Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 813
that you and he could have been together?” Stark thought they
“had no such conspiracy at that time.” He did
not shut it out as an utter impossibility that we could have been
in each other’s company, but I think we were not. . . . We were
together either talking by telephone or interoffi ce visits a great
deal during offi ce hours. We were not together a great deal in
the evening. 271
JCC general counsel Mitchell told Stark that, according to
the record, Knox and Wilkinson had both received Japan’s fi rst 13
parts during the evening. As a result, Knox had made an appointment
for the next morning with Stimson and Hull. Yet Stark
said he had “no recollection of having seen or heard of the pilot
message” announcing that the Japanese reply would soon be en
route; his fi rst information on that score, he said, was “Sunday
forenoon.” 272 Stark also insisted he had not heard anything at all
that evening about the 14-part message.
He was asked by JCC members when he had gone to his
offi ce on Sunday morning. He didn’t answer directly.
I can only guess on that. . . . I usually got down to the offi ce
Sunday mornings around 10:30 and I just assumed that I had
gotten there somewhere around 10:30 or 11:00. I was lazy on
Sunday mornings unless there was some special reason for getting
up early. I usually took a walk around the grounds and
greenhouse at the Chief of Naval Operations’ quarters and
didn’t hurry about getting down and my usual time, as I recall,
was about 10:30 or 11:00. What time it was on this particular
Sunday morning I couldn’t go beyond that. 273
271Ibid., pp. 2291–92.
272Ibid., p. 2183.
273 Ibid.