stark], where,” he recalled, “Admiral
Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and Admiral Turner were present.” 280
In any event, he was quite clear that Stark had read the 14-part
message in its entirety by 9:15 or 9:30. Wilkinson was struck by
the “fi ghting words” in the 14th part. He was “more impressed
by that language than by the breaking off of negotiations” and he
had pointed out to Stark “the seriousness of that language.” 281
Wilkinson believed the Japanese “were going to press on in
the direction of the advance which they were then following in
the South Sea and that something might be expected in that or
other directions.” He was particularly concerned that, in view of
“this strong language,” the fl eet “should be advised of the latest
development.” According to Wilkinson, Stark had the authority
to act. Wilkinson thought Stark should act. But Stark did not
act. 282
It would certainly appear that Stark was in his offi ce and had
seen the 14-part reply and even the “One p.m. Message” several
hours before the Japanese ambassadors’ delivery deadline. Yet,
except for the assembly of an unusual number of naval offi cers,
the apparent lack of any sense of urgency in Stark’s offi ce contrasted
sharply with the frantic activity in Marshall’s offi ce at the
last minute, after he fi nally arrived there at 11:25. 283
Stark said that when Marshall phoned him at about 11:40
and asked “what I thought about sending the information concerning
the time of presentation on to the various commanders in
the Pacifi c,” Stark’s fi rst response was that “we had sent them so
much already that I hesitated to send more.” A minute or so later,
280Ibid., part 36, p. 236.
281Ibid., part 4, pp. 1766–67.
282Ibid., p. 1800.
283Ibid., part 5, pp. 2132–33.