Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 809 for him with the “One p.m. Message” in his hand. “General,” he said, “I have a very important message here which I think you should see at once.” 258 But Marshall did not look up; he had the 14-part reply “and was reading it.” Bratton and Miles “tried to interrupt him with this 1:00 p.m. delivery business but he would not be interrupted, and he went right ahead with his reading until he got to the end of the 14 parts.” 259 Marshall hurriedly drafted his last-minute warning to the fi eld commanders. 260 Bratton had taken this message to Colonel French, Signal Corps offi cer in charge of the message center, and had “explained to him that it was General Marshall’s desire that the message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe means, giving the Philippines fi rst priority.” Bratton testifi ed that he reported back to Marshall, who asked him to return to the message center and fi nd out how long it would take for the messages to reach the addressees. French said “the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes.” 261 Bratton checked his watch; it was then 11:50 a.m. 262 Th e message should be in the hands of the Army Signal Offi cer in Hawaii, still in code, by 12:30 EDT—7:00 a.m. in Hawaii. One important question still remained unanswered when Bratton fi nished testifying: If he hadn’t delivered the 14-part reply to Marshall, how was it on his desk when he arrived at 11:25 a.m.? Gearhart asked Bratton where Marshall could have obtained it when “the only places that the 14 parts had been delivered before that meeting at 11:25 was at the White House and 258Ibid., p. 4573. 259Ibid., p. 4547. 260Ibid., part 3, p. 1112. 261Ibid., part 9, p. 4554. 262Ibid., p. 4555.
810 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the State Department and to Admiral Stark.” 263 Had Marshall obtained a copy message from Stark or the White House, where Kramer had made deliveries that morning? 264 Did Bratton’s assistant, Dusenbury, deliver it to one of Marshall’s secretaries, possibly Colonel Deane, earlier that morning, as Bratton said he might have? 265 Or could he have gotten a copy of the fi rst 13 parts at the White House during the night, possibly from Hull for whom Bratton had delivered them to the State Department, or from Knox to whom Kramer had delivered in his Wardman Park apartment? FDR had not kept copies of the messages delivered to him Saturday evening. Marshall’s Sunday Morning Whereabouts Another unanswered question concerns Marshall’s whereabouts on the morning of December 7. He was supposedly on duty 24 hours a day. If unavailable for some reason, an aide or duty offi cer should have been able to reach him at any moment. Yet Bratton told the JCC that when he called his quarters at about 9:00 Sunday morning in the attempt to deliver the urgent “One p.m. Message,” he was told Marshall was out “horseback riding.” 266 Where was Marshall during the hour and a half between 10 or 10:30 a.m., when he returned Bratton’s 9:00 call, and 11:25 when he arrived in his offi ce? Marshall may have gone horseback riding earlier, but where was he when he called Bratton? Bratton assumed he was still at his quarters at Fort Myer. But was he? Perhaps he was calling from somewhere else and that was why he had told Bratton not to drive out, but to wait in his offi ce. Did he 263 Ibid., p. 4547. 264 Ibid., pp. 4544–45, 4547. 265 Ibid., pp. 4547–48, 4573. 266 Ibid., p. 4524.
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Joint Congressional Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack: Part 3 809<br />
for him with the “One p.m. Message” in his h<strong>and</strong>. “General,” he<br />
said, “I have a very important message here which I think you<br />
should see at once.” 258 But Marshall did not look up; he had the<br />
14-part reply “<strong>and</strong> was reading it.” Bratton <strong>and</strong> Miles “tried to<br />
interrupt him with this 1:00 p.m. delivery business but he would<br />
not be interrupted, <strong>and</strong> he went right ahead with his reading until<br />
he got to the end <strong>of</strong> the 14 parts.” 259 Marshall hurriedly drafted<br />
his last-minute warning to the fi eld comm<strong>and</strong>ers. 260<br />
Bratton had taken this message to Colonel French, Signal<br />
Corps <strong>of</strong>fi cer in charge <strong>of</strong> the message center, <strong>and</strong> had “explained<br />
to him that it was General Marshall’s desire that the message be<br />
transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe means,<br />
giving the Philippines fi rst priority.” Bratton testifi ed that he<br />
reported back to Marshall, who asked him to return to the message<br />
center <strong>and</strong> fi nd out how long it would take for the messages to<br />
reach the addressees. French said “the message would be encoded<br />
in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, <strong>and</strong> in<br />
the h<strong>and</strong>s <strong>of</strong> the addressees in about thirty minutes.” 261 Bratton<br />
checked his watch; it was then 11:50 a.m. 262 Th e message should<br />
be in the h<strong>and</strong>s <strong>of</strong> the Army Signal Offi cer in Hawaii, still in<br />
code, by 12:30 EDT—7:00 a.m. in Hawaii.<br />
One important question still remained unanswered when<br />
Bratton fi nished testifying: If he hadn’t delivered the 14-part<br />
reply to Marshall, how was it on his desk when he arrived at<br />
11:25 a.m.? Gearhart asked Bratton where Marshall could have<br />
obtained it when “the only places that the 14 parts had been delivered<br />
before that meeting at 11:25 was at the White House <strong>and</strong><br />
258Ibid., p. 4573.<br />
259Ibid., p. 4547.<br />
260Ibid., part 3, p. 1112.<br />
261Ibid., part 9, p. 4554.<br />
262Ibid., p. 4555.